# Caro-Kann Defence Panov Attack

ANATOLY KARPOV MIKHAIL PODGAETS

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## Caro-Kann Defence: Panov Attack

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### Foreword

The opening system, characterised by the moves 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4!?



is so called in honour of the Soviet master and theoretician Vasily Panov, who published his analysis in 1930. For the sake of accuracy we mention that as far back as 1925 the idea of exchanging on d5 followed by the dash of the c-pawn was tried by A.Alekhine (in a game against Tartakower) but without success. In 1931 was played the famous game Nimzowitsch - Alekhine, in which 4th world champion was the successful in his fight against the Panov Attack, but, starting the following year, he included it in his own opening repertoire with stunning successes. Eight wins in ten games -

such a score is the envy of every opening variation!

In 1933 the variation was tested by M.Botvinnik in a match against S Flohr - with variable success (one out of two), but in the following years the Panov Attack served Mikhail Moiseevich faithfully. Spectacular and convincing victories over H.Kmoch (Leningrad 1934). R.Spielmann (Moscow 1935). A Budo (Leningrad 1938). A.Konstantinopolsky (Sverdlovsk 1943), H.Golombek (Moscow 1956) - are proof of this.

In our day the Panov Attack has rather receded into the background, but in no way has it become a second class opening system. It is enough to say that it is employed by elite grandmasters – M.Adams, J.Polgar, A.Morozevich and V.Ivanchuk.

The fortune of the Panov Attack in matches is likewise remarkable. We recall the world championship matches Chiburdanidze – loseliani (Telavi 1988) and Karpov – Kamsky (Elista 1996), in both contest sthere was a dispute over the Panov Attack, and only with great difficulty did Black contain the opponent's attack. The material presented in this book is laid out in the following way.

In the first half the authors deal with those defences in which Black refrains from the move  $2^{-2}$  c. Thus, Chapter One is devoted to the variation 1 c4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed c4 c4 216 5  $2 \cdot 23$  20c 6  $2 \cdot 13$ ; Chapter Two – the variation 1 c4 c6 2  $2 \cdot 44$  d5 3 ed cd 4 c4  $2 \cdot 16$  5  $2 \cdot 23$   $2 \cdot 26$   $2 \cdot 62$   $2 \cdot 23$ Chapter Three is given an analysis of the continuation 1 c4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4  $2 \cdot 16$  5  $2 \cdot 23$   $2 \cdot 6$ 

In the second half we deal with the main line: 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 e4 cd 4 cd  $\Delta$ [6 5  $\Delta$ :e3 e6 The positions arising after the exchange on d5 (or c4), with the isolation of the d4 pawn, are analogous to several schemes in the Queen's Gambit Accepted, Nimzo-Indian Defence, or completely transpose into them. Consequently readers who study the given formations have at their disposal a universal scheme, suitable for immediate application in a number of openings which at first in sight look completely different.

The material in the second half is divided into three: after 6 约的 Black can choose between 6... 约c6 (Chapter Four), 6... b4 (Chapter Five) and 6... e7 (Chapter Six).

In the Appendix we analyse the individual Steiner System: 1 e4 c6 2 c4!?



In certain cases this system inevitably transposes into the Panov Attack, but in others its branches resemble Indian or Slav opening schemes. It is important to mention that by examining the Panov Attack together with the Steiner Attack, the reader obtains exhaustive information both on the attacking potential of the c2-c4 idea in the Caro Kann Defence and also on Black's possibilities of neutralising the attack.

The Illustrative Games section includes fresh practical material to supplement the theory of the Panov Attack.

### Chapter One 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 ්ථf6 5 ්ථc3 ්ථc6 6 ්ථf3

And so, we return to the plan where Black rejects the immediate advance e7-e6. Obviously, he intends to resolve the problem of the centre in another way.

There are two main paths:  $5...\bigcirc c6$ and  $5...\_g6$ , but first we deal with  $5...\_@e6!$ ? (after 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4  $\oslash f6$  5  $\oslash c3$ )



The idea looks artificial, but with improvements, above all by the English grandmaster Anthony Miles, the thrust of the bishop gained a reputation of being an interesting and in any case useful move for the cominuation of the struggle.

6 ②ge2 Considered the most dangerous – the knight heads for f4, from where it will 'exert itself' over the d5 and e6 squares. No advantage comes out of 6 cd &xd5 7 &xd5  $\bigotimes$ xd5 & &c2  $\bigotimes$ c69 &c1,  $\bigotimes$ cd 10  $\bigotimes$ c2 in view of 10...e5! 11 b3  $\bigotimes$ a6 12 &xc6+  $\bigotimes$ cf 13 0-0  $\Xi$ d8 (Kosten – Miles, Edinburgh 1985), while 6 c5 will be examined later under a different order of moves – 5... $\bigotimes$ c6 6  $\bigotimes$ 13 &c6 7 c5.

6...dc 7 €1f4 &g4 A necessary intermediate move. Weaker is r...dc 8 & 3x.ec4 e6 because of 9 d51 e5 10 0-0! He cannot accept the piece sacrifice – 10...ef? 11 IE1+ &e7 12 d6, while 10...&d6 led to an undoubted advantage for White in the game Hebden – Martin (Edinburgh 1985): 11 €h5 €hk5 12 ₩h5 0-0 13 €c4 ₩e7 14 &d2 €d7 15 &c3 f5 16 €xd6 ₩e7 l4 &d2 €d7 15 &c3 f5

In reply to 7...&g4 White usually goes into the variation 8 f3 &d7 9 &xc4 e6 10 d6 e5 (but not 10...ed?) in view of 11 @e2+ &e7 12  $\bigcirc$ fxd5 &xd5 13  $\bigcirc$ xd5 &e6 14 &f41 &xd5 15 0-0-0 16 &xd5 with an enormous advantage, Yurtaev – Fette, Lungby 1990) 11  $\bigcirc$ d3, but after 11...&d6 things do not turn out badly for Black, for example: 12 &g5 &f5 13 ④f2 ④bd7 14 盒d3 盒xd3 15 ℃xd3 (Dzhandzhava – Komarov, Novosibirsk 1989), and here, in the opinion of L.Dzhandzhava, 15...雙b6! secures full equality.

A new (and very successful) fight for the advantage was undertaken by the English grandmaster A.Kosten: 8 Wa4+!? (instead of 8 f3) 8...\$d7 9 Wxc4 e6 10 & 2c2 \$\chicklefter colored a colored 9 Wxc4 e6 10 & 2c2 \$\chicklefter colored a colored 12 Zd1 \$\overline{2}d6 13 d5\$!



To exploit the opponent's backward development, White has every right to deliver a blow in the centre. Taking the pawn is too dangerous; the knight must retreat. If 13...De4? 14 "Bb3 ed, then 15 a3  $\partial_{c}6$  16  $\partial_{1}xd5$  with advantage. He could win a pawn: 13...De7 14 "Bb3  $\Delta x$ f4 15  $\Delta x$ f4  $\partial_{1}xd5$ , but after 16  $\partial_{2}xd5$   $\partial_{3}xd5$  $17 \Delta dc6 \Delta c6$  18 "g3 the weakness of the dark squares is deeply felt.

In the game Kosten – Komarov (France 1994) Black preferred 13...2a514 Wd3 e5, not noticing 15  $\bigcirc$ e6! A beautiful tactical blow secures White slight, but stoic pressure in the endgame (be has the two bishops to his credit): 15...fe 16 de  $\pm xe6$  17  $\frac{2}{3}xd6 \times xd6$  18  $\pm xd6$ de c1 9  $\pm$ d1  $\pm$ hd8 20  $\pm$ 2 etc. We will return to the idea 金c8-e6, when going into the position after 5...②c6 6 创f3.

5...€k6 The idea of the move in comparison with 5...€6 is clear: Black immediately attacks the d4 pawn, leaving the light-squared bishop with more room for action on the c8-h3 diagonal.

White has two possibilities of fighting for the initiative. The first is linked to Botvinnik's idea 6 &g5 (the whole of Chapter Two is devoted to this), but here we deal with 6 &13. Because of the deployment of the knights against one another this system is still called the Four Knights.



Of course, 6...\$g4 looks the most natural, but we will also deal with other bishop moves.

6....\$(5?) An almost completely forgotten continuation. According to an analysis by Nenarokov White has a slight positional advantage after 7 c5! c6 8 \$\Delta\$5! \$\Delta\$10 \$\Delta\$ f4 \$\Delta\$c7 10 h3 0-0 11 0-0.

6...兔e6!? is already known to us, although with the inclusion of the moves 5...公c6 6 公召 things are changed somewhat (White has neither a check on a4, nor the manoeuvre  $\bigcirc$ [2]+2-74, but play appears on the pin of the knight c6). After 7 c5 (on 7 B3 simplest is 7...dc1 & & ack & ack  $\rightarrow$  9% c4 e6 – the recommendation of E.Vladimirov) Black is faced with a not very easy choice.

7...g6 is insufficient for equality in view of 8  $\pm$  051  $\pm$  g7 9  $\pm$ 051 In the old game Dake – Alekhine (Pasadena 1932) Black got a bad position without any hint of counterplay: 9...% 8 10 %4  $\pm$  d7 11 0-0 00 12  $\pm$ 14 fa 61  $\pm$   $\pm$ xc6 bc? 14 If fel  $\pm$ 15 5  $\pm$  d2 Ia7 16 Fa 2  $\pm$ 8 17 Iacl.

Of course, 13...bc? is a serious positional mistake; in general Botvinnik considered that after the correct 13...&xc6 Black should not experience difficulties: 14 xc6 bc 15 xfe1 hbs 16 gc5 wg41, and dangerous is 17 xc7 because of 17...nf41 with an attack.

Not leading to equality is 7...\$g4!? (instead of 7...g6) 8 \$\Delta b5 \$\Delta xf3 9 \$\Delta xf3 e6. Black has secured himself against the threat \$\Delta f3-e5, but at the

cost of the loss of the important light-The further squared bishop. continuation of the game Brunner -Miles (Bad Worishofen 1989) was 10 0-0 \$e7 11 \$f4 0-0 12 \$xc6 hc 13 b4 刃d7 14 b5 罩c8 15 罩ab1 皇f6 16 bc 冪xc6 17 切b5 響a5 18 冪fcl Za8, and White agreed to a draw. Too early! The plan to improve the position lies on the surface: 19 a3! 创f8 (not possible is 19...a6 20 创d6 \$xd4? because of 21 2b7! ₩a4 22 萬b4) 20 萬b4 @g6 21 皇g3 皇e7 22 Icb1. The only open file is in White's hands, his pieces are also very active. One cannot talk about equality.

Perhaps grandmaster Dreev has penetrated the position the deepest: 7...a6!?



Sympathetic prophylaxis. Now White's play to pin the knight of is rendered harmelss, and the bishop of need not be given up. In the game Brunner – Dreev (Biel 1995) followed 8.1a &ff 9 &c2 g6 10 0-0 &g7 11 &f4 0-0 12 &c5 &d7! 13 &xd5 &dxe5 and the opponents concluded peace.

6....\$g4 is the main continuation.

The threat to the d4 pawn assumes an all the more tangible outline.



7 cd We are convinced that other moves are noticeably weaker than the capture on d5.

There is no point in playing 7 c5? – after 7... xf3 8 gf g6 Black's position is better.

There is less benefit in 7 &c3 e6 8 &c2 &c7 9 0-0 0-0 10 &c5 &xc2 11  $\blacksquare$  xc2 dc! (a well-known device the weakness of the c6 pawn after the exchange of knights is balanced out by the play against the the isolated d4 pawn) 12 &xc6 bc 13  $\blacksquare$ xc4  $\blacksquare$ d7 (De Firmian – Christiansen, Key West 1994).

7 &c2 − A trappy move. If Black is tempted by the bait − 7...dc?!, then after 8 d5 &x15 9 &x13  $\Leftrightarrow$ zx16 &zb 10 0-0 he risks, as they say, not getting out of the opening. How serious it all is was shown if only by the game Mikenas − Flohr (Folkestone 1933): 10...@d7 11 @c2 &x15 + 12 &x15 0-0-0 13 b31 e6 14 bc ed 15 &t6 44 16 &b5 &c5 17  $\Xi$ ab1 @c6 18 &b15 &c7 17  $\Xi$ ab1 @c6 18 &b15 &c7 17  $\Xi$ ab1 @c6 18 &b15 &c7 17  $\boxtimes$ c7 the feast 0.000 fb fb sc2 mistake. On 18... $\exists$ 7 the result of the game is quite unclear, whereas now...



19 ②xa7+! 皇xa7 20 響a3!, and Black had to resign.

It is best for Black not to accept the Greek Gift, but calmly play 7...e6. There are no pawn weaknesses, also no problems with development – where is White's advantage coming from?

7... Dxd5 8 ₩b3 Yet again unfashionable is 8 & 2c2 ef 9 0 0 & 2c7 10 h3 & h5. The only problem for Black is that he lags behind his opponent in development by one or two tempi. White can possibly try to exploit this by 11 ₩b31, but Black has sufficient defensive resources:

11...2b6?? 12 &e3 0-0 13 Zfd1 Db4? 14 d5?? D4xd5 15 &xb6 Wxb6 16 Qxd5 ed 17 Zxd5 Wxb3 18 ab &xf3 19 &xf3 &d8! 20 Zd7 &b6, and the extra pawn plays no role at all;

In the famous game Nimzowitsch – Alekhine (Bled 1931) was played 8 点b5 響a5 9 響b3 魚xf3 10 gf ②xc3. In this position the great chess inventor Aron Nimzowitsch got confused:



A year later the  $4^{th}$  world champion himself showed the right way for 12....d?! he obtained a very strong initiative: 13 0-0 0-0-0 14 &xcb he 15  $\mathbb{Z}b1$  (Alekhine – Winter, London 1932). However the point in this theoretical debate, like the given game Keene – Roth (Aarhus 1976), is 12....d6? (instead of 12....d2?)! 15 dc ab 14 cb 2B8 15  $\mathbb{Z}b1$   $\mathbb{Z}b7$  16 ad b4 17 &d2 @c5+ 18 &f1 @d6 with equality.

However, is it the point?... Many chessplayers do not trust forcing variations, where it all hangs 'on one nail'. Then in reply to  $\$ \ \$b5$  they should play  $\$ \ ... \ \$c881$ ? This solid continuation allows Black to achieve equality without unnecessary worry. This is how events develop:  $9h3 \ \$b5$ 10 0-0 e6 11  $\Xi e1 \ \&c7 12 \ \Xi c5 \ \Delta xc3$ 13 bc  $\ \&g6$  14  $\ \&xc61 \ \Xi xc6$  15 d5  $\Xi xc3$  16  $\ \&e1 \ \Xi c7 \ \&xc61 \ 5 \ dx5$  $\Xi i.6... \ \Xi dx3$ ? 17  $\ \&xc45 \ zdx51$  8  $\Xi xd5$ e (19  $\ \&xc7 \ \Xi xc8 \ zdx51$  R  $\Xi xd5$ 

20...\$18!) 17 de 0-0 18 ef+ \$\$x\$7 19 \$\$g5 \$\$x\$5 20 \$\$\overline\$x\$5 h6 21 \$\$\overline\$x\$17 Draw (Hasin - Bagirov, Baku 1961).

8.... ≰xf3 9 gf (once again 9 ₩xb7? is not possible because of 9... @db4! 10 gf ⊒b8 trapping the queen). On the board is the tabiya of the Four Knights system.



Black has two acceptable continuations: 9...€bb6 (1), leading to immense complications, and 9...e6 (11), after which the game is simplified and transfers to an endgame. The remaining possibilities are clearly weaker.

Thus, losing is 9... ④xd4? 10 金b5+! ④xb5 11 螢xb5+ 營d7 12 螢xd7+ 金xd7 13 ④xd5 (Rantanen - Baljon, Valetta 1980).

Also poor is 9... $\Omega$ db4? 10 &c3 the same knight cannot untie itself and there is no one to come to its aid. In the game Geller - Orev (Kislovodsk 1968) there followed 10... $\delta$  11 d5 44 12 &d1  $\Omega$ b8 13 a3  $\Omega$ 4a6 14 &b5+  $\Omega$ d7 15 0-0  $\Omega$ c7 16 &xa4, and White's advantage grew to decisive proportions.

Dubious is 9... (2)xc3?! True, White (though it is now time!) had better forget about the b7 square – in the variation 10 (#xb7?! (2)xd4 11 bc  $c_0 c_1 + 12 c_0 c_2$  IB8 13 We6+ Wd7 14 Wxd7+ \$xd7 15 \$\overline{a}b3+ c\_c 6 he does not win the knight, for example: 16 \$\overline{a}te5! 17 \$\overline{a}c\_1 6 18 \$\overline{x}c\_2 \$\overline{a}c\_5\$ with equality (analysis by Moiseev and Ravinsky). However simpler is 10 be \$\overline{b}c\_1 1d\_5 underlining White's positional advantage.

I 9...④b6



#### А

10 \u00e9e3e3 Let us say at once: not the strongest move. Although even in this case, as shown by practice, Black finds it quite difficult to refute it upon accurate play.

10....66 As we see, Black has everything in order with his pawn structure. But here the lag in development can assume threatening proportions. Very much depends on White's following move. Thus after 11  $\mathbb{Z}$ dl?!  $\mathbb{Z}$ b4! 12 a3  $\mathbb{Z}$ a5 Black easily shakes off any fear – White will not succeed in carrying out d4-d5 in the near future. In the game Marin  Magem (Berga 1995) play continued 13 & d3 Ξc8 14 Ξg1 0-0?
 S ΦΠ (the idea of castling is shown in the variation 15 & h6 g6 16 & x18 & xx44) 15... & xc3 16 bc g6 17 & h6 Ξε8 18 Ξg5 & d5 19 c4 & da51, and
 White's attack is finally extinguished.

The break in the centre leads to unclear consequences: 11 d5 ed 12 gg1 g6. For example, the game Plaskett – Wells (London 1991) led immediately to such complications that it is practically impossible to commentate on them: 13 0-0-0  $\Delta$ d6!? 14 gg5 d4! 15  $\Delta$ e4 0-0 16  $\Delta$ th  $\Delta$ c7 17 gb5 gd7 18  $\Delta$ h6 gfd8 19 a4 d3!? 20 gxd3  $\Delta$ d4 21 %d1  $\Delta$ xb5 22 gxd7 gxd7 23 %e1  $\Delta$ d4 etc.

Most often White chooses between 11 Ig1 and 11 0-0-0.

 11 II gl At first glance, the move does not require any particular explanation. With the attack on the g7 pawn White slows down the development of the bishop f8 and thereby gains some time to organise the break d4-d5.

None the less, as we see later, this is not all so simple...



a) First of all we mention that it is dubious to win a pawn  $-11...\bigcirc xd42!$ 12 &xd4 @xd4 in view of 13 &b5+&ce7 14 @d1 @c5+ 15 &f1 g6 16  $\bigcircc4$  f6 17 &c2 f6 17 &f2 f8 @ge1 with a very strong attack.

For that reason we deal with the most logical and possibly the strongest continuation, but...not the most interesting!

b) 11...g6



12 0-0-0 In the game Zaichik – Dolmatov (Kutaisi 1978) White decided in general to do without the break d4-d5. The experiment ended unsuccessfully: 12 Bd1?\* ad6 13 h4 0-0 14 h5 2b4! 15 a3 24d5 16 2b4 2f4 17 hg hg 18 2h3 4g2, and Black stands to win.

13 d5! The attempt to put off the pawn break 'till later' and play in a more refined way does not work, since after 13 2h6 Wc7 14 2h3 Black succeeds in hiding away his king: 14...0-0-0! There is a draw (and a very beautiful one) for White, but no more than that: 15 d5 (15 例b5? ②xd4+) 15... ②xd5 16 Zxd5! (not possible is 16 @xd5? Ixd5, and on 17 Ixd5 or 17 Wxd5 16...響xh2 follows 17...②d4+!) 17 單g3 皇h4 18 皇f4! 皇xg3 19 異xd8+ 冨xd8 20 盒xe6+! fe 21 響xe6+ 邕d7 22 響g8+! with perpetual check.

After 13 d5 you get the feeling that White is about to embark on a 'squeeze' to hold the opponent's king in the centre, but in actual fact everything turns to quite everyday equality. 13...ed 14  $\otimes xd5 \otimes xd5$ 15  $\Xi xd5 We7$ , and then:



16  $\ensuremath{\mathfrak{W}}$ c3 &f6! 17  $\ensuremath{\mathfrak{W}}$ c5 (alas, the bishop is untouchable: 17  $\ensuremath{\mathfrak{W}}$ sf6?  $\ensuremath{\mathfrak{Q}}$ d4+ 18  $\ensuremath{\mathfrak{W}}$ c3 &f6 with repetition of position (Sveshnikov – Hodgson, Sochi 1986) or

16  $\pm b1$  0-0 17 f4  $\equiv ad8$  18  $\pm g2$  $\pm f6$  19  $\equiv c1 \equiv xd5$  20  $\equiv xd5$   $\equiv d8$ 21  $\equiv b5$  a6 22  $\equiv a4$   $\equiv d6$ . Two bishops this is a plus, but how will it be with a defective pawn formation on the king's flank? Most likely, White will not manage to win (Lautier – Illescas, Ubeda 1997).

c) 11....\$b4!? Here it is'l ts cems that the g7 pawn can also be disregarded. This sacrifice was first made by Kasparov in a game against Ehlvest (Moscow 1977). We mention that playing 11...\$c7?!, with the same aim, is noticeably weaker in view of the forcing variation 12 Taxg7 \$\Delta\tar{1}\$, 13 \$\Delta\tar{1}\$, 14 \$\Delta\tar{1}\$, 6 \$\Delta\tar{1}\$, 15 \$\Delta\tar{1}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, and \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, 15 \$\Delta\tar{1}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, 15 \$\Delta\tar{1}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, 15 \$\Delta\tar{1}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, 15 \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, 15 \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, 16 \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, 17 \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, 18 \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, 19 \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, 19 \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, 19 \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, 19 \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, 10 \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, 10 \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, 10 \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Del\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\tar{2}\$, \$\Delta\ta

After 11...2b4 arises the most interesting moment in the whole variation with 11 III.



If 12  $\equiv xg7$ , then of course Black does not go for the win of the d4 pawn but concentrates his forces on the c-file: 12...2045 13 0-0-0  $\equiv c8$ 14  $\pm b1 \pm xc3$  15 be a6 16  $\equiv c1 \geq 2a5$ 17  $\equiv a3 \equiv b6+$  18  $\pm a1 \leq 2c4$  with a menacing initiative.

 was twice defended by Ukrainian master Peter Marusenko, and both times successfully:

14 필g3 h6 15 호d3 0-0-0 16 호e4 필d7 17 필g4 필hd8 followed by ②c6a5-c4 (Nieminen – Marusenko, Port Erin 1999);

14 f4 0-0 15 f5!?  $\frac{16}{2}$  kf5 16  $\frac{16}{2}$  h6 g6 17  $\frac{17}{2}$  xf8  $\frac{18}{2}$  cd3  $\frac{17}{2}$  xf8 with obvious compensation for the exchange (Spanton – Marusenko, Port Erin 2000).

In the above mentioned game, Ehlvest – Kasparov, White preferred to wait a while with casting and play 12  $\pm 551$ ? 0d5 13  $\pm xg7$  But even here after 13...Wb6? Black four counterplay: 14  $\ddagger f1$  0xc3 15  $\pm xc6+$ Wxc6 16  $bc \pm f8$  17  $\pm g5 \pm c7$  18  $\pm 55$ Wxf3 19  $\pm xb7$  0-0 20  $\pm b1 \pm dc6$ Wa1 Wa1  $\textcircled{W}a1 \pm 22 \pm c2 \pm b8$ 



As before, he is a pawn down, but there is no coordination in White's ranks. Perhaps in practical play his game is even more difficult than Black's. Incidentally, in the further struggle Kasparov succeeded in gaining the upper hand.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that the idea 11 III has left the scene. If the threat to the g7 pawn does not trouble Black in the least, is it worth spending time on the rook move?

2) 11 0-0-0 White leaves the rook hl alone and on the whole concentrates on preparation for the break d4-d5.

11...&e7 It is difficult to say definitely if there is any benefit in the inclusion of the moves 11...₩c7 12 &b1. One thing is clear: Black cannot now play 12...0+0 in view of 13 &b5 ₩b8 14 d5! &xd5 15 &h3! a6 16 &xd5 &xd5 17 &xd5 ab 18 &xc6+i winning.

After 12...ed arises a critical position for the 11 0-0-0 variation.



a) 13 **Axb6** brings no advantage but only if Black takes on b6 with the

queen. However after 13...ab 14 ②xd5 0-0 15 罩gl 全f6 16 罩g4! White remains with some chances, for example:

16...黨5 17 當b1 黨c5 18 公xb6 ②d4 19 對b4 黨c6 20 ②c4 (Short – Miles, Brighton 1984);

16..., 變d6 17 €\xb6 (it is worth waiting a while with this capture; 17 \$\product bit?) 17..., \$\overline{\sigma} d4 \$\product xd4 \$\product x

Meanwhile here the endgame after 13...\%xb6 14 \%xb6 ab 15 \@xd5 is completely harmless for Black, which has been repeatedly confirmed in practice:

18  $\mathcal{O}_{XeT} \oplus \overline{\mathcal{A}}_{eT}^{-1}$  19  $\mathbb{I}_{hell} + \# fd$ 20  $\mathbb{I}_{def} \oplus \oplus g_{S!}$ ? 21  $\mathbb{I}_{gl} + \# fd$  White has got the most out of the position but there is no hiding the position weaknesses on the king's flank. Black's counterplay should be enough for a draw. (Potkin – Kazakov, Moscow 1998).

b) Black's task is more complicated after 13 金b5!? 0-0 14 公xd5 公xd5 15 響xd5



In the game Onischuk – Kutsin (Nikolaev 1995) Black did not choose the best order of moves to transpose to the endgame: 15...暖77? 16 螢d7! 蓋fc8 17 卷bl 条fc8 월xc7 嘉xc7 19 &xc6f Both 19...bc 20 b3, and 19...Ξxc6 20 屆d7 b6 21 屆c1 leave no doubt: the endgame is highly unpleasant. Probably upon best defence Black is capable of defending this position, but he would not want to reach it again.

Therefore worth considering is 15...2b4!? Here the transfer to an endgame does not give White the advantage: 16 #xd8 IA 33 a6! etc. Winning the 57 pawn leads to a draw by perpetual check: 16 %xb7 %a5 17 a4 Iac8+ 18 &b1 IIc7 19 %et a6 20 &a7 IIxd?! 21 IIxd? %xa4 22 %xc7 (not possible is 22 IIxc?? IG8) 22...%c2+.

This leaves 16 e4, but then 16...ea5 17 ac4 af6. The struggle is somehow imperceptibly concentrated around the white king. Possibly it is nothing serious but in any event Black directs the play.

18 a3 (also interesting is 18 金b1 国ae8! 19 竇g4 h5 20 賢f4 国相8) 18...竇c7! 19 魚f4 (a double-edged move, but otherwise Black simply has a good game, for example, [9 ab?] b5 20 ac5 fiels or 19 ab1 42c6) 19...20a2+ (the knight is in a very dangerous position but how can he concretely trap it?) 20 ac2 (20 ab1 @b6 21 ac5 field 20...@b6 21 ac5 (21 field field 22 ac3 @b5 23 b3 @c3) 21...axe5 22 @wcs field ac3 b3 @wf2+24 ab1 b5, and Black is close to victory.

If these variations are correct, then 15...②b4 removes all questions about the variations arising from 13 愈b5!? 0-0 14 ②xd5 ③xd5 15 響xd5.

c) 13 ②xd5 ②xd5 14 罩xd5 響c7 15 容b1 0-0



Starting with 10 &c3, both sides have made perhaps the most natural and logical moves. A position has been reached which is most important for the evaluation of the whole variation. The initiative is undoubtedly on White's side but how great is it? In his favour he has the advantage of the two bishops plus chances of developing an attack on the g-file. For his part, Black is able for the present to defend his king against serious trouble, and if nothing comes of White's attack, the weakness of the f3, f2, h2 pawns can outweigh all other nuances.

Meanwhile White has in prospect to solve a local problem: where to develop the light-squared bishop?

16 f4 Apparently the best. White intends to install the bishop on the h1-a8 diagonal. Other continuations promise less:

16 @c2 Ead8 17 Ehd1 Exd5 18 Exd5 @d6 19 h4 @f4 20 a3 (on 20 @xf4 @xf4 21 @xb7 unpleasant is 21...Qd4) 20...@xc3 21 fe Ee8. White's attack is done with (Korneev -Izeta, Alcobendas 1994);

16 全d3 ②b4 17 国h5 ②xd3 18 響xd3 g6 19 至c1 響b8 20 金h6 亘d8 21 響c3 金f8 22 金xf8 国xf8, and Black again defends (Kharlov – Evseev, Kazan 2001).

16...⊙b4 It is unclear how to improve White's play in the variation 16...∑ad8 I7 & g22 ∑x45 18 & x45 & f6 19 Zd1 g6 20 14 Zd8 21 h5 ght? 22 Zg1+ &h8 (Narciso - Matluovic, Belgrade 2001), but the jump of the knight for some reason is more popular.

17 Zd4 A critical position for the variation.



Of course, it is possible to simply go back with the knight, thereby

tacitly offering a draw: 17... (\Delta c6. In the games below White rejected the draw, but we see nothing of substance to show there is a winning plan:

18 **Z**d1 **Z**d8 (or 18... $\hat{\Delta}$ f6 19  $\hat{\Delta}$ g2 **Z**fd8 20  $\hat{\Delta}$ c4 **Z**sd1+ 21 **Z**sd1 **Z**d8 Anad – Karolyi, Frunze 1987) 19  $\hat{\Delta}$ g2  $\hat{\Delta}$ f6 20  $\overline{W}$ a4  $\overline{W}$ c8 21 **Z**c1  $\overline{W}$ g4 22  $\hat{\Delta}$ sc6 be 23 **Z**sc6 **Z**b8. The extra pawn is on hand, but the weak king b 1 is really sick, and the pawn islands on the king's flank are going nowhere (Shchekachev – Iruzubieta, San Sebastian 1996).

18... $\Xi ads$  19  $\&g_2$   $\&g_{6+} 20$  f5!  $\&g_{x15+} 21 \&c4$   $\&g_3 5 22 a3 @c6$ 23  $\Xi_{x48} @x48 @24 \&d4 \&g5 (Acs -$ Ruck, Paks 1996), and here it waspossible to obtain a great advantage $by force: 25 &c3 <math>\&g_5 26 \&b4 \&g_5 27 \end{tabular}$ 

Also having its minuses is 18...  $\mathbb{Z}fd8$  19  $\&_{2}2$   $\&_{2}6+$  20 f5!  $\&_{x}f5+$  21  $\&_{2}4$   $\&_{3}a5$  22  $\&_{h}6$  g6 (22... $\&_{1}6$  23  $\&_{x}g7!$   $\&_{x}g7$  24  $\&_{x}b4$ with a win).



23 桌xg6! hg 24 罩xg6+ 雪h8 25 2g7+ 2g8 26 2f6+ 2f8 27 @xe7+ @xe7 28 響e3+ 會f8 29 黉h6+ 含e7 30 簋e4+ 含d7 31 篇d6+ 當c8 (also losing is 31...當c7 32 單e7+ 當c8 33 覺c1+ 當b8 because of the quiet 34 "f4! "xa2+ 35 cl 34 響xd6 響e6 35 響c5+ 雪b8 36 墓c4 The heavy piece ending is completely hopeless for Black.

However success in a single analytical variation cannot hide the fact that on the whole Black is close to equality in the 10 &e3 system. In the overwhelming majority of cases White does not succeed in developing an attack: it will all come down to an endgame in which White has purely academic chances of victory.

Parallel with the theory of 10 \$e3 our knowledge of 10 d5 has been increased. Here too it gradually becomes clear that quite frankly things are bad for Black ...

10 d5 After 10 ... Od4 White has a choice between two continuations.



The move 11 Wdl leads to boundless complications (in which it continuations. It is possible to take

is Black who will rather have the chance to confuse the opponent); 11 2b5+, which suggests itself, allows a weighty advantage without any 'ifs and buts'.

is both illogical (why move away such a splendid knight?) and simply weak: after 12 \$b5+ 2d7 13 0-0 g6 14 貫el 皇g7 15 皇g5 f6 16 d6! finishes things off. The bishop cannot be taken - 16...fg 17 de axe7 (or 17... Wc8 18 Zc1 with irresistible threats) 18 2d5, while on 16 ... e5 follows 17 罩xe5+!

12 de On the other hand he cannot take the support away from the knight - 12 f4?! âd6 13 fe âxe5 14 âe3 leads to a position in which it is only 15 盒xb6 竇xb6 16 竇a4+ 会d8 17 \$h3 \$xc3+ 18 bc \$e8+ 19 \$f1 響f6 20 響f4 里e5 (Worley -Marusenko, Newport 2001).

After 12 de on the board we have the most critical position of the whole variation with 11 Wdl. If Black wants to 'get to grips' with the struggle, he needs to have a thorough think about the position reached.



We now have a choice of four

In fact the choice is between two moves. The rest are not very suitable:

b) 12...@f6?! 13 ef+ &xt714 & g2 & b4 (or 14...ac8+15 & cbe4 & b4+16 & cbr] @ cbr] = 0.5 cbr]

c) While here 12...\$c51? might prove just the ticket! Let us see how harmoniously Black is ready to develop his pieces. The rooks will occupy the central d- and e-files, the queen jumps over to h4. The compensation may be worth more than the sacrificed pawn.

13 eft- Refraining from an immediate capture does not solve the problem: 13 &b5+ &xb5 (also interesting is 13...&rb3+ &xb5 (also &xe6 with the better game, Eising – Kuijf, Amsterdam 1984) 14 eft- &rb3 (15 &xd8+ &xd8 16 &xb5 &xd7) 17 0-0 &c4 18 &c3 &xd3 19 &c4. It is obvious that Black will not be struggling for equality (van Wely – Lautier, Monaco 1998).

13... 全xf7 14 皇e3 邕e8 15 皇d3!? Shirov's recommendation - 15 皇e2

**W**h4 16 Oe4 – cannot spoil Black's mood. Incidentally, Shirov himself pointed out that Black has at least a draw in hand: 16...Ixe4!? 17 fe  $\textcircled{W}xe418 0 - 0 - \textcircled{O}xe2+19 \\ \textcircled{W}xe428 0 - 0 \\ \textcircled{W}xe418 0 - 0 \\ \end{aligned}{W}xe418 0 - 0 \\ \textcircled{W}xe418 0 - 0 \\ \textcircled{W}xe418 0 - 0 \\ \end{aligned}{W}xe418 0 - 0 \\ \textcircled{W}xe418 0 - 0 \\ \end{aligned}{W}xe418 0 - 0 \\ \textcircled{W}xe418 0 - 0 \\ \end{aligned}{W}xe418 0 - 0 \\ \textcircled{W}xe418 0 - 0 \\ \end{aligned}{W}xe418 0 - 0 \\ \Biggr{W}xe418 0 - 0 \\ \Biggr{W}xe41$ 

15 ... Wh4! 16 De4 Zad8!



The gambit has given up on glory! In the game Grinfeld – Shirov (Budapest 1996) White tried to curb the opponent's initiative:  $17 \pm x44$ (or  $17 - 0-0 \pm d6$  18  $\& xd6+ \pm xd6$ )  $20 \therefore x46 \pm x46$ , which only partially succeeded. Shirov won this fascinating game, indeed the move  $12...\pm c5$  is possibly the main weapon against the variation 11 WdI as a whole.

d) 12...fe Not as thrilling, but a more popular continuation.

13 &e3 The neutral 13 &e2 has been repeatedly tried. Now the thrust (along the lines of the game Grinfeld – Shirov) 13... Wh4?! does not achieve its objective in view of 14 f4! E48 15 0-0 E47 16 &e3 E45 17 ₩53 ₩g4 18 &th1 & da6 19 Eg1 @xc3 20 fe with an obvious advantage (Grinfeld – Kuijf, Munich 1992). But the simple 13...e27? 14 0-0 0-0 15 f4 ₩371 f-16 ∰d3 Ead8 seems fully

satisfactory. After 17 變e4 金b4! 18 查h1 黉c6! the position is completely equal. (Al-Modiahki – Dzhumaev, Malaysia 1994).

13...\$c5 Now White has a choice: to continue his development with the move 14 & g2 or to take the position to the edge by 14 b4.



d1) 14 b4!? Leading to forced play in which Black's chances of equalising the game are higher than White's chances of obtaining the advantage.

In short, even 14...\$xb4!?, apparently, cannot be refuted: 15 \$\overline\$xcid4 \$\overline\$16 \$\overline\$b3 \$\overline\$k2 \$\overline\$c3 \$\overline\$c3 \$\overline\$k2 \$\overline\$c3 \$\overl

The natural choice after 14 b4 is between 14...0-0 and 14...\#f6.

d11) 14...0-0 15 bc ⊘xf3+ 16 \$\Lorepsilon e^2\$ \$\Text{bdl}\$ h4!? More often played is 16...\$\Text{f6}\$, but then by transposition of moves we get into into d12.

17 cb lt is clear that in positions of this kind the cost of a move increases again and again; correspondingly also the cost of a mistake increases. Thus, in the game Eilertsen – Henriksen

(Norway 1990) it was enough to 'miss' just one thing  $-17 \pm 22$ ?, and in an instant the position becomes difficult: 17... $\Xi$ ad8 18 @b3  $\Xi$ d2+! 19  $\pm$ xd2  $\pounds$ d4+ etc.

17...Ξad8 18 ₩a4 Fainthearted is 18 ₩xd8? ₩xd8 19 Ξd1 ₩h4! 20 ba ₩c4+ 21 Ξd3 Φe5 with a decisive advantage (Arytunov – Marusenko, Kiev 1998).



In this very sharp position from the game Pisk - Pingitzer (Stockerau 1992), Black rushed to give check with the knight on d4. The attack was ruined. Meanwhile worth considering 18...,響h5!? with the sample is variation: 19 2g2 2h4+ 20 2f1 (not possible is 20 f3 Ixf3!) 20 ... 2xg2 21 We4 (on 21 wxg2 strong is 21... 劉g6+ 22 雪f1 劉d3+ 23 包e2 響xe3 24 響h4 罩d2 25 罩e1 響xb6. and White's pieces are virtually stalemated) 21 ... Wh3 22 Se2 (it is difficult to evaluate the position after 22 響xg2 響xe3 23 包e4 響xb6!?) 22..... £14+. Alas. no good is 22...萬f4?! (hoping for 23 盒xf4? のxf4+ 24 響xf4 響d3+ 25 空e1 響xc3+ 26 當e2 響d3+ with perpetual check) in view of 23 Ead1! Exd124  $\pounds xf4$  Exh1 25 ba  $\pounds xf4+$  26  $\pounds d2$ . The pawn, which has in a surprising way reached a7, is one step away from a complete triumph.

23 &xf4  $\exists x$ f4 24  $\equiv$ e3  $\equiv$ f5!? 25  $\exists acl$  Also in the event of 25 f3 it is difficult for White to avoid perpetual check: 25... $\exists x$ f3!? 26  $\equiv x$ f3  $\equiv$ d2+ 27  $\equiv x$ d2  $\equiv x$ f3 28 ba  $\equiv$ f4+ etc.



25...Idd?!? How beautiful, also so forced. After this move White, in order to avoid perpetual check, has to give up two pawns (on f2 and b6).

The tempting 25...ER does not work in view of 26 Bnf1 (only not 26 ba? Ixf2+ 27 \$\phiel If 3 28 \$\pmelec2 \$\pmelec2\$ 4 or 28 \$\pmelec4\$ Ixf3 28 \$\pmelec2\$ 27 \$\pmelec4\$ Ixf2+ 30 \$\pmelec4\$ If 3 31 \$\pmelec2\$ 29 Ixf2 \$\pmelec4\$ If 4 28 \$\pmelec4\$ If \$\pmelec4\$ If 3 31 \$\pmelec2\$ 20 32 Ixf3 If \$\pmelec4\$ If \$\p

26 arrows xf4 arrows xf4 27 arrows xf3 arrows xf428 arrows xf4 27 arrows xf4 arrows xf430 arrows xf16 h6 The material correlation is far from standard but we do not think there is any risk of Black losing this position with reasonable play. d12) 14...豐f6 (more popular than the queen sortie to h4) 15 bc 公xf3+ 16 含e2 0-0



In the game S.Polgar – Skembris (Corfu 1990) White played 17 &g2?!, on which, in the opinion of grandmaster Skembris, 17...@c4! was very strong. Obviously there are no alternatives to 17 cb.

**17... 逗ad8** It is necessary to add that bad is 17... 響xc3? 18 全g2 響c4+ 19 豐d3 with a great advantage (Zhuravlev – Gutman, USSR 1972).

18 變c2 The time has still not come to give up the queen: 18 全g2 层xd1 19 层axd1 變xc3 20 全xf3 變c4+ 21 层d3 层xf3!, and a draw is not far off (Kuijf – Bersma, Hilversum 1987).

18...②d4+ 19 鱼xd4 豐xd4 20 ②e4 Not possible is 20 f3?? 氯xf3 with a mating attack (Mayro – Ngyen, correspondence, 1983).

Now however Black's main problem is how to cope with the a7 pawn?

22....嘗b5+ 23 當e3



23... Wa6! The only move! Giving check on b6 was no use – White covers with the queen on c5. Now however everything ends pleasantly for Black. Thus, in the game Rozentails – Lalic (Moscow 1994) after 24 Ibl Wa7+ 25 &c2 Ic8 26 Wb3 Wa6+ the opponents agreed a draw. The French analysts Prie and Tirard propose as strongest 24 Ic1, but also here after 24... Wa7+ 25 &c2 Ia8!? Black's chances are in no way worse.

It is clear that in the variation 14 b4, White, though he will obtain one, and then even two extra pieces, is risking slightly less than the opponent. This is why many prefer not to get involved in an exchange of blows, but quietly continue development – 14 & g2. However there is simply no quiet life.

d2) 14 &g2  $\cong$ h4 Black played the opening superficially in the game Romero – Bersma (Amsterdam 1987): 14...0-0 15 0-0 e5 16 &c4 &d7 17 &xc5 &lxc5, and after 18 f4! the white bishops dominated.

15 0-0 2 d6 16 h3 2 f5 17 2 e4!? A move that calls 'for a fight'. The game Malaniuk - Yudasin (Moscow 1991) ended peacefully:  $17 \text{ Wb}3 \cdot 0 \cdot 0$  $18 \text{ W}_{xc64} \text{ th}8 19 \text{ We}(4! \text{ Wf}6 20 \text{ Wg}4 \text{ Wf}7) 21 \text{ H}4 \Delta_{c4}22 \text{ scl} 2 \text{ hh6}23 \text{ Wf}3 \text{ sc}34 \text{ H}3 \text{ sc}34 \text{ hhi}1 \text{ th} \text{ idea } 17 \text{ ch}5?$   $\Xi \text{ als} 34 \text{ sc}34 \text{ d}4 \text{ sc}34 \text{ d}5 \text{ sc}34 \text{ sc}33 \text{ sc}34 \text{ sc}33 \text{ sc}34 \text{ sc}33 \text{ sc}34 \text{ sc}334 \text{$ 

On 17  $\bigcirc$  e4 there are four replies. We examine them, from the weakest to the strongest.



Unsatisfactory is 17...  $\triangle xe3?!$  18 fe **Id**8, as was played in the game T.Horvath – Hamdouchi (Hungary 1995). After 19 **W**53 **W**e7 20 f4  $\triangle$ d5 21 f5! White's advantage had grown noticeably.

On 17...Od5 White is forced... to exchange all the pieces, apart from the rooks! Let's look at it. 18 &g5  $\$  white 19 [41] & white 10 & white & white & and B an

 19... 公xc3 20 fe 温ad8 21 變b3 基xd6 22 重ad1 重fd8 23 基xd6 基xd6 24 重c1) 20 愈xb6! ab 21 重e1. There is not full equality; though it may be slight, everywhere White has a plus.

17...&cr1? - this is the strongest move! The bishop must be retained for the attack. Black should not think about material losses, the main thing is to defend the e6 pawn and bring the king's rook into the battle. Further events could swing about in the following way:

23...Lal+24 Lxdl Lxdl+25 &L &R8:26 Lb8+ &T7 The most sensible thing is to agree to a draw after a repetition of moves: 27 LD7. A few sharp moves – 27 &C7?! &g6 28 &S6: (the threat was 28...&264): 29 (2xd6 & Wf4 mating) 28...&16 – andalready it is Black who is playing fora win!



For example: 29 徵xe6 (or 29 徵c7 盒g5! 30 ②xg5 徵xf2 31 h4 罩d2) 29...徵f4+ 30 ②g3 ③xg3 31 徵e8+ 當h6 32 fg 盒e5!!

Theory knows a great deal about the variation 11 Wd1, but it does not know the main thing: where is the clear advantage for White? In the variation 11...e5 12 de fe he has extra material, but not a quiet life; in the variation 11...e5 12 de &:c5!? White can do little more than think about how not to lose.

The problem is that practice cannot wait until the theoreticians decide among themselves. It happens that to find a desired advantage in an individual variation – practical players there and then have switched to something else. And it turns out that the abandoned variation, as it were, is hanging in the air. This does not mean at all that it will always be bad – simply that at the present moment slightly better ideas are to be found elsewhere.

Today the variation 11 兔b5+ looks stronger than 11 鬱d1, but who knows what tomorrow will bring?

2) 11 âb5+!



11.... After 11... 3xb5 12 Xxb5 a6 (the threat

was 13 £f4 IIc8 14 (2)xa7) 13 (2)c3 Black has many such possibilities, but an acceptable one among them is not to be found:

13...豐c7 14 金e3 全d7 15 室c1 仓e5 16 豐a4+ 豐d7 17 豐e4 全g6 18 0-0 f5 19 豐e6!, and Black cannot save himself (Bashkov - Magomedov, Chelyabinsk 1990);

13...黨c8 14 0-0 公d7 15 饗xb7 g6 16 黨c1 黨b8 17 饗xa6 皇g7 18 皇g5 with an easy win;

13... 公d7 (relatively best) 14 \ 次b7 g6 15 0-0 象g7 16 元c1 0-0 with some chances of continuing the struggle. However, after 17 象g5! White's advantage is still very great (Rozentalis-Adams, Hastings 1997).

12 Wa4 2xb5 Also this move is forced – let's investigate why.

The f3 pawn cannot be taken: 12... $\Omega_{x}$ (3+?) 13  $\cong$ f1  $\bigtriangleup$ e5 14  $\cong$ f4 a6 15  $\pounds_{x}$ (3+?) 16 d6 b5 17  $\frac{1}{2}$ (4  $\bigtriangleup$ )f6 18  $\equiv$ e1  $\frac{1}{2}$ (7 19  $\equiv$ g1  $\equiv$ c8 20  $\Xi_{x}$ (3?) (Bashkov – Marusenko, Polica 1992).

The main boost to the variation is the fact that Black is deprived of the defence 12...e5? 13 de Dxe6 in view of



...14 \$\overline{a}g5! This surprising blow finishes off the game: 14...\$\verline{b}xg5

15 0-0-0, and Black resigned (Bologan – Borges, Linares 1999).

13 世xb5 g6 As shown by the game Alburt – Dorfman (Erevan 1975), weak is 13...c5? 14 de fe. White achieves an advantage in the most natural way: 15 全e3 豐c7 16 墨c1 etc.

140-0 A healthy move. White does not need to provoke complications and, even more so, look for them. Thus, there is no need to take the pawn at once -14 \$\$\$ who???, as after 14...\$\$\$\$ 27 5 0-0 0-0 Black has sufficient compensation. The immediate 14 \$\$\$ 5 100 ks more interesting, though White will hardly manage to save a tempo on short castling.

14...2g7 15 **Zel!** Feeling for the right idea: the c7 pawn ought to be attacked by the rook c1 instead of the bishop g5.

In the present position the move  $15 \pm g_25$  is trappy: 15...h6? is not possible in view of  $16 \pm xc?1 \pm xc?1$   $17 \pm br4 \pm dce8$  18  $\pm acl + \pm c5$  19 H br4 + dce8 18  $\pm acl + \pm c5$  19 H br4 + dce8 viming (Von Gleich – Fette, Hamburg 1987). But after 15...dc0 15  $\pm c1$  it all returns to the channels of the main variation.

15...0-0 16 盒g5 The tabiya of the variation 11 盒b5+.



It seems that all Black's attempts to avoid trouble have been no help. Here are just a few paths of fruitless endeavour:

16...2e5?! 17  $\Xi e3$   $\Xi e8$  18 &f4@d7 19 &kb7 – White has an extra pawn and the opponent has no compensation (Dvoretsky – Izeta, Terrasa 1996);

16... $\bigcirc$ 16 17 wxb7 (it is not clear how to react to 17 adl 1?) 17...b818 wxc7  $\fbox{xxb2}$  19 wxd8  $\fbox{xd8}$ 20  $\ddddot{adl}$ , once again with a healthy extra pawn (anlysis by V. Chekhov);

16...16 17 &f4  $\triangle$ 65 18  $\mathbb{E}$ 63 %68 19 &g3 g5 20 &xe5 fe 21 %b4  $\mathbb{E}$ 17 22  $\mathbb{E}$ d1 a5 23 %g4, and it remains only to complain about the fate of the bishop g7 (Korneev – Moreda, Malaga 2001);

16... $\Xi e8?!$  17 d6 f6 18  $\triangle d5!$  (it is obvious that Black has no available resources) 18...ed (no help are either 18...fg 19 de \overline \overline 82 00 \overline 18...fg 21 \overline 82 00 19 \overline 28 de \overline 82 00 \overline 82 de \overline 82 21 \overline 82 de \overline 82 de \overline 82 de \overline 82 21 \overline 82 de \overline 82 de \overline 82 de \overline 82 21 \overline 82 de \overline 82 de \overline 82 de \overline 82 21 \overline 82 de \overline 82 de \overline 82 de \overline 82 21 \overline 82 de \overline

16...2 f6 Even quite recently this move was considered relatively promising and in any case – acceptable. But now it is hopelessly out of date.

17 Δxf6 ef Now he does not have to defend the weakness on e7. True, in return Black presents the opponent with a passed d-pawn, hoping subsequently to blockade it. The alternative is 17...Ωxf6, but after 18 ₩xh5 Tac8 19 Bad1 ₩d6 20 Qe4 Sxc4 21 Bxc4 it is difficult to persuade oneself that there is real compensation for the material (Sanchez - Pablo, Barbera 1997).

After 17...ef, it seems that a convenient moment has arrived to finally gobble up the b7 pawn...



On the theme 18 @xb7!? only one game is known: Cohen - Marusenko (Tel Aviv 2003). But one is soon convinced that it is still too early to take the pawn! This is how events developed: 18 ... De5 19 #e3 2c4!? 20 篇e2 ④e5 21 誉b4!? It is more natural to look at 21 f4, but after 21...萬b8 22 豐xa7 包f3+ 23 會g2 Black has available a complicated combination: 23... 響c8! 24 h3 罩xb2! Things are not bad for White, but also not brilliant: 25 邕xb2 燮xc3 26 燮b7 ②h4+ 27 當h2 ②f3+ 28 當h1 ④d2! or 25 響e3 ④h4+ 26 當h2 邕xe2 27 (Dxe2 gc4.

21... $\bigcirc$ xf3+ 22 eg2 ed7 Here White cannot maintain the tension – 23 Ec7?, after 23...Oh4+! he would be forced to part with material and lose.

The right defence lies in 23 ¥f4!? De5 (or 23...Dg5 24 Ie3 Ife8 25 Iae1, and White consolidates his forces) 24 Id1 Ife8 25 De4 Black's threats have run dry, while it is not easy to defend the f6 pawn.



Here is a sample variation of the unfolding events:

25...€g4 (or 25...₩g4+ 26 ₩xg4 €xg4 27 d6 f5 28 d7) 26 h3 f5 27 €c5 ₩b5 28 Exx8+ Exx8 29 hg ₩xc5 30 gf ₩b5 31 d6 ₩xb2 32 d7 Ed8 33 ₩c7 ₩b6 34 ₩xb6 ab 35 f6, and the white king heads for c7.

One cannot recommend this path for White – there are too many twists and turns. At any moment one could stumble. Far clearer is 18 **Zad1**, counting on the d-pawn and the weakness of the f6 square.

18 Iadl! 20e5 There is no solution to the problem in 18...Ke8 19 Kac84 Wac8 20 WAYD IB8 21 Waa7 Iaxb2 22 Wa3 Ib6 23 Wa4 Wc8 24 Wd4, and by now White has two passed pawns (Shchekachev – Bergez, San Ouentin 2001).

**19 Ie3 Wc8 20 d6 Id8** It is a miserable endgame after 20...₩c6 21 ₩c6 42 d7 Ifd8 23 42-4 42/36 (Gallagher - Krizsan, Lugano 1999). He has to give up the knight for the pawn or else the rook.

 premature to play 21 暫d5 暫f5 and Black still holds on (Dolmatov – Dyachkov, Elista 1996).



21 20d5! An excellent discovery by Romanian grandmaster Mihai Marin which effectively refutes Black's whole system of defence. In the game Marin – Fressinet (Sitges 1999) there followed 21...20x3+ 22 cfr1! 20xb4+ 23 cc1 cg7 24 foxf6! The very moment to lower the curtain.

Indeed, talking about the variation  $9...\widehat{O}b6$ , the ending has turned out sadly for Black. Nothing can be done about it – the variation is difficult. White needs only to refrain from trifles (10 &c3) and firmly tread the smooth path – 10 d5! &d4 11 &b5+!

Sometimes it is useful to play dull, correct chess. With the black pieces go over to the endgame and make a laborious draw there.

#### п

#### 9...e6

Reliable, solid, correct.

10 響xb7 ②xd4 (but no way 10 ③db42! 11 象b5 篇c8 12 象e3 **â**e7 in view of 13 d5! ed 14 ∞xd5 0-0 15 **â**xc6 ∞xc6 16 ∞xc7+ ∞xc7 17 **ï**d1 **¥**a5+ 18 b4, and Black's prospects are bleak, Peng Zhaoqin – Stefanova, Wijk aan Zee 2002) 11 **â**b5+ ∞xb5



12 ₩c6+! An important intermediate move, forcing the black king to occupy an uncomfortable position. Of course White can also play at once 12 @xb5+, but without particular success: 12 ... #d7 13 響xd7+ 金xd7 14 例xd5 ed 15 @ e3 @ b4+16 @ e2 幫hc8 17 算ac1. The game Rozentalis - Bologan (Philadelphia 1994) continued 17 ... a6 18 當d3 g6 19 盒d4 當e6 20 h3 當f5 with approximate equality, but possibly the most accurate was 17......d6!?, keeping in his sights the h2 pawn and intending to place the bishop on e5.

Thus the game Vasyukov – A.Zaitsev (Berlin 1968) ended literally two moves later: 13...a6!? 14 ②d4 ②b4?? (14...黉c8, and White

has nothing in particular) 15 2g5+!

To put it mildly, Black's play was dubious in the game Gulko – Ignatiev (Moscow 1969): 13...堂f6?! 14 簋g1 金b4+ 15 當f1 h6



16 b3! The best place for the bishop is the b2 square. It is essential that the al-h8 diagonal is not covered over: on 16...  $\Xi c8$  17  $\pm b2+\pm c3$  there is the decisive queen sacrifice 18  $\pm cxc3$  $\Xi xc6$  19  $\pm xd5+\pm c5$   $\pm c9$   $\pm c4$ 21  $\Xi d11$  White is going for a real hunt: 21...  $\Xi d6$  22  $\Xi c11$  or 21... g622  $\Xi xd8$   $\Xi xd8$  23  $\pm c2$  h5 24  $\pm f6$ winning.

Ignatiev played 16... $@c8 17 \ \&b2+ \&c7$ , but after 18  $\bigcirc d4$  g6 19  $@b5 \\ \&c3 c2 0 \ \bigcirc c6 + \&c4 c2 1 \ \&c3 \ @xc3 \ @xc3 \ @xc3 \ @xc3 \ @xc3 \ @xc3 \ @xc4 \ @b4 \ @a6 \ c2 \ @b4 \ @b4 \ @a6 \ c2 \ @b4 \ @b4 \ @c6 \ can \ at too high a price.$ 

In reply to 13  $\Delta xb5$  we can recommend 13...**E**b8!?, for example: 14  $\Delta d4$  **will 15** 0-0 **E**8 16 **wa6**  $\Rightarrow$ c8 (interesting is 16... $\Rightarrow$ f6!? 17 b3  $\Delta$ c3!?) 17  $\pm$ c3  $\Delta$ b4 18 **w**c2  $\pm$ d6 has nearly beaten back the opponent (Vorisek – Hollman, Czech Republic 1995). After 13 Wxb5, on the board is the tabiya of the variation.



In the famous game Fischer – Euwe (Leipzig 1960) was encountered 13... $2xc3^2$ ! 14 bc. It seems that White has a small cartload of weak pawns, but Fischer showed his opponent that the weakest is the isolated pawn on a7: 14...WaT15  $\Xi$ b1  $\Xi$ d8 (or 15...Wxb5 16  $\Xi$ xb5  $\Delta$ d6 17  $\Xi$ tb7 76 18  $\Delta$ c2  $\Delta$ c6 19  $\Xi$ t7 a5 20  $\Delta$ c3 with the advantage – analysis by Fischer) 16  $\Delta$ c3 Wxb517  $\Xi$ xb5  $\Xi$ d7. Strongest here was an immediate 18  $\Xi$ a5; however Fischer won the game also with the simple 18  $\Delta$ c2.

Black also failed to equalise in the game Balashov – Hort (Buenos Aires 1980): 14...豐d5 15 區b1!? 冨d8 16 盒e3 當f6 17 冨g1!?

Later an attempt was made to improve Black's play by -14...66!? But, as shown by practice, this defence does not eliminate the problem: 15  $\pm a_{34} \pm a_{17}$  16  $\pm d_{11}$ ?  $@c_8$  17  $\pm d_{17} \pm d_{17}$  4  $\pm d_{18}$  8  $\pm x_{18}$   $@c_{17}$ 19  $\pm c_{2}$   $\pm x_{18}$  20  $\pm hd_{1}$  hs 21  $\pm d_{8}$  $@a_{3}$ 



22 Ξ1461 An extremely unpleasant move for Black. Until here 22 Ξ147 Ξh6 23 Ξxf8+ 營xf8 was played (Christiansen – Shamkovich, South Bend 1981), and the black queen succeeded in closely covering its king. Now however after 22...餐x2+ 23 cf1 營a1-24 c52 the king gk has to rely on its own agility: 24...≩f7 25 Ξkaf7+金g8 26 Ξxe6 Ξh6 27 營f51 (Rantanen – Burger, Gausdal 1982).

13...\#d7 Essentially, here was White's last chance to avoid the endgame. Whether it was necessary to avoid it is another question, but a second such chance will not present itself.



There is no advantage to be had in 14 響a5?! ④xc3 (the modern treatment is - 14...f6!? 15 0-0 @xc3 16 bc 雪打 17 響a6 皇c5 18 皇f4 Ihc8, and in any event it is not Black who is fighting for equality, Onischuk - Dreev, Yalta 1995) 15 資xc3 (or 15 bc f6 16 篇b1 當f7 17 響a6 皇e7 18 里b7 響d5 19 皇a3 The8 20 0-0 Wxf3, Gaprindashvili -Chiburdanidze, Pizunda 1978) 15...f6 16 2e3 2f7 17 0-0 2e7 (M.Tseitlin - Kasparov, Daugavpils 1978). With queens, the weakness of the a7 pawn is an insignificant factor; it is his free development and prospects of attacking the f3 pawn that are more important.

More interesting is 14 We2 ?? -White prefers a direct attack on the king to positional niceties. The recipe for defence is already well known to us: the king should hide on f7: 14...f6! 15 公xd5+ 豐xd5 16 0-0 會f7 17 Id1. On principle, it is difficult to establish in this position that Black is threatened with real danger. But accuracy must never be relaxed. Thus, in the game Taeger Rogozenko (Bad Weissee 1997) the Romanian grandmaster for some reason or other did not take under control the d7 square and after forced to part with the a7 pawn. Instead of 17... #f5?!, 17... #b7 18 響e4 罩b8 19 響xb7+ 罩xb7 20 罩b1 de7 21 de3 ac8 looks more healthy. All Black's problems are behind him (Nirosh - Bageri, Teheran 1998).

14 ②xd5+ 營xd5 For Black (with the king on e7) there is absolutely no reason to avoid the exchange of

queens. And that is why 14...ed?! is foolish: 15 \$\$\vee\$2+\$ (Fischer recommends 15 \$\$\vee\$4+\$\vee\$4 (8 \$\vee\$4) 15...\$\$\vee\$6 16 \$\vee\$4, and the black king is again threatened with an attack.

After 14... $\forall xd5$  arises the first serious fork in the variation 9...e6. White can choose between the immediate 15  $\forall xd5$  (A) and the intermediate 15 & xd5 (B).

#### Α

15 谢xd5 ed



In this position there are three completely different plans of play for White: 16 ≜e3, 16 ≜f4 and 16 0-0.

 16 & c3 & c6 17 0-0-0 Appropriate, as it was for this reason that White played 16 & c3. The attempt to switch ideas (refraining from castling queenside) brings no advantace:

17  $\underline{\mathbb{C}}$ cl  $\underline{\mathbb{A}}$ b4+ 18  $\underline{\mathbb{C}}$ c2  $\underline{\mathbb{I}}$ hc8 19  $\underline{\mathbb{C}}$ d3 a5 20  $\underline{\mathbb{I}}$ xc8  $\underline{\mathbb{I}}$ xc8. The bishop endgame is not winning for White, but otherwise Black is left with the only open c-file (Pigusov – Dreev, Tallinn 1986);

17 Ig1 2d6! 18 Ixg7 2e5 19 Ig4 2xb2, once again with equal chances (Rogers – Adams, London 1988).

After 17... 2 b4 the statistics of results of games are somewhere around the 50% mark. It is rare that one of the opponents manages to extract a full point:



Unpromising is 18 2d4 f6 19 2hg1 \$\overline{17}\$f7 and the bishop has to go back: 20 2e3 2hd8 21 2g4 a5 22 2d3 2d7. White's position is not worse (Garcia - Becerra, Matanzas 1995);

18 Zd3 Zhd8 19 a3 Zac8+ 20 4b1 2c5 21 Ze1 2xe3 22 Zexe3+ 4r6 23 Zd4 Zc4. White has achieved nothing (Franco - Dominguez, Mondariz 2002);

18 金b1 置hc8!? 19 置d3 金c5 20 置e1 兔xe3 21 置dxe3+ 金f6 22 置e7 置e4. The f2, f3 and h2 pawns feel the draught (Stripunsky – Dreev, Internet 2001). 18 a3 Ehc8+ 19 Seb1 Sc5! The defensive strategy is the same in any case: to force a bishop exchange, since it is well-known that nobody can win the rook endgame.

20 = he1 @xe3 21 = xe3+ @d6 22 f4 = ab8 23 = d4 with a draw (Vaganian - Dreev, Odessa 1989).

2) 16 & 14 Far more interesting than 16 & c3. Now forcing an exchange of bishops is considerably more difficult; Black can no longer allow himself to play 'on general principles.'



16... $\pm$ f6!? The other choice is 16... $\pm$ d7!? 17 0-0-0  $\pm$ c6, and he is all ready for  $\pm$ f8-d6.

17 0-0-0 Zd8 18 Zhg1 Zd7 19 & c31 h6 In the game Kindermann – Lobron (Berne 1990) Black did not properly appreciate the bishop transfer and played 19...Zg8?! There followed 20 Zg4! and without delay the rook was swept over to a4 – White had an obvious advantage.

20 \$d4+ (also here it is perhaps worth thinking about the manoeuvre Bg1-g4-a4?) 20...\$75 21 \$xg7 \$xg7 22 Exg7 Ec8+ 23 \$d2 \$d4 24 \$d3 \$xf3 25 Ec1 \$d4 26 h3 Ec4 27 Ec3 \$d5 28 Ef3+ \$de6 29 Eg4 Exg4 30 hg Eb7 Though 'more pleasant' for White, the game did not leave the drawing zone (Onischuk – Dreev, Moscow 2002).

3) 16 0-0 On principle, the most logical move. The rooks combine for an attack on the a7 and d5 pawns (likewise they would not mind seizing the open c-file), while the king is brought over for defence of its own pawn weaknesses on the f and hfiles.

Black ought to be able to defend the most vulnerable points in his position - besides a7 and d5, such should be considered all the squares on the 7<sup>th</sup> rank. From there comes the first link in the plan - the manoeuvre **Za**(h)8d8-d71 Then, by developing the bishop on f6, he is ready to blackmail the opponent with an advance of the d-pawn. On d5 this is a weakness, but if it gets as far as d3...

Moreover it is useful to fix the enemy pawns on the king's flank by means of g7-g5.

16...全e6 17 星e1+ 全f5 White is at a crossroads: 18 鱼e3 or 18 星d1. The first move is idealistic, the second – popular.



a) 18 2c3 2c7 19 Eac1!? Only this move, encountered in the game Sermek - Golubovic (Bled 1994),

sets Black some problems. Upon other continuations it is easy to equalise the game:

19 Ind I Ind 20 Idd g5 21 Iedl 19 Calvanov – Seirawan, Durango 1992):

19 簋ed1 簋hd8 20 簋ac1 簋d7 21 簋d4 金f6 22 簋f4+ 会f6 23 簋c6 簋e8 (Klinger – Ivanchuk, Baguio 1987).

The improvement lies on the surface: instead of 21 b4?! (the prenaturely advanced pawn will become a target of attack) he should play 21 b3? Precisely this was seen in the game Sermek – Golubovic. After 21 b3 White can torment the opponent for a long time. Probably, upon accurate defence, he will not break through Black's position, however it is not worth consciously going in for this type of position.

19... Ehc8 denies the rook the c5 square, while Black compensates for his pawn deficit by the activity of his pieces, supporting the passed d-pawn:

20 IIxc8 IIxc8 21 2xa7 2f6 22 III 2a6 23 2d4 2xd4 24 IIxd4 2be5!? 25 IId2 IIc1+ 26 2g 2g5



We have reached a complicated rook ending which Black should not lose:

27 f4+!? (or 27 a4 d4 28 a5 ≣a1 29 b4 \$\phi\$d5 30 b5 \[\exists a5 31 \] \[\exists b2 \] \[\exists a7 32 f4 g4!] 27...gf 28 \$\exists a1 \] \[\exists b1 \] 29...\$\[\exists d6 30 \$\exists a4 \] \[\exists b1 \] 29...\$\[\exists d6 30 \$\exists a4 \] \[\exists b1 \] 29...\$\[\exists d6 30 \$\exists a4 \] \[\exists b1 \] 29...\$\[\exists d6 30 \$\exists a4 \] \[\exists b1 \] 29...\$\[\exists d6 30 \$\exists a4 \] \[\exists b1 \] 29...\$\[\exists d6 30 \$\exists a4 \] \[\exists b1 \] 29...\$\[\exists d6 30 \$\exists a4 \] \[\exists b1 \] 29...\$\[\exists d6 30 \$\exists a4 \] \[\exists b1 \] 29...\$\[\exists d6 30 \$\exists a4 \] \[\exists b1 \] 29...\$\[\exists d6 30 \$\exists a4 \] \[\exists a6 \] \

b) 18  $\blacksquare d1$   $\blacksquare d8$  19 & c3  $\blacksquare d7$ 20  $\blacksquare c4$  The alternative is 20  $\blacksquare d4$ ?, and after 20...& c5 21  $\blacksquare f4+ \& c5$ White needs to decide whether to exchange bishops or leave them on the board:

22 Ic1 @xe3 23 fe Ib8 24 b3 Ibb7 and Black is a little worse (Adams – Morovic, Leon 1995);

22 & d2!? Ec8 23 Ec1 Edc7 24 Ec1+ & dc6 25 Eg4 Ec7 26 Exc7(or 26 Exg7 Exc1+ 27 & xc1 & d4 28 Ext7 Ec2 with obvious compensation for the material) 26...& xc7 27 Exg7 & dc4 28 Ext7Ec2 Black should not have any particular problems in achieving a draw.

**20...全e7 21 基d4** Also seen is 21 基c4 全f6 22 基c5 重hd8 23 b3 全e5 24 基a5 全c3!, and the d5 pawn becomes dangerous (Wahls – Adorjan, Germany 1989).



21...g5!? The most idealistic, athough 21...\$cf6!? 22  $\Xi$ [4+ \$\phige] 23 b3 h6! 24 \$\vec{De}Ce\$ \$\PhiPi\$ ris also not bad. In the game Belyavsky - Ivanchuk (Truskavetz 1987) White fell into a disguised trap: 25 \$\vec{L}e\$ \$\vec{L}e

22 Za4 & f6 23 b4 It is possible to recommend 23 b3!? (only not 23 Zaxa??! Zaxa? 24 & xa7 & xb22 25 Za7 & c66), though in the game Reinderman – Henkin (Antwerp 1993) White did not achieve too much: 23...d4 24 Ze5+ & g6 25 & d2 Ze8.

23...d4 24 IIa5+ \$\prod g6 25 \$\overline d2 IIa8 26 \$\prod f1 d3 This position was reached in the game Arkipov – Filipenko (Belgorod 1989) and Adams – Dreev (Wijk aan Zee 2002). A draw is not far off.

#### В

#### 15 @g5+!?

This looks rather fresher than 15 歡xd5 ed. White tries to weaken the e6 square, where (after doubling) White's rooks can penetrate.



15...16 16 \vert x43 \vert cd 17 \vert x43 \vert cd 18 0-0-0 Very interesting is 18 \vert cd 18 \vert

18.... b4 The last fork in the whole system.



1) 19 **Ehg1** does not give Black any trouble: 19...g5! 20 a3 2d6 21 **Ege1** 2e5 (Gavrikov – Dreev, Biel 1995).

2) In a series of grandmaster games was tried the idea **19 Zd31**? **Zhd8 20 \Delta b1**? (20 a3 **Zac8+ 21 \Delta b1 \Delta c5** 22 **Ze1 \Delta del**! with equal chances, Karpov - Kramnik, Linares 1993)

 Insufficient for a serious advantage is 19 \$1, and then:

19... 里hc8 20 軍d3 軍c4 21 單hd1 覃h4 22 軍xd5 軍xh2 23 軍d7 全f8 24 軍xa7 軍xa7 25 全xa7 h5 26 a4. The edge pawn hurries to queen. We bet on White! (Pilgaard – Flambort, Budapest 2003);

19...Ehd8!? 20 Id3 a5!? 21 a3 \$\overline{1}\$ fs 23 Ic1 Id7 Still not a draw, but already close (Nielsen - Dominguez, Esbjerg 2002).

4) 19 a3 In the variation 15 Wxd5 ed 16 &e3 &e6 17 0-0-0 &b4, 18 a3 is considered a main move; the insertion 15 &g5+ f6 changes little. True, the e6 square is weakened a little. But how to exploit this?

19...Ihc8+!? 20 Ibl &c5 21 Ihc1 &xc3 22 Ixc3+ Ibc6 23 Idc1 It seems that White has achieved something – he threatens a check on e6. But...



Black: 24 **Ee6+ \$**c5 25 **E**c1 **E**xc1+ 26 **\$**xc1 **\$**d4 27 **E**c7 **E**c8+ 28 **\$**d2 **E**b8 29 b4 a5! with a draw (Gulko – Harikrishna, Bled 2002).

He can get to the 7<sup>th</sup> rank, but this changes little to the assessment of the position: 24 **Ze7 Zh4** 25 **Zle6**+ (25 b4 d4) **25...&c5 26 Zrg7** (26 **&c2 Zh4** 27 **&d3 Zrg7** (26 **Ze7 Zh4 27 &d4 Zrg7** (26 **Ze7 Zh4 27 &d4 Zrg7** (28 **Zle14 D5 Zle16 Zle** 

The paradox of the Four Knights system 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4  $\Omega$ 16 5  $\Omega$ c3  $\Omega$ c6 6  $\Omega$ 13 lies in the fact that the 'rate of movement' in it is determined by Black, but 'the rudder' is invariably directed by White!

It all depends on Black whether the game develops at a mad tempo (6... & g4 7 cd 2 xd5 8 3 b3 & xf3 9 gf 3 b6) or it proceeds softly, softly

(9...6). But in the first case (after 9...2b6?!) theory leads Black to a painfully narrow corridor for manoeuvre (10 d5! 20d4 11 &b5+!), while in the second (9...6 10 ₩xb7 2xd4 11 &b5+2xb5 12 @c6+! &c7 13 ₩xb5 ₩d7 14 2xd5+ ₩xd5) he has to switch, as it were, to a... tricycle! Attacking with such an outmoded vehicle is complicated – how to outrun the opponent? No matter how much he pedals, the speed is almost zero.

White too has nothing special to be happy about. No adherents play  $9_{-\Delta}$ bbc?), and it is only possible to reckon seriously on an endgame victory after 9...c6 if the opponent is significantly lower rated. Conclusion? If a win is needed at all costs, then it is hardly appropriate to go for the Four Knights system as White. After 6 &g5 the play is richer, indeed the theory less. But about this - in Chapter Four.

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### Chapter Two

# 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 公f6 5 신c3 신c6 6 皇g5

Before going over to an examination of 6 & g5, we pause for a little while to look at other moves of the dark-squared bishop.

The other thing that Black should know is – how to react to  $6 \pounds f4 g6$ 7 2b5?



Analysis shows that the complications after 7...e5! 8 de 2b4+ favour Black:

6 \$25 The original source of this plan should apparently be considered the game A.Rabinovich - Tartakower (Carlsbad 1911), although we also habitually date its 'chronology' from the match Botvinnik - Flohr (Moscow/Leningrad 1933). In his commentary to one of the match games, Mikhail Moiseevich himself acknowledged that а weighty contribution to the elaboration of the system was made by the analysts A.Model and V.Ragozin.



White attacks the d5 square; correspondingly, from now on Black ought to decide how to deal with this. The centre can be given up - 6...de (A), but, perhaps, on the other hand, consolidated - 6... $\pm$ c6 (B). If however you are accustomed to playing aggressively, irrespective of which colour you are; then it is possible to go over at once to a counterattack: 6... $\pm$ g4 (C), 6... $\pm$ b6 (D) or 6... $\pm$ g5 (E). The position after 6...e6 by transposition of moves will be looked at in the second part of the book.

### А

**6...dc** At once we have a division:  $7 \stackrel{\circ}{=} xc4$  and  $7 \stackrel{\circ}{=} 5$ .

 1) 7 &xc4!? White offers the opponent a real gambit and, it seems, Black has every right to accept the gambit. Only this must be done intelligently.

a) Weak is 7...<sup>2</sup>0xd4?! 8 <sup>(1)</sup> <sup>(2)</sup>xG3 <sup>(2)</sup> C10 <sup>(2)</sup> b5+ <sup>(2)</sup> d7 <sup>(1)</sup> 0-0. The advantage in development assumes threatening proportions, for example, 11...<sup>2</sup>xb5 <sup>(2)</sup> 2xb5 <sup>(2)</sup> b613 a4 a6 14 <sup>(2)</sup> c3 <sup>(2)</sup> d8 <sup>(2)</sup> 15 <sup>(2)</sup> c10 <sup>(2)</sup> xb7! ab 17 <sup>[2)</sup> xd7! <sup>(2)</sup> (Cipslis - Schultze, Biel 1995).

But proving that the initiative is worth a pawn will be considerably more difficult after an exchange of queens. Therefore 7... wat 4? 8 wat 4 (2x) 49 0-0-0 es!



What luxury for the black knight on d4! It covers the dangerous d-file, defends against attacks on b5. It must be driven away, but how?

On 10 f4 there is 10...\$g4!? 11 ②f3 桌xf3! (the knight d4 is the way to any material blessings: 11... @xf3?! 12 gf @xf3 13 fe! @xh1 14 cf or 13... 全xd1 14 罩xd1 -analysis by B. Kantzler) 12 gf Ec8! (do you notice how often in this variation Black succeeds in making counterattacking moves with tempo) 13 fe Ixc4 14 ef g6 (also possible is 14.... De6 15 Ihel Ic8 16 \$b1 h6 17 de3 gf, though after 18 2d5 White's position is still better, P.-H. Neilsen - Dominguez, Esbjerg 2003) 15 黑he1+ 2e6 16 金b1 (if White decides that he will play his 'Evergreen Game', then own disappointment awaits him: after 16 基xe6+?! fe 17 f7+ 空xf7 18 罩d7+ 堂g8 19 호f6 b5 20 술d1 트f4 it is only Black who can aspire to victory, Vrenegor - van Wely, Holland 1993) 16...耳c6 17 创d5 皇d6 18 皇h6 会d7 19 Ee2 Ed8 20 &e3 &c5 21 &xc5 Exc5 22 Exc6 fe 23 &fd+ Ed5! White's initiative is neutralised (S.-B. Hansen – P.-H. Nielsen, Copenhagen 1996).

There remains 10 2f3 2xf3 11 gf, but then Black succeeds in hiding away his king.

alternative is 11... 皇e6 12 皇b5+ 创d7, and in the event of 13 f4 f6 14 2h4 all problems are solved by 14 ... 0-0-0! 15 fe 2 xe5 16 罩xd8+ 當xd8 17 罩e1 皇d6 (Lanka Preissmann Geneva 1993) Promising for White is another plan doubling rooks on the d-file: 13 菖d2!? f6 14 菖hd1 菖d8 15 桌e3 a6 16 \$a4 b5 17 \$c2 \$b4 18 a3 (Broberg - Heppner, Grunheide 1996) 18....皇xc3 19 bc 雲e7 20 罩d6 etc

12 Ehel 0-0 13 Exe5  $\pm$ d8 14  $\oplus$ e4  $\oplus$ d7 15 Ef5  $\pm$ c7!? Black played poorly in the game Sveshnikov – OII (Moscow 1992): 15... $\oplus$ f6?! 16 Ef4  $\pm$ c6?! After the exchange of all the minor pieces the rook invades on d7 with great effect.

16 🖓 d6



This position was reached in the game Poluljahov - Maiorov (Krasnodar 1995). Black played 16...&xd6?: 17  $\Xi xd6$  g6 18  $\Xi$ 14  $\triangle$ e5 19 &x5 &x5, but did not achieve full equality. The two powerful white bishops outweigh both the defective pawn structure and rather uneasy position of the king e1.

However grandmaster Poluljahov himself also suggested a better solution in this position: 16...\Db6! 17 \Ec5 \Deckard 18 \Exd6 \Deckard 2xc4 19 \Exc4 \Deck O wo the ending is absolutely equal.

Of course, Black has the right to decline the gambit on the 7<sup>th</sup> move. All the same, as we see, he risks more than his opponent, and upon mutually accurate play will be fighting only for equality. So is it possible that this is a rather simpler way?



b) 7...e68 &213 &279 0.00 0.00 - asolid, 'compact' way to achieve his objective (equality). This variation has a close affinity to the Queen's Gambit Accepted: 1 d4 d5 2 c4 d6 3 &2163 &2163 &2164 c3 a c5 & & & & c3 c4 c5 c5 0.00(it being understood that in this variation the idea 9 &25 is in no way considered to be the main line). In practice more often than not White does not realise his ambition:



10 Wd2 a6 (also possible is 10...bc, as the break in the centre leads only to equality and a speedy draw: 11 d5!?  $\partial_{15}$  12  $\pm$ d3 ed 13 ffel  $\Delta_{c6}$ 14 ffad1  $\pm$ g4 15  $\pm$ xf6  $\pm$ xf6 (b  $\pm$ xf3  $\pm$ xf3, Anad - Dreev, Hyderabad 2002; on this theme the same opponents played yet another game - see 10 ffcl) 11 ffad1  $\pm$ Db4 12  $\pm$ b3 b6 13 We2  $\pm$ b7 14 ffel  $\Delta$ bd5 15  $\Delta_{c5}$ 5  $\pm$ xc3 16 be  $\Delta$ d5 17  $\pm$ d2 b5 18 Wd3  $\pm$ g5. The game is equal (Pelletier - Dreev, Biel 2002);

**10**  $\Xi$ c1 a6 11  $\pounds$ d3  $\pounds$ d7 12  $\Xi$ c1  $\Xi$ c8 13 a3  $\bigcirc$ d5 14 h4!? (though this looks very strong, Black reacts in a cool way) 14... $\bigcirc$ xc3! 15 bc h6 16  $\pounds$ xc6?  $\bigcirc$ xc7 17 c4 b51 18 c5  $\bigcirc$ d5 19  $\bigcirc$ c5  $\pounds$ c6 20 a4  $\blacksquare$ xh4 21  $\bigcirc$ xc6  $\Xi$ xc6 22 ab ab 23  $\pounds$ xb5  $\Xi$ c7 (lvanchuk – Dreev, Moscow 2002). An interesting game – and again a draw.

10 冨e1 a6 11 a4 全d7 12 響e2 (12 響d2 冨c8 13 冨ad1 全b4 14 d5 ed 15 金xd5 金c6 16 金b3 金xf3 17 gf 響xd2 18 冨xd2 全c6 19 金g2 鼍fd8

20 IIxd8+ IIxd8 21 IId1 IIxd1 22 IIxd1 Qd5! with a draw, Anand – Dreev, Hyderabad 2002) 12...Qd5 13 III III Qxe7 III Axd5 Qxd5 15 Qxd5 ed 16 Qe5 f6 17 Qd3 IIe8 18 Wd2 and once again a draw (Gelfand – Dreev, Wijk aan Zee 2002):

10 a3!? Perhaps the most flexible way. Even the impregnable Dreev stumbles every now and then, as in these variations:



10...a6 11 ¥d3 b5 12 &a2 b4?! 13 Qa4 e5?! 14 &xf6 &xf6 15 ¥e4! (Tkachiev – Dreev, Cap d'Agde 2000). Though White lost the game, this has nothing to do with the assessment of the position.

**10...b6** 11 ₩d3 ŵb7 12 IIad1 2d5 13 ŵc1!? 2xc3 14 bc 2a5 15 ŵa2 ∞xf3?! 16 ₩xf3 ₩c7 17 IId3 4c4 18 ₩f5 g6 19 ₩f6. Again Dreev stood worse, and... again he won (Bologan – Dreev, Cap d'Agde 202):

10...h6 11 金h4 公h5! 12 金xe7 ⊙xe7! (classical genre) 13 罩el 公f6 14 彎d3 b6 15 罩ad1 金b7, and Black can boldly look to the future (Kron – Treguboy, Tomsk 2003).  7 d5!? This idea of M.Botvinnik and his helpers was specially prepared for the match against Flohr.



White gains time, but what is even more important – he also gains the d4 square for his queen. The knight c6 must move away. But to where: the centre or sideways?

a) 7... Def?! In chess, surprisingly, not infrequently there are situations where natural, logical, healthy moves are not the strongest!

8 @id4 
2d3 
2d3 
2d3 
2d4 
2d3 
2d3

9 âxd3 cd 10 ⊘h3! In the ls game of the Botvinnik – Flohr match was played 10 âxt6?!, and after 10..ef 11 ≝xd3 âd6 12 @ge2 0-0 13 0-0 ≣e8 Black fortunately avoided danger. But only up to the 9th game of this same match...

By playing 10 ©131, White is not distracted by trifles, but calmly completes the mobilisation of his forces. It is important that he retains the possibility of castling both on the short and the long sides – White can vary his plan depending on the situation.



Whichever pawn – h, g or e – makes a move, it looks like there will be trouble from which there is no escape:

10...h6 11 急f4 g5 12 急e5 皇g7 13 饗xd3 with advantage (analysis by Botvinnik);

**10...g6** 11 &x(6 ef 12 0-0 &b6 13  $\exists$ fic1+ &x48 14 &b14! (the last difficult move in the game) 14...g5 15 &b15 &b16 &b17  $\exists$ 78 17 &b17 g4 18 &b2d2 with an overwhelming position (Botvinnik – Flohr, Leningrad 1933, – the very same 9<sup>th</sup> game of the match!);

10...e6? 11 0-0-0! 鱼e7 12 蒕hel 0-0 13 蒕xd3 ed, and 14 蒕xe7! 饗xe7 15 心xd5! is decisive (Furman – Naglis, Moscow 1970). We return to the position before the 8th move and try out 8...h6!?



The position is tenable by word of honour. But none the less – nobody has yet proved a win for White.

9 &r4 Also upon 9 %xc5 hg 10 &xc4 Black's life, as they say, is teetering on the edge of a precipice. Thus, in the game J. Polgar – Seirawan (Monaco 1993) Black could not withstand the pressure and after 10...a611 0-0-0 %d6 12 &15 g4 13  $\exists$ hel? % %c5  $\exists$  xh2 15 d6! e6 16 &c4 2xc4 17  $\exists$ xc4 he lost by a one-move blunder: 17...f6? (17...&d7)18 d7+.

Apparently, after 9 Wxe5 hg 10 axc4 the most accurate defence lies in 10 ... ad7 !? The pawn sacrifice is temporary - 11 @xg5?! @c7! 12 盒b3 罩xh2 13 罩xh2 豐xh2 14 0-0-0 g6! (Kindermann - Balogh, Baden 1999), while 11 2f3!? allows a surprising pin of the white pieces: 11...g4 12 ②g5 邕h5! The continuation of the game Hernandez Gonzalez (Reves 2000) is interesting: 13 0-0 罩c8 14 2b5 曾b6 15 Iacl a6 16 d6! Ixg5! 17 響xg5 ab 20 Exc1 e6 21 Ec7+. Here Black missed the chance to equalise the



...in view of 11...Qe7! In the game Anand – Seirawan (Amsterdam 1992) White could not immediately recover from this blow: 12 Ed1 Qed5 13 We5 Qd7 14 We2?! (later Anand admitted that it was time to repeat moves: 14 Wd4 Q716 15 We5) 14...Qx3 15 be g6 16 Qes Qxx5 17 Wxc5 Eg8 18 Qxx4 Qg7 19 Qb5+ Qd7 20 Qxd7+ Wd7 21 We3 We6 and Seirawan's bishop is noticeably stronger than the white knight, although later on Anand's class told – and he won.

10...\$\overline\$xf4 11 \overline\$xf4 a6 Wild positions need corresponding methods. For example, such as: 11...\$?! 12 \overline\$d2 \overline\$g2 a6 14 0-0 \overline\$0; and Black is only a little worse (Lalic - Almagro, Madrid 2003).

12 **∲f3 g6 13 0**-**0** Black also holds up after 13 **€**c5 **∰6** 14 0-0, albeit with help from the same resource: 17 **Eacl g4** 18 **€**b3 **€5** 19 **E1 Eacl g4** 18 **€**b3 **€5** 19 **E1 Eacl g4** 18 **€**b3 **€5** 19 **E1 Eacl g4** (Timofeev – Galliamova, Kazan 2001).

13... g7 14 d6



Thus went the encounter Vaganian – Ehlvest (Riga 1995), Grandmaster Jaan Ehlvest was afraid to take the pawn, And, possibly, for no reason: the variation 14... with 40% for 3% of ed 16  $\mathbb{Z}$ [e1 + 4% ft 7  $\mathbb{Z}$ ald  $2\omega$ e8 does not convince us that White has the means to finish 'squeezing' this position.

However, if we talk as a whole, then, without any doubt, the move 7... (De5?) leads to a difficult game for Black.

b) 7... 2a5!? It is hard to believe, but this move - is the strongest!



**8 b4** The most principled – White wants to trap the knight, stranded on the edge of the board. And perhaps he has no other way of playing:

8 213 hands back the lost tempo: 8...a6! 9 b4 (he must; if Black manages to carry out b7-b5, then he will simply be left with an extra pawn) 9...cb 10 ab c6 11 &c2 &b4 12 &c1 &xd5, and Black has won the opening battle (Ravinsky - Tolush, Moscow 1944).

Rejecting the idea of winning the knight - 8 &xc4?! Qxc4 9 ₩a4+ Ad7 10 ₩xc4 - is likewise ineffective. If we believe the old analysis of A.Konstantinopolsky, Black has not bad play after 10...b5? 11 ₩c2 (or 11 Qxb5 II.8) 11...₩b6 12 &xt6 gf. Meanwhile in the game Rother - Schultze (Germany 1988) Black chose 10...g6 11 &xt6 ef and also did not miscalculate: 12 QiJ 2x 21 31.00-014 II.6

**8...cb 9 ab Ad7!** The point of the whole plan. By freeing the c8 square for the rook, Black is ready to meet the blow b3-b4 fully armed.

White's problem is that he has a crisis of ideas:

10 象xf6 gf 11 b4 置c8! 12 兑e4 ④c4 13 鲫b3 唑c7 14 ④f3 象g7 15 ④c5 ④d6 16 置xa7 f5 17 象d3 0-0 18 0-0 置a8 (Sveshnikov – Vuruna, Belgrade 1988);

10  $\pounds$ d3 e6 11 de  $\pounds$ xe6 12  $\pounds$ b5+  $\pounds$ c6 13 wxd8+  $\blacksquare$ xd8 14  $\nexists$ xa7  $\pounds$ b4 15  $\pounds$ xf6 gf 16  $\pounds$ c2 c0-0 17  $\nexists$ xb7  $\hbar$ a5 (Hector - P.-H. Nielsen, Copenhagen 1996). In both cases White cannot aspire to an advantage. So, all the same, he must advance the pawn:

10 b4  $\Xi$ c8! 11 bb5 bc4 12 bxa7 (on 12 axf6 he has an effective blockade 12...ab5 13  $\Huge{a}$ c3 cdd() 12...e6! 13 bb3 Taking the rook was not possible in view of the check on b4 – but Black has two pieces under fire at the same time!?



13...\#c7! Everything is hanging by a thread, but will not fall! The queen defends c4, while the rook as before is untouchable – this time because of a check on c5. Moreover, also 13..\#b6!?, which occurred in the game Sveshnikov – Rupert (Budapest 1988), might equally prove sufficient to maintain the intrigue: 14 @xe8 &xh4 + 15 @c2 \#c5!

14 2x16 (14 2)3 2x5? 15 2x16 2x13+16 2x17 2ff25? 15 4.2f 15 213 2x5? From the 12<sup>th</sup> move the rook was under fire, but... 'the grapes are sour' 16 2xc8 2x13+17 gf25\* 18 2x12 2fx119 2x2 2fd4 winning. 16 2x1



In the game Pukhyala – Kallio (Lakhti 1997) followed 16...2xf3+17 gf  $rac{1}{9}$  (Worth considering was the simpler 16...2xf3+ 17 de (17  $\leq$ b5  $\leq$ xf3+ 18 gf  $rac{1}{9}$ e5+ 19  $\leq$ d2  $\mathbb{Z}$ e8, and

how to defend against the check on h6?) 17...fe 18 金b5 公太f3+ 19 豐xf3 豐e5+ 20 豐e2 金xb5 21 公xb5 金xb4+ 22 金f1 蓋al winning.

#### В

6...2e6!? A move well known from the time of the game Levenfish – Belavenets (Leningrad 1934). 70 years have passed and a refutation still not found.



In striving to prove that the development of the bishop on e6 in itself is artificial, 7 ef suggests itself. But in the game Gelfand – Dreev (Munich 1994) Black 'unravelled' in five moves: " $-\infty$ -Gel \* &  $\Delta$ hd  $\Delta$ xc3 9 be Wa5 10 Wd2  $\Delta$ f5 11 a4 e5! Already it is time for White to think about equalisation.

 $\begin{array}{c} 7 \bigotimes_{\mathbf{g}} 2 \ dc \ 8 \And_1 4 \ looks \ ideal, and it is seems that Black will have problems with countering 4d-d5. However, though dangerous, Black seems to get a way with taking the d4 pawer by a seem store of the second seems to get a second seco$ 

mention that after 7 Oge2 dc it is naive to count on 8 Axf6?! ef 9 d5? in view of 9...Ob4! 10 Of4 Af5(Boudre – Miles, Ostend 1986).

White does not manage to pose any problems by  $\mathbf{7} \quad \mathbf{Wd2} \quad \mathbf{g6} \quad 8 \quad \mathbf{\&x} \quad \mathbf{f6}?! \text{ eff}$ 9 c5. After 9...h51 it becomes clear that the position of the white queen is poor: 10  $\quad \mathbf{\&b5} \quad \mathbf{\&h6}! \quad \mathbf{11} \quad \mathbf{f4} \quad 0\text{-}\mathbf{0}$ 12  $\quad \mathbf{\&xc6} \quad \mathbf{bc} \quad \mathbf{13} \quad \mathbf{\&pc2} \quad \mathbf{Zh8} \quad \mathbf{14} \quad \mathbf{0} \quad \mathbf{Ol} \quad \mathbf{E8}$ 15  $\quad \mathbf{Zael} \quad \mathbf{\&c8} \quad \mathbf{16} \quad \mathbf{\&p3} \quad \mathbf{\&a6} \quad \text{with a} \quad \mathbf{a} \quad \mathbf{comfortable game} \quad (\mathbf{Sveshnikov} - \mathbf{Oll}, \\ \text{Podolsk} \quad \mathbf{193}.$ 

The main continuations are considered to be 7 2f3, 7 2e2, 7 a3 and 7 2xf6.

1) 7 2f3 2e4!



It can be shown that  $8 \ 2xe4$  de 9 d5 does not cause Black any trouble: 9...ef 10 de  $\frac{1}{8}a5+11 \ 2c42$  $\frac{1}{8}e5+12 \ 2c43 \ 2c4c6 \ 13 \ 2c43 \ 14 \ 2c2 \ 2c4 \ 15 \ 0-0 \ 2c7 \ 16 \ 2c4 \ 14 \ 2c2 \ 2c4 \ 15 \ 1c4 \ 2c4 \ 2c4 \ 1c4 \ 2c4 \ 1c4 \ 2c4 \ 2c4 \ 1c4 \ 2c4 \ 1c4 \ 2c4 \ 2c4 \ 2c4 \ 1c4 \ 2c4 \ 2c$ 

Another direct plan − 8 cd &xd5 9 ⊕xc4 & &xe4 10 &c4 − is also harmless: 10...∰5+ 11 &c42 @F5 12 ⊕g5 &d5 13 @b3 ⊕xd4 14 @a4+ b5! 15 &xb5+ ⊕xb5 16 @xb5+ @d7 (A.Minasian − Shurigin, Decin 1996).

lgor Zaitsev suggested 8 单d3!? ②xc3 9 bc dc 10 单e4 单d5 11 響b1!? Completing his development is really not so simple, but all the same White's attack should not be underestimated.

Thus, in the game Al. Sokolov – Turov (Nijni Novgorod 1999) Black stood his ground by 11...b6 12 0-0 f6!? 13 2f4 g6 14 Zet e6 15 Wb5 \$17 16 Zab1 2xe4 17 Zxe4 Wd5

2) Therefore 7 ▲c2!? is more cunning – White 'deceives' with the development of his minor pieces. Which one will go to f3? Most likely the knight, but in certain variations – the bishop, when it will attack the d5 square.

However, after 7.... **Wa5!?** none of White's pretentious novelties can secure him an advantage.



The idea 8  $\pm x$ 16 ef 9 cd  $\pm x$ d5 10  $\pm$ 13 is too simple to seem right. Black equalises: 10... $\pm$ 14  $\pm x$ d5 I  $\pm x$ d5 12  $\pm$ 013  $\pm$ 04 13  $\pm$ 62+  $\pm$ d8! (Gulko – Rogers, Oropesa 1996).

Practice is concentrated around two ideas: 8 20f3 and 8 c5.

a) 8 263 dc 9 0-0 2d8 10 2e1?? For the present the experimental sacrifice of a pawn 10 Wc1?! does not justify itself:

10...h6 11 皇d2 ②xd4!? 12 ③xd4 算xd4 13 b4 鬱d8 14 皇e3 罩d7 15 皇d1 a6! 16 b5 ab 17 單b1 g5! (Rogers - Dreev, Biel 1993) or

10...\(\overline{\chi}\)xd4!? 11 \(\overline{\chi}\)xd4 [1xd4 12 b4 \(\overline{\overline{\chi}\)dd4 13 \(\overline{\chi}\)e3 [2d] 7 14 \(\overline{\chi}\)xa7 g6 15 \(\overline{\chi}\)b5 \(\overline{\chi}\)g7 16 \(\overline{\chi}\)c4 4 0-0 18 \(\overline{\chi}\)xa7 gf 19 \(\overline{\chi}\)e3 \(\overline{\chi}\)e4! 20 [2b] 1 [2c7 (Ramesh - Adianto, Madras 1996).

10...b5 11 響c1!? b4 12 皇xf6 bc



13 d5!? \$\Delta dsrc3 \Vec5 15 \Vec{Wf4} e616 \(\Delta dsrc4) For the sacrificed pawn White has somehow managed to develop a fair degree of initiative (Stocek - Zurek, Czech Republic 2003), however there can hardly be any doubt that the theory of this subvariation will be rewritten in a very short time.

b) 8 65 2n 49  $\pm$  0.212? The creation of Alexander Morozevich. The more standard 9  $\Delta$ I3  $\pm$  10 be # 8xc3+ 11  $\pm$  0.2 #a3 12  $\pm$  10 be #xc3+ 11  $\pm$  0.2 #a3 12  $\pm$  11  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  10 be #xc3+ 11  $\pm$  0.2 #a3 12  $\pm$  11  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2 \pm 0.2  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2 \pm 0.2  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2 \pm 0.2  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2 \pm 0.2  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2 \pm 0.2  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2 \pm 0.2  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2 \pm 0.2  $\pm$  0.2 \pm 0.2  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2 \pm 0.2  $\pm$  0.2 \pm 0.2  $\pm$  0.2 \pm 0.2  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2 \pm 0.2 \pm 0.2 \pm

9...鬯c7 10 全f3 0-0-0 11 ②ge2 g5 12 盒xe4 de 13 營a4 盒g7 14 ②b5 How can he refuse such a thrust? The

more so that the other natural move – 14 盒xg5 – is far weaker: 14...②xd4 15 叠xd4 盒xd4 16 蠻xa7 盒xc5 17 蠻a8+ 蠻b8 18 蠻a5 b6 19 蠻a4 Дhg8 etc.

And yet analysis shows that it is worth waiting with the thrust to dS, and firstly defend d4: 14 & ac3! If A..h6, then 15 0-00, while 14...f5 allows a favourable return to the main idea: 15 &xg5 &xd4 16 &xd4 &xd4 17 &b5 WeS 18 &d1 with a strong initiative.

14...₩b8 15 \$xg5 a6 16 @bc3 ⓐxd4 Even more dangerous looks the capture on d4 with the bishop, however a direct refutation is something we do not see.

After 16... 2xd4 arises a position, key to the evaluation of the whole plan with 9 \$d2!?



17 @xe7 @d7 18 Wd1 @g4 19 2xd8 (also upon 19 2d6 2xd6 20 cd Wxd6 the compensation for the material is most probably sufficient for a draw) 19 ... Ixd8 20 Wc1 2xe2 21 Gixe2 @xe2 22 Wg5 (a necessary intermediate move. weaker is 22 @xe2 We5) 22... 2b5 23 Wxg7 ₩f4 (White is the exchange ahead, but the difference in the activity of the pieces might be felt deeply) 24 Idl Ixd1+ 25 gxd1 Wxf2 26 Wo4+ f5 (there is also nothing clear after 26... 當d8) 27 響g8+ 當d7 28 響xh7+ 當c6 29 響h8 當xc5 30 Wc3+ \$66 31 Wd2 e3! Both the exchanges and the whimsical dance of the white queen have proved of eradicating incapable the opponent's initiative.

3) 7 a3!? A non-standard idea, and the man who thought it up was also absolutely non-standard – Kazan master Rashid Nezhmetdinov.



Black's counterplay, associated with \#d8-a5 and \D16-e4, is nipped in the bud: on 7...\#a5? follows 8 b4. This is welcome. The question is this - is it worth spending a whole tempo on such prophylaxis?

It is interesting that in the game Kasparov - Dreev (Moscow 1996) Black immediately returned the tempo: 7...&g4?! 8 f3 &c6. After 9 c5 g6 10 &b5 &g7 11 &c22 0-0 12 0-0 &f5 13 b4 a6 14 &a4 h6 15 &c3 began a great struggle (with some advantage to White).

More often seen: 7...g6 or 7... #d7.

a) Leading to a tough game, devoid of sudden changes, is 7...g6 8 2xf6 ef, and then:

9 \$e2 \$h6 10 \$f3 \$be7 11 cd 2xd5 12 2ge2 0-0 with approximate equality (Nezhmetdinov - Flohr, Moscow 1961); to combat the impending manoeuvre @g1-e2-g3 Black tries to restrict the knight by the advance h5-h4; at an opportune moment the pawn is also ready to go on to h3) 10 2b5 2h6 11 2ge2 0-0 12 0-0 Ie8 13 b4 h4! 14 f4 Wd7 15 Wd2 2f5 16 Zael Ze7 17 Ocl Zae8 18 Zxe7 Zxe7 (Hebden - Anic. France 2001). In this position White should bring the h4 pawn to a halt, so that he can then deal with it in earnest: 19 h3! But even then Black has chances of maintaining the tension, for example, 19 ... 2e4 20 響f2 g5!

9 g3!? (the most ideal) 9... ≜h6 10 ≜g2 ⊕e7 11 c5 0-0 12 ⊕ge2 f5 13 @d3 @d7 14 0-0 œg7 15 Ife1 ⊕g8 16 @b5! Black has not managed to fully equalise the game (Chabanon – Elict, France 2001).

b) 7...₩d7?? A flexible move, as distinct from 7...g6. Black shows the opponent that he is not at all bothered by his undeveloped king's flank. He intends first to castle queenside, and then strike out at the centre; the bishop f8 will somehow get into play. Most often White reacts with an exchange on f6, but other continuations are also possible:



8 b4 (8 c5 ①e41) 8...dc1? (not fearing the pawn fork) 9 盒xf6 gf 10 d5 0-0-0! 11 盒xc4 ④c5 12 盒b5 響c7 13 ②gc2 (Lanka – Adianto, Adelaide 1990) 13...彙b81? with counterplay (a recommendation of Z.Lanka);

8 & 2: 0-0-0! 9 & & xf5 (leading to a very sharp game is 9 c5 & 4! 10 & 11 & 45 & 5: 11 & 14 & 10 & 13 & 3 c5! 14 & d4 15 c6! Kobalija – Khalifman, Maikop 1998) 9...gf lo c5 (or 10 & 13 & 12 & 14 & 26  $\ge$  12 & 42 & 6: 13 & 26 & 14 & 26  $\ge$  12 & 42 & 6: 13 & 26 & 11 & 6: 16 z 16 z 16 z 17 Z & 16 & 11 & 27 & 12 & 15 z 25  $\le$  15 & 26  $\le$  11 & 27 & 25! (Sveshnikov – Takahiev, Vienna 1996).

These examples, together with the previous ones, direct one's thoughts to the fact that Black has a certain plan: development of the queen, then castling long, taking on f6 with the grawn, and at some moment -e7-e5?

Subsequent events only reinforce this impression. It turns out that Black's play in the variation 6...\$c6 is not at all as chaotic as might appear at first glance. 8 ± Aff gf 9 c5 There is a standard reaction to 9 ±C2: 9...0-0-0 10 c5 ±G5 (affer 10...Ξg8 the position on the board is one that we have already examined in the game Sveshnikov – Tkachiev) 11 Ch3 c5! 12 b4 Ξg8. The reply to 13 0-0 should not be 13...±A2! H 4g3 ±Ar1 15 kAr1, as occurred in the game C.Hansen – Hector (Malmo 1998), but 13...±C4! Y 4g 3 ±Ar1 15 de fe 16 Ef 15! In such positions the extra exchange is worth far less than the possibility of continuing the attack.

In the game Topalov – Leko (Vienna 1996) the move 9 g3 was seen. And once again Black achieved a comfortable game by just repeating the basic idea of the variation: 9...0-00 10 &g2 &g4! 11 f3 &c6 12 c5 (on 12 f4 &g4 13 &af4 Leko had prepared 13...c5! 14 cd &xd4 with the initiative) 12...&f5! 13 b4 c5 14 &opc2 &fe5!



A recommendation of the wellknown Latvian theoretician Zigurds Lanka - 11...h5 12 ②gc2 单h6 13 0-0 星g8 - passed the test in the European junior championship (Patras 1999). The game Edrichka – Berescu continued 14 &h1 II da 15 Wei &18 16 Wh4 a6 17 &a4 &g5 18 W12 &d3 19 II ad1 Wf5. Black has an acceptable game, but no more.

But it is best not to split hairs and play, as we have already repeatedly observed: 11 ... e5! 12 @ge2 0-0-0! After 13 0-0 Black, in the game Lanka - Leko (Budapest 1996), preferred 13 ... We6 14 wh1 2h6, and here, in Lanka's opinion, 15 b4!? followed by \$xc6 and b4-b5 allows White to count on an attack. More accurate is 13 ... @ h6!? 14 @h1 Ehg8 15 Wa4 (Izoria - Mastrovasilis, Athens 2003). Here the opponents agreed a draw, though from Black's side this decision looks premature. Possible, even if there is nothing else, is 15....a6 16 @xc6 @xc6 17 @b3 \$b8 18 Had1 2e6. and White still has a struggle for equality in prospect.

4) 7 \$xf6 (the most principled) 7...gf!? First played in the game Miles – Yusupov (Tunis 1985). Black easily won this game! The idea 7...gf made such an indelible impression on

the Englishman that subsequently he himself began to capture with the g-pawn.

The other capture -7...61 has now completely gone out of fashion, though it is also possible: 8 cs a6!? 9  $\bigcirc$ ge2 b6 10 b4 &e7 11  $\blacksquare$ a4 b5 12  $\blacksquare$ b3 a5! 13  $\bigcirc$ xb5 a14  $\bigcirc$ (14  $\blacksquare$ a5 15 &d3  $\blacksquare$ b1  $\bigcirc$  xb5  $\bigcirc$ 0 17 0-0  $\blacksquare$ xb5 18 &xb5  $\blacksquare$ xb5  $\bigcirc$ 0 17 0-0  $\blacksquare$ xb5 18 &xb5  $\blacksquare$ xb5  $\bigcirc$ 0 17 0-0  $\blacksquare$ xb5 18 &xb5  $\blacksquare$ xb5  $\bigcirc$ 19  $\blacksquare$ fe1. Here, in the game Yurtaev = Dreev (Frunze 1988), Black replied with bishop to d8, whereas worth considering was 10... $\blacksquare$ d8!? 20  $\boxdot$ xc7+ (no good is 20  $\blacksquare$ xc6!? c 21  $\circlearrowright$ c7+ no ivew of 21... $\circlearrowright$ xd4! 22  $\between$ xb5  $\textcircled$ xb3 23 ab  $\And$ xc5) 20... $\boxdot$ xc7+ with the better chances.

The position after 7...gft? is rather 'one-sided'. Black's play is simple and understandable – long castling, play on the g-file, preparation for  $e^{7}e^{5}$  etc. But what will White do? It is necessary to say that the majority of players will not be up to the task and will very quickly be forced to fight not for the advantage but already for a draw.



Thus in the original game was played 8 營d2 營a5 9 c5 0-0-0 10 象b5 翼g8 11 f4 象h6 12 營f2? 创b4 13 罩d1  $\hat{\underline{s}}$  15 14 a3  $2c^2$ + 15  $\frac{1}{2}$  d2  $\frac{1}{2}$  e4, and after a few moves Miles resigned. Actually it is difficult to point out exactly where the decisive mistake was made – rather White's whole plan was wrong.

There are two main ideas: 8 <sup>(2)</sup>f3 or 8 c5.

a) 8 ⊘f3 For the time being not resolving the pawn tension in the centre – first of all White wants to complete his development. Reasonable, but the opponent, seeing that in the near future he is not threatened with anything, also develops his pieces to their best squares. If nobody threatens anything then equality is reached. Or an immediate draw.

Also quite popular is 8...@d7, for example, 9 c5?! &g4 10 &c2 &xf311 &xf3 c6 12 0-0 &g7 13 &c2 a6 14 @a4 0-0 15  $\exists fa1$  f5! (Sax – Miles, Wilk aan Zee 1989) or

9 <u>&</u>c2 <u>E</u>d8 10 cd <u>&</u>xd5 11 <u>€</u>xd5 <u>w</u>xd5 12 0-0 <u>&</u>h6 13 <u>w</u>c2 0-0 14 <u>&</u>d3 <u>€</u>xd4 <u>w</u>xd4 16 <u>E</u>ad1 <u>&</u>h8 17 <u>E</u>fc1 e6 18 <u>&</u>xh7 <u>w</u>b6 19 <u>&</u>d3 15 (Fedorowicz - Miles, USA 1988). In all previous examples Black did not experience the slightest

problem in achieving equality.

b) 8 c5 Continuing the principal line, beginning with the move 7 &xf6. The problem is – that 'principal' still does not mean 'good'.



13...Qx44! 14 arrowg8 ah6 15 ae8 ah3+ 16 Qxh3 arrowh3+ 17 rrowe1 Qc2+ 18 rrowe2 arrowh5+ 19 g4 arrowf2+ 20 arrowf3 Qxa1 21 arrowf1 24 arrowf2+ d3 23 Qc3 arrowf2+ 20 arrowf3 arrowf1 21 arrowf1 22 Qc2d3 23 Qc3 arrowf2+ arrowf2+ arrowf3+ a

In the variation 6... \$e6!? the analysts still have a wealth of work to do.

### С

7... & xe2 8 @gxe2 dc 9 d5 @e5 10 0-0 Let's assume that he succeeds in stirring up Black's position – to whose benefit will this be?



The game Mortensen – Birnboim (Haifa 1976) continued: 10...e6 11 @44 ho 12 @xc5 hg 13 de &dd14  $@b5+ \pounds R$  15 @2g3 @b6. By transposing to the endgame – 16 @xb6 ab 17 &fe1, White retained the advantage.

Black acted more aggressively in the game Tal – Bronstein (Leningrad 1971): 10...h6 11 & ft4 20g6 12 Wa4+ Wa7 13 Wc4 Ec8 14 Wh3 e5 15 de Waxe6 16 Wxb7 He lacks a single tempo to complete his development. 16...2c5 17 20d4! & xd4 18 Eael winning.

### D

6...\$b6?! A move combined with an idea devised and tested (in 1934 in a game against Spielmann) by the Czech Josef Reijfir. The first time everything turned out well – Spielmann played 7 c5? and after 7...\$xb2 & 2gc2 &f5 he did not obtain compensation for the pawn. After losing the game, Spielmann added the move 6...\$b6 to his own armoury. But he didn't have much luck: the first person he played queen to b6 against was Botvinnik.



In the game Botvinnik – Spielmann (Moscow 1935) Black lost his head and quickly succumbed: 7...豐xb2? 8 置c1 公b4 9 公a4 豐xa2 10 並c4 彙g4 11 公f3 並xf3 12 gf. A piece is lost – game over.

Unsatisfactory is  $7...2xdS^2$ ; 8 2xdS imeson 54 imeson 54 2xdS imeson 54 2

Only by finding the one defence 7... $\Im$ xd4!, can Black once again get interested in Rejfir's variation. The search first gathers pace around the moves 8  $\Im$ gc2 and 8  $\pounds$ c3.

8  $\partial_{12}e^{2}$ ?  $\partial_{15} 9$  **W**(2 h6 10 \$\pm k16 ef 11  $\partial_{12}$ \$\pm b5 + \$\pm 13\$ 13  $\partial_{12}e^4$ \$\pm 51 4 0-0 g6 15 a4 a6. In this complicated position the opponents concluded a peace. (Polugaevsky – Bagirov, Alma Ata 1969).

7 cd!

sacrifice: 13 0-0! ₩xc3 14 ℤc1 ₩b2 15 ℤc1 ☎f8 16 ᡚxd4 âxd4 17 ₩d3!, Romanov – Flerov, correspondence game, 1976) 12 ₩c1 âf5 13 âxd4 âxd4 14 ₩d2 ℤhc8 15 ₩c2+ œf8



The position is extremely confusing, and it is not absolutely certain that White can extricate himself from his situation without loss. Thus, in the game Shardmer – Szallai (Budapest 1969) after 16  $\triangle$ 13 Black delivered the next sacrifice – 16... $\pm$ ce4?: 17  $\pm$ ce4  $\pm$ x12+ 18  $\pm$ f1  $\pm$ xb2 19  $\pm$ 10  $\pm$ b6 – retaining the initiative.

But as soon as the move **8 (b)f3**! was discovered, Black once again (and this time finally) lost any interest in Rejfir's variation.

8...豐xb2 (he is prepared to suffer just for a pawn) 9 罩c1 ②xf3+ 10 豐xf3 h6 11 盒d2 a6 12 盒c4 g6



White has practically finished his development, whereas Black is lined up on the first rank. There is nothing surprising in the fact that White combines easily with a great supply of solidity.

13 d61 響a3 14 0-0 響xd6 15 全e4 響b6 16 兔a5! 豐xa5 17 全xf6+ ef 18 置fe1+ 兔e7 19 豐xf6 0-0 20 豐xg6+ 金h8 21 豐xh6+ 堂g8 22 置xe7 winning (Rausis - Berges, Yvres 2002).

E

6... #a5!? First encountered in the game Keres – Czerniak (Buenos Aires 1939). With this queen sortie the game turns out no less sharp than upon 6... #b6?!, but Black's ambitions this time have far more basis. In the first instance he threatens effect, but even if the fails to achieve this, his claim for free development with visions of counterattack might wild molta.



White can simply capture on f6; he can counter the jump of the knight to e4 directly (7  $\pm$ d2, 7  $\frac{10}{3}$ d2) or indirectly (7 a3), and can take the view that this is of no concern (7  $\frac{1}{2}$ d7).

1) 7 &xf6 ef Taking with the epawn is useful not only on general considerations; now on 8 c5?! there is the counter-blow 8...&xc5! 9 dc d4, and Black's chances are at least no worse: 10 &ad dc 11 &xd5 &xa5 12 &b5+ &d7 13 &xd7+ &xd7 14 0-0-0+ &c6 15 b4 &c4 16 &c2 (J.Polgar - Aguire, Ovice0 1992). Here he should play 16...a5!, and White is forced to repeat moves: 17 &dd4 &cf1 8 &b5+ etc.

8 cd Worth considering is 8 a3!? This idea was worked out in the 30s of the last century by the Soviet master Sergei Belavenets. White's threatened pressure on the queen's flank (c4-c5, b2-b4) forces the opponent to give up the centre:

 
 8...dc
 9 & xc4 & dd (possible is at 9...&c7 10 d5 € c5 11 & b5+ & ad7 12 & xd7+ € xd7 13 € b73 & ad67 14 & c5 & xc2 € c5 & xc2 € c5 with an approximately level endgame. Kobalija - S.Guliev, Yalta 1996) 10 & c2+ ef8 11 & d2.



White seems to have prevented the manoeuvre g7-g6 followed by \$\psiRg7. In the game Ljubojevic - Adams (Belgrade 1995) Black took the opponent at his word and after 11...\$\psice for 12 \$\psixe6 for 13 \$\Psi for \$\P 14 0-0 **Z**ad8 15 d5! he was forced to reconcile himself to a somewhat worse position.

But we think that the move 11...g6!? is still possible and, more than that, it is best. For example, 12  $\frac{12}{6}$  h6+  $\frac{1}{6}$ g8 13  $\frac{1}{6}$  gc2  $\frac{2}{16}$  7 14  $\frac{1}{2}$ g3  $\frac{2}{6}$ f5 15  $\frac{2}{6}$ xf5  $\frac{1}{8}$ xf5, and the queen will not hang around very long on h6.

9 ₩d2 ≜xc3 Events turn to an extremely confusing scenario after 9.... 20e7?!



Before it was considered that White obtained the advantage by 10 \u00e2b5+ \u00e2d8 11 \u00e2ge2:

11...②xd5 12 요c4 요c6 13 요xd5 象xd5 14 0-0 요c4 15 置fel 置e8 16 a3 象d6 17 ②g3 (Jansa – Vukic, Belgrade 1977) or

11... & xc3 12 @ xc3 @ xd5 13 a4! &e6 14 0-0 IIc8 15 IIfc1 @ xc3 16 d5! 2d7 17 bc (Vaisser -Sveshnikov, Sochi 1983).

But in the game Sveshnikov – S.Guliev (Vladivostok 1994) Black made an important correction: the endgame after 10...\#xb5! 11 \@xb5 &xd2+ 12 \@xd2 \@xd5 was harmless for him.

And yet the last word in this variation for the present remains with White: instead of 10  $\pm$ 55 more refined is 10 d6!?  $\Delta$ d5, and only now 11  $\pm$ 55 +  $\pm$  d7 12  $\pm$  dxd7 +  $\pm$ xd7 13  $\Delta$ ge2 Tac8 14 0-0 Ec6 15 Wd3  $\pm$ 2xc3 16 be  $\pm$ xd6 17 c4 with the advantage (Hamdouchi – Gonzalez, Malaza 1998).

10 bc  $\forall x d5$  11  $\triangle e2$  With the aim of ejecting the queen from its central position. The more natural 11  $\triangle f3$ 0-0 12 & e2 does not offer a tangible advantage in view of 12...& g4! 13 0-0  $\triangle e5$ !



This exchanging combination leads the position to a draw:  $14 \ \text{OxeS}$  $\text{Axe2} 15 \ \text{Wxe2} fe 16 de \ \text{Efes} 17 \ \text{Ze1}$  $\text{Zac8} 18 \ \text{Zac1} \ \text{Wa5} 19 \ \text{c4} \ \text{Wc3}$  $20 \ \text{Zd7} \ \text{b5}$ , and the b-pawn is untouchable because of  $21...\ \text{Zxe5}$ ? (Dueball - Libo, Germany 1988).

11...0-0 12 2 f4 Wa5 Hardly worth considering is 12... Ze8+?! 13 2c2

響d6. After 14 0-0 全f5 15 互fc1 基ac8 16 全f3 it is impossible to understand what Black has achieved with his intermediate check (Gulko – Gonzalez, Las Palmas 1996).

An immediate 12... 變d6 looks stronger, for example, 13 金e2 金f5 14 0-0 篇ac8 15 篇ac1, and the saved tempo can be spent on 15... 篇fd8!? (Ornstein – Shamkovich, Gausdal 1984).

13 全e2 罩d8 (in passing - a little trap: 14 0-0? 罩xd4!) 14 罩d1



Can Black restrain the pawn pair c3+d4? Can he get his own counterplay going, and if so, then where, in which part of the board? On this complex question perhaps depends the assessment of the whole variation 7 & xf.6.

In the game Sveshnikov – Bagirov (Tbilisi 1978), right up to the end Black was not able to cope with solving the problems and after  $14... \pm f5$  15 0-0  $\Xi ac8$  16  $\Xi b2$   $\Xi c7$ 17 g3 b6 18  $\pm f3$  he stood worse.

Bagirov showed more confidence in the same USSR championship (Tbilisi 1978) against Belyavsky: 14...âc6!? 15 d5 De5 16 c4 Wc5 17 Od3 Dxd3+ 18 Wxd3 åd7 19 0-0 Eac8 etc. Possibly the most important information about this position – is the recommendation of Ergeny Sveshnikov: 14...b612 15 0-0  $\pm a6$ 16  $Bf \in ] \pm xc = 17 \Xi xc 2 chc 32$  18 Wellchg 6 19 chxg 6 hg The minor piecesare exchanged, and White's hangingpawns in the centre are rather weak.

2) 7 & d2 Not aspiring to much, as after 7...dc 8 & xc4 e6 it is not easy for White to justify the manoeuvre &cl-g5-d2. Three wasted moves have led only to the dark squared bishop running back in fear to its own pieces:

9 d5!? An attempt to force the game. In a quiet struggle – 9 Af3 <u>&</u>e7 10 ∂d5 W68 11 Øxe7 ∂xe7! 12 0-0 <u>&</u>d7 13 <u>&</u>g5 <u>&</u>c6 14 <u>Be1</u> h6 15 <u>&</u>h4 (Tal – Marovic, Malaga 1981) 15...2f5 – White's chances are also not great.

9...ed 10 公xd5 對d8 11 對e2+ &e6 12 公f4 公d4 13 公xe6 fe 14 對d3 對b6!



White has managed to spoil the opponent's pawn structure and at the same time obtain the advantage of the two bishops. However this has left him still further behind in development. Therefore Black is counting on long castling, so as to

develop immediate counterplay with support of the rook d8:

is  $2_{0}2$  0-0-0 16 0-0 es 17 2 xd  $\frac{1}{2}$  xd 18  $\frac{1}{2}$  has 19  $\frac{1}{2}$  as 5 he 20 wb3  $\frac{1}{2}$  sc 21  $\frac{1}{2}$  sd  $\frac{1}{2}$  23  $\frac{1}{2}$  5 23  $\frac{1}{2}$  acl e4!? (forced, but a promising sacrifice of a pawn) 24  $\frac{1}{2}$  xf 6  $\frac{1}{2}$  xf 6  $\frac{1}{2}$  c 2 h5! With opposite coloured bishops the extra pawn has no significance. Moreover the menacing open h-file is unpleasant for White. He hurriedly offered a draw, which was accepted (Bronstein - Bagirox, Talling 1981).

3) 7 Wd2!? A move which upon a superficial glance looks dry. In fact White is urging the opponent to continue his over-aggressive play, as well as looking for a defence that will lead to an advantage for himself.

For example, 7...&15, with the idea of a knight jump to b4, is partied by 8 &13? (but not 8 &, kfc?) ef 9 ed precisely because of 9...&b44 10 &b5+ &d8 11 &fc1 &dx6 with unclear play, Gavrikov – Matulovic, Vrsac 1985) 8...&b4 9 &c1 de 10 &x64  $\equiv$  86 11 &c51



Black's raid has almost been beaten off and already White threatens the f7 square. On 11...e6 there is 12 2b5+ 2bc6 13 d5! with decisive threats. In the game Vescovi – Moreda (San Vincent 2001) a combination occurred to Black: 11...**K**xc4? 12.2<sub>x</sub>xc4 **@a6**.He actually wins back the material but by now the game cannot be saved: 13 0-0! **@**xc4 14 **@**fa1 **@**c8 15 20b5 20c6 16 **&**xf6 gf 17 d5 etc.

Well known to theory is also the sharp variation 7...dc?! 8 &xc4 e5 9 d5  $\bigcirc$ d4. It seems that Black's idea is irreproachable: he has established his knight in the centre and controls all the important squares. But the knight is unstable and White can a malysis by Keres, 10...&f5 is no good because of 11 fe1  $\bigcirc$ c2+12 &ff 2xal 13 ef with an attack) 11  $\bigcirc$ go2 &ff5 12 &b5+ &d7 13 &xf6 gf 14 &xd7+&xd7 15 0- $\bigcirc$ c3 16  $\Xi$ f3  $\bigcirc$ ge4.



In the game Keres - Czerniak (from which, we recall, started the theory of the variation 6...饗a5) White, with a few accurate moves, brought clarity to what seems at first sight a confusing position:

17  $rac{1}{2}$   $ac{1}{2}$   $ac{1}{3}$   $ac{1}{3}$ 

20 暫b5+ \$d8 21 ④e4!) 18 \$h1 暫b6 19 氯af1 \$c8 20 h3 h5 21 ④e4 \$b8 22 對b3! with a great advantage.

**7...** & c6 8 & xf6!? Played according to the proverb 'better a bird in the hand than two in the bush'. There is more scope in 8 c5, but in the endgame after 8...&c4!? 9 &xe4 de 10 &xa5 &xa5, for the present White cannot boast of any tangible achievements:

11 皇b5+ 公c6 12 公e2 0-0-0 13 皇e3 公b4! (Lerner - Sveshnikov, Leningrad 1976) or

11 2d2 2c6 12 2c3 0-0-0 13 2e2 2c4! (Ribli - Torre, Alicante 1983).

8...ef 9 c5 a6!? In the game T.Ivanov – Timofeev (SLPetersburg 2001) Black did not want to prevent the bishop going to b5, and, pethaps, rightly so: after 9...g6 10 &b5 &g27 11 & 2ge2 0-0 White has the greater possibilities for active play.

10 \$\Delta f3 b6!? 11 cb \exists b6!? 11 cb \exists b6!? 13 0-0 0-0 14 a3 \$\vert xb6 15 b4 g6 16 \$\Delta b1 \exists fd8 17 \$\Delta a2 \exists white's advantage is either extremely small or nothing at all. (Seils - Dizdarevic, Soln 1996).

4) 7 a3 This is frequently (and successfully) played by the Latvian theoretician Zigurds Lanka.



We have already come across the prophylactic idea of the move a2-a3 – White tries to generate counterplay, connected with Wd8+a3 and  $e^{h}fbee4$ . But in the present situation prophylaxis is too late: if 7... $e^{h}e^{h}$  is met by 8 b4?!, then after 8... $e^{h}xc3$ 9 Wei Wd8 10 9 Wc3 d2 White standsworse. Then why does he play 7 a3!?Obviously to provoke the knightjump to e4!

a) 7....@e4?! White has a choice: 8 cd or 8 2d2

a1) 8 cd 2x3 9 be 3x45 10 213 gad In this position we must consider 11 gad 3 cf 12 gad gad gad gad gad gad gad gad gad gad13 0-0 0-0 14 cd 3x3 with a complicated struggle, for example: 15 3b1 3ac 16 d5 cd 17 cd 3x1318 3x13 2bd 19 ac2 (Ribli – Kuczynski, Polanica Zdroj 1993) 10...3xa3 20 3b3 3ad 62 1 afc1 3ad 72 2ab7 3ab7 3ab7 3ab7 3ab, and such an endgame most frequently ends in a draw.



But in the game Voitsekhovsky – Timofeev (St.Petersburg 2002) like a bolt from the blue came 11 &c2!? White sacrifices a piece even though it is unclear when it will be regained. Nevertheless Black's defence is not verv easy: **11...** &**xf3 12** &**xf3** <math> w**sq5 13** w**sq4 IZ68 14 0-0 e6 L** cosing is 14... w**f5 15 15 15 15 15 15 17** w**16** w**xb5** w**d8** (not possible is 16... **66 17** w**a4 ed? 18** &**ed4**) because of 17 &**g4**! w**xe4 18 dc** w**e6 21** e **7** w**f7 22**  $\fbox{z}$ **d8**!

15 耳fb1 Precisely this rook! On 15 耳ab1? 豐e7 16 d5 豐xa3 the whole of White's game goes to pot.

15... #d2?? At the board Artem Timofeev did not decide on this move, but analysis shows that only in this way is it possible to continue the struggle:

16 Xxb7 Wxc3 17 Xab1 \$\overline{c}\$d6\$ 18 Z7b3 Wc2 19 d5 \$\overline{c}\$c5 20 dc, and he needs to choose between two captures on f2. Whatever, Black will hold on.

This idea of Voitsekhovsky does not inspire us, but there is one more interesting path in store:

a2) 8 @d2!? @xd2 9 b4!?



Here too the move a2-a3 is appropriate! Incidentally, the lawgiver of fashion in this variation, Zigurds Lanka, has played exactly this move 9 b4, but also suggested completing White's development first -9 %xd2 de 10  $\pm$  xc4 e6 11  $\pm$  01  $\pm$  xc7 12 0-0 0-0, and only now 13 b4!? In the game Lanka - S.Guliev (Cappelle La Grande 1997) Black reacted poorly: 13...%f5?! (more solid is 13...%f5?), and White began a queen hunt: 14 @le4 Ed8 15 Afel b6 16 @g3 @g4 17 Afel @g6 18 Alael 26f6 19 h3!

But all the same an immediate 9 b4!? is more interesting, the more so that White risks nothing. This is how further events might develop:

9...₩d8 10 ₩xd2 dc 11 d5 \(\overline{\Delta}\)5 21 ₩d4 \(\overline{\Delta}\)6 13 \(\overline{\Delta}\)5 e51? (a forced sacrifice of a pawn, otherwise Black will not manage to complete his development) 14 \(\overline{\Delta}\)xes \(\overline{\Psi}\)? 15 \(\overline{\Psi}\)7 ansferring to an endgame looks more reliable: 14...\(\overline{\Delta}\)xes \(\overline{\Psi}\)? 15 \(\overline{\Psi}\)xes \(\overline{\Psi}\)? 18 \(\overline{\Psi}\)6 development \(\overline{\Psi}\)? 15 \(\overline{\Psi}\)xes \(\overline{\Psi}\)? 15 \(\overline{\Psi}\)xes \(\overline{\Psi}\)? 16 \(\overline{\Psi}\)xes \(\overline{\Psi}\)? 15 \(\overline{\Psi}\)xes \(\overline{\Psi}\)? 15 \(\overline{\Psi}\)xes \(\overline{\Psi}\)? 16 \(\overline{\Psi}\) xes \(\overline{\Psi}\)? 15 \(\overline{\Psi}\) xes \(\overline{\Psi}\)? 16 \(\overline{

15 **a**d2! Obviously Black is counting on the pin along the e-file, but the game is up: 15...⊙xe5? 16 ⊠el f6 17 f4 with a quick win (Blehm – Yakupovic, Hallsberg 1999).

15...₩g5+1614 2x1417 2f3 ₩h6 18 ≣el+ drd8 19 ≣e3! Leaving no doubt as to the assessment of the position. There could still follow 19...\$d6 20 g3 2bg6 21 2bc4 2bc7 22 2bd6 ₩xd6 23 ₩xg7 ₩xd5+ 24 drc1 Ig8 25 ₩f6 2e6 26 Δh3!, and Black is in for it.

Disappointed in the results of the move 7.... De4?! Black switched to another continuation:

b) 7...dc!? 8 d5 ②e4!? As shown by the Lanka game, weak is 8... ④e5?! 9 變d4!, and then:

9...⊙d3+ 10 &xd3 cd 11 ℃f3! (in White's play there is something of the famous Botvinik – Flohr game examined above, did you notice?) 11...⊙f3 12 0-0 ≣d8 13 ☉h4! &d7 14 ጄfe1 ₩b6 15 ₩xd3 (Lana – Fridman, Vilnius 1993) or

9...h6 10 \$\overline{d}d2 \$\overline{d}d3+ 11 \$\overline{d}xd3 cd 12 \$\overline{d}f3 c6 13 0-0 \$\overline{d}xd5 14 \$\overline{d}xf6 ld \$\overline{d}xd3 15 \$\overline{d}xc3 (Lanka - Pingintzer, Oberwart 1998), in both cases with a menacing initiative.

The position after 8....@e4 deserves a diagram.



In the game Kovacevie – Dizdarevie (Istanbul 2000) the opponents, a like, frightened of getting their hands dirty, rushed headlong for a draw: 9 &dd 2 &dxd 10 %dd 265 11 %d4 %c7 12 &b5 %a5+ 13 &c3 %c7. However we are interested in a forcing continuation of play:

9 dct? ᡚxg5 10 cb ೩xb7 11 ೩xc4 ೩c6 (on 11...Ξc8 unpleasant is 12 Δb5+ Δc6 13 Δxc6+ Ξxc6 14 b4!) 12 b4 ₩c5+ 13 ᡚgc2 Ξd8 14 ₩b3 Leaving behind the opening. it is not easy to evaluate the chances of the two sides. Probably, they are still slightly superior for White.

5) 7 ⓐf3!? White takes the view that the opponent's idea (₩d8-a5 and ⓐf6-e4) is none of his business!



The fact of the matter is that after 7...  $\bigcirc e4?!$  8 cd!  $\bigcirc 2xc3$  9 bc @xd510 & c2 a position is reached, more characteristic of the Grunfeld defence, but with an extra tempo for White. Which means that he has nothing to fear from 7... $\bigotimes 2c4$ .

Also insufficient for equality is  $7...\&_{0.6} \le \le O_{0.6} 4.9 \& d.2! \& xd.2$  10 & xd.2. In the game M. Tseitlin – Dizdarevic (Belgrade 1999) there followed 10...g6 11 & b5 & f 12 0-0 0-0 13 & xc6 bc 14  $\exists$  fel  $\exists$  fel  $\exists$  fel  $\exists$  fel  $\exists$  fel  $\exists$  sa  $\exists$  w 71 fo b4 & d 71 7 b51  $\exists$  ab8 18 a 4.1 is possible that White's advantage is not as great as it scems, but the fact that he has all the play – is beyond question.

7...2g4! Black feels that there is something a bit better than the knight jump to e4. White's pieces are again pinned down and when the rook arrives on d8 Black's position will start to look particularly attractive.

White needs to do something quickly. But what? Weak is 8 2e2? dc 9 d5 because of 9...0-0-0! After 10 愈xc4 e6 11 愈xf6 gf 12 0-0 罩g8! 13 愈e2 ed! The way it is all coming together for Black couldn't be better (Uusi – Bagirov, Tallinn 1981).

Also not dangerous for Black is 8 cd ⓓxd5 9 单d2 (suggested by Grigory Ravinsky).



Ravinsky's idea lies in a temporary queen sacrifice:  $9... \odot xd4?$  10  $\odot xd4!$ xd1 11  $ab5+ \oplus d8$  12  $\odot xd5$  etc. But the simpler 9...66 10 ac4 ab4dashes White's fantasy: 11 axd5 ed 12 0-00-01 3  $a^2$  ac7 14 h3 ah515  $\Xi c1$  af6 16  $\odot c4$   $\oplus d8$  with equality (Klundt – Fette, Germany 1983).

The complications after 8  $\pm x/6$  ef 9 cd  $\pm y/41$  also turned in Black's favour. 10  $\pm 053$  (losing is 10 dc?  $\pm xc3+ 11$  bc  $\pm xc3+ 12 \pm c2$  0-0!) 10... $\pm x/51$  11 dc  $\pm xc6$  12 a3 (or 12  $\pm c4 \pm a41$  13  $\pm x/71 \pm a/81$  4 $\pm c4$  $\pm a/51$  15  $\pm 0/51$   $\pm 0/51$  a Ruderfer, Dnepretrovsk 1970) 12... $\pm xc3+ 13 \pm xc3 \pm 0/51$  13  $\pm 0/51$ 15  $\pm 0/21$  0-0-16  $\pm 0/61$   $\pm 0/81$  7  $\pm c4$  $\pm 0/71$  18  $\pm 0/21$   $\pm 0/61$  and the winner can only be Black (van den Doel – van er Sterren, Rotterdam 2000).

Here it also turns out that the right move can only be found by the process of elimination. If everything else is bad, there remains...

8 **₩b3!** What, for all that, makes the variation 7 2013!? interesting? The two sides exchange surprises and one cannot say that these surprises will be pleasant for the opponent.

8...0-0.9  $\pm xf6$  Letting Black decide what is more important to him: reliability with his sights on a draw or playing va banque. Players who value reliability above all else will prefer -xe17: 10 cd (or 10 0-0-0 dc 11  $\frac{10}{xc4} \pm xf3$  12 gf  $\pm b8$ , 10... $\pm xf3$  (leading to unclear consequences is 10... $\frac{2}{xc4} + 11 \pm 22$  $\frac{1}{xc2} + 12 \pm f1$ ) 11 dc  $\pm xc6$ 12 0-0-0  $\pm dc6$  with an acceptable game.

9...gf?? And, all the same, risk - it's a matter of honour!



A move far from being new, but here is the assessment... Many respected commentators clearly overestimated the strength of this move. In fact Black is taking a risk, and a hieh one!

10 cd Ob4 11 &c4 (Botvinnik suggested not clinging on to the pawn, but playing simply 11 Od2) 11...Ob8 12 a3 c6 13 de fe 14 0-0 &xf3 15 ab  $\blacksquare$ g8 16 g3 Wb5

17 Efc1?! (stronger is an immediate 17 @.xe6) 17...Exd4 This is how the game Martin – Baljon (Las Palmas 1977) continued. Two weak moves – 18 @.b5? Ed2 19 @c3?, and after 19...Exg3+! there was no stopping Black.

He should play 18 *keel*, after which it is not clear how Black pursues the attack.



No good are either  $18... \pm x_5 \pm 3^{11}$ 19 fg &c5!? 20 bc  $\equiv d2$  21  $\Leftrightarrow$ c2! &xc2 20  $\equiv$ c5! (the same move also follows upon 10...  $\pm h$ 4, Finally, on 18...&6d6 again decides 19  $\Leftrightarrow$ c2!  $\pm h$ 4 20  $\equiv$ ac5 &c5 21  $\equiv$ ac5, and White wins.

The idea of Abram Rabinovich 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4  $\bigcirc$  f6 5  $\bigcirc$  3  $\bigcirc$  c6 6 & g5!? will soon be more than 100 years old, but questions not only do not diminish but, on the contrary, increase and multiply.

Is it possible to play 6...del? And if so, then what must White do: offer a gambit with the move 7 & &xc4? Or play in the centre: 7 d51? And if in the centre, then how to react to 7... @a51? And how to win after 7... @e5 8 \#d4 h61? How can Black be punished for 6...&e6!? You see, he cannot delay his own development in such an artificial way and remain unpunished. And how to obtain the advantage after 6... @a5!?

Old theory reinvents itself – this is natural, but the new does not rush to occupy some free place. Does this mean that a variation is bad? Nothing of the sort. It means that its time has not yet come.

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# Chapter Three 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 최f6 5 최c3 g6!?

After this move the game enters a completely different scenario from the previous chapters. Combinational storms give way to a strict positional struggle; and first and foremost comes the ability to play complex endgames.



In fianchettoing his bishop, Black must be prepared to sacrifice the d5 pawn which, however, he hopes to recover after ⊘b8-d7-b6 (or ⊘b8-a6c7). In order to defend the pawn, White will have to lose several tempi. As a result Black will outstrip the opponent in development and hope to obtain compensation (and also organise pressure on the d4 square) in return for his outlay. There are two continuations which allow White to fight for the advantage: 6 cd (I) and 6 @b3 (II).

### I

### 6 cd

Black has a choice between an immediate recovery of the pawn by 6... 2xd5 (A) and the move 6... 2g7 (B), after which he will remain behind in material for a short while.

### A

6...②xd5 Another branch: 7 ≜.c4 or 7 ₩b3.

1) 7 & 4c4 Nothing is offered by play along the a4-e8 diagonal – 7 & b5+ 20c6 8 @a4 & 2xc3! and it is dangerous to win the pawn: 9 & xc6+ be 10 @xc6+?? & dc7 11 @xc3 & 2c8 (analysis by M.Filip). In the game Karpov – Miles (Amsterdam 1981) White preferred the sensible 9 bc &g7 10 & 13 0-0 11 0-0, but after 11...\$251 Black fully equalised the position.

7.... ②b6 8 **2.b3 2.g7** The main thing in this position is the development of the knight on f3. But first we look at some examples in

which White preferred the development of the knight to e2.



9 d5!? 0-0 10 @ge2 @a6 11 &e3 فg4 12 f3 فd7 13 فd4 فxd4 14 Wxd4 如c8 15 0-0 Wb6 16 包e4 \$b5 17 ≣fe1 @b4 18 @4c3 \$xe2 19 響xh6 ab 20 基xe2 罩d8 21 罩d1 \$f8 22 #d4 and the positional niceties which imbued the game did not cease even in the ending (Sermek - Zelcic, Split 2002):

9 de3!? (Black needs to play very accurately if he is not to fall into a difficult position) 9... 包c6 10 d5 包e5 (10... 2a5!?) 11 回ge2 0-0 12 皇d4 \$g4 13 f3!? (upon 13 0-0 Black rightly carried out an exchanging operation - 13... xe2 14 Wxe2 公f3+1? 15 ¥xf3 皇xd4 16 篇ad1 ≜xc3 17 ₩xc3 ₩d6, Skachkov -Evseev, Nefteugansk 2002) 13... 2d7 14 0-0 Ic8 15 If2 Dec4! 16 \$xg7 當xg7 17 豐d4+ 當g8 18 包e4 皇f5 (Syeshnikoy - Hubner, Munich 1992).

As we see, every time the struggle continues on one and the same scheme: White hammers in a pawn nail on d5, then, after eliminating the pin on the knight e2 by f2-f3, exploits the vacant d4 square as a base for prophylactic 12 h3: after exchanges

transfer of his minor pieces. Black has less space; a weak pawn on e7 (in certain variations - also a pawn on a7)

And all the same the abovementioned factors are insufficient to assess the present type of position as obviously better for White. We have a complicated struggle in which White has a moral rather than a palpable advantage.

9 313 26 This move, provoking White into d4-d5, also need not be hurried. 9...0-0 10 0-0 \$g4! 11 d5 ⑦8d7 12 h3 盒xf3 13 豐xf3 邕c8 14 皇g5 创f6 looks fully worthwhile. Pursuing the 'advantage of the two bishops' here can hardly be realised since the bishops are up against a barrier: apart from this, all Black's pieces are well developed. A possible continuation is 15 Zad1 h6 16 ah4 @c4 17 @xc4 ≣xc4 18 @g3 @e8 19 貫fe1 切d6 with unquestionable equality (Pogosian - Evseev. Moscow 1996).

10 0-0 0-0 11 d5 2a5 The opening is almost over; time to think about future plans.



no time for the There is

on b3 and c3 Black gobbles up the d5 pawn with impunity. Therefore it is worthwhile for White to occupy himself in earnest with the c7 pawn.

With this objective in view, 12 Ze1 has been tried but after 12...9)xb3 (it is not excluded that even more accurate is 12 ... 2g4!? 13 h3 2xf3 14 響xf3 邕c8 15 皇g5 @xb3 16 ab \$xc3 17 bc \#xd5 18 \#xd5 \\$xd5 19 c4 f6 20 cd fg - when play clearly inclines towards a draw. Lein -Seirawan, Seattle 2003) 13 ab e6 (in the endgame after 13 ... axc3 14 bc ₩xd5 15 ₩xd5 ᡚxd5 16 c4 ᡚb4 17 Exe7 White possibly also retains a microscopic advantage) 14 d6 2d7 15 \$g5 f6 16 \$e3 \$c8 17 \$c5 b6 18 and the chances of the two sides look equal. True, in the game Glek -Szabolcsi (Paris 2000) Black blundered - 18 ... Ze8?, and after 19 2d5! was forced to resign at once. However how to approach Black's unclear.

More promising is 12 &g5? &g413 h3 &xf3 14 @xf3 Straightforward exchanges in this position do not lead to anything good – 14...&xb3?! 15 ab, and then:



15...盒xc3 16 bc 響xd5 17 響xd5

②xd5 18 c4 ②f6 19 트fel 트fe8 20 逸xf6 ef 21 三xe8+ 三xe8 22 三xa7. In this rook endgame White has practically an extra pawn;

15...h6 16 金e3 金xc3 17 bc 螢xd5 18 螢xd5 毫xd5 19 金xh6 筥fd8 20 屬fe1! e6 21 金g5 f6 22 c4! and though it is small, White still has a 'plus'.

15...₩d7 16 篇fd1 公c8 17 ₩c3 篇c8 18 & cf4 a6?! 19 Øa4 ₩f5 20 爲ac1 b5 21 g4 ₩f6 22 爲c6, and it is already very bad for Black (Nunn – Scirawan, London 1984).

The conclusion is obvious: after 12 & gs?? & gd 13 h3 & xh3 l4 WxH3 Black should temporarily abstain from exchanges. For example, 14...WH7? IS Ifel Ife8 16 Be2 h6 17 & d2 Ifed Ife8 16 Be2 h6 17 & d2 Ifed Ife8 16 Be2 h6 17 & d2 Ifed Ife8 16 Be2 h6 18 & gamma and the black knight, Black's own weaknesses are covered, there is a square of invasion – c4. Chances are mutual.

2) 7 who (considered a 'tougher' move than 7 &cd) 7...&b6 For a long time the exchange 7...&xc31? was denounced without exception by all the theoreticians – on the basis of the game Tal – Pohla (USSR 1972). However it was the analysis of the SLPetersburg master Konstantin Agapov that first shook this assessment, and then the Norwegian grandmaster Simen Agdestein finally convinced us that Black was more or less okav.

Critical for the variation 7...Qxc3 is the position after 8 &c4! e6 9 bc Dc6 10 Df3 &g7 11 &a3 &f8! A possible continuation is:



12 ±xf8 ±xf8 13 0-0 €a51? (this is more accurate than 13...±g7 14 ±b5 ±d7 15 ₩b2 €a5, Kochiev – Agapov, Leningrad 1987, after which White, in the opinion of Agapov, could maintain a minimal advantage by 16 ±c2 ≡c8 17 ≣ac1) 14 ₩b4+ ±g7 15 ±c2 b6 16 ≣fd1 ±b7 17 c4 ≣c8 18 c5 ±d5 and Black even has the more promising position (van der Sterren – Agdestein, Germany 1998);

12 象c1 (trying to find another plan of play) 12...象g7 13 象b5 愈d7 14 象a3 愈f8 15 象xf8 슣xf8 16 0-0 슣g7 17 象c2 b6 18 c4 響f6 and Black has no problems (Botvinnik – Petrosian, Moscow 1963);

12 0-0 €a5! (after 12...\$xa3? 13 ¥xa3 ¥e7 14 ¥e1 Tal placed the queen on h6 and won with a direct attack against Pohla) 13 £b5+ £d7 14 ¥a4 £xa3 15 £xd7+ ¥xd7 16 ¥xa3 (16 ¥xa5 £d6) 16...€c4 17 ¥e5 ¥d5 18 ¥xd5 ¾d5, and Black, even after giving up the d5 pawn, saved this endgame (Lukin – Kalinin, Medzibrozhe 1991).

So, in all probability, playing 7... (2)xc3 is possible, even if in such a way Black also backs himself into a corner. Far more possibilities for

counterplay remain for him after 7...心b6!? In reply White usually chooses between 8 金b5+ and 8 d5.



a) 8 2h5+ 2d7 (dubious is 10 鱼e2 包f6 11 a5) 9 包f3 The Romanian grandmaster Levente Vaida decided to run to the edge: 9 a4. It turned out favourably: 9...\$ g7 10 a5! 包c8 11 包f3 包d6 12 皇xd7+ ④xd7 13 皇f4 0-0 14 2xd6 ed 15 0-0, and Black had no compensation for his pawn weaknesses (Vaida Taylor. Budapest 2003). But in reply to 9 a4?! more concrete (and stronger) is 9... ②c6! 10 ②f3 皇e6!?, and if 11 d5?! (11 響c2 皇f5 with equality), then 11... 2xd5 12 2d4 2c7! The extra pawn proves useful (de Jong -Pilen. Wijk aan Zee 1990).

However, besides the idea a2-a4-a5 in this or that variation, there is nothing else for White.

9...&g7 10  $\Leftrightarrow$ s5 ne more example with the plan of advancing the edge pann: 10 &xd7+ &xd7 11 a4 0-0 12 a5  $\Leftrightarrow$ s8 13 d5 &a6 14 0-0 &d6 15  $\blacksquare$ c1  $\blacksquare$ c6 &c3 &c8 14 0-0 &d6 c5 18 &c2 c5! with a comfortable game (Nureev – Evseev, Tula 1999). 10...0-0



The advantage of the two bishops is the most that White can get out of the position. But this is too small to fight for a real advantage:

11 2xd7 26xd7?? (also sufficient for equality is 11...28xd7 12 &e3 2f6 13 0-0 2g4 14 &ec2 2xe3 15 fe es!, Gdanski – Urban, Brzeg Dolny 1996) 12 0-0 &c6 (Osinovsky – Evseev, St.Petersburg 2002).

We get the impression that nowadays the variation 8  $\pm$ b5+ has become obsolete. If White does not push the d4 pawn, then it automatically becomes a weakness. And for what in return? Only the possibility of driving the knight from b6 by a 2:-a4-3. This is very little.

b) 8 d5!? (now the struggle moves to more interesting territory) 8...2g79 &c3 0-0 10  $\exists$ d1 Somehow Black needs to unravel the cluster of pieces on the queen's flank. And he cannot always achieve this. Thus extremely dubious is 10...c8d7?! (with the idea of capturing the c4 square) in view of 11 &c2! &c3 12 h31 and the game is up for Black: 12...@c7 13 &b5 @b814  $\exists$ c1 e6 15 d6 &b45 16 &bc7. minning the exchange (Pavasorie -Burmakin, Ljubilana 1997). 10....♦a6?? This looks the most sensible. Thus Black does not duplicate the function of his knights (one heads for c4, the second – for c5) and does not obstruct the pathway of the bishop c8.



The critical position of the 8 d5 variation.

b1) 11 \$\hlows xa6 A principal decision. Now there is a devaluation of the black pawns on the queen's flank and a weakening of the c6 square, which at an opportune moment can be occupied by a white knight. On the other hand, the loss of the bishop is deeply felt by White, and if its black counterpart gets to a6, the whole diagonal will be under its control.

This struggle of 'for and against' prompts all the following moves.

11...ba 12 @ge2 a5! The remaining moves are weaker:

12....2b7?! 13 0-0 ₩d6 14 Id2 Ifd8 15 Ifd1 a5 16 a3 a4 17 @xa4 盒xd5 18 響b5 e6 19 ④xb6 ab 20 ④f4, and White will soon be a pawn ahead (Kuijf – Pilen, Amsterdam 1987).

13 **wbs** (not allowing the bishop to a6) 13...**wd**7? Having his own way. The alternative is 13...a4? (but not 13...**L**Bs because of 14  $\bigcirc$  0.44] 14  $\bigcirc$  0.44  $\bigcirc$  0.75 **wb4 L**Cs 16 0.0 **Get**. In the game Sveshnikov – Seres (Nova Gorica 1997) Black made a few more very decent moves: 17 **wa5 wb** 18 h3 ab 19 ab **L**C 7 20  $\bigcirc$  204  $\bigcirc$  15 21 d6 de 22  $\bigcirc$  2xd6  $\bigcirc$  22 3  $\bigcirc$  xg7 and after 23... $\bigcirc$  xg7 was able to fully count on a draw.

14 響xa5 ②c4 15 響b4 皇a6



Black is a pawn down, but compensation can be seen with the naked eye: two splendid bishops, and for White – problems with his king and on the queen's flank. In the game Pavasovic – Silpak (Pinamar 2002) Black quickly established parity: 16  $\pm 4$   $(2_1 x 0.2)$ : 17 % x 0.2  $\pm x 2$ 20  $\pm c 3$   $\pm c 3$  + 21  $\pm d 2$   $\pm g 7$ 20  $\pm c 3$   $\pm c 3$  + 21  $\pm d 2$   $\pm g 7$  and it still seems that he has got a bad deal out of it.

b2) After 11 2673 Black likewise has the right to reckon on

counterplay. All will depend on the next few moves.

11...@d6i? It is important to activate the knight a6 quite quickly. A supplementary idea is to exchange queens on b4 at an opportune moment. In the event of the passive 11...da7 White exchanges the darksquared bishops and obtains an obvious advantage: 12 &c2  $\Xic8$ 13 &d41 &c7 14 c-0  $\Xifd8$  15 &xg7&xg7 16  $\Xifc1$  &c5 17 &b4 &d618 &b5 &fo1 9 &xd7  $\Xixd7$  20 &c65(Suba – Jaime Malaga 2002).

12 & c2 And why not the prophylactic 12 a3, preventing the exchange of queens? The whole point being that Black has the tactical resource 12...Qc5 13 #05 Qca4!



If  $14 \text{-} \Omega_{xa4}$ , then  $14 \dots \& d7$ , while after  $14 \text{-} \Omega_{cd} \# d7$  15  $\# b3 \text{-} \Omega_{xb2}$ ? 16  $\& b5 \# d7 \text{-} \Omega_{cd} 3 \text{-} \Omega_{xb1}$ ! 18 h3 & nca 3 p9 hg & nxg2 + 20 & d1 & D4 and White's position is like a ruin (Barde - Adorjan, Reykjavik 1988). We must say that Adorjan's play in this game makes a powerful impression.

12...♀c5 13 ₩b5 ℃ca4! (a familiar blow) 14 ℃e4 ₩d7 15 ₩b3 It seems that White has already lost control over the position. Black has at least a draw 'in the pocket'. 15...②xb2!? 16 公c5 暫f5 17 罩d2 暫b1+ 18 罩d1 暫f5 (Sermek – Sax, Bled 1999).

On the whole, at the present time the variation 6...2xd5 looks quite reliable for Black. True, a great extent of knowledge is required in order not to land in a difficult position – but who can say that in other schemes less knowledge is required? But, objectively, nowhere – neither upon 7 & c4 nor 7 @b3 – can White count on a serious advantage.

В

6...≜g7



What to do with the extra pawn on d5? Cling on to it with all his might (7 &c4), advance it in order to spoil the opponent's 'coiffure' (7 &b5+&bd7 8 d6) or simply carry on with his development (7 &f3?)

Continuing his development will not be a success. Or rather it will in itself be a success, but White's advantage will then be irretrievably lost:  $7 \text{ (II)} \text{ Grafs } 2 \text$   7 愈c4!? 0-0 8 ②ge2 Finally making a claim on the extra material – when the knight gets to f4, recovering the pawn will be considerably more complicated.

There is less sense in 8 创f3 创bd7, and then:

9 d6!? ed 10 0-0 0b6 11 0b3 1f3 12  $\fbox{0}$ e1  $\vcenter{0}$ c4 13  $\vcenter{0}$ c4 14  $\fbox{0}$ c4 15  $\vcenter{0}$ c6 16  $\vcenter{0}$ b3 b5 17 a4  $\ddddot{0}$ c6. Black has happily solved his problems and is ready to adequately deal with the complications:



18 ab!? 罩xd4! 19 豐xe6! 罩xf4! (19...fe?! 20 ②xd4) 20 豐e3 罩b4 with equal chances;

The idea 8  $\frac{10}{3}$ ?  $\frac{2}{3}$ bd? 9 h3??  $\frac{2}{3}$ bf 10  $\frac{1}{8}$ b3 a5 11 a3 a4 12  $\frac{1}{8}$ a2 has been insufficiently tested in practice to be able to make any kind of definite judgement. We mention only the game Spangenberg – Ricardi (Buenos Aires 2000) in which Black reacted with an interesting exchange sacrifice: 12... [23] 2.3 2.422bxd5!? 14 2bxd5 2xd5 15 2xa532xa5+ 16 2xd5 15 2xa538 2b1 32bc 4bc 17 32d1 32c818 2b1 32bc 3bc with compensation.

After 8 2 ge2 Black can choose between two march routes of the knight b8: d7-b6 or a6-c7.



Few chances of equality are offered by 10...@d6 11 0-0 dd7 12 ac1 a513 a4 Iac8. The future invasion of the knight on c4 was countered by White in a totally surprising way... with a rook on c5: 14 h3 h6 15 Iac91c2c4 16 @e21 (Tal – Wade, Tallinn 1971).

11 0-0  $\pm$ e4!? Black made a poor redeployment in the game Kobalija – Turov (Kolontaevo 1997): 11... $\pm$ 0e8 12  $\pm$ e1  $\pm$ 0d6 13 h3  $\pm$ c8 14  $\pm$ 63; 55?; 15  $\pm$ 0d3! a5 16 a3  $\pm$ b6 17  $\pm$ 0e5 41 8  $\pm$ 0a4. As a result of all the manoeuvring White's knights obtained outposts, but Black's – did not. 12 ②xe4 ③xe4 13 單d3 ④d6 14 鱼e3 獸d7 15 罩fc1 罩fc8 16 h3 ④f5 17 罩c5 獸d6 18 罩ac1



b) 8... €a6!? 9 0-0 €c7 10 €14 Both sides have included virtually all their reserves in the struggle for the d5 pawn. And yet there are more black reserves to come! He can bring up the bishop (to b7) and the rook (to d8), whereas White has only a queen - to go to b3 (hardly to f3, where it has to put up with the bishop b7). Is the struggle for the d5 pawn being lost by White? Apparently, yes, but how long can the moment of realisation be delayed?

10...b6 11 里e1 (after 11 a4 单b7 12 對b3 里b8 13 桌e3 a6!? the queen on b3, faced with the imminent break b6-b5, is starting to feel uncomfortable, Conquest - (8...0-0 or 8...e6). Bronstein, Bayswater 1989) 11 ... 2b7



12 Ze5?! Stubborness will cost White dear! It was necessary to reconcile himself to giving back. finally, that cursed pawn: 12 a4 නcxd5 13 තිfxd5 තිxd5 (Galkin -Burmakin, Oberwart 1999).

12. Ad7 13 He2 Af6 14 Wb3?! 二h8 15 a4 a6 16 全d2 b5! 17 ab ab 18 2d3 g5! 19 2h3 h6 20 Zae1 b4! And with energetic play Black took over the initiative (Velimirovic -Drazic, Pogorica 1996).

2) 7 金b5+ ②bd7 On 7... 盒d7 verv convincing play was demonstrated by the English grandmaster John Nunn (in a game against Hickl, Dortmund 1987): 8 盒c4 0-0 9 響b3! 盒f5 10 豐xb7 2bd7 11 单f4 2e8 12 2f3 2b6 13 2b3 2c8 14 Wc6 2d6 15 Wc5 皇a6 16 包e5 墨e8 17 0-0-0!

8 d6! Strictly speaking, this makes sense of the check on b5: Black has been forced to cover the d-file and thereby oblige him to take on d6 with a pawn.

Black can join the opponent's cause (8...ed), but can also be obstinate



a) 8...0-0!? An interesting pawn sacrifice, first played in the game Canal - Opocensky (Sliac 1932). Black's idea has its points: he intends to carry out a7-a6, b7-b5, blockade the queen's flank on the light squares and transfer the whole heavy struggle to the weak isolated d4 pawn. And it is not possible to say what is the right way for White to deal with this plan!

9 de Wxe7+ 10 @ge2 Here we have an excellent example that shows how Black's idea can work: 10 \$e2 a6! 11 幻f3 b5! 12 a3 盒b7 13 0-0 Wd6 14 皇g5 h6 15 皇h4 ④h5! The compensation is evident (Hendriks van Mil, Antwerp 1995).

10 ... a6 11 & xd7 Even after 11 & d3 b5 12 0-0 \$b7 Black has repeatedly managed to demonstrate that his aspirations are well-founded:

13 皇g5 @b6 14 響d2 篇fe8 15 @g3 響d7 16 ᡚce2 ᡚe4 17 毫xe4 毫xe4 18 b3 20d5 (Bronstein - Gurgenidze, USSR 1972):

13 回g3 篇fe8 14 a3 包b6 15 皇g5 h6 16 皇e3 ④fd5 17 罩e1 響h4 (Alabkin - Turoy, Krasnodar 1997).



11....¥xd7!? Black has the firm intention of establishing his bishop on b7. Therefore inconsistent is 11...\$xd7?! 12 兔g5 ¥d6 13 &44 ¥b6 14 兔g5 其fd8 15 0-0 ゑc6 16 ¥d2 Ĉe4 17 ¥d4 Ĉxc3 18 bc and chances of realising his extra pawn appear for White (Sveshnikov – Ginslis, USSR 1975).

12 0-0 b5 13 \$f4 \$b7 14 \$e5 Ife8 15 對b3 ②g4!? 16 桌xg7 單c6 17 d5 (also in the event of 17 f3 雪xg7 18 昌ac1 创f6 the weakness of the d4 pawn, together with the weakening of the e3 square, gives Black chances of obtaining counterplay) 17 ... 響d6 18 2g3 空xg7 19 Wd1 Wf4 Winning this position is of course difficult for Black but it is fully possible to make a draw (Frolyanov - Malofeev, St.Petersburg 2002).

And so if you do not want to sit in the trenches – boldy play 8...0-0. It's worth it!

b) 8...e6?! As distinct from 8...0-0, this is not a gambit – Black is hoping to win back the pawn. But he intends to capture on d6 with a piece so as to leave Black again with a weak isolani on d4.



**9** Φ13 Impetuosity - 9 d5?! - here is completely out of place: 9...e5! 10 Φ13 0-0 11 0-0 Φ28 12 Ξe1 f6 13 Φe4 a6 14 Δa4 Ξf7 15 Δe3 Δf8, and suddenly Black's plan has succeeded (Djuluis - L.-B. Hansen, Groningen 1986).

9...0-1 10 0-0  $\oplus$ b6 Even worse is 10...a6?! 11 &d3. Now if 11... $\oplus$ b6, then after 12 &f4 Black will not get the d6 pawn: 12... $\oplus$ bd3 13  $\oplus$ xd5  $\bigotimes$ xd5 14 &g3  $\oplus$ b6 15 &c4!  $\oplus$ xb2 is  $\oplus$ c4  $\oplus$  xb2 with great chances of victory (Jansa – Kucera, Usti. nad Labern 1994). While on 11...b5 12 a4!? b4 13  $\oplus$ c4 &b7 14  $\oplus$ c5! looks very good (Jansa – Burovie, Euroen 1996).

11 & 14 & 15 12 & est a 613 & 23 d 14 & g3  $\Im$  xg3 15 hg % x66 16 % b3 & dot 15 % 15 fB lack has in the end won the d6 pawn. But he will not like the suspect position he has reached (Meduna – Lipka, Czech Republic 2002).

c) 8...ed (the main continuation) 9 @e2+. If Black does not want to transfer to an endgame so soon, then he is forced to play 9...\$rf8. Though he will spend some time castling artificially (h7-h6, \$rf8-g8-h7), it is not so easy for White to obtain the advantage:

10  $\oplus$ 13 h6 11 0-0  $\oplus$ 16 (or 11... $\oplus$ 28, Shirov – Vizhmanavin, Tibbrg 1992; in Shirov's opinion, White retains a minimal advantage by 12 &c4  $\oplus$ 18 13  $\Xi$ e1 &c6 14 d5 &g4 15 h3) 12 &d3 &g8 13 &d4 &h7 (...and once again the king's journey has a happy ending) 14 h3  $\Xi$ e8 15 &d2 &d1d5 16 &g3  $\oplus$ 1xc3 17 bc &c6 18  $\Xi$ ab1. This is how the game Lautier – Yusupov (Baden Baden 1992) continued. After 18...&d51? there are chances for both sides.

**9...** $\oplus$ e7 The critical position of the system with 7  $\triangleq$ b5+. Now the exchange of queens cannot be avoided; and the endgame is not easy to play.



10 全f4 響xe2+ 11 全xe2!? The light-squared bishop transfers to f3, making it difficult for the opponent to develop his queenside pieces.

The other idea – to place the rook on e1 a little earlier and try to exploit the enemy king – 11  $\textcircled{}{2}$ gxe2  $\textcircled{}{2}$ e7, and then:

12 0-0 20b6 13 第fe1 호e6 14 필ad1 a6 15 d5!? 진fxd5! 16 진xd5+ 진xd5 17 호c4 진xf4 18 진xf4 호e5 19 진xe6 12 0-0-0 全)b6 13 置he1 金e6 14 金b1 a6 15 金d3 金d7 16 全e4 全)bd5 17 受g5 冨ac8 (Georgadze – Bagirov, Tashkent 1984). As we see, the minor pieces (mainly the bishop on e6) are unable to defend their king.

11... $\pm e7$  12  $\pm f3$  Premature is 12 0-0-0  $\pm b6$  13  $\pm f3$ , upon which the pawn sacrifice 13... $\pm e61$ ? 14  $\pm xb7$   $\pm ab8$  is worth considering. The position of the king on c1 gives Black a target for counterplay on the b and c files.

12...\Db6 13 \Dgc2 It is worth mentioning the prophylaxis carried out by White in the game Miles - Belyavsky (Biel 1991): 13 b3!? Immediately 'clipping' the knight b6, indeed the standard pawn sacrifice 13...\$\$\Ddc6\$ does not be same effect. Belyavsky was restricted to the modest 13...\$\$\Ddc6\$ b8 15 \Dc2 ad b1 \Dc6\$ b15 \Dc6\$ b15 \Dc6\$ b2 \Dc6

After 13 2 ge2 Black has several plans to choose from.



The slowest is 13...a6 (Black denies the white knight he b5 square, but is it worth spending time on this?) 14 0-0 Bb8 15  $\pm$ fe1 &c6 16  $\pm$ g3 47 17  $\pm$ ge4  $\pm$ xe4 18  $\pm$ xe4 (Smagin – Vizhmanavin, Tashkent 1984), and the d6 pawn falls all the same: 18.. $\pm$ G8 19  $\pm$ C5+1

However, at times purely defensive tactics give not a bad result. As, for example, in the game Miezis -Jonkman (Bad Worishofen 1999): 13... 温d81? 14 0-0 温b8 15 黑fe1 a6 (just like it all went in Smagin against Vizhmanavin but with a single exception: the position of the rook on d8 allows the king to hide on f8, and the knight to come up to defend the d6 pawn) 16 包g3+ 當f8! 17 包ge4 De8! 18 Had1 \$15 19 g4 \$xe4 20 \$xe4 @c7 21 \$g3 @e6 22 @e2 Id7! (the same excellent manoeuvre: Black frees the rook b8 from menial work) 23 b3 He8, and there is hardly anything left of White's initiative.

In contrast to the slow 13...a6 and 14....£B8 – there is the impatient 13....\$c6?1 + 4.\$xb7 faabs 15 ≜f3 €fd5. The intermediate 16 \$g5+1 (remember this moment) severely complicates Black's counterplay: 16...f6 17 &c1 €b4 18 0-0 Ehc8 19 b31 f5 20 \$g5+1 \$c37 21 \$fd1. There is no real compensation for the pawn (Rasic - Salai, Slowakia 1998).

Australian grandmaster lan Rogers treated this variation rather well. One can fully emulate the following example of his creative work.

13...h6!? Threatening to win a piece by g6-g5-g4! If the opponent notices this threat, he will be forced

to spend time on prophylaxis (14 h3 or 14 h4), but then Black can already sacrifice a pawn - 14...\$c61? You see the g5 square (we recall 16 \$g5+! in the game Rasic - Szallai) is now reliably covered!

14 h3 In the game Smerdon – Rogers (Canberra 2002) after 14 h4 deft? White did not risk taking the offered pawn and played 15 \u2264 C? is clear that he is not fighting for the advantage; but what was Black thinking about in reply to 15 dxh7? Analysis shows that even in this case he has compensation, sufficient for equality: 15...\u2264 b16 dxf3 \u2264 Cfd4 I ad 12 h6 dxf3 \u2264 Cfd4 u22 \u2264 \u2264 b26 f2 u26 \u2264 L26 L26 L2 22 \u2264 \u2266 fb 23 \u2264 L26 L22 4 \u2264 L27+ u278 ter.

### 14....皇e6 15 皇xb7 罩ab8 16 皇f3



When Rogers met this position for the first time, he, so to speak, 'muffed it': 16... \Dbd5?!, and did not obtain compensation for the pawn (Zifroni – Rogers, Agios Nikolaos 1995). But then a year later it all fell into place:

16... $\bigcirc$  fd5! (by linking up with the bishop g7, Black thereby overloads the knight e2, which makes the move 17 b3 impossible) 17  $\triangle$ d2  $\triangle$ xc3 18 åxc3 ča4 19 0-0 Intest (Bergstrom – Rogers, Gausdal 1996). The arising position somehow resembles the Volga Gambit. Like here, the pawn sacrifice bears a purely positional character, like there, Black will not only fight with less material in the endgame, but even urges on the opponent towards this! The activity of the rook on the b and crifics together with powerful minor picces (the bishop g7 is particularly good) means he will have an enduring initative.

### II

### 6 \b3!?

Less popular is the other way of pressurising the d5 pawn: 6 \$\overline{2}g5\$. There are several reasons for this.

Secondly, there is the quiet move 6...\$g7. White can win a pawn; but this does not bring him an advantage.



7 ±xf6 ±xf6 8 cd (long ago Botvinnik advised against taking the pawn on d5 with the knight in view of 8...£g7 9 €/13 €/c6 followed by ±c8-g4 and c7-c6, 8...0-0 9 ±c4 ₩b6!? 10 €/gc2 ₩xb2 11 ≣b1 ₩a3 12 0-0 €/d7 with the better chances (Krasenkov - Swider, Madrid 1998).

So hardly anyone departs from the theoretical verdict on the non-topical 6 \$\overline\$5. Quite another matter is 6 \$\overline\$b3!?

6...dc?! 7 &xc4 e6 8 Of3 or 6...e6?! 7 Of3 &g7 8 cd ed 9 &g5. In the present situation the combination of the moves g7-g6 and e7-e6 does not make the slightest impression:

 $\begin{array}{l} 6...\mathfrak{Q}c6?! \ 7 \ cd \ \mathfrak{Q}a5 \ 8 \ \ \mathfrak{W}a4 + \ \mathfrak{A}d7 \\ 9 \ \mathfrak{A}b5 \ a6 \ 10 \ \mathfrak{A}cd7 + \ \mathfrak{Q}cd7 \ 11 \ \mathfrak{Q}gc2 \\ b5 \ 12 \ \ \mathfrak{W}d1 \ \mathfrak{Q}fc1 \ \mathfrak{Q}fc1 \ \mathfrak{Q}fc1 \ \mathfrak{Q}fc1 \ \mathfrak{Q}fc1 \\ chances \ are \ small \ that \ Black \ will \\ obtain \ \ compensation \ \ for \ the \\ sacrificed \ \ material \ (Noskov \ - \\ Katalymov, USSR \ 1973). \end{array}$ 

A stand alone idea is 6... Dbd7? 7 cd Db6. It is worthwhile for White to look for something else apart from the experimental 8 @c2?! Drd59 @b5+?? dd7 10 Dxd5 Dxd511 @c4 @c6 12 Drd5 @g7 13  $0 \cdot 0 \cdot 0$ 14 Qc5 c6 15 Dxc6 be 16  $\fbox{dd1}$   $\fbox{db8}$ . Black has weaknesses, but he also has his own trumps (Smeets – Seirawan, Dordrecht 2003).

7 cd 0-0 Before us lies the tabiya of the variation 6 對b3.



It is clear that all White's plans are linked to the defence of the d5 pawn. But how best to defend it? Just one light-squared bishop can defend the pawn from three positions: c4, f3 and g2. But how best to go to work: first to move out the bishop, and then the knight, or first to develop the knight along the march route g1-c2-f4, and only then think where to post the bishop?

For convenience the further layout of material is examined in three parts:  $\$ \diamondsuit_{20} (C) (A), \$ \And_{30} (B) and \$ \And_{20} (C).$ It goes without saying, however, that in many variations these ideas cross over, and similar positions are reached by transposition of moves.

А

8 ⊕ge2 He will not succeed in defending the pawn in the more natural way: 8 ⊕15 ⊘bd7 9 ♣g5 ⊕b6 10 ♣c4, as Mikhail Tal twice tried to do in the XXIX USSR Championship (Baku 1961). After 10...♣15 sooner or later Black will bring the bishop to the c4 square (by means of ⊒a8-c8):



11 單d1 ②e4 12 0-0 ②xc3 13 bc 單c8! 14 单b5 h6 15 单h4 g5 16 单g3 響xd5 (Tal - Bronstein).

After 8 Dge2 Black usually chooses between two moves of the gueen's knight: to d7 or a6.

1) 8... $\mathcal{P}$ bd 7 9 g3 The alternative -9  $\mathcal{P}$ 14  $\mathcal{P}$ 8 (the position on 9... $\mathcal{P}$ b6 10  $\mathcal{A}$ c2 is looked at within the variation 8  $\mathcal{A}$ c2) 10  $\mathcal{A}$ c3  $\mathcal{A}$ d6 11  $\mathcal{A}$ c2  $\mathcal{P}$ b6 12 a4 a5 13 0-0  $\mathcal{A}$ d7 with a very complicated struggle. Thus the game Yakovich -Miroshinchenko (Noyabrisk 2003) continued 14  $\mathcal{A}$ d3  $\mathcal{A}$ bc4 15  $\mathcal{P}$ c5  $\mathcal{A}$ c31 6 fe  $\mathcal{A}$ c3 17  $\mathcal{A}$ d3 b6 18  $\mathcal{A}$ 5c4  $\mathcal{A}$ r5 19  $\mathbb{Z}$ ac1 6 c2 0 de  $\mathcal{A}$ xc6 and the game still did not verto one side or the other.

9... $\triangle$ b6 10 &g2 &f5 It is not clear whether it is worth Black including 10...a5 11 a4 and only then play 11...&f5. It is important that after 12 0-0 &d3?! White has the jab 13 d6!, when the doubled weak extra pawn is converted to one in top condition: 13...ed 14 &xb7  $\Xi$ 08 15 皇f3 置e8 16 變d1 皇a6 17 置e1 變d7 18 创f4 (Hubner - Smyslov, Tilburg 1984).

11 @f4!? Starting concrete play, the point of which becomes clear later.

Of course, 11 0-0 is also played. After 11...@d7, with just a single move White cannot prevent the transfer the bishop to d3 or h3 (11 2514 g5!), but it is possible to prepare himself for the bishop sortie:



12 a4!? 单d3 13 d6! ed 14 a5! 並c4 15 斷b4 並xe2 16 ①xe2 ①bd5 17 斷b3 黨fe8 18 ②c3 with tangible pressure on the long diagonal (Liberzon – Gurgenidze, Alma Ata 1968) or

12 Idl!? 2h3 13 2h1! 2g4 14 Idl 2xe2 15 Idl 2xe2 Idl 2ke4 and in view of the weakness on e7 Black will hardly win the d5 pawn in the near future (Brodsky – Mittelman, Rishon-le-Zion 1997).

11....\U00eff47 While White has not castled short, it is dangerous to play 11...g5. However the attempt to prepare this move by 11...h6!? did not succeed in the game A.Sokolov – Ziganova (Helsinki 1992): 12 h4! IC8 13 0-0 響d7 14 a4 心c4 15 a5 Ifd8 16 IIa4! 心d6 17 IId1 心fe4 18 IIb4.

12 h4! The point of the idea  $11 \otimes f4$ - now the construction  $\frac{W}{d7} + \hat{a}f5$ loses all sense. The bishop has simply nowhere to go!

12...프ac8 13 0-0 h6 14 프e1 신c4 15 빨a4!



Making the opponent 'an offer he can't refuse'. However, with the exchange of queens, the last possibilities of striking up, if you like, some kind of counterplay are extinguished (Korneev – Novitsky, Minsk 1998).

2) 8...€a6?? (it is logical to exploit the fact that the f1-a6 diagonal is temporarily obstructed) 9 g3 The endgame after 9...₩b6?! 10 ₩xb6 ab 11 Åg2 €b4 12 0-0 ∄d8 has been investigated at the very highest level. The conclusion, confirmed by the authority of four world champions, is that 13 d6! guarantees White a scrious advantage:

13...ed 14 兔g5 鼍e8 15 a3 ②c6 16 鼍fe1 兔g4 17 兔xf6! 兔xf6 18 ③d5 兔d8 19 邻ec3 (Tal – Botvinnik, Moscow 1966).

In recent times Black has pinned his hopes entirely on another idea: 9...b5!?



Black will not object to an exchange of the b-pawn for the dpawn. But he will offer the exchange now, while the white pieces have poor interaction with one another.

It is of course possible to reject the capture on b5, but then he has to abandon any dreams of an advantage: 10 a3  $\underline{\mathbb{Z}}_{04}$  **H**  $\underline{\mathbb{Z}}_{14}$  **H**  $\underline{\mathbb{Z}}_{1$ 

10 ②xb5 Also after 10 徑xb5 黨b8 11 營a4 ②b4 Black, in the opinion of Slovakian grandmaster Ljubomir Ftacnik, has quite a few chances of generating an initiative.

10... 2xd5 11 2g2 2e6 12 Wd1 Wa5+ 13 2bc3 2xc3 14 bc Zad8 (also interesting is 14... Zab8!? 15 0-0 2c4) 15 0-0 2c4 16 2d2



In the encounter Adams – Granda (Madrid 1998) Black rushed to establish material parity: 16...65?! With the loss of the d4 pawn the white bishops become active; shortly after Black miscalculated a simple variation and resigned.

Michael Adams himself also pointed out the right direction of counterplay: 16...268! (no rush!) 17 Eel Eb2 18 &11 (not possible is 18 &cl:1? &xd4! 18..&168 Black's initiative is worth a pawn, though it would be unjust if White complained about his position.

As we see, upon both 8... Cbd7 and 8...Cad White does not hurry to deploy the knight to 14. With two moves – 9 g3 and 10 &g2 he takes both the h1-a8 diagonal as a whole, and the b7 pawn (with the idea d5-d6!) in particular. Therefore it is worthwhile for Black to think about a line of play that is especially directed against g2-g3.

3) 8 ... Ie8!? 9 g3 e6!

The same motive as in the variation 8... $\Omega$ a6 9 g3 b5!? – the undeveloped, uncoordinated state of the white pieces. But the carrying out of the idea by 8... $\mathbb{Z}$ e8!? 9 g3 c6! is perhaps even better.



Dangerous now is 10 dc?! ≙xe6 11 ₩xb7 €bd7 12 ≙g2 ☎b8 13 ₩xa7 in view of 13...≙c4 14 €f3 €d5 15 ₩a4 €∂7b6 16 ₩c2 ₩f6 with an attack (Beim – Shereshevsky, Kharkov 1967).

The idea of 8... are 8 works even if White does not play 9 g3. For example, 9  $\Delta$ f4 c51 or 9  $\lambda$ g5 c61 10 de  $\lambda$ xc6 11 d5  $\Delta$ f5 12 0-0-0  $\Delta$ bd7 13  $\Delta$ d4  $\Delta$ c5 14 #b5 (2ude – Schmittner, Geissen 1991) 14... #c81? 15  $\Delta$ xf5 #xf5 16  $\lambda$ c3 #ac81 with a matack.

It has to be acknowledged that the move 8 2ge2 is too slow and therefore inaccurate.

#### В

8 g3 Suggested by the Soviet master and theoretician Vasily Sozin in 1932. We will not digress from the usual moves such as 8... 4bd7, but

will immediately pass on to a couple of counterattacking ideas: 8...e6!? and 8...包a6 9 魚g2 b5!?

1) 8...e6!? White can refuse the sacrifice - 9 象g2 公xd5 10 公ge2 公c6 11 0-0.



Black retains chances of gradually equalising the game:

11... $\underline{w}_{bb}$  12  $\underline{w}_{xb6} \oplus x_{b6}$  13  $\underline{a}_{d1}$ with an endgame which Black, in the game Tukmakov — Dydyshko (Rostov on the Don 1967), clearly overestimated: 13... $\underline{a}_{d8}$  14  $\underline{a}_{d4} \oplus \underline{a}_{d5}$ 15  $\underline{a}_{g51}$  16 16  $\underline{a}_{d2} \oplus \underline{a}_{d4}$  17  $\underline{a}_{ac1} \oplus \underline{a}_{d3}$  18  $\underline{a}_{10} \oplus x_{d4} \underline{a}_{d4}$ 20  $\underline{a}_{d3}$  18  $\underline{a}_{10} \oplus x_{d4} \underline{a}_{d4}$ 20  $\underline{a}_{c3}$   $\underline{a}_{d7}$  21  $\underline{a}_{d2} \oplus c_{5}$  22  $\underline{a}_{bd1}$  $\underline{a}_{d2}$  23  $\underline{a}_{d2} \oplus c_{17}$  (23... $\underline{a}_{R8}$ !?) 24  $\oplus b51$  winning;

So that the adherence to principles, shown by White with his capture on e6, can only be welcomed by Black in the present concrete case.

9 de 2c6 Upon 9... 2xc6 10 ₩xb7 2bd7 11 2g2 158 12 ₩xa7 Ic8 13 2gc2 2c4 14 2d3 2d5 by transposition of moves we have reached a position identical to that which we met in the game Beim – Shereshevsky (page 78).



Here we have yet another example, showing that White, despite his extra pawn, risks far more than the opponent:

15 0-0 (Beim, we recall, played 15  $\frac{1}{8}$  a) 15...Qxc3 16 Qxc3 axf117  $\frac{1}{6}xr1$  (Qx18 k Qdx2) (it seems he can still make a draw: 18 d5 axc3 1 19 he  $\frac{1}{6}$  (Qx20  $\frac{1}{2}$   $4\frac{1}{8}$  xc3 21  $\frac{1}{2}$  xb8  $\frac{1}{8}$  xa1+22  $\frac{1}{6}$  Q2  $\frac{1}{8}$   $4\frac{1}{8}$  xc3 21  $\frac{1}{2}$  xb8  $\frac{1}{8}$  xa1+22  $\frac{1}{6}$  Q2  $\frac{1}{8}$   $\frac{1}{8}$  xc3 21  $\frac{1}{2}$  xb8 $\frac{1}{8}$  xa1+22  $\frac{1}{8}$  ya2  $\frac{1}{8}$   $\frac{1}{8}$ 

10 eft  $\pm h8$  (again Black is 'minus three', and again virtually without risk) 11  $\delta_{202} \leq we'r$  The key d4 pawn is hanging. He cannot defend it by  $12 \leq w'r$ .  $\delta_{20} = 13 \leq w'r$ .  $\delta_{20} = 12 \leq w'r$ .  $\delta_{20} = 12 \leq w'r$ . He will not live long (Gheorghiu – Johannessen, Havana 1966). It means that White is forced to retreat with virtually his only developed piece: 12 @d1!?



The main thing for Black in this position – is not to overestimate it. Thus on 12...694?! 13 & g2 & x44'surprisingly' it becomes clear that White has still not lost the right to castle: 14 0-0. Try to get at the king on g1!

The Canadian grandmaster Kevin Spraggett suddenly decided to play 'in brilliant style':

12...Qxd4? 13 \u00ebxd4 \u00ebcd4 2g4 14 \u00ebcd4 2g4 14 \u00ebcd4 25 17 \u00ebcd5 20 0-0 the attack came to an end (Hennigan - Spraggett, Lugano 1988).

So is there a win for Black? As a matter of fact, no, but there is a precise draw: 12...&f5!? 13 &g2 &b4 14 0-0 &c2 15 II b1 @b4 with a repetition of moves.

2) 8...2a6 9 ≜g2 b5!? We have already given a rough idea of what happens after the capture of the pawn: 10 ₩xb5?! ≣b8 11 ₩a4 Δb4 or 10 ₹xb5 Δb7 11 ₹ac3 (in the variation 11 Åc7?! ₩xc7! 12 d6 ≜xg2 13 dc €xc7 Black has a whole set of pieces for the queen) 11....Eb8 12 ₩c4 ₩b6 13 Δpc2 2 Åb4 14 0-0 If d8 with more than enough compensation for the sacrificed material.

Prudence should take precedence: 10 @ge2, but then 10...b4!



It is dangerous to win the exchange: 11 d6?! be! 12 Wa3 (even worse is 12 & xa8 because of 12... & e6! 13 de & xa8) 12... & Ta8 13 de & xa8) 12... & ta8 13 de & xa81 12... & ta8 2 & xa81 6 & 35. Tue, there is no mate, but there is an initiative, and an enduring one: 16... c2+ 17 &f1 &f5 18 & 32 de etc.

In the game Stanec – Krivoshey (Oberwart 2000) White again refused the Greek gift: 11 \@d1 \&b7 12 \@e3 \Bb8 13 0-0 \@c7 14 \&b4 \@cxd5 15 \&a3 \@xe3 16 \&xe3 \&xg2 17 \@xg2 \&d5+ 18 \&G3 Draw.

If up to now the variations 8 g3 e6!? and 8 g3 a a6 9 a g2 b5!? have not been the focus of attention (at least, officially), then it is only because White has been wary of continuing the discussion.

#### С

8 &e2 The main continuation. Incidentally, the moment White picks up the bishop he finds it necessary to place it precisely on e2. After 8 & c4?! & Dod7 9 & pc2 &Db 10 0-0 there are still some questions after 10..&Xc4 11 &Xc4 b6 12 &g5 &D7 13 &Dt4 &G7 14  $\Xi$ fe1  $\Xi$ td8 15 &Hol4 And in the famous game Alekhine – Euwe (Berne 1932) White even managed to carry out a nice combination: 15..&G4 16 &Xcf6 &Xcf6 17  $\Xi$ c4 &T5 18 g3 e6 19 &Xc67

But the more accurate 10...&15!? ends all questions: 11 2g3 &c2! or 11 2f4 2xc4 12 3xc4 2e8!, and White is not destined to gain the advantage.

After 8 &e2 none of the jabs (e7-e6!? or b7-b5!?) work. There are two main continuations: 8...&bd7 and 8...&a6, but first of all we deliberately get shot of the side-lines:



Dubious is 8...b6?! 9 全f3 全b7 10 ②ge2 豐d7 in view of 11 全f4 蓋d8 12 簋c1 ②a6 13 豐a3! (analysis by Boleslavsky).

The transfer of the knight to d6, suggested by the Soviet master Nikolai Kopylov, does not bring equality. In the game Vasyukov – Doda (Belgrade 1961) White refuted this manoeuvre in the simplest way: 8...\$\colored to \$\frac{1}{2}\$ does 10 \$\locate{1}\$ for \$\colored \$\locate{1}\$ for \$\locate{1}\$ for \$\colored\$ for \$\frac{1}{2}\$ cloce 15 \$\colored\$ for \$\frac{1}{2}\$ cloce 15 \$\colored\$ for \$\colored\$ for \$\frac{1}{2}\$ cloce 15 \$\colored\$ fo 16 ②xd6 ②xd6 17 h3 罩fe8 18 皇g4.

Bronstein suggested 8...a5?!, but Botvinnik responded: 9 &13  $\Leftrightarrow$ a6 10 a3! Later, two Scandinavian grandmasters also decided to take a look at it: so what happened next? This: 10... $\Leftrightarrow$ c7 11  $\bigotimes$ loc2 @d7 12 0-0 at 13 @cd  $\Xi$ a5 14 &d2 b5 15 @c5 @d8 16 &a2!  $\Xi$ a8 17 &b4 and Black's game is simply bad (C.Hansen – Hector, Vejle 1994).

 1) 8...⊙bd7 9 ▲f3 In the game Janosevic – Hort (Copenhagen 1965)
 White, quite frankly, complicated his development unnecessarily: 9 €Jh3?!
 ₩b6 10 ₩d1?! And after 10...⊙e8!
 he immediately began to have difficulty finding moves. He played 11 & &3, but then came 11...⊙df6
 12 & fti ₩b2 with advantage.

9.... 2b6 The tabiya of the variation 8 ≜.e2.



He needs to develop, but how? Obviously, 10 皇f4, 10 皇g5 or 10 ②ge2.

a) 10 \$\overline{1}f4 Apart from everything else, this is excellent prophylaxis against 10...66?! - 11 d6! \$\overline{1}c4 dc1 12 \$\overline{2}c5!\$, and Black already has major problems: 12...\$\overline{1}b4 13 \$\overline{2}c6 14 \$\overline{2}c4 5 \$\overline{2}c4 5 15 \$\overline{0}c4 c1\$}

(Sveshnikov - Gipslis, Naberezhny Chelny 1988).

10... $\pm$ 65 Ålso possible is 10... $\pm$ 64 but its main defect is Black's complete lack of counterplay after 11  $\pm$ xg4  $\pm$ xg4 12  $\pm$ 105  $\pm$ 16 13 ddf ed 14  $\pm$ 0-0. He can hardly get moving, e.g. 14... $\pm$ 15  $\pm$ g5  $\pm$ d7 16 a4!  $\pm$ ac8 17 a5  $\pm$ 26 8 18  $\pm$ fc1 (Gulko – Delaney, New York 1998).

11  $\Xi$ of  $\Xi$ of V.V. Smyslov treated this position quite riskily: 11... $\Xi$ os 12.h3  $\Xi$ oc<sup>2</sup>/4. After 13  $\circ$ \_02e2  $\Xi$ oc 14 ab  $\pm$ c2 15  $\Xi$ a1  $\pm$ xb3 16 d6  $\odot$ fd5! 17 de  $\Xi$ fc8 18  $\pm$ d6  $\pm$ fc6 19 0-0  $\pm$ xe7 it all came together pretty well (Bhend – Smyslov, Tel Aviv 1964). On the other hand we don't know how Black intended to reply to 13 d6! ed 14  $\pm$ xd6  $\Xi$ fc8 + 15  $\odot$ ge2.

12 h3 h5 13 @ge2 White resolved the problems of defence of the d5 pawn more simply in the game Gulko – Tukmakov (Vilnius 1978): 13 &c5 Ξfd8 14 &xi6 ±xi6 15 @ge2 However this didn't bother his opponent: 15...h4!? 16 0-0 Ξac8 17 Ξfel @c4 18 @f4 @d6 with sufficient counterplay.

After 15...d5 White arrives at a crossroads.



It is possible to win a pawn –  $16 \oplus g3 \&e6 17 \oplus b5 \oplus 81 & 2hxa7$ , but 18...2bc41 forces White to allow a repetition of moves: 19  $\oplus b5 \oplus 32$ 20  $\frac{10}{2}44 \oplus c4$  (Pavasovic – Ivacic, Portoroz 1996). Incidentally, Botvinnik advised Black not to hurry to force a draw, but consolidate by means of 16... $\underline{x}ac81$ ? 17 &g5 &c6.

However after  $16 \text{ } \pm \text{g5}$  or  $16 \text{ } \pm \text{e5}$ Black 'unloads' his counterplay with the help of one or other tactical operation:

16 皇e5 皇g4! 17 hg hg 18 皇xf6 皇xf6 (Sveshnikov – Burovic, Torcy 1991) or

16 ±g5 ±g4! 17 ±xg4 hg 18 h4 ≣e8 (Georgadze – Vaganian, USSR 1983), and both times achieved the better position. Therefore today the move 10 ±f4 has rather fallen into the shade.

b) 10 🚊 g5



Despite the fact that the variation has had extensive practice, it is difficult to give any kind of clear cut recommendation as to its performance.

Thus, even the extravagant 10...hc?! 11 &xf6 cf?; is apparently possible: 12 &xf6 cf?; is apparently possible: 12 &gc2 15 13 .00 &d7 14  $\Xifd1$  @b8 15 a4 &c8 16 d6 &xd6 17 &d4 &ch7 18  $\Xiacl$  h5. White has space and comfortable squares for his minor pieces, while Black has two bishops and a huge amount of optimism (Potkin – Novik, St.Petersburg 2003).

It is also possible to say the very same about 10...a5?! On general considerations the move ought not to be particularly good; in practice, however, Black frequently achieves a game with fully equal rights.

11 置d1 a4 12 對55 免e8 13 包ge2 包d6 14 對54 皇d7 15 0-0 包bc8 16 包g3 罩e8 17 罩fe1 h6 18 皇f4 對56 (Pinter - Bronstein, Budapest 1977);

11 魚xf6 ef?? 12 ②ge2 魚f5 13 0-0 魚d3 14 ②a4 魚xe2 15 魚xe2 ③xa4 16 覺xa4 f5 17 魚f3 變b6 18 置fd1 (Vasyukov – Ermenkov, Cienfuegos 1975) 18...置fd8?? 19 置ab1 變b4 with a draw.

It has to be established that Black will find some way (transfer of the knight to d6, bishop to d3, again occasionally prodding the queen with the edge pawn), and White – not quite.

Usually Black (as also upon 10 愈f4) will choose between two moves with the bishop – to g4 or f5. bl) 10....âg4 11 âxf6 âxf3 12 2xf3



Botvinnik rejected 12...全xf6?! in view of 13 a4 響c7 14 0-0 互fd8 15 a5 響c4 16 互a3! He assessed the endgame as being in White's favour.

Subsequent generations of grandmasters have transformed Borvinnik's idea in this variation: 12...&xf6?! 13 0-0 @d6 14 a4 a5 15  $\Xi a3$   $\Xi d8$  16 @c4 @b4 17 d6! @c4 18 @xb4 ab 19  $\Xi b3$ - $\Xi xa4$ 20 @c5. We single out the games Hebden – Arkell (London 1988), And why not? The endgame actually proves to be in White's favour!

It turns out that the idea 12....ef?? 13 0-0 燮d7 is not an alternative.

The further continuation might be:

14  $\equiv$ fe1  $\equiv$ fd8 15 a4  $\pm$ 8 f8 16  $\oplus$ 4  $\pm$ g7 17 d6  $\pm$ xd6 18  $\oplus$ c5  $\equiv$ 66 White is effectively left with an extra dpawn, but all the other factors are not in his favour. The most probable outcome of the game will be a draw (Kosten - Arkell, Hastings 1991).

b2) 10.... f5 11 Id1



Compared to analogous positions from the variation  $10 \ \&f4 \ \&f5$ II  $\XidI$  this is not quite appropriate: the continuation 11...@47 12 h3 h5 13  $\Im_{02}2$   $\Xifd8$ , considered the main line when the bishop is on f4, here is dubious in view of 14  $\&xf61 \ \&xf61$  $\Xi10 \ 90 \ \Imc28$   $16 \ \Imc29$   $\Imc16$   $17 \ \Xie1$  $\Xiac8$  18  $\Xic2$  and White's chances are still superior (Sermek – Ivacic, Slovenia 1993).

Therefore Black returns to the plan with the advance of the a-pawn: 11...51? 12 Oge2 a4 13 "b55 h6It is worth turning our attention tothe game Dolmatov – Gurgenidze(Kutaisi 1978; <math>13...247? 14 "b44 $<math>\Xi$ e 815 0-0 h6 16  $\pm$  xft6 ef 17 d6  $\pm$  R8 I8  $\pm$ xb7  $\Xi$ h8 19  $\pm$ B 3 f5 20 d5 "b7 For the present Black is two pawns down, but there is no doubt that he will win back both the one on d6 and (a little later) that on b2.

14 @xf6 ef!? 15 0-0 Ze8



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A position has been reached in which there is, as they say, 'dynamic equality': any one of three results is possible. White could extinguish the opponent's initiative and steadily realise his extra pawn, he can return the material and force a draw by exchanges, but might 'overdo' things and lose, even with the extra pawn.

c) 10 @ge2 Black's standard choices are: 10...\$g4 or 10...\$f5.

c1) 10...2g4 I1 2xg4 ⊙xg4 Obviously, with the loss of the d5 pawn, White's chances of an advantage are also lost. He must somehow manage to do something before Black plays ⊙g4-f6 or ₩d8d7 and Z%(a8)-d8. But what?

12 a4! (and here is the reply - it is necessary to pester the knight b6) 12...②f6! Weaker is 12...a5?! 13 0-0 習d6 14 盒f4 徵b4. After 15 彎d1! the black queen starts to feel uncomfortable.



15...公f6? 16 d6! ed 17 创5 觉e8 18 b3 d5 19 单c1!, and there is no defence against 20 单a3 (Ricardi – Glavina, Buenos Aires 1987);

 25 2b6 (J.Polgar - Skembris, Corfu 1990).

13 ℃f4 (13 a5?! ℃bxd5 14 ₩xb7 is too carly in view of 14...₩d6 15 ₩b3 ≣ab8 16 ₩ 11 ≦fc8 17 0-0 ₩a6! 18 ₩d2 c6 19 Ξd1 Ξb3 20 ₩c2 ₩c4 with colossal compensation, Sabyanov – Burmakin, Kstovo 1997) 13...#5t? The only move. Weak is 13...g5? 14 ℃fc2 h6 – White has still not castled kingside and therefore can allow himself to play 15 h4!

However if Black defends b7 – 13...@d7, then he risks falling into an extremely passive position after 14 a 5  $\bigcirc$ ck 15 0-0  $\bigcirc$ dd6 16  $\equiv$ dd1  $\equiv$ ac8 17  $\bigcirc$ dd3!?  $\bigcirc$ fe4 18  $\bigcirc$ c3  $\bigcirc$ xc3 19 bc  $@b5 20 \equiv$ a3  $\equiv$ c4 21  $\bigcirc$ c5 (Kobalija – Ponomarev, Rimavska Sobota 1996).

140-0 ₩d6! (Black has made three best moves in a row and ought to be rewarded for his efforts) 15 Åd1 The immediate 15 Φh5 ₩d7 16 d6 ed has been encountered. In the game S.Polgar – Gipslis (Brno 1991) White did not manage to consolidate his claim to an advantage: 17 d5 Åc8 18 ₩d3 ♣c8 19 Åa2 ♣c4 20 b3 ♣c5 21 ₩d1 ♣c7! with the unstoppable break b7-b5.



The fact that even very early on Black can be unnerved is shown by the game Sax – Cipslis (Valbo 1994): 19....Eek 20 h3 Ec4?! 21  $\stackrel{\circ}{\sim}$ Ad3  $\stackrel{\circ}{
m Wa}$ 8 22  $\stackrel{\circ}{\sim}$ De5! Probably Black missed this shot but even upon the more appropriate 20... $\stackrel{\circ}{\sim}$ De4 21  $\stackrel{\circ}{\sim}$ Id5  $\stackrel{\circ}{\sim}$ Xd5 22  $\stackrel{\circ}{\sim}$ Xd5 White has the more pleasant position.

24 Wb5 Eaa8 25 f4 Wb5 26 Eel  $\textcircled{O}_{16}$  27  $\textcircled{C}_{27}$   $\textcircled{W}_{15}$  28 Exc8+ Exc8 29 Ef1 (or 29 Ecl h6!? followed by g6-g5!) 29... $\textcircled{O}_{17}$  30  $\textcircled{C}_{xa5}$  Ad!with a threatening initiative.

c2) 10.... ≜f5 The idea is clear: while the knight is not standing on f4, the bishop will be ferried over to d3, and from there to c4, winning a pawn.



The knight, incidentally, can hardly be maintained on f4: 11 @f4 g5! 12 @fe2 g4! Continuing the forcing variation -13 @g3 &g6 14 &e2@bxd5 15 0-0 (Botvinnik recommended 15 h3?), but this is by now another story) 15... @a5 16 &d2@ft8 17 @xb7 @fab8 &bxd5 @xd519 @fxd5 &bxd5, we reach a position in which the activity of the black pieces should be enough for a draw (Batakov – Volchok, correspondence, 1987).

After 11 d6 ed 12 &tb7 lb8 13 &f3 Black likewise obtains sufficient compensation for the pawn -13... &bd5 14 %o1 &b4 15 0-0 &c2 16 &b1 &b4 17  $\Xi$ al &c2 18 g4 &xg4 19 &xg4 &xa1 20 &f3 %d7 with very sharp play (Ulibin – Bagirov, Vilnius 1997).

I 0-0 It goes without saying that even here Black can (indeed in several ways) exchange the b-pawn for the d-pawn. That he obtains compensation for the material is confirmed by statistics. But it is still not sure that it is worth giving up b?!

For example, we examine the programmed 11...&d3? 12 d6 ed 13 &xb7  $\Xi b8$  14 &f3 #d7 15 #d1 &a6 16 b3  $\Xi fe8$  17  $\Xi e1$   $\Xi bc8$  18 &a3.



In the game Milos - Kamsky (Palma de Mallorca 1989) Black played 18...d5 and soon won (White put a piece en prise). Also encountered is 18...g5??, likewise with good results.

On the other hand, perhaps White's king is weak? Or he has pawn weaknesses? Or a poor development of pieces? You see none of these hings. And a pawn...is a pawn.

Or 11...a5 12 &f4 &d3!? 13 d6 ed. This is a trap – Black invites a capture on b7: 14 &xb7?  $\exists$ B8 15 &f3 Dbd5!, actually with good play. But even here it is not certain that Black's construction is without defects. Thus in the game Dolmatov – Adams (Hastings 1989) followed 14 Bd1!; &a6 15 b3! h6 16 h3 Dh7 17 g3  $\fbox{E}$ c8 & b2  $\oiint$  Be 19  $\oiint$ e1 Df6 20  $\fbox{E}$ c1 and Black's minor pieces on the queen's flank find themselves unemployed unit the end of the game.

The most accurate move appears to be 11... #d7!? – both to defend b7 and also to bring up the rook to d8. And the idea  $\pm$ f5-d3-c4 has not gone away.



**12** a4!? **≙d3** (on 12...**≣**fd8 unpleasant is 13 d6! followed by a4a5) 13 d6 **≜c4** Possibly the most accurate move here is 13...e6!? 14 **≜f4 šc4** 15 **₩a3 ⊑fd8** 16 **⊑fc1** 

14 暫b4 e6 The alternative, as is not difficult to imagine, is again a pawn sacrifice: 14... 敏太d6!? 15 歐太d6 ed 16 兔xb7 簋ab8 with compensation.

15 &g5 @165 16 &xd5 ed 17 &c7 **If (8 18 If (1 )** @A8 19 @14 a5 **20 Wa3** @xe7 21 de &h6 22 b3 &x44 23 bc dc 24 @c4 <math>&g7 We have failed to prove that the capture on d4 is bad. The maximum White gets after 24... &xd4 is a complicated heavy piece endgame: 25 If ad1 &g726 @c3 &f6 a5 a5 ca 28 &f6 a5&xc3 29 &xc3 <math>&f5 a5 aff et cc.

25 15 We have left the opening problems quite far behind but on the other hand the whole variation hardly looks forced.



In this position White cannot transpose into the endgame – 26 g3?! – in view of 26. g3?! 27 m244 m242 gf faces. In the game Kornev – Alabkin (St.Petersburg 2003) White defended the rook el – 26 fm12, at the same time setting a 126 m262 gs12 gelt with an immediate win. But such a side-step with the king also has its filt pisiet: it allows

26... ≙xh2!? 27 ₩xf5 gf 28 心c3 ≙d6 29 ℃d5 ≣ac8 with equality. Therefore worth considering is 26 ⇔h1!?

Drawing a line under the variation S...@bd7, it should be mentioned that it develops with noticeable pressure from White. It takes a lot of effort for Black to maintain equality, and this obliges him to look for a roundabout way.

2) 8... ②a6!? The knight goes not to c7, as one might first think, but to b4 (after 彎d8-b6).



There are three paths: 9 \$\overline{g5}, 9 \$\overline{f4}\$ or 9 \$\overline{g5}\$.

a)  $9 \pm g5$  This was played long ago by Robert Fischer, true, without particular success: 9... **Who 10 Wyb6** ab 11 a3 (directed against  $\Im acb-b4$ ) 11....Ed8 12  $\pm x16 \pm x16$  [13 Ed1  $\pm x5$ 14  $\pm ac4$  Eace 15  $\pm b5$  B51 16  $\Im t5$  b4 17 ab  $\Im xb4$  18  $\pm c2 \pm 2$  19  $\pm xc2$  $\Im xc2$  20  $\pm t3$   $\oplus b4+$  with equality (Fischer - Yanofsky, Netanya 1968);

b) 9  $\pounds$ f4 Superficially – a simple developing move, but in fact – a trap: if 9...\@a5?, then 10 d6!  $\pounds$ c6 11 \@b5!, and Black remains a pawn down, and without compensation for it. For example: 11...\@b4 12 de \%xe7 13  $\pounds$ 13  $\pounds$ 12  $\pounds$ 4 14 0-0  $\sharp$ ff48 15 a3  $\pounds$ c2 16 星ad1 里ac8 17 d5 全d7 18 d6! (Cherniaev – Dunnington, London 1999).

9. Wh6!? 10 Wxh6 ab 11 d6 More cunning would be to wait until the knight jumps to b4, and only then carry out the break; 11 罩c1!? 公b4 12 d6! The pawn cannot be taken, and exchange occurs without the hindrance: 12... Ze8 13 de Zxe7 14 2e5 (Inkiov - Hodgson, Palma de Mallorca 1989). White won this game: true, Venzislav Inkiov himself regarded his plan with scepticism. grandmaster The Bulgarian considered that after 14 ... 2) fd5!? 15 のxd5 のxd5 16 例f3 皇xe5 17 de 2f4 Black would retain possibilities of fighting for the initiative.

11...ed 12 &xd6 Id8



Yet another position with 'dynamic equality'. White has - a pawn, Black has - development. In the game Ulibin - Evseev (St. Petersburg 1998) White tried to hang on to the material - 13 @b5, but after 13...åd7!? (a he might have run into difficulties. Apparently the right strategy lies in an immediate return of the pawn and readicating his lag in development:

13 @a3!? Exd4 14 @f3 Ed8

15 0-0 &e6 (15..20c5)? 16  $\exists$ ad1 &d7) 16  $\Im$ g5  $\Im$ d5 17  $\Im$ xe6  $\Im$ xc3 18 &xa6 fe 19 &c4  $\Im$ d6 2 0  $\exists$ ad1 White's superiority has increased noticeably (Shaked – Perelstein, Seattle 2003). Probably, not without help from the opponent.

c) 9 &13 (considered the strongest) 9.&766 [t is not clear whether it is worth first exchanging the lightsquared bishops: 9.&2g4 10 &xg4&xg4 11 &2gc2 &766. True, the d5 pawn is weakened, but in any case White intends to give it up. The game White intends to give it up. The game Wahls – Lutz (Cologne 1989) bore witness to the fact that Black was probably wrong: 12 &766 ab 13 0-0 &7614 &4c14 &768 IS 661 cd 16 &755&768 17 &76c3 &767 18 &7fd1 and White has the advantage.

After 9...@b6 the choice, as before, is to exchange yourself (10 @xb6) or allow this to be done for you.



c) 10 **Wxb6 ab** 11  $\textcircled{2}_{0}$ (2) (Botvinnik's idea, to take under control the c2 square, has not received recognition: 11  $\textcircled{2}_{14}$   $\textcircled{2}_{0}$ (b) 12  $\textcircled{2}_{14}$ (2) 11... $\textcircled{2}_{14}$ (2)  $\textcircled{2}_{14}$ (2) 11... $\textcircled{2}_{14}$ (2)  $\textcircled{2}_{14}$ (2) 11... $\textcircled{2}_{14}$ (2)  $\textcircled{2}_{14}$ (2) 11... $\rule{2}_{14}$ (2) 11...00(2) 11...00(2) 11...00(2) 11...00(2) 11...00(2)

13... Ixd6 14 单f4 Id7 15 Ifd1

(worth considering is 15 &e5!? ∄a5 16 ∄fd1, Dolmatov – Evseev, Novgorod 1999) 15...②fd5 Slightly weaker is 15...②bd5 – after 16 &e5 ∄d8 17 <sup>1</sup>⊘f4 the knight f6 and the bishop g7 will remain for some time, as it were, 'out of play':

17...QxF4 (incorrect is 17...QxG3 18 bc g??] – White obtains a great dvantage by force: 19 &xF6 &xF6 20 Qd5 Ed6 21 Ed61 Ed6 22 Qx7 Ed4 23 Qx84, Potkin – Burmakin, St.Petersburg 2000) 18 &xF4 &g4 19 &xb7 &xd1 20 &xa8 &g4 21 &G1? &xF3 Z2 gf Exd4 23 &sG Ed6 24 Qb5 Ed8 25 a4! All captures have been made and it must be acknowledged that White has chances of victory (Marin – Slovinianu, Romania 2000).

Therefore practice turns to the side of 15... 创fd5 – now both the knight b4 and the bishop g7 themselves take an active part in the play.



 Weak is 16 &c5?!
 ♠xc3 17 bc

 &xc5 18 de ⊕d3 19 &g4 e6 20 f4

 ≣a4!
 21 & âf3 (21 g3 ⊕xc5!)

 21...⊕xf4 (Galdunts - Burmakin, Graz 2001).

Therefore if White wants to establish a bishop on e5, it is necessary first to exchange: 16 2xd5 If we forget about the idea  $\pm 14$ -e5 then there remains 16  $\pm 23$  2xc3? 17 bc 2xc618 214  $\pm 35$  19 H8 Black's redoubt in this endgame is defended by the St.Petersberg grandmaster Denis Evseev.



At first he tried 19...\$\* 820 Tabil; e5 (weaker is 20... Taka2?! 21 0:05 Table 22 0:27 Tab 23 Tabbo, but after 21 de 0:xe5 22 0:45 Tes5 23 0:45 Table 24 Table 25 0:45 it must be said that all Black's problems are behind him (Voitsekhovsky – Evseev, Tula 1999). Evseev lost this game, not finding the correct order of moves: 25...Table 2:46 0:46 0:46 But the next time he was ready with an important improvement: 19...e5!? (not spending time on the unnecessary king move) 20 de ∞xe5 There is full equality: 21 &d5 ⊗c6 22 ∏ac1 &c5 ctc. (Vokarev – Evseev, Toliati 2003).

c2) 10 @ge2!? How strange that his own doubled pawns on the b-file give White far more chances than the other side's!

10...,竇xb3 11 ab ②b4 12 0-0 冨d8



Finally, however, White can fall back on the standard method -13 d6, and then:

13...ed?! 14 h3!? (preventing the exchange of the light-squared bishops) 14...Qc2 15 Ea4 &d7 16 Ec4 Eac8 17 &f4 d5 18 Exc8 &xc8 19 &c5 &c6 20 &f4 with appreciable pressure;

13...**IX**46!? 14 ⊕b5 **Id8** 15 ⊕c7 **IB8** 16 **§**£14 **§**<u>g</u>4 17 **§**<sub>X</sub>**g**4 ⊕**xg**4 18 h3 ⊕ft 61 9 **§**<sub>X</sub>a7 ⊕c6 20 **B**aal **Bb**c8 21 ⊕b5 ⊕d5 22 **§**d2 (Ehlvest – Yagupov, Batumi 2002) 22...c6!? White's chances of success are not great.

But exploiting the open a-file is too great a temptation: 13 **IIa5!**? Even if this brings White nothing in particular, the freshness of the resulting positions makes them attractive. In the game Gelfand – Morozevich (Wijk aan Zee 2002) Black replied 13...h6!? Taking under control not only the g5 square, but also the neighbouring one – f4, since on 14 &f4?? follows 14...g5!, and White loses one of the bishops.

After the forced 14 h4 Morozevich easily created counterplay after: 14...243? 15 **Z**d1 2xc1 16 **Z**xc1 16 **Z**xc1 16 71 **Z**a4 &b7 18 d6 &xf3 19 de **Z**d7 20 gf **Z**e8. The weakness of the white pawns on the king's flank guarantees him a not insignificant material advantage. Meanwhile instead of 13...h6!? more popular is **13...a6**, which is also probably enough for equality.

14 &g5 Also tried is 14 &At, but Black manages to extinguish some of the opponent's activity: 14...&g4?? 15 &xg4 &Dxg4 16 IEG5 &Dt6 17 d6!? (obviously, the only chance) 17...ed 18 IEC7 IIab8 19 &g5 IIdc8 20 IEc4 &Dd3 (Acs - Smetankin, Rimavska Sobata 1996).

14...h6 15 🔍 xf6



15...eft? The whole idea, though also quite possible is 15...\$xf6 16 ≣a4 2A3 17 \$c4 \$cf5 18 \$cxf5 gf 19 ≣b1 b5 20 ≣a5 2b4, and Black equalises (Bauer – Okhotnik, Alberville 2002).

16 ②a4 b5!? 17 ②c5 重b8 18 重c1 f5 19 g3 置b6 In this complicated position Black's chances are in no way worse (Charbonneau – Perelstein, Bermuda 2002).

The system 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 20f6 5 20c3 g6!? is a difficult, heavy-going variation in which from the very first moves Black must work intensively and put every effort into dealing with its intricacies.

Black sacrifices a pawn – but what does he get in return? Either compensation, which (at least, at first) does not look quite sufficient, or an inferior endgame, in which he still needs to earn a draw. Variations, where White risks no less than the opponent (for example, 6  $\frac{1}{2}$ b3 b5?) or 8... $\frac{1}{2}$ 89? 9 g3 e6!?) – an exception which only proves the rule.

Such a variation cannot be a 'pass' in our opening repertoire. It needs either to be studied properly, examined and understood with all its fine points, so as to feel it, so to speak, with the tips of one's fingers – or not to play it at all.

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## Chapter Four 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 ∅f6 5 ∅c3 e6 6 ∅f3 ∅c6



The main move is  $6 \oslash 13$ , but first we look at the sidelines. There are three of them: 6 a3 (A), 6 c5 (B) and 6  $\bigotimes 25$  (C).

#### А

6 a3!? Pursuing a concrete aim – not to allow the bishop to b4; however in many variations of the Panov Attack the move a2-a3 is useful also in its own right (for example, as part of the pawn chain a)-b4-c5-d4). Black's task is to find an order of moves upon which the very early advance of the a-pawn turns into a waste of a tempo.

6....&e7 More rarely encountered is 6...dc, and this is understandable – it is more logical to take on e4 after White has developed the lightsquared bishop. Upon 7 &xc4 &e7 8 €/13 0-0 9 0-0 the game (with an increase in move numbers by one) transposes into a corresponding variation of the Nimzo-Indian defence -1 d4 2h6 2 c4 e6 3 2c3 2b4 4 c3 d5 5 a3 2c7 6 2h3 0-0 7 2d3 de 8 2xc4 c5 9 0-0 cd 10 ed.



Play continued 12 2xd5 2xd5 13 2xd3 2xd7?? (more solid than the routine development of the knight to c6) 14  $ref{e}$ c4, and now, in the opinion of Yudasin, Black equalises by means of 14...207f6 15  $ref{e}$ h4  $ref{e}$ b6.

7  $\bigcirc$  13 With the knight on g1, 7 631? 0-0 8 & 43 b 6 9 b4 a5 10  $\bigcirc$  a4 has independent significance. This is because the tempo saved on the development of the king's knight has been spent by White on the erection of a pawn wall – from 'a' to 'd'. The idea is interesting but clearer than daylight is also its 'painful spot': no knight on B – no control over the e5 square.

From this also comes the decision: 10...bc 11 bc &able 12 &ac2 (it is clear that after the exchange of lightsquared bishops Black has a good game) 12...&c7! 13 &c2c2 c5! (the pawn wall is wrecked and all White's efforts turn to dust) 14 de &xe515 &alt &c2c2 (bbd  $\Xia7$  17 &c32 &xe2 18 &xe2 &bd7 and Black's position is better.

7...08 & d3 de 9 & xc4 A position is reached, analogous to that which occurred in the game Topalov – Yudasin. Analogous, but not identical – White has brought the bishop to c4 in two moves, and not one, and therefore has not managed to castle kingside.



9...b6 Sharper is 9...a6!? 10 0-0 b5 11 ▲a2 ▲b7. Events developed interestingly in the game Zhang Penxiang – Galkin (Erevan 1999):

12 &g5 &bd7! Since the pawn is already on a3, there is no point thinking about the manoeuver &b8sco+b4. Therefore the knight is better developed on d7 and then (depending on White's play) to decide where to transfer it. The best square is b6, but it is quite possible that the knight has to transfer to 18 for defence of the king.

13  $\pm$ b1!? (not spending time on bringing the queen's rook into play) 13...Ee 81  $\pm$ 043  $\pm$ Ee 815  $\pm$ 01  $\pm$ C7 16  $\pm$ b4  $\pm$ c68 17  $\pm$ a2  $\pm$ b8. It is possibly worth simplifying the position: 17... $\pm$ C51? 18  $\pm$ C2  $\pm$ Cc4 19  $\pm$ Xc4  $\pm$ xc4, and it is not clear how White can generate further threats.

18  $\underline{\mbox{w}}{2}$   $\underline{\mbox{Obs}}$  19  $\underline{\mbox{x}}{2}$  3(the tempting piece sacrifice 19  $\underline{\mbox{x}}$  ec6?! does not work because of the intermediate 19... $\underline{\mbox{x}}$  fill and Black repulses the attack: 20 gft e 21  $\underline{\mbox{w}}$  ec6  $\underline{\mbox{x}}$  eff 21  $\underline{\mbox{w}}$  ec6  $\underline{\mbox{x}}$  eff 22  $\underline{\mbox{Os}}$  ec6  $\underline{\mbox{x}}$  eff 24  $\underline{\mbox{Os}}$  ec6  $\underline{\mbox{x}}$  ec6  $\underline{\mbox{x}}$  ec6  $\underline{\mbox{w}}$  ec6  $\underline{\mbox{x}}$  ec6  $\underline{\mbox{w}}$  e

10 0-0 **(b)**7 At the very least, no worse is 10...(**(c)**46, but this continuation has still not been successfully instilled into practice with the same credibility as the usual development of the bishop on the lone diaeonal.

The idea of 10... a 6 lies in the fact that Black effects an exchange of the opponent's most dangerous attacking piece – the light-squared bishop. The downside of the plan is the weakening of the c6 square, but Black can live with this:



11  $\triangleq$  xa6  $\triangleq$  xa6 12  $\triangleq$  c  $\triangleq$  c  $\triangleq$  1 13  $\triangleq$  c  $\equiv$   $\circledast$ 8 14  $\triangleq$  xc7 +  $\equiv$  wc7 15  $\equiv$  s f b 6  $\triangleq$  b 4  $\equiv$  ads 17 14  $\equiv$  d'? (an unconventional but successful decision) 18  $\triangleq$  xf6 g f 19  $\equiv$  b f 2 (also in the case of 19  $\equiv$  g 4  $\equiv$  b f 7 20  $\equiv$  ad1  $\equiv$  g 8 21  $\equiv$  15 18 lack risks nothing) 19... $\equiv$  xd4 - 20  $\equiv$  h 1  $\equiv$  b 7 and White has yet to prove that his initiative is worth the sacrificed pawn (Rozentalis - SpecIman, Esbjerg 2001).

1 Eet  $2 \cdot c6$  The position has the look of the tabiya of the Queen's Gambit or, more accurately, the Semi-Tarrasch defence. Opening reference – D40, but with the following order of moves: 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3  $2 \cdot 13$   $2 \cdot 164$   $4 \cdot 2c3$  c5 5 c3  $2 \cdot c6$  6 a3 cd 7 cd 2c7 8  $2 \cdot d3$  2c6 6 a3 cd 7 cd 2c7 8  $2 \cdot d3$  2c6  $4 \cdot 2c3$  c5  $5 \cdot c3$  $2 \cdot c6$  6 a3 cd 7 cd 2c7 8  $2 \cdot d3$  2c6  $4 \cdot 2c3$  cf  $4 \cdot 2c3$  cf 4

12  $\pm a2$   $\equiv 68$  13  $\equiv 643$   $\equiv 68$  in the game Stein – Peterson (Kiev 1964) Black transferred the rook to d7 – 13... $\equiv 671$ ? 14  $\pm g5$   $\equiv 47$ , but this did not bring a radical change. After 15  $\equiv ad1 \equiv 68$   $\pm 61$   $\pm 617$   $\pm 62$   $\equiv 7$   $\pm 22$  $\equiv 68$   $\equiv 60$  White continued to hold the initiative. 14 호g5 ④d5 15 h4!? ④xc3 16 bc g6 17 프ad1 ④a5 18 프e5



This is how the game Bernt – Detting (Germany 2001) continued. After 18... $\Delta x13$  19 wx13 Black hurried with an exchange on g5. More solid looks 19... $\forall de1$ , when neither 20  $\forall e2 \ \Delta xg5$  21 hg  $e_2e6$ 22  $\exists e3 \ e_2e7$ , nor 20  $\Delta xe7$   $\exists xe7$ 21  $\forall f6 \ e_2e6$  42  $\Delta xc4$   $\exists xc4$  23 d5  $\forall d81$  are so terrible.

It is not worth spending time preventing the threat of 6...\$b4 at such an early stage of the game. The move 6 a3 is experimental and on the whole narrows down White's possibilities.

В

6 c5 A normal development of events would be 6...&c7 7 OB, but we will meet this position in Chapter Six (under a different order of moves - 6 OB &c7 7 c5). But first we stop at 6...bc?, though the idea is premature (the undermining of the c5 square is better undertaken after castling).

We are mainly interested in the position after 7 b4 a5 8  $\triangle$ 1a4  $\triangle$ 1d7 (in the game Delchev – Pyankov, Saint Affrique 2002, Black first exchanged on c5 – 8...be 9 bc, and

only then played 9... $\mathfrak{A}$ id7, but White all the same easily obtained the advantage: 10  $\mathfrak{A}$ 13  $\mathfrak{A}$ e7 11  $\mathfrak{A}$ 14  $\mathfrak{A}$ 0 12  $\mathfrak{A}$ c1  $\mathfrak{A}$ c6 13  $\mathfrak{A}$ 55  $\mathfrak{A}$ 57 14  $\mathfrak{A}$ 0  $\mathfrak{A}$ 15  $\mathfrak{A}$ c1  $\mathfrak{A}$ c6 13  $\mathfrak{A}$ 57  $\mathfrak{A}$ 71  $\mathfrak{A}$ 7 17  $\mathfrak{W}$ 03  $\mathfrak{A}$ c6 18  $\mathfrak{A}$ b6) 9  $\mathfrak{A}$ 55 bc 10 bc  $\mathfrak{A}$ a6 11  $\mathfrak{W}$ e2



If Black has a way to equality then this must be by some kind of refined trickery. But this is something we do not see. And he could even lose at once here: 11...&e7? 12  $\bigcirc$ b6 faa7 13  $\bigcirc$ xd7  $\implies$ xb5 14  $\implies$ xb5 faxd7 (14... $\bigcirc$ xd7 15 c6) 15 &fd4 0-0 16 fab1 (Popovic – Wells, New York 1984). Not much better is 11...%c7 12  $\bigcirc$ b6 faa7 13 &xa6  $\oslash$ xb6 14 &b5+ (Netzel – Hazelhorst, Germany 1996).

### С

6 \$25 This move is an original test for Black's understanding of the nuances of the Panov Attack. This can be expressed in an even more concrete way: Black must understand why he should not play 6...\$2c6?! 1) 6...Ωc6?! 7 c5! Ohly so! Unconvincing is 7 cd ed 8 Δb5 Δe7 9 Φ3 0 -0 10 Δxc6 be 11 Δc5 if ohly because of 11...h6!? He can win a pawn - 12 Δxc6, but after 12...Ψe8 13 Δxc7+ ₩xc7+ 14 Δc3 (Sveshnikov - Peresipkin, Chelyabinsk 1975) 14...Δa0! White, ouite frankly, is taking a risk.

Ulibin, in a game against Morovic (Pula 1999), did not take the pawn and play quickly led to a draw:  $12 \ \& e3 \ \& d6 \ 13 \ 0-0 \ c5 \ 14 \ \& f4 \ \& b7 \ 15 \ Ecl.$ 

After 6 &g5 &c6?! 7 c5!, because of the pin, Black is deprived of his main resource – the jump of the knight to e4. Strategically he has nothing to counter White's claw of pawns on the queen's flank.



Nothing helps, and 7...b6?! only plays into White's hands because of 8 b4!

7...h6?! enjoys a dubious reputation: 8 &xf6 %xf6 9 &b5 g6 10 &f3 &z7 11 %d2 & d7 12 & dd1 0-0 13 0-0 %d8 14 & ffe1!, and all the key dark squares find themselves under the control of white pieces and pawns. In the game Ehlvest – Granda (Fervan 1996) play continued 14...b6 15 &xc6! &xc6 16 b4 bc 17 bc \\$b8 18 \\$De5 & e8 19 f4! with a solid advantage.

When everything is bad, tricks come into play. Here we have just such a case: instead of 14...b6 he could try 14...豐a5!?



If White decides that Black has blundered a pawn, and plays 15  $\pm xc6?$   $\pm xc61$  6  $\pm xd5?$ , then he loses all his advantage: 16... $\pm xd2$ 17  $\pm xc7$   $\pm xc7$  18  $\pm xd2$  (18  $\pm xd2?$  $\pm xc73$  19 gf  $\pm c8$  - the knight falls) 18... $\pm xd4$ .

But if White is adamant about having his own way -15 a31, then Black's position again becomes worthless. Incidentally, after 15 a31, there is the immediate threat of 16 b4, and on a3 he cannot take because the queen would then be trapped by  $\Xi$ a1 and  $\Xi$ b1.

Objectively, the strongest path is  $7...\&c7 \otimes DiS$ , and this position too we will look at in detail in Chapter Six ( $6 \odot DiS \&c7 7 \&g5 \odot Cc6 8 cS$ ). But in the meanwhile let's stop at the move 7...&d7, upon which Black places the opponent under the obligation to decide how exactly to carry out b2-D4. 8 a3/2 Less promising is 8 ±b5 b6 9 ±xc6 ±xc6 10 b4 in view of 10..b6 11 b6 ₩a5! (the black queen undertakes counterplay all by herself) 12 ±d2 ₩a6! In the game Topalov – Gulko (Elenite 1995) there followed 13 €/13 €/14 ₩e2 ₩c2 ₩c2 15 ±xc2 ±c7 16 ±c3 f6! 17 €/e1 0-0 18 €/d3 ≝ab8 19 ≣ab1 a5 20 f4 g5!, and White did not manage to win this endgame.

8... h6 9 h4 hc 10 dc h6 11 &e3 a6 (on anything else he cannot slow down the advance of the pawns) 12 ge2 g6!? 13 Ec1 gg7 14 af3 0-0 15 0-0 \$h7 (up to this moment we have been following the game Damjanovic - Stojanovic, Bela Crkva 1996, but White was not able to detect the right plan in this position) 16 @d4! On the queen's flank White has got everything he wants: now he needs to realise the dark-squared strategy in the centre. The exchange of knights is the first, but extremely important step. Then the advance f2-f4, establishing d4 for the knight or the bishop, with a complete blockade.

16......65 (or 16...豐c7 17 f4! 囂fd8 18 ②xc6 এxc6 19 盒d4!) 17 ②xc6 点xc6



**18 f4! e4** Black is forced to let go of the key d4 square. In the opposite case everything turns out worse: 18...d4? 19 fe de 20 管xd8 置fxd8 21 ef or 18...ef?! 19 置xf4.

19 f5! Far more energetic than the direct 19 dd d de 20 a4, after which Black, tempo by tempo, succeeds in generating counterplay: 20..dxd4+ 21 wxd4 dzg7 22 b5 dzf5 23 wd2 ab 24 ab d4 25 be e3!

19... $\bigcirc$ e8 20 fg+ fg 21  $\blacksquare$ xf8 &xf8 22 &g4! (the e2 square is needed by the knight as a point of transfer on the way to its main objective – d4!) 22...&g7 23  $\bigcirc$ e2! White has an unquestionable positional advantage.

2) 6... \$e7 7 \$ f3 0-0! Without the target on c6 the plan with c4-c5 and h2-h4-h5 loses half its strength. Moreover, having reliably tucked away his king into safety as well, without difficulty Black can undermine the opponent's pawn chain: 8 c5 b6! 9 b4 a5! 10 a3 @e4!? 11 @ye7 Wye7 If White continues to be stubborn - 12 2a4?, then he risks losing: 12...ab 13 ab bc 14 bc Wa7 15 盒d3 幽a5+ 16 包d2 盒d7 17 盒c2 ≜b5 (Kan - Makogonov, Leningrad 1939).

Pushing the c-pawn to c5, without having the target of a black knight on c6, is stoolish. Therefore once again it all comes down to the pawn pair c4-d5. Either White exchanges on d5 – when a position arises with symmetrical pawns on the d-file, or else Black takes on c4 – and continues the eternal debate about the 'isolani' on d4.



8 & d3 Choosing the 'isolani'. In the game Oral – Burmakin (Koszalin 1999) White took the first path – 8  $\equiv$ cl b6 (incidentally, even here 8...dct? 9 &xc4 2oc6 10 0-0  $\exists$ d5 is guite possible with favourable simplification) 9 &xf6 &xf6 10 cd ed 11 &c2 2äc6 12  $\bigotimes$ 4 &f0 13 0-0, but fabre 13...dc? 14  $\equiv$ fd1 b5 15  $\bigotimes$ c2  $\equiv$ c8 16  $\bigotimes$ f5 2c7 17  $\bigotimes$ 4  $\bigotimes$ 4 fd6 18 &d3 g6 Black does not achieve more than enduring equality.

8...dc 9 \$\prod xc4 a6 10 0.0 He can also prevent the thrust b7-b5 - 10 a4. However the accurate move 10...\$\prod 71 (a well-known nuance - if the knight does not develop to c6, this square will be exploited by the bishop) brought the game Sharapov -Ovseevich (Alushta 2000) to a perfectly even endgame: 11 0-0 \$\prod £c6 12 \$\prod a2 Cbd7 13 \$\prod 22 \$\prod 82 Af 37 \$\prod 50 Af 31 \$\prod 82 Af 37 \$\prod 82 A

10...b5 11 ≜d3 ≜b7 12 ₩c2 ℃c6 13 ∑ad1 ⊘b4 14 ≜b1 ⊘bd5 Black has done everything in a competent fashion and now should not experience any particular problems. Of course the whole game still lies ahead but for the time being he can have no complaints. The game J.Polgar – Inkiov (Stara Zagora 1990) continued: 15 公e4 公xe4 16 徵xe4 g6 17 h4



17....亘a7!? 18 闡g4 创f6. The chances are mutual.

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 2 f6 5 2 c3 e6 6 2 f3

We go over to the tabiya of the Panov Attack. Chapter Five will be devoted to a look at the continuation 6...&4b4, Chapter Six – to a look at 6...&67. But in this chapter we stop at the least favourable (among the main lines) move –  $6...\pounds2c6?!$  You have probably already guessed what is the right reaction: 7 c5!



It is precisely the position of the black knight on c6 that makes the idea of the closed centre promising. Catching on to the knight (whether by b2-b4-b5, or the simple exchange  $\pounds f1-b5xc6$ ), White invariably seizes the e5 square. And it is this that determines his advantage.

As distinct from the position upon  $6 \pm g.5 \oplus c6?!$  7.551, here we glance at counterplay for Black, linked to the manoeuvre  $2 \oplus c-4$  and a subsequent advance of the kingside pawns (f7-f5 and even g7-g5). All the same, as shown by practice, White's chances are preferable.

We look at two replies for Black: 7...逸e7 (A) and an immediate 7...论e4 (B).

A

7...&c7 8 &b5! 0-0 Black can reserve the right to take on c6 with the bishop, and not the pawn: 8...&d7. But after 9.0-0-0-10  $\boxtimes$  2 a6 11 &xc6 &xc6 12 &c5! it becomes obvious that this does not change the evaluation of the position. The game Sadvakasov – Kobalija (Calicut 1998) continued: 12...&d7 13 &xc6 be 14 &fd1  $\boxtimes$ c8 15  $\bigotimes$ d4 We8 16  $\boxtimes$ c2 (in no case allowing the e5 square out of his hands) 16...f6 17  $\boxtimes$ fael and White has play on both Inanks. Black – nowhere.

9 0-0 €0e4! The only way of generating counterplay. That such play is generally possible is made clear upon the superficial 10 &f4?! After 10...g51 11 & &s3 & dA7 12 ... for 10...g51 11 & &s3 & dA7 12 ... for 10...g51 in the game Smirin – Olafsson (Istanbul 2003), managed, only with difficulty, to extinguish the opponent's initiative: 13 & &x6 & &xc6 14 ②e5 盒f6 15 ③xc6 bc 16 f3 ④xc3 17 罩xc3 f4 18 盒f2 e5 19 營d3 ed 20 盒xd4 螢d7 21 盒xf6 罩xf6 with a quick draw.

Hardly particularly favourable is 10  $\underline{\mathbb{Z}}$ el  $\underline{\mathbb{Z}}$ xc3 11 bc – White voluntarily spoils his pawn structure, for what? A possible continuation is:

11...豐c7 12 单d3 b6! 13 cb ab 14 ②g5 鱼xg5 15 鱼xg5 鱼a6! (Brunell – Henkin, Stockholm 1996);

11... 愈d7 12 置b1 b6! 13 c4 ④a5 14 cb dc 15 ba 罩xa7 (Martin – Bagirov, Dieren 1990).

As we see, the simple resource b7-b6 exposes White's pawn weaknesses on the a- and c-files.

10 Wc2! The most promising continuation. White bothers the knight e4, and also defends himself against doubled pawns on the c-file.



10....15!? The game takes shape in a more simple way after 10...Qp5 11 & \$\pm sp\$ & \$\pm sp\$ for 10...Qp5 13 \$\pm sp\$ & \$\pm sp\$ for 10...Qp5 13 \$\pm sp\$ do \$\pm sp\$ for 10 & \$\pm sp\$ for 11 & \$\pm sp\$ for 10 & \$\pm sp\$ for 11 & \$\pm sp\$ for 10 & \$\pm sp\$ for 11 & \$\pm sp\$ for 10 & \$\pm sp\$ for 10 & \$\pm sp\$ for 10 & \$\pm sp\$ for 11 & \$\pm sp\$ for 10 & \$\pm sp\$ for 11 & \$\pm sp\$ for 10 & \$\pm sp\$ for 10

11 Oe21? A very important and fine moment. It seems there is a simple solution to the position: 11 &xcb bc 12 Oe5. But after 12... $\&rc1^{+}$  it becomes clear that the white knight on c5 is still uncomfortable – a capture is threatened on c5, while 13 &c4, as we already know, is poor because of 13...g5! In the game Delchev – Henkin, (Pardubice 1997) there followed 13 Oxet f = 144 &aa615 &fc2 &ab4 16 g3 &f6 17 &c3 &xc518 de &d3 19 &c3 &ab8, and White obtains no advantage at all.

So the attempt to resolve the position by the really quite simple method of &fl-b5xc6, followed by &le5, is far from always being a success!

11...&f6?! Too timid. Once again, as in the previous examples, he should venture 11...g5?! 22 &xc6 bc 13  $\triangle$ e5 @c7! White can then fight for the advantage by 14 b4!? (defending the c5 pawn and threatening to expel the enemy knight) 14...f4 15 &c1 a5 16 f3!  $\triangle$ f6 17 ba  $\exists$ xs6 18 &2d2  $\blacksquare$ 8 19  $\triangle$ c1!

12 ≙f4 ≜d7 13 ≜xc6 bc 14 ≜e5 ⊕g5 15 ⊕xg5 ≜xe5 16 de ¥xg5 17 f4 The position is clearly favourable for White (Velimirovic – Solmundarsson, Revkiavik 1974).

### В

7.... 2e4!? More concrete than 7... 2e7. Black places his hopes on the fact that he succeeds in distracting the opponent from play on the dark squares.



8 ₩c2! As in the variation 7...\$e7 8 \$\overline\$b 500 9 00 \$\overline\$c4\$, this is the best reaction to the thrust of the knight. The point lies in the fact that White does not spoil his pawn structure.

It is more natural to look at the development of the light-squared bishop, but then, by exchanging on c3 and undermining the c5 pawn with the move b7-b6, Black obtains counterchances, e.g. 8  $\pm$ d3  $\pm$ c3; 9 bc  $\pm$ c7 10 c0 b6 11 te tha b1 2  $\pm$ b5  $\pm$ d7 13 c4 dc 14  $\pm$ xc4  $\pm$ a5 15  $\pm$ c2 0-0 16 d5 cel 17  $\pm$ xd5  $\pm$ c6 18  $\pm$ xd8  $\pm$ fxd8 19  $\pm$ c3  $\pm$ c5 (Grosar – Dautov, Altensteig 1995).

Incidentally in the variation 8 \$\Delta d3 \$\Delta xc3! 9 bc, apart from play with b7-b6, it is necessary to remember the idea of grandmaster Alexei Vizhmanavin: 9...e5!?



The idea is obviously 'nonclassical' (Black is too badly developed to open the centre at such an early stage of the game), but it seems that there is no direct refutation.

Encountered is 10 @xe5 @xe5, and then:

11 變e2 彙xc5! 12 變xe5+ 變e7 13 彙f4 彙d6 14 變xe7+ 萤xe7 15 彙xd6+ 萤xd6 16 萤d2 彙d7 17 萬he1 圖he8 18 薹xe8 with a draw (Smirin - Vizhmanavin, Elenite 1993);

We return to 8  $\underline{\basel{eq:4}}$  C. The knight on e4 is hanging, and Black must decide what to do about it: exchange (8... $\underline{\basel{2}}$ xc3), consolidate (8...f5) or sharpen the position even further (8... $\underline{\basel{2}}$ ).

1) 8... 2xc3 A routine move. By exchanging his only active piece, Black deprives himself of any counterplay: 9 Wxc3 a5 (in order to forestall the advance of the pawns on the queen's flank, quite bad is 9...@e7 10 @h5 @d7 11 0-0 0-0 12 Hel De5?! 13 Dxe5 2xh5 14 a4 de8 15 b4. Jansa - Kolarov, Lugano 1968) 10 2b5 2d7 11 0-0 2e7 12 @ f4 0-0 13 Ife1 @ f6 14 Wd2 Ie8 15 Hacl a4 16 @xc6 @xc6 17 Hc3! \$e7 18 Qe5 \$b5 19 \$b3 \$f8 20 @c2 In view of the fact that had is 20 ... g6 21 2 xf7! (Gulko - Contreras, Cali 2001), White will hold the initiative for a long time.

2) Occasionally 8...f5 is met. The general opinion is that upon accurate play White obtains a positional advantage. Here are a few examples from practice: 9 ±b5 ±d7 10 0-0 ±c7 11 ±cx 6 ±xc6 ±xc6 (or 11...bc 12 ⊕c5 0-0 13 £3 ±xc3 14 ¥xc3 ±c8 15 b4 ±c6 16 ≣c1, Schmidt – Lechtynsky, Bavaria 1998) 12 b4 0-0 13 ±c4 ±5 14 ±c5 f4 15 €d2 €xd2 16 ¥xd2 15 17 g4! (Gdanski – Bartel, Warsaw 2002).

3) 8...\#a5!? Out of three possibilities for Black - it goes without saying this is the most intriguing. Nevertheless, the right recipe for White was prescribed as long ago as 1908!



But here, upon 9... at xc3 10 ad2! the black queen already cannot retreat along the f1-a6 diagonal. Another

idea is the move 9 a3! shown by the variation 9...\$d7 10 \mathbf{E}b1! with the threat of b2-b4. In the game Reti – Duras (Vienna 1908) White continued to act in exemplary fashion: 10...f5 11 b4 \mathbf{W}c7 12 g3! (securing the f4 square for the bishop) 12...a6 13 \mathbf{L}f \mathbf{W}c8 14 \variable c9 4!

The taste of old games, like old wine, becomes all the richer and finer with the years.

9...2c7 10 Zb1 f5 11 b4 Wc7 This is how the game Gdanski – Henkin (Osterskar 1995) continued. The Polish grandmaster without further ado played 12 b5 and achieved victory after a great fight. But, in our view, strongest in this position is the decision 'a la Reti':



12 g3! If 12... 愈f6, then after 13 愈f4 豐f7 14 愈b5 愈d7 15 愈xc6 愈xc6 16 b5 White has an obvious advantage.

And in the case of 12...g5 White should exploit the fact that he has still not castled kingside: 13 2.b5 0-0 14 h4! with a menacing initiative.

Thus Black still has to find an antidote to the plan 7 c5! Therefore the variation 6...42bc6?! is an infrequent guest in modern chess practice.

## **Index to Chapter Four**

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 🖄 f6		1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 🖾 f6	
5 @c3 e6	92	5 Dc3 e6 6 Df3	98
A. 6 a3	92	6@c6 7 c5	
<b>B.</b> 6 c5	94	A. 7ĝe7	98
C. 6 单g5	95	<b>B.</b> 72e4	99
1) 6Øc6	95	8 ₩c2	
<b>2)</b> 6 皇e7	97	1) 8	100
		2) 8f5	101
		3) 8響a5	101

## 

After these moves arises a position that is characteristic for the Nimzo-Indian defence. We will look only at those continuations which have a direct relationship with the Panov Attack, although drawing a boundary line between them is very difficult.



The main move in this position is 7 cd, upon which White insures himself against the loss of a tempo (unavoidable, for example, after 7 &dd & & & xc4). But before we set about an analysis of the capture on dS, we need to stop at the side lines. There are four of them: 7 &ba3 (A), 7 &ba4 (B), 7 &cb5 (C) and 7 &da3 (D).

#### А

7 ∰b3 ②c6! If White places the queen on b3 in order to immediately obtain the advantage of the two

bishops  $- 8 a_3?! \triangle xc_3 + 9 extbf{wc3}$ , then a cruel disappointment awaits him:  $9... \ge 4 10 extbf{wc2} extbf{wc3} + 11 extbf{ad2} extbf{cd2} extbf{xd2} extbf{zd2} extbf{zd2}$ 

8 2g5 dc Probably played through fear of losing a pawn. However analysis shows that after 8...0-01? 9 cd ed 10 2x16?! ₩x16 11 ₩xd5 Ze8+ 12 2c2 2c6 Black's initiative is worth a pawn.

9 &xc4 As we see, once again it all comes down to the 'isolani'. True, White loses a tempo but the position of his queen on b3 is not easy to justify, for example:

### в

7 豐a4+ ②c6 8 ②e5?! A rather different theme – White tries to raise the level playing field to a position with forcing variations. But Black has a retort:



8...&d7?? The simpler 8... $\forall$ a5 is also appropriate. In the endgame after 9  $\forall$ xa5 &xa5 10  $\bigotimes$ xc6 be 11 cd cd White does not have even a shade of advantage.

9  $\Re_{x66}$  9  $\Re_{xd}$  1  $\Re_{xd}$  7 10 a3 &xc3+11 bc 0-0 also suits Black. In the game Melnikov – Shaposhnikov (St.Petersburg 2001) the knights surprisingly quickly came to dominate the bishops: 12 &c2 dc! 13  $\Re_{xc4}$   $\amalg_{ac8}$  14 0-0 &ca5 15 &d3&d5 etc.

9...\$xc3+10 bc \$xc611 #a3 dc 12 \$xc4 #c71 (Oswald - Orlov, Vancouver 2001). It is already clear that White has achieved nothing; 22 is hanging, the bishop on c4 is also under threat; his development is backward. It remains for Black to play 0-0-0 and e6-e5 in order to finally turn the position to his favour.

### с

7 ≜g5 We break up the further play, separating variations which have no connection with each other: 7....⊕a (quiet), 7....∰a5 (sharp) and 7...h6 (middling). 1) 7...0-0.8 cd (8  $\exists cl \ll hd 7 > c.st)$ looks richer in ideas) 8...ed 9 & xf6 $\boxtimes xf6 = 10 \& c2 \& c6 = 11 = 0.0 <math>\exists d8$  $12 \boxtimes b3 \& c6 = 13 \exists ad1 \exists ab8 14 h3 a6$ simple position with a slight advantage for Black (Hedke – Dreev, Bad Wiessee 1998).

2) 7.... #a5!? 8 2d2 @e4!?



Reminiscent of the variation 7 @a4+ @c6 8 @e5, but here already Black is asking for trouble.

9 2xe4!? Only this principled move leaves White chances of victory. More conciliatory are 9 ed or 9 a3 breaking the tension in the position, but only just:

9 cd ed 10 &d3 &f5 11 0-0 0-0 12 ₩c2 &c6 13 &c3 &xc3 14 bc &g6! (Gulko - Smyslov, Moscow 1976);

9 a3 2xd2 10 2xd2 4c 11 2xc40-0 12 0-0 2xc3 13 bc 2xd7 14 2xd3b6 (Barua - Adianto, Shakti 1996). Black is not threatened with anything.

9...de 10 a3 \$\overline{x}xd2+ 11 \$\overline{x}xd2 \$\overline{x}c6\$ 12 b4 \$\overline{t}fs 13 \$\overline{x}b3 a6 This is how the game Hracek - Dautov (Germany 1997) went. It looks like Black's early activity has turned out a mess. The e4 pawn is weak and White has good prospects of an attack on the queen's flank. This is how Dautov himself suggested playing: 14 &c2 0-0 15 0-0 b6 16 @d2 &b7 17 a4 @g6 18 @c3 15 19 f4! @f6 20 b5 with an unquestionable advantage.

3) 7...h6 8 \$\Delta xf6 \$\Delta xf6 \$\Delta yf6 \$\Delta xf6 \$\Delta yf6 \$\D

10 c5 &a5 11 &b5+ &d7 12 &b5! (the hear of the position lies in the control of this square) 12...&c6 13 &xc6 &xc6 14 0-0 Dreev played 14...&c7 here, but after 15 f4! he ran into difficulties. It seems it would be more practical to simplify the position: 14...0-0 15 &xc6!? be 16 &a4 &xc3 17 be &c7, but even in this case it is White who is conducting the play - 18  $\blacksquare$ b1  $\blacksquare$ b8 19  $\blacksquare$ b3!

D 7 ≜d3 dc 8 ≜xc4 ₩c7!?



An idea of the Czech grandmaster Miroslav Filip, which he first tried in

a Candidates tournament (Curacao 1962) against Benko.

It will not be easy for Black to exploit the enemy pieces on the crile; no, his idea is far deeper. The light-squared bishop is developed on the long diagonal and after White castles short, a cloud hangs over his king's position: Qifo-gd, and then an attack on G - after which h2 is undefended. Filip's idea has stood the test of time as White has not found a complete antidote.

Meanwhile c4 is hanging. 9  $\frac{1}{8}$  A4+?! Not very productive – after 9...  $\frac{1}{20c}$  10 0-0  $\frac{1}{20c}$  xc3 11 bc 0-0 it is obvious that the white pieces are not where they need to be.

Nor is there any particular sympathy for 9 W53? – the queen and the bishop are deliberately subjected to the threat of D48-c6-a5!The Dutch grandmaster John van der Wiel pointed out a convincing variation: 9...Dc6 10 0-0 dxc3!11 bc Da51 2 d55+dc7 13 dxd7+Wxd7! 14 W64 Dc6 and it is only White who has problems.

So there isn't a big choice: 9 嘗d3 or 9 竇e2.

1) 9 Wd3 0-0 10 0-0



The further choice of plan depends

on how Black regards his own lightsquared bishop. If like a son (who he wants to quickly bring out to b7), then he must give up his stepbrother: 10...2xc31 be to 5. But if like a stepson, then he can leave the bishop on c8 and for the time being play 10...2bd7.

However, playing 10...b6 at once is dangerous in view of 11 205 %d8 12 264, True, it should be mentioned that in the original game Black extricated himself with honour from the difficulties: 12...a6 13 262 3b714  $\Xi$ ad1 20bd7 15 a4?1 2xc3 16 be %e8 17 2b3 3ac4 18 %c3 3ac519 4c2 %b7 (Benko – Filip, Curacao 1962), But nobody wanted to repeat Filip's exploits – which in itself gives us clues for reflection...

At first glance, also dubious is 10...公bd7 – for roughly the same reason: 11 公b5 斷b6 12 a3 息e7 13 息e3.



But here it all comes together – for the queen sacrifice Black acquires three minor pieces: 13...a6! 14 d5 ab! 15 \$\overline\$xb6 bc.

In the game Reindermann – Ivanchuk (Wijk aan Zee 1999) in reply to 13...a6 White reacted in another (and more modest) way: 14 20c3, but after 14...#d6 15 20c515 16 2a2 2b7 17  $\Xiad1$   $\Xiad8$ 18 20c4 #b8 19 h3 20xe4 20 20xe4 20f6 he was forced to go over to defence – the weakness of the d4 pawn did not offer compensation.

If the above mentioned discussion is right and the jump of the knight to b5 is harmless, it means that there is no particular need to hurry with the exchange on c3. Nevertheless 10 ... & xc3 11 bc b6 remains the most popular variation. Incidentally, it is better to begin precisely with 11...b6; if the moves are transposed -11.... 2bd7 12 Zel b6, then after 13 皇a3!? 罩d8 (even worse is 13... Ze8 14 d5!) White has available the unpleasant resource 14 2.e7! Continuing the variation - 14... Ze8 15 皇xf6 ④xf6 16 ④e5 皇b7 17 罩e3!? (Florean - Nisipeanu, Romania 1997) revealed that the black king began to feel uncomfortable



But once again everything comes together tempo by tempo: 17...6247!  $8 \le 2x47 \ \mbox{ward} 19 \ \mbox{Zh} 3 \ \mbox{go}, and the$ white queen will not manage to joinup with the rook on the deadly h-file: $<math>20 \ \mbox{ward} 2 \ \mbox{xg} 2$  or  $20 \ \mbox{zh} 3 \ \mbox{ward} 6 \ \mbox{zh} 2$  $10 \ \mbox{mass} 2 \ \mbox{Za} 2 \ \mbox{mass} 2 \ \mbox{mass} 2$  $10 \ \mbox{mass} 2 \ \mbox{Za} 2 \ \mbox{mass} 2 \ \mbox{mass} 2$  12 金b3 金b7 13 星e1 全bd7 14 金g5 Black is not scared at all of 14 c4 置fd8 15 金g5 in view of 15... ℃c5: 16 響e2 ℃c4 17 金xf6 ℃xf6 with a comfortable game (Vaida – Groszpeter, Gyula 2000).

14... **Eace** 15 **Eacl Wd6!** Yet another standard device for such a position: while threatening Old7-c5, Black transfers his queen to a3, from where it keeps 'under surveillance' the c3 pawn.

16 &c2  $\Xifd8$  17 &b4 (or 17 &c2 $\Xic8$  18 &b1 h6 19 &xf6 &xf6 axf6 raction 16 must be conceded that it is more far pleasant to play Black in this position, Vajda - Nisipeanu, Bucharest 1977) 17...&a3 18 &b3On 18 &b1?! Black had prepared 18...&c4! and, in view of the fact that the rook on c1 is 'in the sights' of the queen, White cannot take on e4.

But also on b3 the bishop gets no rest: 18...a5! 19 ②d2 a4! 20 ③c4 豐f8 21 ≜xf6 ③xf6



22 ⊕xb6 (after 22 ≜xa4 ≜a6 the knight e4 definitely will not survive) 22...ab 23 ⊕xc8 b2! After the forcing variation ends (White eats up b2, and Black – e8), there should not be any doubt about the evaluation of the position: the two minor pieces are

considerably stronger than the rook and two pawns (Kraut - Schlusser Germany 1996).

2) 9 ₩e2 0-0 10 0-0 ⓑbd7 The alternative is 10... ≜xc3 11 bc ⓑbd7, and then:

12 兔g5 b6 13 兔xf6?! 公xf6 14 全x5 兔b7. The black pieces are placed so harmoniously that they are ready to meet any counterattack (Schpenger – Dautov, Germany 2003);

12 2a3!? Ze8 (as distinct from the variation 9 Wd3, here this move is possible since the position of the queen on e2 deprives White of the break d4-d5) 13 Zac1 b6 14 @e5 ▲b7 15 f4!? (upon the presence of the dark-squared bishop such an attack has chances of success; this is why Schpenger was wrong to exchange on f6) 15 ... Had8 ?! (this and the following moves by Black are extremely passive) 16 2d3 Wb8 17 Icel 響a8 18 響c2 g6 19 包c4 âa6 20 @d6 âxd3 21 ₩xd3 Ie7 (21... 耳f8 22 ②b5!) 22 f5! (Speelman - Richardson, England 2001).

11 ②b5 The knight, staying alive, starts to show its tenacity. It seems that Black is in for it, but as shown by the games Benko – Filip and Reindermann – Ivanchuk, concrete variations appear quite naturally for him.



In the game de la Riva – Magem (Terrasa 1995), after 11...\%d8 12 a3 &a5 (taking measures against &clf4) 13 b4 a6! 14 2c3 &c7 15 &g5 h6 16 &h4 b5 the opponents agreed to a draw although the position is somewhat preferable for White.

More accurate is 11...豐c6!? 12 ④e5 鰀e4! The game Karpov – van der Wiel (Saloniki 1988) transposed to a complicated endgame in which both sides had chances:

13 a3 &c7 14 &g5 &xc2 15 &xc2h6 16 &h4 g5: 17 &g3 &c4 18  $\exists$  Id1 &xg3 19 hg Id8 20 &g4 &f621 &c7 (little is offered by the immediate 21 &xh6+ &g7 22 &g4&xg4 23 &xg4 &d7, but also the intermediate move does not change anything) 21...&b8 22 &xh6+ &g723 &g4 &xg4 24 &xg4 e5! A draw was soon agreed.

Let us go over to an analysis of the main continuation 7 cd lt depends on Black, whether he will adopt play with a symmetrical pawn structure – 7...ed (1), or continue with a typical 'isolani' on d4 – 7... $\mathcal{O}$ Xd5 (1).

# I

#### 7...ed

With the bishop on b4 we have a more lively position than with the bishop on c7. Besides this, Black has no problems with the development of his light-squared bishop. Yet, for all that, the symmetrical pawns usually favour the one who has an extra tempo at his disposal – in the present case White.



There are three strategies of immediate development for White: a deployment (8 &g5 or 8 &c5), introduction of the queen (8 Шb3; 8 Шa4+) or the bishop fl (8 &c2; 8 &c5+; 8 &cd3).

A

8 &g5 (this move offers no advantage, but of course the whole game still lies ahead) 8...0-0 9 &e2 **@d610** IZe1  $\bigcirc$ e4 11 0+0 &rc3 12 be  $\bigcirc$ c6?! He should do away with the enemy bishop - 12... $\bigcirc$ xg5 13  $\bigcirc$ xg5 hó 14  $\bigcirc$ 13  $\bigcirc$ c6, when Black will not in the least be worse.

13 & h4 f5? (after this serious positional mistake Black's position becomes uneasy: why not 13... & eq4??) 14 c4! Now the a2-g8 diagonal (and as a consequence of this also other lines) starts to 'whistle'. But Black has brough this misfortune upon himself.

14...dc 15 象xc4+ 容h8 16 罩e1 h6 17 d5 ②a5 18 營d4 b6 19 ②e5 容h7 20 象d3



#### в

8 ⊘e5 (again by-passing the advantage) 8...0-0 9 ≗d3 ⊘c6 The quietest. He could attack the c3 square but usually he leaves well alone:

9...⊕e4 10 ₩b3 ₩b6 11 0-0 &xc3 12 bc. According to an analysis by Erling Mortensen, the pawn is untouchable: 12...₩xb3 13 ab Φxc37 14 &a3 Zd8 15 Zfc1 Φc4 16 &c7 Ze8 17 &b51 In the game Mortensen – Danielsen (Copenhagen 1997) Black played more modestly: 2...⊕c6 13 &a3 ₩xb3 14 ab. The endgame is in White's favour: he has two bishops and a more flexible pawn structure.

10 0-0 2d6 In a quiet and approximately equal position

everything is decided by an imperceptible nuance. How, for example, to drive away the knight from the outpost on e5? Possibly with the bishop, but also possibly with the rook -10... & After 11 @xc6 be Black, in the game S.Polgar – Zelcie (Portorz, 1994), gradually took over the initiative: 12  $\pm$ (42?  $\pm$ xc3 13 be was 14  $\pm$ c5  $\pm$ 0.47 15 we2 h6 16 f4  $\pm$ a61 etc.

11 全xc6 bc 12 全g5 里b8 13 b3 h6 14 全h4 單e8 15 單c1 全f4 16 罩c2 單b4 17 全g3



We are following the game Shamkovich – Mureshan (Palma de Mallorca 1989). The position has not moved a jot away from equality and this can be most simply confirmed by means of 17...2xg3 18 hg (or 18 fg 2g4 19 % 22 % 7) 18...2h 81 9 % 22 % bho 20 % d2 52 1  $\frac{2}{5}$  Ct  $\frac{2}{2}d7$ 

#### С

After 8 **Wb3**  $\bigcirc$  c6 9 & b5 Black (if only he had not put his bishop b4 en prise) has generally nothing to fear. For example, 9...0-0 10 0-0 & xc3 11 **W**xc3  $\bigcirc$  c4 12 **W**33 &d7 13 &c5 **Wb6** 14 & xc6 with a draw (Renet – Vizhmanavin, London 1996). D

More interesting is 8 #a4+ 2c69 ab5 After -...04 White can force the game (10 acc) white can force 1) 10 acc of wait(10 -0). 1) 10 acc acc -1: 1 acc -1 -1 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -0 -2 13 -2 -1 -2 -0 -2 13 -2 -1 -2 -0 -2 13 -2 -1 -2 -0 -2 13 -2 -1 -2 -0 -2 13 -2 -1 -2 -0 -2 13 -2 -1 -2 -0 -2 13 -2 -1 -2 -0 -2 13 -2 -1 -2 -0 -2 13 -2 -1 -2 -0 -2 13 -2 -1 -2 -0 -2 13 -2  $\text$ 

11 bc bc 12 0-0 ₩h6 (sharper is 12...Ωc4): 13 ₩ac6 Ib8 14 c4 Δb7 15 ₩a4 dc 16 ₩xc4 ৠa5 with compensation, Oral – Kharitonov, Koszalin 1999) 13 Δa3 IB4 14 Ωc5 Qc4 15 ₩xc6 ₩xc6 16 Qxc6 Qxc3 17 Ifc1 Δa6 The game is even (Marin – Volkov, Romania 2001).

2) 10 0-0 Wa5 Absolute symmetry should be in White's hands, but... actually too many pieces are standing 'under exchange'.



First we mention that it is not possible to win a pawn - 11 2xc6 bc 12  $\frac{10}{2}xc6$ ?? in view of 12...2d7.

ought to achieve a draw without problems.

A similar scenario developed in the game Miladinovic - Bras (Korinth 1998), with the only difference that White managed to achieve victory: 11 響xa5 盒xa5 12 句a4 盒g4?! An instructive mistake! Black wants to spoil the opponent's pawn structure on the king's flank but does not take into account that the main defender of the c6 pawn will leave the board. Incidentally, it is incomprehensible how Black intends to attack the pawns on f2 and f3 - as he will be riveted to the defence of his own pawn weaknesses. After 13 2xc6 he 14 2e3 \$xf3?! 15 gf White in the end will gobble up both the c- and apawns. And easily win the game.

In order to avoid problems with weak pawns, on 11 Wxa5 it was necessary to reply 11...Qxa5? Then, generally speaking, we cannot see how White can obtain the advantage. For example: 12 @d2 a6 13 @d3@c4 or 12 @g5 @xc3 13 be a6 14 @d3 @c4.

E

8 **2c2** 0-0 9 0-0 **2xc3** The game Liberzon – Petrosian (Erevan 1965) ended in an anaemic draw: 9...**#a5** 10 **₩c2 2g4** 11 **2g5 2bd** 12 **2e5 2xc2** 13 **2xc2 Zic8** 14 **2xf6 2xf6** 15 **2bc3 ₩b6** 16 **2bf3 g6**.



White has two bishops, Black – a strong position in the centre. There is a complicated game in prospect with chances for both sides (Dolmatov – Kharitonov, Sochi 1978).

8 ≜b5+ ≜d7 9 ∰e2+. Grandmaster Stanislav Voitsekhovsky tried playing 9 ≜d3, but without great success:

9...公c6 10 0-0 皇g4 11 簋e1+ 皇e7 12 豐b3 皇xf3 13 豐xb7 豐c8 14 豐xc8+ 簋xc8 15 gf 公xd4 (Voitsekhovsky - Dreev, Novgorod 1999);

9...0-0 10 20-5 20-6 11 0-0 Ee8 12 Ee1 20-41 13 20-13 Exel+ 14 Waxel (Voitsekhovsky Kharitonov, Ekaterinberg 1999) 14...We71? 15 h3 Ee8 16 Wdl 20-6.

9...€e4 Another line of defence is 9...€e4 Another line of defence is 9...€e7 10 2e5 2c6!? 11 2xd7 ₩xe2+ 12 2xe2 2xd7. The game Franco – Romero (Dos Hermanas 2001) continued 13 £e3 Ihe8 14 End1 2xc3 15 bc 2ve4 16 Edc1 2d6, and Black should hold.

10 0-0 Definite problems are set by 10 创创2!? 0-0 11 创dxe4 (Ashley -Vadasz, Budapest 1997). Black must play very clearly, in order not to drift into the worse position. In particular, instead of taking on c4, worth considering is 11...Ee8!? and then: 12 & 2a3 de 13 0-0 2ac6 14 d5 (or 14 ffd1 al of 15 & 2a4 4 Mh 16 h3 b5 17 2ac2 2ad6 with counterplay) 14...2bc5 15 2xe4 2bg4 16 2ad4(more careful is 16 2ax7 4x3717 4wc4) 16...4wh4 17 h3 2hc218 2wh2 2xc4 19 2a3 2ad6+20 4wf4 2axh3 with a decisive attack.

10....\$xc3 11 bc 0-0 12 \$d3 On the board is the tabiya of the variation.



 First we should discuss
 12... Dxc3!? Thus - do not be afraid of ghosts! - plays the Czech grandmaster Eduard Meduna.

13 ₩e5! 13 ₩b2?! is unprincipled. White does not attempt a pawn storm on the king and his double attack on c3 and b7 is easily repulsed: 13...₩c8 14 ₩b3 &a4 15 ₩b3 &b5 16 &axb5 @xb5 17 ₩b3 ₩c4 (Sveshnikov – Meduna, Sochi 1986).

13....2g4 14 2\25?? h6 15 2\h7 (in such positions you don't move backwards) 15....2e8 16 2\2016 ff ff 17 2\2016 All this looks highly dangerous for Black, but... only at first sight. In fact the attack is easily repulsed:

17...f5 18 f3 \#f6 19 fg \#xd4+

F

20  $\approx$ h1  $\approx_{12}$ 42 ( $\approx_{17} \odot_{16}$ 622  $\approx$ h7  $\approx_{16}$ 623  $\approx$ h4  $\odot_{14}$ (Janev – Meduna, Budapest 2000). The handsome knight on e4 single-handedly cements Black's position. At an opportune moment it will also be ready to go over to a counterattack: 24  $\pm$ b5  $\odot_{15}$ 5  $\approx$ 67?  $\approx$ 628 126  $\approx$ 135  $\approx$ 21?

2) On the other hand, do not look at **12...\$(5?)** The base of the knight e4 is confirmed as unstable: the d5 pawn can be undermined (c3-c4), the bishop (5 – driven away (c)(3-h4).

But what is the accurate order of moves? Most promising looks 13 wb2:? We8 (now the queen does not control the h4 square) 14 &47 15 @h4! (undermining the right) 15...&66 16 c4! (undermining the left) 16...@h6 17 Iact Wa7 18 @h7 16 16 c4! cundermining the left) 16...@h6 17 Iact Wa7 18 @h7 16 19 c5 White has an unquestionable advantage (Sveshnikov – Kalinichev, Norilsk 1987).

3) Interesting is 12... **Ze8**!? 13 De5 Dc6, practically forcing White to sacrifice a piece.



After 14 ②xf7!? 響f6 (considered the only move; bad is 14...②xc3? 15 斷h5) 15 ②c5 ②xc5 16 de 竇xc5! and Black equalises (Sveshnikov – Savon, Moscow 1991).

But, frankly speaking, we do not see why he cannot grab the material –  $14...\Delta_x t??$ : 15 wh5+  $\Delta^2$ R8 If 16 wxd5, then simply 16...D(f6 17  $\Delta_a$ 3+  $\Delta_b$ 7 18 wedsh7 wedsh5 – the attack is over, and the three pawns for the piece will allow White (after successful deployment) to escape defaat. If however 16  $\Delta_a$ 3+, then in this case there is no clarity at all:  $16...\Delta_c t??$ : 17  $\Delta_x$ xc4 de 18 wedsh7  $\Xi$ c8 19  $\Xi$ ael wedsh3 20  $\Delta_b$ 4 (or 20 i3 wedsh3 21 fe+  $\Delta_f$ (51) 20...wedsh7 21 wedsh5 22 R6 33

### G

8 & d3 Among all seven candidates - the healthiest and probably the strongest move.

8...0-0 The intermediate 8...₩67+ counts on the fact that White has weaknesses – 9 &c2?1, is met by 9...2c44 10 ₩h3 0-0 11 &c3 Ωc6 12 0-0 &c6 (Turov – VirolyJansky, SLPetersburg 1998). But if White is not afraid to sacrifice a pawn – 9 Δc51 &Ωc6 10 0-0 &2xd4, then instead he could gain a very strong initiative: 11 Ziel Qc6 12 &b5+ &r81 32 &c6.

**9 0-0** And here we have a branch. Other moves most frequently met are 9...\$g4 and 9...\$c6.



 9... 2g4 10 #b3!? Hinting to the opponent that his last developing move was not with the right piece.

10... & xc3 (Poluljahov recommended 10... & c6 11 & b c5 and only now 11... & xc3) 11 bc & xc13 12 gf in two moves Black has given up his two bishops, and for what? It must be out of a great love of knights.

But in the position there is also a third factor – the partially open b- and griftes. And both can fall into the hands of the white rooks, as occurred in the game Poluljahov – Wells (Balatonbereny 1992): 12...we713 wh11? 2bd7 14  $\Xi$ gl (one!) 14...wh8 15  $\Xi$ bl (two!) 15... $\Xi$ ac8 16  $\pounds$ d2 2b6. In the opinion of grandmaster Aleksander Poluljahov, White consolidates his advantage by 17 alt 2b418  $\pounds$ xc4 Wex1 9Wex1 $Zxc4 20 as <math>\Xi$ a4 21  $\Xi$ b5.



Quite another matter! Now there is little use for the rooks on the b- and gfiles (Spraggett - Zelcic, Geneva 1995).

12 Wd2! As is clear from the games Poluljahov – Wells and Spraggett – Zelcic, White should not fear an exchange on f3 since this gives him the chance to break through on the grfile.

Harmless is 12  $\Xi$ el  $\Xi$ d6 13 h3  $\Delta$ h5 14  $\Delta$ xf6  $\Xi$ rf6 15  $\Xi$ e3  $\Xi$ fe8 16  $\Xi$ d2  $\Xi$ xe3 17 fe (Sveshnikov – Vizhmanavin, Elista 1995) 17... $\Xi$ e8 with equal chances.

12...&xf3 13 gf @d6 14  $\blacksquareab1$  b6 15 @b1 &b5 16  $\blacksquare$ gl (now the usefulness of the move 11...h6 becomes apparent) 16...@a5?! 17 &b4!



The position is ripe for all sorts of combinations. Black should not even think about the f4 square: 17.... (2) f4?

18 &g3 or 17...@f4? 18  $\exists$ xg7+1 &xg7 19  $\exists$ g]+ &h8 20 &rf4 &xh4 21 &f6 matel In the game Rantanen – Ornstein (Ekso 1981) Black carelessly played 17...h6? and after 18 &c7! he was left the exchange down. Necessary was 17...&h8, though even in this case it is White who is definitely conducting the game.

On the whole the system with 7...ed is fully viable. Nowhere does Black lose at once, more than this, in nearly every variation theory fails to promise White even a minimal advantage.

The main defect of this, as indeed every other symmetrical system, lies in the fact that play frequently proceeds, as chessplayers say, 'with two possible results'. White either wins or obtains a draw. No other is on offer.

But we would very much like it to be.

# П

# 7...Øxd5

In positions with an isolated d4 pawn Black has more 'chances' of being subjected to an attack, but also more chances of taking over the initiative. There are two main moves: 8 & 2 (A) and 8 & d2 (B). Besides this, it is worth mentioning **8** & b3. At one time this was a main move in the repertoire of Judit Polgar, but after her game with Smyslov (Aruba 1992) she no longer played it. This is how the game went:



8... ⊘c6 9 **≜d3 Wb6!** The clearest decision. With the exchange of queens disappear White's chances of an attack – and the weakness on d4 remains...

10 & d.2 & d.5 : 11 0-0 W xh3 12 ab & b6 13 & d.4 More careful is 13 & 2xd5 ed 14 & 2,3 though even in this case Black's problems are over: 14...0-0 15 b4 E88 16 Efc1 & d.7 17 b5 De7 18 & b4 & 2f5! (Christiansen - Schwartzmann, Wijk an Zee 1993).

14 5 a4!? 2 c7 (avoiding the trap: 14...盒xd4? 15 2xd4 2xd4 16 2b6!) 15 b4 a6 16 ()c3!? 0-0 (also the second pawn is not very edible: 16 ... Dxb4?! 17 9b5! gbd5 18 貫fc1 皇b8 19 \$xd5 ed 20 例c7+ \$xc7 21 萬xc7 with the initiative) 17 h5 (a5 18 2a2 ab 19 2xb5 2b6 20 De5 Dac6 That's it: Judit Polgar played this endgame very enterprisingly. But nevertheless White did not have even a hint of advantage.

The conclusion is clear: Smyslov's discovery 9...豐b6! and 10...全a5! closes down the whole variation with 8 暫b3.

#### A

8 Wc2 This continuation was first met in the game Najdorf – Portisch (Varna 1962) and up to the present day it has not lost its topicality.



 Already, right from the start, definite accuracy is required of Black. Thus on 8...0-0?! follows
 9 &d3!, forcing the opponent either to weaken his castled position or remove his king from the centre.

9...g6 10 0-0 2\c6 11 a3 2\e7 7 12 2\u00e0h6 \u00edee 8 13 \u00edfd1 d1 \u00e0 \u00e6 (Kobalija - Turov, Sochi 1998) 14 2\u00e0e4!, increasing the pressure;

9...216 10 0-0 \$\overline{A7} 11 2\overline{Coversion} 2 \$\overline{A6}\$ 10 0-0 \$\overline{A7}\$ 11 2\overline{Coversion} 2 \$\overline{A6}\$ 12 \$\overline{A6}\$ 13 \$\overline{Ac}\$ 0 \$\overline{Ac}\$ 3 \$\overline{A6}\$ 14 \$\overline{W}\$ d2. Once again the position of the black king inspires no confidence at all \$\overline{Bologan}\$ and \$-\overline{Ac}\$ and \$-\overline{A

2) Ålso unconvincing is 8... **W**(7) 9  $\&d2 \bigtriangleup d1$ 7 in view of yet again 10 &d312 &d167 **10**... &xc3 **11 bc**  $\bigotimes 5f6$  **12 0-0** in the game Potkin – Asrian (Moscow 2002) the careless 12...OO2? was met by 13  $\Xi acl b6$ 14  $\bigotimes c5 \&b7$  15 (4  $\Xi fc8$  16  $\Xi a 3 <math>\bigtriangleup fc8$ ) 17 f5! of 18  $\&xf5 \bigtriangleup g6$  19  $\Xi h3!$  and White was close to his objective.

Black should delay castling till later: 12...b6 13  $\Xi$ fe1 (or 13  $\Xi$ ac1 &b7 14  $\triangle$ bc5  $\triangle$ txc5 15  $\Xi$ xc5 0-0 16  $\Xi$ fe1  $\Xi$ fc8 17  $\Xi$ 5c3 a5 18  $\Xi$ h3 h6 19  $\cong$ c1 &fR 20 c4, and White's prospects are superior, Sveshnikov - Sasikiran, Dubai 2002). 13...2b7 14 @e5 @xe5 15 Ixe5 0-0



In the game Sveshnikov – Schweizer (Cap d'Agde 2003) White decided that the position was already ripe: 16 &g5? Punishment followed swiftly: 16... $\bigcirc$ g4! 17 &th7+ &th8 18 &e2 &wz.519 Ed1  $\bigcirc$ z6.8c5 20 de (20 &th5  $\bigcirc$ 16.3+1) 20...&e6, and Black won. It is not hard to see that 16  $\equiv$ ae1 returns us to the game Sveshnikov – Sasikiran. Incidentally, on 16  $\equiv$ ae1 no good is 16... $\bigcirc$ g4? 17 &xh7+ &h8 because of 18  $\equiv$ h5.

3) 8 (a)d7 (the idea of this move lies in the transfer of the knight to f6) 9 2d3 Worth considering is 9 2e2!? - the bishop heads for f3, paralysing the queen's flank. In the game Voitsekhovsky - Donchenko (Tula 1999) White realised his idea: 9...②7f6 10 0-0 0-0 11 皇g5 皇e7 12 De5 h6 13 2xf6 2xf6 14 2f3! のxc3 15 資xc3 萬b8 16 萬fd1 竇d6 17 Zacl etc. But only because the opponent did not counter White's plan. Instead of 11 ... 2e7 stronger is 11...h6 12 2h4 @f4! 13 2c4 @g6!, scattering White's bishops around the board. Possible then is 14 2g3 2h5! 15 a3 @xc3 16 bc @d7 17 Ife1 Ic8 18 皇a2 (Howell - Speelman, London 2003) 18...①xg3 19 hg 響a5 with a pleasant game.

9....27f6 10 0-0 &e7 Noticeably weaker is 10....&d7?! in view of 11 20xd5 20xd5 12 20e5 &d6 13 &ec4 \frac{2}{3}c8 14 \frac{2}{3}b2 dc6 15 \frac{2}{3}g3! (Benjamin – Seirawan, Seattle 2000).



Conclusion: launching raids on Black's position will not work; he needs to carry out a systematic siege - 11 a3 0-0 12 De5, and then:

12...h6 13 變e2 變d6 14 蓋d1 b6?! (it is surprising but in this way Black loses control over the d5 square) 15 包xd5 變xd5 16 盒c4 變e4 17 變xe4 包xe4 18 d5! (Potkin – Vescovi, Limares 2001) or

12....\#d6 13 &g5 (more elastic is 13 \Early: \overline{A}d7 14 \Early xd5 \Vert xd5 15 \overline{A}c4 \vert xd6 16 \overline{A}f4) 13...h6 14 \Overline{A}xd5 \vert xd5 15 \overline{A}c3 \vert xd7 16 \overline{A}c4 \vert xd6 17 \vert xd3 \overline{A}c6 (Ivanovic -Yermolinsky, Erevan 1996).

And so the plan 2b8-d7-f6 can be recommended in practice as being sufficiently reliable. But the development of the knight to c6 is incomparably more popular. Why? The same principle: Black does not want to play passively for a draw, he wants to struggle for three results! 438...5c6

There are two main plans for White. The first – with the development of the bishop to d3, when it is necessary to be prepared for the sacrifice of the d4 pawn. Secondly, with the bishop going to e2.

a) 9 **Ad3**? By stopping the opponent castling, White hopes to prevent the members of the diagonal battery changing places with a transfer of the queen to e4.

It depends on Black which course the further play will take: quiet and moderate (9...\$e7; 9...h6) or forcing and explosive (9...\$xc3; 9...\$a5).



al) 9...\$e7 10 a3 A knight threatened to jump to b4, but now Black must decide how to avoid losing h7 or else put the king to work.

al1) **10... (b) f6?!** Voluntarily retreating from the centre should not be partcularly good.

11 0-0 There is an interesting but hardly positionally based plan with long castling: 11 & a:3 0-0 12 0-0-0?! In the encounter Anand – Adams (Groningen 1997) followed 12...a/d 7 13  $\Delta$ gs (the break 13 d5 cd 14  $\Delta$ xd5 is inappropriate, namely because his king has gone to the left: 14...a(84) 15  $\Delta$ bl h6 16  $\Delta$ xc7+ $\Delta$ xc7 17 W53  $\Delta$ cd5 13...h6 14  $\Delta$ gc4 a(85 15  $\Delta$ h1  $\Delta$ as 16  $\Delta$ c5. By continuing 16...ac6 17 Wc2 b6 18  $\Delta$ 5c4  $\Delta$ xc4 19  $\Delta$ xc4

11...0-0 (losing is 11... $\hat{\mathbb{D}}_{2}$  dd? 12  $\hat{\mathbb{D}}_{2}$  dd  $\mathbb{W}_{2}$  dd 13  $\hat{\mathbb{D}}_{5}$  5) 12  $\mathbb{Z}_{61}$  The retreat of the knight from d5 begins to tell. Thus, on 12...a6? there is the decisive 13 d5! ed 14  $\hat{\mathbb{D}}_{2}$  d5!  $\hat{\mathbb{D}}_{2}$  dc 15  $\hat{\mathbb{D}}_{2}$  that  $\hat{\mathbb{D}}_{2}$  dc  $\hat{\mathbb{D}}_{2}$  dc 17  $\hat{\mathbb{D}}_{2}$  dc  $\hat{\mathbb{D}}_{2}$  dc 18  $\mathbb{W}$  fs, and White remained with an extra pawn (Topalov Causel, Moscow 1994).

12...âd7



In this position Topalov rejected the immediate break with d4-d5 in favour of 13 包e5 a6 14 金e3 響c7 15 包xd7 響xd7, and only now 16 d5 (Topalov - Yudasin, Groningen 1993).

In fact, there are no grounds for delay: after 13 d5! ed 14 0xd5! hfo 15 0xe7+ 0xe7 16 0e5 0ed517 0xd7 0xd7 18 0x5 0b5 19 b4 **Zfd8** 20 0b2 the two powerful bishops and open position defines White's advantage (Estremera – Izeta, Leon 1997).

al2) 10... $\hat{a}$ f6 11 0-0 h6 Preparing castling whilst retaining pressure on the d4 pawn. Objectively this is the right path but nevertheless psychologically there is the fear: will White suddenly find how to exploit the tempo spent on h7-b6?

Instead of 11...h6 he has other tries:

11... $\hat{a}xd4$ ?! (too risky) 12  $\hat{\Box}xd5$  ed 13  $\hat{a}b5$   $\hat{a}c6$  14  $\hat{a}xc6$ + bc 15  $\forall xc6$ +  $\hat{a}d7$  16  $\exists e1$ +  $\hat{a}c8$  17  $\forall xd5$   $\hat{a}c6$ 18  $\forall ec5$ +  $\forall e7$  19  $\forall h5$  (Brodsky – Berg, Groningen 1994);

11...②dc7?! 12 金e3 h6 13 重ad1 0-0 (Topalov – Gulko, Moscow 1994) 14 ②e5!? ③f5 15 盒xf5 ef 16 f4! with a strong initiative.

12 Idl 0-0



Apropos White's plan, there is no discord at all – the queen ought to transfer to e4 via e2. But theoreticians and practical players are by no means in agreement about the correct order of moves.

Here is one harmless attempt to set up a 'queen + bishop' battery with the necessary range: 13 @c2?! @xd414 @xd4 &xd4 15 @c4? (recklessly played; 15 &h7+ would lead to draw) 15.&h7+ would lead to draw) 15.&h7+ would lead to draw) 15.&h7+ 80 Harchardtow 15 &h7+ 80 Harchardtow 15 &h7+ 19 @xf2 @xg5with an extra pawn (Velimitrovic – Garcia, Rio de Janeiro 1979).

More interesting is the idea of the German grandmaster Karsten Muller: 13 & e4!? The bishop not only offers the possibility of the queen going to e4, but also itself 'strains' the d5 square. And yet, in the opinion of Muller, Black has the right to count on equality: 13...Quee7 14 We4 b6!? 15 & d3 Qg6 16 Que5 & xe5 17 de & b7 etc.

a2) 9...h6 10 0-0 0-0 11 a3 &c7 A modification of the previous variation, with the only difference that Black intends to defend against the threats on the b1-h7 diagonal by means of g7-g6.

Acceptable is 11... 2d6 - then the knight on c6 goes to e7, reinforcing the outpost on d5 and heading for f5 or g6:

12 響e2 ②cc7! 13 ②e5 ②f5 14 單d1!? ③xd4 15 響e4 ③f5 16 ③xd5 ed 17 豐xd5 盒c7! (Bologan - Epishin, Germany 1999);

12 亘d1 ④cc7! 13 暫e2 並d7 14 ④c5 並xe5 15 de ④xc3 16 be ④g6 17 並xg6 fg 18 並e3 (18 斷d3 並c6) 18.... ¥e8 19 亘d6 並c6 20 >g4 亘f5 (Kindermann – Lobron, Dortmund 1983). 12 @e2 Iae8! A cool and absolutely correct reply, whereas the panicky 12... $\Omega$ f6?! gave White a very strong attack in the game Naiditsch – Cvitan (Oberwart 1998): 13 Ia 16 h 6 4  $\Lambda$ e4  $\Omega$ d5 15  $\Delta$ b1  $\Delta$ f6 16 @d3  $\Omega$ cc7 17  $\Omega$ e5  $\Omega$ f5 18 e4!  $\Omega$ ie7 19  $\Omega$ e3.

13 &c2 &f8 14  $\Xi e1 \&d7$  15  $\Im d3$ (by lingering a move, White risks not setting up the battery at all: 15 &c2 $\Im b1$  16  $\Im d3$   $\Im a61$ , Korneev – Assmann, Werfen 1993) 15...g6



In the game Malaniuk – Aleksandrov (Wisla 1992) White, by playing 16 兔d2?, fell into a wellknown tactical trap: 16...公cb4! 17 ab 公xb4 18 敏4 金c6 19 d5 ed.

There is no alternative to h2-h4-h5 - otherwise he will not break through to the g6 pawn. The question only is whether Black will allow this march to be carried out to the end. In the game Kunte – Sasikiran (Kelambakkam 2000) he allowed – 16 h4 Q16?! 17 Que5 Que7 18 h5! wh51 9 W151 with a double attack on f7 and b7. But only a year later the same opponents followed the right version: 16...h5 Kunte – Sasikiran, New Delhi 2001). The game is even.

a3) 9..... a3) 9.... a3) 9.... a3) 9.... a3) 9.... a3) 9.... a3) bc and a by Black in the stem

game Najdorf – Portisch (Varna 1962), probably wishing to refute White's whole plan beginning with 8 @c2.

However it cannot be refuted with anything but it is possible to lose here - and quite quickly.



11 ②xd4 豐xd4 12 盒b5+! Weaker is 12 豐a4+? 盒d7 13 豐xb4 豐xd3 14 盒a3 because of 14...0-0-0!

12... $\pounds e^{7}$  13 0-0  $\Re xc^{3}$  14  $\Re a4!$ ? Najdorf attacked in another way: 14  $\Re e^{2} \leq \pounds dc$  15  $\pounds dc$   $\Re a^{3}$  16  $\exists dl$  $\exists d8$  17  $\Re h5$  f6 18  $\Re h7$ , and soon achieved victory. Instead of 17...f6 there is no salvation in 17...h6 18  $\pounds xg^{7} \pounds d7$  19  $\Re h4+ \pounds c8$ 20  $\pounds d7+ \Re xd7$  21  $\pounds xh6$ , but the consequences of 14... $\exists d8!$ ? are not clear until the end.

Now however on 14... $\blacksquare$ d8 follows 15  $\blacksquare$ b1, and on the retreat of the bishop b4 - 16  $\clubsuit$ h4+ and 17  $\clubsuit$ xh7.

14...2d6 15 &f4 &xf4 (or 15...e5 16  $\exists$ ac1 @d4 17  $\exists$ c4 @d5 18  $\exists$ d1 @e6 19 &c1!) 16 @xf4 @c5 17 a4 g5 18 @g3  $\exists$ d8 19  $\exists$ ac1 @d5 20 f4! White's attack is virtually irresistible (Nunn – Lobron, Biel 1982).

a4) 9...& a5!? A correction to Portisch's plan – Black wins a pawn when the bishop is not on b4, but on

a5 (which in many variations it is), and, what is no less important, White is obliged to place a pawn on a3, depriving himself of the manoeuvre &cl+a3.

10 a3!? White has no right to display faint-heartedness and returns to his chosen path. Pieces not allowed:



10 & e4?! 2xd4 11 2xd4 2xc312 bc wxd4 13 0-0 wxc3 14 wb1 f5! 15 wb5+ xef7, and Black is ready to castle artificially (Hubner – Hracek, Batumi 1999):

10 全xh7? ②xc3 11 bc 罩xh7! 12 豐xh7 全xc3+, remaining with extra material;

10 0-0?! (by allowing the exchange of one of his key attacking pieces, White reduces his prospects) 10...2044111 Wall 2xd312 Wal3 f6!? 13 Zd1 0-0 14 2c442b415 Wal4 dd5 16 2d2 2xc317 b 2cb618 Wb3 Wd5 19 Zac1 2cc4 with advantage (Rechlis – Henkin, France 1999).

10....♦xc3 In contrast to White, Black can allow himself to deviate: 10...h6 11 0-0 0-0. The feeling of course is that this play is strange, but a refutation of such chess 'cowardice' has not yet been found: 12 皇c4 ②ce7 13 皇d2 皇d7 14 ②xd5 ed 15 皇d3 皇b6 (Gdanski – Luther, Istanbul 2003);

12 温d1 兔c7 13 h3 ②cc7 14 ②e5 兔d7 15 ③xd5 ④xd5 16 兔h7+ 쓸h8 17 兔c4 盒e8 18 豐e2 f6 19 ④d3 兔c6 (Ehlvest -- Yudasin, New York 2003).

11 bc ②xd4!? (they're off!) 12 ⊙xd4 ¥xd4 13 <u>\$b5+</u>! In Najdorf mould. Weaker is 13 0-0 ¥c5 14 <u>\$c3</u>, and Black can in some way extinguish the opponent's initiative:

14... 金b6!? 15 單fe1 豐c7 16 冨ab1 金d7 17 單b4 金xe3 18 單xe3 金c6 (Kindermann – Speelman, Plovdiv 1983).

After 13 \$b5+! arises a critical position for the variation 9 \$d3.



What carries more weight – a pawn or the initiative? The evaluation has changed time and again. At the present moment the conclusion is this: Black has deployed sufficient resources for the defence. Let's look at all the possibilities: 13...&h78, 13...&h27 and 13...&h247.

a41) 13....\$f8 (a rare but interesting move) 14 0-0 ¥xc3 15 ¥e2 (it is

worth thinking about 15 營b1?? followed by a3-a4 and 全c1-a3) 15...a6 16 盒d3!? 營xa1 17 盒b2 營xf1+18 念xf1 盒d8



In the game Gipslis – Albert (Berlin 1995) White decided not to risk anything and forced a draw by perpetual check: 19 &xg7+ &xg720 @g4+ &ch6 21 @h4+ &g7 22 @g4+ &ch6.

Taking into account that it is not casy for Black to put right the coordination of his pieces, White can, without particular risk, continue the struggle. For example: 19  $rac{1}{2}$  2.  $rac{1}{2}$  0. (19...65 20  $rac{1}{2}$  acds)  $rac{2}{3}$  2.  $rac{1}{2}$  2. ra

a42) 13...2e7 14 0-0  $\frac{1}{2}$ e5 1f Black's life is without risk, which is food without salt, then it is worth trying 14... $\frac{1}{2}$ xc3?! 15  $\frac{1}{2}$ e4?? f6 (Rogers - Effert, Altensteig 1988) 16  $\frac{1}{2}$ c4?? e5 17  $\frac{1}{2}$ fd!

15 a4! 盒b6 16 盒a3+ 盒c5 17 燮e2!? (weaker is 17 笃fel 燮c7 18 燮f5 盒xa3 19 燮g5+ 含f8 20 笃xa3 燮e7, and Black has almost defended himself, Rogul – Zelcic, Pula 2000) 17..."gcr 18 "gg d st 8 In the game Kotronias – Kurkunakis (Athens 1996) White slightly lowered the tempo of attack – 19  $\pm$ b4, and after 19...e5 20 "gcd b6 21 a5  $\pm$ 8 the opponent consolidated his forces.

Therefore worth considering is 19 wet?: **b6 20** ffd1, with the pin on the bishop c5 drawing fire in the direction of the only open d-file. Losing now is 20...we7 in view of 21  $\pm$ xc5 bc 22 file b8 23  $\pm$ a6! Exb1 24 fixb1 we7 25  $\pm$ xc8 wixe8 Exb1 24 fixb1 we7 25  $\pm$ xc8 wixe8 Exb1 24 fixb1 we7 25  $\pm$ xc8 wixe8 is indeed humble. Nor is there any relief in 20...a6 21 wh4 f6 22  $\pm$ xc5+ bc 23  $\pm$ c4

**20...g6 21 變e4**? **258** Inferior is 21...金b7 22 盒xc5+ bc 23 變e3 with a great advantage for White.



22 &cl! 66!? (useless is 22...&br) in view of 23 @h4! &cg 24  $\Xidr$  @c525 &cho 23 @f4! @xf4 24 <math>&xf4  $\Xih7$ (material loss is inevitable also on 24...e5 25  $\Xid8+ \&cg$ ? 26 &h6+!&xh6 27  $\Xih8$ ) 25 &a6 &cf26 &xh7 &xh7 &xh8) 25 &a6

It goes without saying that all the analysis starting with 19 Wc4!? needs to be carefully tested in practical play.

443) 13....2d7? In the variation 9...€λxc3?! 10 be €λxd4? 11 €λxd4 ₩xd4 12 &kb5+t this move would in principle not be possible, since after 12....2d7? 13 &xd7+ &xd71 4 ₩a4+ Black loses a bishop; here however this is, generally speaking, the main line!

14 0-0 A time for reflection approaches for Black...



He would like to cut the Gordian knot at once:  $14...\Xi cs!?$  15  $\Xi dl$ gxdl + 16 gxdl 2xb5. The king is no longer threatened, while the rook and light-squared bishop can construct a quite impregnable fortress. Nevertheless the game Topalov – Magem (Pamplona 1995) showed that Black does not succeed in achieving full equality: 17 ghs 36 18 dx2 for 10 e4<sup>4</sup>  $\Xi xc4$  20 a4.

14... $\Im$ xc3?!, as always, - is an extra shot of adrenalin to the game: 15 &xd7 + &xd7 16  $\Im$ e4  $\Im$ c6 17  $\Im$ d4+ &e8 18 &b2 66 19  $\Im$ d4 &18 20  $\exists$ ac1 h 5 21  $\Im$ f4  $\Im$ b5 22 &xf6  $\Im$ f5 23  $\Im$ d6+ &g8 (Ikonnikov - Nureev, Perm 1997), and here White did not notice 24 &xg?1  $\Im$ xg7 25  $\exists$ sc5. A rare guest in tournament practice is 14...@c51?, and it is not quite clear why. After 15 &xd7+&xd7 16 &ad4 &c7 17 &44 there is 17...b51 R@xa3 &xd74 (Bersma – Gyimesi, Groningen 1999). As soon as the rook h8 enters the game, all Black's problems will be over.

14....\U00e9d5 15 c4 \u00e9f5! The queen must transfer to a defensive square. Otherwise, as for example in the game Boyle - Purich (correspondence, 1992), he might be left material down: 15...\u00e9f5? 16 \u00f644 \u00e3265 17 \u00e845.

16  $\triangle$ xd7+  $\Rightarrow$ xd7 17 Bb2 The most promising continuation, but here are the others:

Weak is 17 燮d1+?! 空e7 18 罩b1 b6 19 燮e2 罩hd8 20 罩b3 罩ac8, and White has neither pawn nor attack (Pavlovic – Tukmakov, Biel 1997);

Finally, there is no promise of advantage in 17 ima4+ ime7 18 c5!? in view of 18...b6! 19 imf4 e5! (Wahls – Dautov, Germany 1997).

17...b6 Now again White has a great choice – but that does not mean to say it is a very rich one.

18 c5!? looks very rich in ideas.

The problem for White is that his opponent is not thinking of extra pawns but simply about artificial castling: 18...ce7 19 cb ab 20 &c3 $\blacksquare$ hd8 21  $\blacksquare$ ad1 &fk8 22  $\blacksquare$ xd8+  $\blacksquare$ xd8 with full equality (Aronian – Asrian, Erevan 2001).

The most natural move in the position is of course 18  $\exists dl+$ . But also here, Black easily fulfils the obligatory programme:  $18...\&e^2r$ , 19 &a3 (19 &xg771  $\exists hg8 20 \&d4$  $\exists ad8 21 \&wh4+ f6 22 <math>\exists xd8$   $\exists xd8$  $23 \&e^2 \&c3$ )  $19... {\exists} ad81$ ? (there is no need to be distrated by the defence of the g7 pawn: 19...f6?! 20 c5!, Topalov – Tukmakov, Groningen 1993 20  $\exists xd8$   $\exists xd8 21 \&xg7 \&d2$ 22 &d4 &g6 The advantage seems already to lie with Black (Trabert – Henkin, Holland 1998).

The only means of complicating the evacuation of the black king is by **18 a4!?** 



On the simple-minded 18... where 16... where 16... where 18... where 16... where 18... where 18...

it is not easy to withstand the pressure (Kunte - Prakash, Calcutta 2001).

Totally unconvincing is also 18...67! 19  $\Xi$ d1+  $\pm c6$  20 c5! (AL Karpov – Ovechkin, Smolensk 2000), and on 19.. $\pm c7$  follows 20  $\Xi$ a3+  $\pm c8$  (or 20... $\Xi$ c5 21  $\Xi$ g3) 21  $\Xi$ d6, and the harmony in Black's camp is not what it was.

Obviously, it is necessary to place the rook on d8. But which rook? In the game Calzetta – Kakhani (Istanbul 2000) Black prescribed 18...End8, but she was not able to guarantee the safety of her own king: 19 Ea3! f6 20 Eg3 g6 21 En3 h5 22 c5!

It is worth trying 18...Iad8!?, and if White acts along the lines of the old scheme - 19 I as 16 20 I as, then he can add the rook to the defence of the pawn: 20...Ing8 After 21 Wb3 &c7 22 c5 bc 23 Aa3 Wd5 Black can at last breathe freely (Bergstrom -Taylor, York 2000), though it is hardly appropriate to consider this game as the last word.

In the variation 9 \$\overline\$d3 time after time there arises a very interesting 'frontier' situation. The evaluation continually fluctuates, and theory cannot give a guarantee that the next novely that comes along will not turn upside down the current verdict on the position.

Not every practitioner is happy with this. To play such a variation is like sitting on a barrel of gunpowder! For those who feel best in a quiet, peaceful backwater, there is the variation 9 &e2. b) 9 单 e2



White does not intend to sacrifice more pawns (9...2xc3?! 10 bc  $Q_{3x}d4?$  11  $Q_{3x}d4$   $W_{3x}d4$  12  $W_{34}4$  and 13  $W_{3x}b4$ ), so making the move 9...2a5?! pointless – the jump of the knight to b4 is no longer a fork.

White does not quite reject attacking play – after  $C_2$ -e4 and  $\&c_2$ -d3 the battery is once again in place (though, of course, there is also the march route to 13 for the bishop). In short, everything is the same as 9 & d3, only... quieter.

**9...0-0** Before castling he did not attempt to make any critical moves, but recently there has been a tendency to do precisely this:

9... $\pounds_{cc}71?$  10 -0-0  $\pm dr$  11  $\pm \pounds_{c}5$  (or 11 a)  $\pm dd$  12  $\oplus 4 \pm dc$  13  $\oplus c$  14  $\oplus 4a$  61 5  $\oplus xc6$  16  $\pm b2$   $\Xi c8$ 17 g3 0-0 18  $\oplus 3a \pm c7$  with roughly equal chances, Kobalija – Ovechkin, Moscow 1999) 11... $\oplus 01$   $\Xi m b3 \pm c6$ 13  $\pm g5 \ \#a5$  14  $\pm c13 \pm xc3$  15 bc  $\pm a4$  (15... $\oplus 15?$ )? 16  $\oplus 3a$  16 17 c4  $\oplus 41$  8  $\pm dc$  18  $\oplus xa$  19  $\oplus xa$  36 2c 0  $\Xi xT3!?$  21 gf  $\oplus xd5$  22 de with a very complicated endgame (Ulibin – Ovechkin, Toliati 2003). 10 0-0 We have reached the tabiya of the variation 9 ≜e2.



After 10...\$16?! White can obtain a favourable version of the Queen's Gambit. This is achieved in the following way: 11 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ after 12 after \$\frac{1}{3}\$ \$\frac{1}{2}\$ c4 \$\frac{2}{6}\$ 814 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ c2 15 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ \$\frac{1

That leaves just two moves: 10...2e7 and 10...Ze8

bi) 10...\$e7 Black transfers the bishop to f6 where it will occupy a more favourable position, and to be exact: it will create a threat to the exact: it will create a threat to the d4 pawn and take part in the consolidation of the king's position along the well-known scheme: g7-g6, &Coc-e7, &fo-g7.

11 單d1 急f6! Every other move, slowing down (or more so, excluding) the above mentioned regrouping of forces, is noticeably weaker:

11... $\partial_{2}$ Cbd 12 **(b**b) 3b6 (in case of 12... $\partial_{2}$ Cb (b) White, as shown by the game Sveshnikov – Olafsson, Stockholm 1998, will force the opponent away from the d5 square: 13  $\partial_{2}$ Cb (b) 14  $\partial_{2}$ Cd (c) 42  $\partial_{3}$ Cb (c 11... $\&d\Omega$ ?? (counting on a trap) 12  $\bigotimes d\Omega$  d 3  $\bigotimes b3 \&\&8$  14  $\bigotimes c5$ ; (not possible is 14  $\bigotimes b3$ ? because of 14... $\boxtimes b8$  15  $\bigotimes c6 \bigotimes b4$  – this is the whole trap) 14... $(615 \bigotimes c26)$   $\bigotimes b16$ 16  $\bigotimes xb6$  ab 17  $\bigotimes c3$  with a steadily improving position (Ulibin – Asrian, Krasnodar 1998);

11...署d6?! 12 全g5! g6 13 署e4! (threatening to transfer the queen to h4) 13...f6 (forcing measures) 14 全f3 点付 15 点c4 全cb4 16 星に 五作名 17 点d2 点信 18 点b3 (Sveshnikov – Spraggett, Palma de Mallorca 1989);

11...#b6 (Black will deploy his pieces – queen on b6, rook on d8, bishop on f6 – so they occupy themselves in real earnest with the d4 pawn, but who will be defending his king?) 12 #e4!



The model game Ulibin Tukmakov (Pula 1999): 12...骂d8 13 @d3 g6 14 @c4! (going over to a siege of the d5 square) 14 ... 2) f6 15 響e2 创d5 (acknowledging that the plan to pressurise the d4 pawn was a failure - 15... xd4? 16 Ixd4! Ixd4 17 @e3 @c5 18 のa4 響b4 19 のxd4 響xa4 20 盒b5, and White somehow or other is left with an extra piece: 20... 響a5 21 2b3; 20... 響b4 21 2c2) 16 \$h6 \$f6? (a blunder, but also after 16 Øxc3 17 hc @c7 18 @b3 White has an obvious advantage) 17 @xd5. And not waiting for 17 ... ed 18 @xd5!, Black resigned.

Black does not have the right to delay the plan \$\$e7-f6, g7-g6, \$\$C6e7; there is no alternative to 11...\$\$f6.

12 We4 Ce7 13 h41? Slightly more flexible than 13 d3 g6 14  $\Huge{}$  h6  $\Huge{}$  de8 15 h4. With such an order of moves White might have perhaps still been able to carry out h4-h5, but at this moment the brilliance of the attack losses its lustre, for example: 15... $\Huge{}$  d7 16  $\Huge{}$  dg5  $\Huge{}$  dc6 17  $\Huge{}$  Wg4  $\Huge{}$  Cl5 18  $\Huge{}$  d2 h6 19  $\Huge{}$  Dxf6+  $\Huge{}$   $\Huge{}$  Dxf6+  $\Huge{}$  O2  $\Huge{}$   $\Huge{}$  dxf6  $\Huge{}$   $\Huge{}$  Wife (Adams – Magerm, Debrecen 1992).

13... 2d7 14 2d3 The moment of truth has arrived.



How to save himself from mate – 14....26 or 14....215 ? Surprisingly, modern theory permits both possibilities!

14...g6 looks dangerous as it allows the opponent more freedom of action. For example: 15 h5 \$c6 (Black demonstrated a new plan of defence in the game Sveshnikov - Malakhov, Moscow 2003: 15... Ec8!? 16 hg hg 17 皇h6 公xc3 18 bc 皇c6 19 響f4 ②d5 20 響g4 盒g7 21 盒xg7 當xg7 22 De5 Wf6, and after 23 c4 Df4 24 會 f12 單h8 25 例xc6 罩h4! he took over the initiative) 16 Wg4 2f5 17 hg hg 18 De4 2g7, but what then? White has completed his 'obligatory programme' of work, but the way to complete such a well-begun attack is somehow not apparent. Matters might be concluded by a repetition of moves - 19 包fg5 Ie8 20 響h3 包h6 21 句f3 句f5 22 句fg5 包h6 (lonov -Danialov, Wijk aan Zee 1998), whereas the attempt to continue the struggle - 19 響h3 邕e8 20 包eg5 包f6 21 ④e5 邕e7 - in the game Sveshnikov - Ryzntsev (Moscow 2002) turned out badly: in the end Black won.

So that for the time being 14...g6 has not been refuted. However 14...20f5! is tough and even stronger! The tactical basis of the move lies in the fact that on 15 g4?



...follows 15.... 全6! 16 包xd5 象xd5 17 豐f4 包xd4! 18 包xd4 息xd4 19 豐xd4 豐xh4 20 f3 魚xf3 21 單d2 f5! with threats difficult to repulse.

Also incorrect is 15  $c_{DCS'}$ ! Black simply exchanges half of his opponent's active pieces – but the other half of them are no worse: 15... $c_{DCS'}$ 10 bc  $\Delta x$ 55! 17 dc  $\Delta c$ 6 18 wg4 wa5 19  $\Delta x$ 15 ef 20 wg3  $\Xi$ fc8 (Renet – Speelman, France 2001).

Finally, the attempt to provide himself with material  $-15 \ \Delta xd5$  ed 16  $\$ %d5 likewise finds a tactical refutation: 16...&a41 17  $\$ %xd8 (inferior is 17 \%xf5 gel 8 %h3 &xd1 19 &h6 &xf3 20 &xf8 &xg2!) 17...%fXd8 18 b5  $\$ %xd4!, and a draw is not far off.

b2) 10... $\Xi$ e8 Obviously Black intends to dispatch the bishop to the long diagonal, not via f6, but via g7. But this is not the only feature of his plan. First, by remaining on b4, the bishop prevents White from setting up a battery ' $\Psi$ e4+ $\pm$ d3' – while the c3 pawn is hanging and the queen immobile. And there is an almost imperceptible nuance: if White wants to oust the knight from the d5 square, he must somehow or other uncover the e-file. And then the bishop on e2 looks bad!

After **11 II d1** the most logical move seems to be 11...**û**f8, but first we look at how the struggle turns out on 11...**û**d7.

b21) 11 ... 2 d7!?



If White wants at all costs to set up a battery, he has to spend time on 12 a3. But with the extra tempo Black will not even fear the devil: 12...4813 Wet 4g of 4a 4g S Wa 51 2 Bach ho 16 2a Wd8 17 2a 55 2x 51 8 de 2c 61 9 Wg4 2g 7 (Howell – Wells, Edinburgh 2003).

13....2c8!? Not hurrying with 13....2f8, Black retains the tension in the position.

14 兔g5 兔e7 15 兔xe7 ②cxe7?? 16 ②d6 Even if White sees the opponent's counterplay coming, he must play like this otherwise 16....\$c6 follows with consolidation.



16...2a4! 17 ₩xa4 ₩xd6 18 ₩xa7 ₩b4 19 Δt3 (or 19 Φxd5 Φxd5 20 b3 Φc2 21 Ξe1 Ξed8, winning back the pawn) 19...₩xb2 20 Φxd5 Φxd5 21 Ξab1 ₩c2 22 ±xd5 ed 23 ₩sb7 ₩f5 In view of the activity of the black pieces, it is extremely complicated for White to realise his material advantage.

b22) 11...\$18 12 ₩e4 There is no serious alternative to this move, though, (dissatisfied with the following course of events) White has repeatedly tried to deviate:

12 2d3 of 13 2e4 ()xc3 (he can also maintain the tension in the centre - 13...\$g7!? 14 \$g5 f6 15 \$h4 Dce7 with a double-edged game, for example: 16 篇e1 单d7 17 ④xd5 ②xd5 18 對b3 盒c6 19 包e5 對b6 20 @xc6 bc 21 Hac1 g5! 22 @g3 f5) 14 bc 2d7 15 2f4 (stronger is 15 Zb1!?, when some problems remain for Black: 15...響c7 16 皇g5 Iac8 17 ₩d2 Da5 18 De5 2a4 19 萬dc1 皇g7 20 皇f4) 15...罩c8 16 Wd2 b6 17 d5 ed 18 2xd5 2e6 19 c4 息g7 20 罩ac1 暫e7 with approximate equality (Wolf - Lutz, Groningen 1993);



...and here, 18 \$g3?? leads to interesting complications: 18...\$\$e4 19 \$\$xb7 \$\$xe2 20 \$\$ze1 \$\$a3 20...\$e5 21 \$\$as5 \$\$xa4 22 \$\$x17+ 21 \$\$xd7 \$\$a6 22 \$\$c7 \$\$xa4 23 \$\$c5 \$\$as5 24 \$\$xa4 \$\$ad5 25 \$\$cf1 \$\$xe1 \$\$26 \$\$\$c7 27 \$\$zc7 \$\$2xc7 \$\$2\$\$xa7 \$\$ac5 \$\$\$c5 \$\$\$as5 \$\$as5 \$\$as5

12 265 (the most active of the subvariations, but even now Black gradually extinguishes his opponent's initiative) 12...2xc3 13 Wxc3 2d7 14 Wb3 (or 14 2d3 13 Wc3 2d7 2xc5 16 de b6 17 2dc3 12c7 18 Wd3 Wb8 19 2dc4 h6 20 f4 Ince, Sveshnikov – Tukmakov, Budapest 1996) 14...2xc5 15 de wc7 16 2dc3 2c6 17 Wc3 a5 18 2dc4 Inces 19 Wc3 2d5 20 a3 2c5 (Sveshnikov – Zontakh, Vringkck Banja 1999).

After 12 **@e4** the above-mentioned nuance comes into effect: the vis-avis of the rook e8 and bishop e2 provides an opportunity for the unhindered development of the bishop c8.



13 &g5 &e7!? On 13...@a5 lay in store 14 &d3 g6 15 @h4 &g7 16  $\bigcirc$ c4 @b6 17 &c4!, and the f6 square is on the verge of a bad crash (Ulibin – Henkin, Koszalin 1999).

14 盒d2 f5 15 暫c2 盒f6 16 ②xd5 ed 17 盒c3 暫b6 18 盒d3 g6 The game is even (Kindermann – Bareev, Germany 2000).

The variation 8 @c2 will satisfy the taste of chessplayers of every style and temperament. If you want complications – after 8...@c6 play 9 @c31, and you will have more

than enough excitement. If you want a strictly positional struggle – place the bishop on e2 and prove the advantage of the 'isolani'. Moreover the attack (with help of the battery  $rac{1}{8}e4+2e3$ ) has by no means been removed from the agenda.

Indeed it is difficult here – the queen on c2 (as is clearly seen from the variations given above) is far from always being capable of quickly setting up a battery. On the other hand, most frequently he has to reorganise the combination  $rac{10}{2} c_{-2}^{-2} c_{-4}^{-4}$  (3) by playing  $rac{10}{2} c_{-2}^{-2} c_{-4}^{-4}$ But, you see, the queen could read the same path from the dl square!

From there comes the idea – not to spend time on 8 @c2, but defend the knight c3 with the bishop from d2, and bring the queen (after &f1-d3, of course) to c4 by the short march route: d1-e2-e4. Thus was born the variation 8 &d2.

R

8 & d2



In reply to \$...\$kc 6 9 & d3 & c7 it is better to secure himself early against bostility - 10 a3!? Now, matters are clearer, no good is 10...\$bc 6 11 0 0\$bc 21 2 & a4, as the d4 pawn is inedible: 10... & fc 11 0 - 0 & acd a



13 公太d5 獣太d5 (13...cd 14 罩e1+ 公e6 15 獣h5) 14 獣g4 0-0 15 急h6 獣e5 16 f4! (Vaisser - Sveshnikov, Moscow 1989) or

13 響a4+ 全c6 14 全xd5 響xd5 (14...ed 15 罩fe1+ 金c6 16 金b4?) 15 金c4 彎d7 16 富ad1 全e7 (16...f5? 17 金g5!, King - Korchnoi, Switzerland 1999) 17 竇c4 仑d5 18 金xd5 똏xd5 19 竇g4!

9 <u>&</u>d3 <u>©</u>c6 10 0-0 After casting, analogous thoughts can arise for White. Indeed, while the black knight can cover the h<sup>2</sup> square in one move, the combination 10 <u>&</u>h7+ <u>&</u>xh7 11 <u>©</u>g5+ <u>&</u>g8 12 <u>@</u>h5 (or 12 <u>©</u>xh3 <u>@</u>xh3 13 <u>@</u>h5 <u>@</u>f5) does not work – 12...<u>0</u>Afb. But it is possible to step up the pressure! In the game Lanka – Prysikhin (Germany 2000) followed 10 a3 @c7 11 h4!?



White commences active play on the king's flank. The threat is  $\bigotimes gs$ , and in certain variations – the manoeuvre  $\Xi h1+h3$ -g3. Moreover the savet tempo on castling is somehow very relevant. However when faced with operations on the flank, according to all the rules of warfare you must look for counterplay in the centre: 11...e5!? 12 de  $\bigotimes db4$  13 &e4 $\bigotimes db3$  + 14  $\bigotimes da3$  @wd3 15 @e2. By continuing 15...@wze2+!? 16  $\bigotimes ze2$ f6l, Black obtains sufficient compensation for the pawn.

In the game J.Polgar – Karpov (Dos Hermanas 1999) in reply to 10...2)f6 there followed 11 & g5 h6!? 12 & e3 &d6 13 \overline close for the second second 'isolani' at d4, it is not often that you come across such an advance, but in the present case it all turns out nicely

From the other continuations, after  $10...\Omega_{16}$  we see 11 a  $3 \le 7$  12  $\le 32$ ? In such positions this kind of development of the dark-squared bishop was recommended as long ago as Nimzowitsch. Here are two examples from contemporary practice -12...b6 13  $\frac{39}{2} \le 57$ , and then:

14 置ad1 置c8 15 如e5 如d5 16 单e4 (Vysochin – Sergeev, Cappelle la Grande 2003);

14 월ac1 墓c8 15 볼fd1 빻d6 16 진g5 (Vysochin – Abdelnabi, Cairo 2003) 16... 진a5 17 d5!?

As we see, the Ukrainian grandmaster Spartak Vysochin was twice able to obtain a highly promising position. But returning to 10...&c7, White has a huge number of possibilities.



The general line of course is **wd1**e2-e4, it is necessary only to decide whether to play 11 **w**c2 at once or first make the move 11 a3 which is useful in every respect. Besides this, on principle one can reject the idea of placing the queen on e4 and play something else. 1) 11 ②xd5 ed 12 變b3 急f6 13 急c3 a5 14 a3 急g4 15 急e2 温e8 16 温fe1 (Lputian - Bologan, Poikovsky 2003) 16...變d6;

2) 11 置e1 &f6 12 ②xd5 ed 13 ②e5 g6 14 &c3 (Mirumian – Asrian, Erevan 1996) 14...對b6!? 15 對否 &g7 16 螢xd5 &c6 17 對b5 置fd8

3) 11 &c3 (how can he lay claim to an advantage by simply giving up his dark-squared bishop in this way?) 11...Qxc3 12 fe b6 13 &c4 &b7 14 Qc5 Qxc5 15 &xb7 ≣b8 16 &a6 Qg6 17 Qb5 &g5 (Agdestein – Henkin, Germany 2000);

4) 11 2e4 2) 16 12 2xc6 bc 13 2) a4 2 a6 14 IIe1 2c4! 15 16 2 2d5 (Vaganian - Schussler, Germany 1994).

It is obvious that Black is not posed serious problems by 11 @xd5, 11 \$\overline{2}e3, 11 \$\overline{2}e4 or 11 \$\overline{2}e1.

5) 11 置c1 The idea of the move is shown by the variation 11...①db4 12 \_\_\_\_\_\_\_②xd4 13 ④xd4 螢xd4 14 ②b5 斷f6



15 IC3! e5 16 €\c7 Ib8 17 IG3 @c6 (Onischuk – Polak, Vienna 1996) 18 @c3! with a very strong attack. However if Black is not tempted by the d4 pawn, the benefits, so to speak, from playing 11 IC1 are not obvious.

6) II We2 2ndb4?! It goes without saying that stronger is 11...g6. After 12 &ht Be8 13 a3 by transposition of moves we arrive at the game examined above, Kobalija – Turov, but! with an extra tempo for Black (Kobalija's bishop went to h6 in one move, and not two as here).

7) 11 a3 Preventing 2 db4, but at the cost of a tempo. Black's task is to generate counterplay in the region of the a3 pawn.

11...\$f6



Surprising: after the programmed 12 ∰e2 Black step by step achieves equality. This is what the extra (on account of 11 a3) tempo means!

First, it is possible to gobble up the pawn. Only he should not do this with the bishop – after 12...\$x4d?! 13 ¢\xd5 ¥\xd5 (13...ed 14 \$\xh7+1) 14 \$\overline{c}ced and further exchanges on c6 and d4, the 'opposite coloured bishops' give White a strong attack (PCramling – Korchnoi, Biel 1984) – but with the knight!



This is why: 12...Qxd4!? 13 Qxd4 &xd4 14 &xh7+ & h7 15 @e4+ &g8 16 @xd4 Qb6!? 17 &e3 @xd4 18 &xd4 Qc4 with an equal endgame (Adams – Speelman, Hastings 1991).

Secondly, the idea of changing the pawn structure is also not a bad recommendation: 1.2... (2x.32)? In the game Wahls – Karpov (Baden Baden 1992) Black had no problems at all: 13 be g61 4 & dc4  $\pm$  d7 15 flabl b6 16  $\pm$  2bc5 (16 c4  $\pm$  flabl b7 16... $\pm$  flabl b6 17 f4?!  $\pm$  gr. Perhaps the 'hanging' pawn pair c3-t44 looks even worse than the isolani on d4, and together with the weakness on a3 – particularly so.

Here we also have the only tempogaining move in reply to 11...&16 – this is **12 @c2** But then the queen does not get to c4, so why then was 8 & d2 played? 12...g6 Incidentally, it is unclear how White can prove his advantage upon 12...h6. After 13 I ad 1 there are two ideas to choose from:

13... $(2x_3)$ ? 14  $(2x_3)$ ? 15  $(2x_3)$ ? 14  $(2x_3)$ ? 15  $(2x_3)$ ? 16  $(2x_3)$ ? 17  $(2x_3)$ ? 18  $(2x_3)$ ? 17  $(2x_3)$ ? 18  $(2x_3)$ ? 18



13  $\underline{\&}h6$   $\underline{\&}g7$  14  $\underline{\&}xg7$   $\underline{\&}xg7$   $\underline{\&}xg7$ White's position is more pleasant, but no more than that. He can commence an attack - 15  $\underline{a}$ ad  $\underline{\&}cc7$  16  $\underline{h}$ , or proceed more carefully - 15  $\underline{\&}c4$  $\underline{\&}cc7$  16  $\underline{a}$ acd  $\underline{\&}cc3$  the  $\underline{\&}cd3$   $\underline{\&}xd5$ 18  $\underline{\&}cc5$ ; in each case Black has sufficient resources to lead the game to a draw.

8) 11 <sup>w</sup> e2 This move is not only in itself natural but is also objectively the strongest in the present position. Which is not possible to say about 1...42n6. This reply is seen most frequently (Black prevents the deployment of the queen to e4), but not exclusively – and Black could play more inventively. However, everything is still in order.



a) Winning a pawn by 11...Qdb4 12 & 4c4 @xd4 13 @xd4 Wxd4 is suspect, though similar to another version that is favourable for Black. Developing the bishop c8 is complicated and White's advantage in force gives him the initiative: 14 & c3 We5 15 WI3 etc. (Yudasin – Udashev, Erevan 1996).

He could try to win the exchange – 12... $\pm$ 16 13  $\equiv$ ad1 b6, but White is alert: 14  $\pm$ b1!  $\pm$ a6 15  $\equiv$ 64 g6 16  $\equiv$ 161  $\pm$ 0-7 17  $\pm$ h6 with advantage (J.Polgar – Magem, Las Vegas 1999).

b) It is better to give up the d4 pawn in another way: 11... #b6!? (the patent of certain Dutch players). Possible then is:

12 Ladl (12 a3?! Ld8 13 Ladl Wxb2! by transposition of moves leads to the game Cherniaev – Nielsen, looked at above) 12...Ld8 13 Lg5 Lxg5 14 Lxg5 h6 (Zude – van Welk, Germany 1998) or

12 響e4 g6 13 克a4 響d8 14 篇ac1 2)f6 15 響e3 公b4 (van den Doel – de Vries, Rotterdam 2000). c) And, finally, the main line. There is a hypotoist at work indicating that the strongest move in the position is  $11...\Delta cht^2$  [f now White makes all the 'obligatory' active moves – 12 eds ge (3 a cht d c c s), then after  $14...\Delta d c^{71}$  it becomes clear that it is time for him to beat a retreat: 15 ab5 a (16 c Axc6 b c 17 acc6c c c a s w and begins to play for a win(Vaida – Nisipenan, Budapest 1996).

He needs to be more attentive - **12 Ead1**, and then **12...#b6!**, when again concrete threats appear. After 13 **bb1 2xd4** 14 **2xd4 Wxd4** 15 **bc5 Wc51 Black** has nothing to fear (Vajda - Berescu, Romania 2000).

White should make a tempo move, in order to divert the opponent away from the d4 pawn: 13 We4 g6 14 &h6 (Sermek - Lopez Martinez, Leon 2001), but then follows 14...**Ed8**!



The position has still not been met in practice, but this phenomenon is probably temporary. By not removing the knight from the centre, Black, with three moves (11...&fh, 12...&fhand 14...&fk), is able to properly pressurise the d4 pawn and thereby

guarantee himself worthwhile counterplay. Possible then is:

15  $\Xi fe_{11}$ ? (intending a double capture on d5 and them mate on e8) 15... $\pm 0.7$  16  $\pm g5 \pm xg5$  (losing is 16... $\pm xg5$  19  $\pm xg5$  (losing is 16... $\pm xg5$  19  $\pm xg5$  h5 because of 20  $\pm xg7$   $\pm xg7$  h5 because of 20  $\pm xg7$   $\pm xg7$  h2  $\pm xg6$  hg 19  $\pm xg4$   $\pm xg6$  hg 21  $\pm xg4$   $\pm e8$  22  $\pm ed1 \pm e2$  23  $\pm xg5$ Black develops activity that is sufficient for a draw after 23  $\pm xg6$ dec 24  $\pm 0.73 \pm 25 \pm 256$  d4! 26  $\pm 2xd4$ dec 24  $\pm 0.73 \pm 25 \pm 256$  d4! 29  $\pm xb7$ Ec.4.

d) 11...2)f6 At first sight, all very logical: one knight strikes the e4 square and thereby prevents the battery We4+2d3, while the second knight (travelling via b4) takes up a position on d5.

. And yet 11... 16 does not equalise - 12 @e4!



An unpleasant move. Firstly, White wants to exchange the knight f6 before his stepbrother transfers to d5 - then nothing will stop the queen occupying the principal square e4. The other idea for White is purely positional: to grab space on the queen's flank by means of a3, b4 and a future  $\delta_{\rm LC}5$ .

The tactical basis of 12 20e4! lies in the variation 12...20xd4? 13 20xd4 Wxd4 14 2c3, when White develops a very strong attack for the pawn:

14...豐d8 15 公xf6+ &xf6 16 罩fd1 豐e7 17 豐e4 g6 18 皇b4;

14...#d5 (the most tenacious) 15  $\Delta x$ f6+  $\Delta x$ f6 16  $\Delta x$ f6 gf 17  $\equiv$ acl?? #c5 (17...f5 18  $\Delta b$ 1) 18 #d2 #g5 (trying to prevent the invasion of the queen on h6) 19 f4 #d5 20  $\equiv$ 15  $\equiv$ 18  $\approx$ 1 f5!

Since the manoeuvre  $\triangle cb-cb-d5$ (12... $\triangle bd+7$  13  $\triangle x(b+)$  is not possible and since he cannot play 12...b6? because of the double attack 13  $\triangle x(b+ \triangle xf6$  14  $\blacksquare c4$ , the question arises: how can Black complete his development? Worth considering is the simple 12... $\triangle xc4$  13  $\blacksquare xc4$  51?? 14  $\blacksquare c5 \triangle c5$  followed by  $\triangle cc-c7-d5$ . This order of moves appeared quite recently and up to now White has achieved nothing in this variation:

15 息c3 ②e7! 16 息c4 ②d5 17 息xd5 響xd5 18 置fe1 置e8 19 ②c5 b6 20 ②d3 息b7 (Yakimov – Al. Kharitonov, Haldikiki 2001) or

15 簋ad1!? ②c7! (not to be distracted by the capture of the d4 pawn) 16 ゑc4 ②d5 17 響b3 響b6 (Smeets – Rogers, Wijk aan Zee 2002). The prospects for  $12... \pounds xe4!?$  will become apparent in the near future but, for the present, practitioners (and home analysts) are concentrating on two directions:  $12... \pounds d7$  and  $12... \clubsuit b6$ .

d1) 12...2d7 13 Zad1 Black put off his problems for a move, but now it is necessary to make some kind of decision.



Playing with a view to a repetition of moves -13... are 814  $\pm$  fel  $\oplus$  d5 15  $\oplus$  d2  $\oplus$  d6 is mistaken in principle, because White has resources to improve his position: 16 a  $\pm$  7 17  $\pm$  g5. In the 2<sup>nd</sup> game of the match for the FIDE world championship kamsky - Karpov (Elista 1996) play continued 17...  $\pm$  37 18 d5! ed 19  $\pm$  xf6  $\pm$  xf6 20  $\pm$  xh7 21  $\pm$  xd5 and though Black gave up his queen he was unable to save the game.

On the other hand, Black equalised with apparent case in the game Barua - Sasikiran (Calcutta 1998): 13...Ec8 14  $\Xi$ fc1  $\Im$ c7 15 &g5  $\Im$ d5 16  $\pounds$ c3 g6 17  $\Im$ c4  $\Im$ cb4 18 &xc7  $\Xi$ xc7 19  $\Im$ h  $\Im$ c4. It is strange that White did not even try to exploit the position of the queen on c7: 15  $\Xi$ c1? (instead of the insipid 15 &g5), and if 15...②d5 16 ②e5 f6, òì 17 ②g5! fe 18 象xh7+ 當f8 19 de with a decisive attack.

The ideal place for the queen in the present scheme is the b6 square. However in the game de Vries – Gyimesi (Ohrid 2001) after 13...₩b6 14 âg5 @d5 15 @le5 the queen was forced to return home – 15...₩d8 But what to do? The threats on the king's flank are increasing and 15...@xd4? is dubious because of 16 ₩h5 g6 17 ₩h3.

A few moves later White's advantage became visibly quite distinct: 16 **Wh5 g6 17 Wh6 (nothing** is offered by 17 **Wh6?!** 2xd418 2xc7 **Wxc7 if** 2xd7 in view of 19...2xf5 **17...f6 18** 2xc6 2xc619 2xh6 **Tr 20** 2c5

d2) 12... #b6!? Epishin's idea, worked out after an unfortunate development of events for us in the second game of the Kamsky – Karpov match.



At the time it seemed to us that this move was the most accurate – by threatening to capture on b2, the queen does not allow White to improve the arrangement of his forces. But much water has flowed under the bridge since them... The

plan which we did not fear at the time (a2-a3 and b2-b4), as will become clear, actually places in doubt 12...暫b6. And on the other hand – the deployment which we feared most of all, now does not look so dangerous at all.

d21) 13 **Efd1** It was precisely this move that we feared most of all during the match with Kamsky. The threat to the b2 pawn, as becomes clear, is illusory. After 13...**@**xb2? 14 **Edb1 Wa**35 **Edb3 Wa**46 **C**2**K**64 both captures on f6 are equally bad; 16...**2**x16 loses the queen after 17 **Bed 4**69 **4**255, while **16**...**g**falso clearly leads to mate: 17 **2**x47+1 **4**xh7 18 **2**\000554; **1**g 19 **Wh**5+ **4**g7 20 **Eh3**.

Black can link the move  $13... \pounds d7$ to ideas that are well known to us from the games Yakimov – A1. Kharitonov and Smeets – Rogers: 14 a3 Ead8 15 b4  $\pounds$ xe4 16 wxe415! 17 we3  $\pounds$ f6 18  $\pounds$ c3  $\pounds$ o7!

Stronger is 14 De5!? and problems remain:



14... 兔e8 15 纪c4 豐c7 16 纪xf6+ 兔xf6 17 豐e4 g6 18 兔b6 纪xd4 (or 18... 兔g7 19 兔f4 豐d7 20 兔d6 f5 21 豐e1 置f7 22 兔e5) 19 兔xf8 金xf8 20 氙ac1 兔c6 21 豐e3 适d8 22 兔e4. It

will be difficult to realise the extra exchange but White still remains on top.

However after 13...**Id8**! the d4 pawn can be taken without any sacrifice!

14  $\pounds$  Xf61  $\pounds$  Xf61  $\xi$  We4 g6 16  $\forall$  Wf4 On 16  $\pounds$ C3 it is not necessary to hurry with 16. $\pounds$ Xa4?! 17  $\pounds$ C5  $\forall$  d6 18 14, when White exerts unpleasant pressure. Correct is 16. $\pounds$ Zd71 Only by reinforcing the f7 square by 17.. $\pounds$ C8, can Black occupy himself with the d4 pawn.



The position has suddenly become sharp and general considerations are no use. To be sure, even here he would like to wait a while with the capture on d4, but after the 'conciliatory' 16...\$27?! White is ready with 17 202! The 77 pawn is hanging and 17...6 loses in the long but uncomplicated variation 18 2xh7; 4xh7 19 \$mh4  $\pm xg8$ 20 \$2xg6  $\pm$ 18 21 \$mh7 \$mx04 22 \$2sh5 (defending the rook on d1 and creating the threat 23 \$2h6) 22...\$%d2 23 \$Xxd2 \$2xd2 24 \$%g6 \$xg8 25 \$%e8+ \$\$mh7 26 \$2g6+ \$\$mh6 27 \$2s.4.

There remains 17...15 18 &c3 2x44 (upon 18...h6 19 c13 g5 20 We3 g4 21 c25 Black suffers for nothing) 19 &c4 h6 20 c13 and White's compensation far outweighs the sacrificed material.

And here upon the immediate 16...&xd4! the compensation, so to speak, is not obvious: 17 &c3(17 @xd4 @xd4!) 17...c5 18 @h4 h5 19 &c4 @g7 20 @g5 &g4! There is no attack, but there is an extra pawn.

It is interesting that there are no practical trials of the move 13...**.....d**8!. Nevertheless one fine day White, as if by command, will stop for a moment and play 13 **........**.

d22) 13 a3! By rejecting a direct attack on the king, White makes a sort of compromise. In fact the move has a healthy positional basis. Firstly, it radically prevents the manoeuvre  $\Delta c c b 4 d 5$ . Secondly, it organises pressure on the queen's flank by means of b2-b4 and  $\Delta c 4 c 5$  (at the same time the knight on c5 shields the d4 pawn against the queen). It is not apparent where Black's counterplay is coming from. **13....堂d7** As before, 13...豐xb2? is not possible because of 14 算fb1 ②xd4 15 ③xf6+ 龛xf6 16 釁e4!



14  $\pm$ fd1 Possibly the most accurate order of moves is the following: 14 b41  $\pm$ ad8 15  $\pm$ 05:1? In the game Palac – Hermansson (Panormo 2001) White continued to play convincingly: 15... $\pm$ 8 16  $\pm$ 16 1 a6 17  $\pm$ 18 a4  $\pm$ 66 19  $\pm$ 0-5! And White's advantage is obvious; the won this game.

 $\begin{array}{c} \textbf{14...\textbf{Iad8}} & \text{Black rightly rejects} \\ \textbf{14...\textbf{Q}Ad4?, calculating the variation} \\ \textbf{15} & \textbf{Q}_X d4 & \textbf{w}_X d4 17 b31 \\ \textbf{Wc6} & (not possible is 17...\textbf{W}X33 \\ \textbf{because of 18} & \textbf{Q}_X f6 + \textbf{a}_X f6 19 & \textbf{Wc4} 1 \\ \textbf{18} & \textbf{Q}_X f6 + \textbf{a}_X f6 19 & \textbf{A}x f6 gf \\ \textbf{20} & \textbf{a}_X h^{2+1} & with a mating attack. \end{array}$ 

15 ②xf6+ & xf6 16 豐e4 g6 17 & e3 ②e7 18 ②e5 ③f5 19 ③c4 豐a6 20 a4 & c6



We are following the 4<sup>th</sup> game of the match for the world championship Kamsky – Karpov (Elista 1996). It can be seen that Black has not only equalised the game but his chances are perhaps already preferable. However the improvement 14 b4! Ead8 15  $\triangle$ c5 forces one to treat the whole variation  $11... \hat{a}_16$  with a fair deal of scenticism.

The system 6... &b4 in the Panov Attack 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 D16 5 Dc3 e6 D13 has managed to accumulate so many ideas and nuances that it is not easy to deduce any kind of general conformity to established chess wisdom.

Take, for example, just the last variation – 7 cd 2xd5 8  $\pm d2$  0-0 9  $\pm d3$  2xc6 10 0  $\pm d2$  7.11  $\underline{w}c2$ . In some variations Black should capture the d4 pawn at once, when the opportunity presents itself. In others – it is necessary to be patient and defer any win of a pawn, sometimes he even rejects the idea of taking on d4 on principle. But only calculation of concrete variations can help the practical player make the right choice; any deviation from pure reasoning may lead him far away from the truth.

A startling lack of chess laws can also be observed in the present system. Once again we return to the last variation. Statistics bear witness to the fact that 11...{20ff, a she fore, is to the fact that 11...{20ff, a she fore, is the most popular reply to 11 We2... Meanwhile from our previous variations it follows that this move is out of date. Stronger is 11 ... \$. f6 !?, but who would give a guarantee that when this idea gets into the head of some analyst or other, he will not find here there and everywhere. a stronger move?

The search for truth in the system 6... ab4 is continuing day by day. This means that the variation is alive.

# **Index to Chapter Five**

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 4	∂ <b>16</b>	G. 8 🚊 d3	112
5 2 c3 e6 6 2 f3 2 b4	103	80-0 9 0-0	
A. 7 Wb3	103	1) 9âg4	113
A. 7 曾03 B. 7 曾a4+	103	2) 9Dc6	113
D. 7 ⊈g5	103	II. 7	114
1) 70-0	104	A. 8 Wc2	114
	104	1) 80-0	115
2) 7≝a5	104	1) 8豐c7	115
3) 7h6	105	3) 8Dd7	115
D. 7 🗟 d3	105	4) 8Dc6	116
7dc 8 ≜xc4 ₩c7	105	a) 9 â.d3	116
1) 9 ₩d3	105	a) 9 Lus a1) 9 â.e7	117
<b>2)</b> 9 ₩e2	107	10 a3	117
	Dec	a11) 10 16	117
1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4	108	a12) 10â.f6	117
5 ②c3 e6 6 ②f3 盒b4 7 cd		a12) 10a.10 a2) 9h6	118
I. 7ed	108	a2) 910 a3) 92xc3	118
A. 8 🔍 g5	108	a3) 9∉a5	119
B. 8 2e5	109	a4) 9#a5 10 a3 Øxc3 11 bc Øxd4	119
C. 8 Wb3	109	10 a3 公xc3 11 bc 公xd4 12 ②xd4 豐xd4 13 皇b5+	
D. 8 ₩a4+	110		120
8@c6 9 2b5 0-0		a41) 13⊈f8	
1) 10 🗟 xc6	110	a42) 13@e7	120
2) 10 0-0	110	a43) 13â.d7	121
E. 8 💁 e2	110	<b>b)</b> 9 盒e2	123
F. 8 单b5+	111	90-0 10 0-0	
8âd7 9 ₩e2+ @e4 10 0-0 âxc3		<b>b1)</b> 10皇e7	124
11 bc 0-0 12 2d3		<b>b2)</b> 10	126
1) 12@xc3	111	11 單d1	
2) 12â.f5	112	<b>b21)</b> 11≜d7	126
3) 12	112	b22) 11≗f8	127
.,			

<b>B.</b> 8 ≜.d2	128	8) 11 響e2	132
80-0 9 🛓d3 🖄c6 10 0-0 🌲e7		a) 11	132
1) 11 🖄 xd5	130	<b>b)</b> 11≝b6	132
2) 11 Iel	130	c) 11⊉.f6	133
3) 11 🚖 e3	130	<b>d)</b> 11∕∆f6	133
<b>4)</b> 11 单 e4	130	12 De4	
5) 11 邕c1	130	<b>d1)</b> 12â.d7	134
6) 11 響c2	131	<b>d2)</b> 12響b6	135
7) 11 a3	131	d21) 13 邕fd1	135
		d22) 13 a3	136



The most popular branch in the Panov Attack. White has three replies to choose from: 7 c5 (I), 7  $\triangleq$ g5 (II) and 7 cd (III).

# 1 7 65!?

Never very popular, and now a virtually forgotten continuation. The plans of the two sides are clear: White intends to construct a pawn chain b4-c5-d4 and on the basis of this carry out an advance on the queen's flank, while Black will set about undermining this pawn chain (a7-a5 and b7-b6) and also undertake counterplay in the centre:  $\Omega_1$ f6-o4 and 17-f5.

Practice shows that Black can reckon not only on equality but also something more. Upon this it is very important that the second knight is not yet standing on c6. And it does not need to! There it only becomes a target for the white pawns (b4-b5).

We add that the prophylactic 7 a3 is not necessary here; White then would be making an excess of pawn moves. For example, 7...0-0 8 c5 ∞c4 9 ₩c2 f5 10 b4 âf6 11 åb2 ∞c6 12 äd1 åd7 and Black's chances are in no way worse (analysis by Botvinnik).

Âfter 7...0-0 (also interesting is an immediate 7...(2c4!?) arises the tabiya of the variation 7 c5. White can play directly – 8 b4 (A), 8  $\pm$ g5 (B) or 8  $\pm$ f4 (C), and can prevent the manocuvre  $(2f6-64: 8 \text{ We2} (D) \text{ or } 8 \pm$ d3 (E).



8 b4 Black has two active retorts: 8...b6 and 8...@e4.

 8...b6!? 9 ΔD2 Likewise encountered is 9 Eb1!? bc 10 bc Δe4
 11 Δ<sub>2</sub>xe4 dc 12 Δpc6 % σF 13 ΔA I ΔB8
 14 % a4 (14 % d2!?) 14...g5! 15 Δd2
 Δd7 16 Δp5 Δxb5 17 % xb5 Ξxd4
 18 % e8+ ΔsB 19 Δc3 % z5
 (Morozevich - Bareev, Dortmund
 2002). Here White should concede a draw by 20 Bb7 Qd7 21 % xa8 % xc5
 2x Δxd % cl+.

9...35 10 a3 ab 11 ab  $\Xi xa1$ 12  $\pounds xa1$  be 13 de 1 seems that Black is playing into his opponent's hands, giving him connected and far advanced passed pawns. But this impression is deceptive. White lags seriously behind in development and while he is making up for his neglect, Black will manage to generate counterplay.



We are following the game Pilgaard - Ngyen An Dung (Budapest 1999). Black, by playing **15...\$d77**, showed his determination to sacrifice a piece. Such tactics justified themselves; soon he won. However analysis showed that the sacrifice was incorrect. He should play simply 15...\$b7!? 16 0-0 Ea8 17 Wb3 @g4 18 g3 @ge5 19 @b5 Qx13 + 20 \$x13 Wb8 with sufficient chances. 16 b5 &xc5 17 bc &xc6 18 ⊘b5 ⊘le4 A critical moment in the game. By choosing 19 &dd4?, White made a blunder. There followed 19...&xb5 20 &xb5 &xd4 21 @xd4 ∰c3+, and he had to resign because of the unstoppable mate.

The refutation lies in 19 0.01 who  $20 \pm d4 \, \Xi_{88} \, 21 \pm xc_{5} \odot xc_{5} \, 22 \, \text{wb4}$ Black apparently thought that by playing  $22...\Xi_{82} \, (22...\odot_{24} \, 23 \, \text{wd4})$ , he would obtain sufficient compensation for the piece. But  $23 \, \Xi \text{b11}$   $\Xi \text{vc2} \, 24 \, \odot \text{b44} \, \text{wsh4} \, 25 \, \Xi \text{b4} \, \odot \text{a6}$  $26 \, \Xi \text{b11} \, \text{dispess lal his illusions.}$ 

Despite setbacks in individual games, on the whole the reliability of playing 8...b6 and 9...a5 is beyond doubt.

2) 8...②e4!? He can defend the knight on c3 in two ways: 9 營c2 and 9 盒b2.

a) 9 "c2?! looks completely natural but after the game Estrin – Bergrasser and Berta – Bergrasser the desire of players to play this was something we did not see...

9...2c6! In conjunction with the following combination – the most resolute, though also not bad is 9...f5 10 2d3, and then:



10...@c6 11 a3 \$f6 12 @e2 g5! 13 \$b2 (or 13 b5 @e7 14 @e5 \$xe5

15 de  $\bigcirc g6$  16 @b2 @a5+ 17 @f1@d7) 13...g4 14  $\circlearrowright cbe5$  @c7 15 f3 @h4+ 16 g3  $\circlearrowright cbe5$  17 de gf 18 gh fe 19 @xe2 b6. The struggle is very sharp, but Black is in no way worse;

10...b6 11  $\square$ b1 &f6 12 h4!? (preventing the thrust g7g5, inevitable affer 12 0-0; for example, 12...Oc6 13 Oc2 a5 14 a3 ab 15 ab bc 16 dc g5!, Estrin – Zagoryansky, Moscow 1944) 12...Oc6 13 Oc2 a5 14 a3 ab 15 ab bc 16 dc e5 17 0-0  $\blacksquare$ e7 18 Ot5 (inferior is 18 b5 Oxc5) 19 bc e4) 18...Od8 19 Og5  $\ddddot{A}$ g5 20 hg f4! 21 Bb3  $\ddddot{A}$ c6. White has a difficult position (Estrin – Konstantinopolsky, correspondence, 1950).

After 9...0c6! the break e6-e5 is threatened. White's reply is forced – **10 b5**, but it is then that followed Bergrasser's combination:



10...\Dxd4! 11 \Dxd4 &xc5 For the piece Black has a total of two pawns. On the one hand, not much, but on the other - the pawns are in the centre and very difficult to blockade. Besides this, White is again behind in development.

12  $\textcircled{a}xe4 \ \&xd4 \ 13 \ \textcircled{a}c3$  (according to an analysis by Boleslavsky, weaker is 13  $\textcircled{a}g5 \ g6 \ 14 \ \textcircled{a}b1 \ e5 \ 15 \ \textcircled{a}f3 \ \textcircled{a}b6$ ) 13...e5 An important moment. Bergrasser himself suggested for the present not to touch the centre pawns: 13...&d7!? This is how a couple of his games went:

14 4 2b2 IC8 15 16 2d2 2b6 16 2d1?! (really it was best to return the piece − 16 2c2 44 70 −0, rather than suffer) 16...a6! 17 ba d4 18 2b5 ba 19 2xd4 2x5 20 18 d3 e5 with a decisive advantage (Estrin – Bergrasser, correspondence, 1980);

14 Wd2 2b6 15 2a3 Wf6! 16 2b4(on 16 2x18 Zkt8 Black is for the end it me being a rook down but in the end it will all come together in his favour: 17 Zc1 2a5 18 2d3 Zc8 19 -0 2xc3 20 Wd3 bb 16...Zfc8 17 Zc1 a5 18 ba ba with serious compensation for the piece (Berta – Bergrasser, correspondence, 1987).

In correspondence play it is quite possible that the move 13...  $\pounds d7$  is strongest. However in practice it is clear that simpler is 13... e5.

14 ∞b2 ∞c61 (weaker is 14...∞b6 15 ∞c2 d4 16 ⊘c4 ∞a5+ 17 ∞f1 ∞f5 18 ∞d3 Ξc8 19 ₩c2 ₩c7 20 g4!, and White quite surprisingly has somehow managed to blockade the pawns, Estrin - Zagorovsky, correspondence, 1974) 15 ₩d2 Ξc8



Detailed analysis of this position was made in his day by Isaac Boleslavsky. Here is his conclusion.

19...\$c4 20 \u00fcet 4 \$\u00ex re2 21 \u00fcet xe2 21 \u00fcet xe2 30 \u00ex re2 30 \u

b) 9 2b2 Essentially a natural move.

9...15 10 2 d3 This position arose in the game Matulovic – Petrosian (Belgrade 1961). It has decisive significance for understanding the play in such situations.



Black needs to tackle the pawn wedge b4-c5-d4. An immediate 10...35 is weak because of 11 b5. Therefore correct was 10...b6!, preparing the break a7-a5. Petrosian committed an inaccuracy by playing 10... $\pm$ f6?! There followed 11 b5! It becomes clear that it is practically impossible to shake the foundations of White's pawns on the queen's flank. Black has to look for chances in an attack on the enemy king, but even here his possibilities are not great: 11... $\pm$ d7 12 0-0  $\pm$ e8 13  $\pm$ b1 Qd7 (13... $\pm$ h5!?) 14 Qe2 g5 15  $\oplus$ c1 Qg7 16 13  $\pm$ c16 17  $\pm$ c2  $\pm$ c2 fc8  $\otimes$ d3  $\pm$ g6 19 a4  $\oplus$ h5. By continuing 20  $\oplus$ b4!, Matulovic had every

However after the correct **10...b6**! Black, in all variations, achieves his objective – shaking the opponent's pawn wedge on the queen's flank.

11 a3 bc 12 dc There is also a defect in 12 bc. It opens the b-file, and Black does not fail to exploit this: 12...\(\Delta c6 13 \) \(\mathbf{Wa4} = 15 \)...\(\Delta c6 13 \) \(\mathbf{Ma4} = 15 \)....\(\Delta c6 13 \) \(\mathbf{Ma4} = 15 \)...\(\Delta c6 13 \) \(\mathbf{Ma4} = 15 \) \(\mathbf{Ma4} = 15 \) \(\mathbf{Ma4} = 15 \) \(\mathbf{Ma4} = 15 \) \(\mathbf{Ma4}

12...a5! 13 0-0 ≙f6 14 ≣c1 ab 15 ab €ac6! Black provokes the further advance of the b and c-pawns, endeavouring to prove that without due support of the pieces the passed pawn will be weak, not strong.

16 b5 2b4 17 c6 (or 17 호xe4 fe 18 신리 신a2!? 19 프c2 신xc3 20 호xc3 d4).



The previous phase of the struggle has turned out in Black's favour. But how should he proceed further?

Dubious is 17...  $\pm xc3?!$  18  $\pm xc3$  $\oplus a_2$ , since after 19  $\pm d4$  White has good compensation for the exchange. On the other hand, worth considering is 17...  $\oplus a_{12}$  18  $\oplus xa2$   $\pm xb2$  19  $\equiv a_2$  $\pm f6$  20  $\equiv c2$   $\equiv c7$  21  $\equiv b1$   $\equiv b8$ 22  $\equiv c3$   $\equiv b16$  with a blockade on the dark squares.

However the strongest is the following path: 17... #b6!? 18 &b1 &xc6 19 &xc5 #b2 0 &xf6 ed Black will hardly manage to realise the pawn (particularly after 21 &d4!), but in this way he fully insures himself against hostile action.

It is no great exaggeration to say that the idea of an immediate 8 b4 is obsolete.

## в

 $8 \pm g5$ ?! In principle, the exchange of the dark-squared bishop in a situation where there is a skimish going on around the c5, d4, e5, squares, should be favourable for Black. But the manoeuve 2016-e4 enters into his plan. Does White then allow his bishor to be exchanged?

8...b6 9 b4 Now Black has two plans, approximately equal in strength – either to further undermine the pawn chain by means of a7-a5, or immediately offer an exchange of bishops: 9...Qc6 10 b5 Qc4 or 9...Qc4. In each case, in order to defend his pawns on the queen's flank, White is forced to spend extra time, which means that castling will be delayed. In reply follows the break in the centre e6-e5, and with the king on e1 White might as well think about equality.



1) 9 ... a 5 !? 10 @a4 The position after 10 a3 was studied in Chapter Four under the following order of moves: 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 216 5 2c3 e6 6 225 2e7 7 2f3 0-0 8 c5 b6 9 b4 a5 10 a3 To what was said there we can add that after 10... 2e4 11 皇xe7 剿xe7 12 2a4 ab 13 ab bc 14 Dxc5 (we remind you that had is 14 hc? in view of 14...響a7! 15 皇d3 響a5+ 16 包d2 ≙d7 17 ≙c2 ≙h5. Kan Makogonov, Leningrad 1939) 14...冪xa1 15 響xa1 e5!? (also interesting is 15 ... 2 c6 16 Wb2 e5!? -Makogonov) 16 de 公c6 17 公d3 ④xb4 18 對b2 ④xd3+19 盒xd3 盒g4 20 @xe4 de 21 @d2 e3! 22 fe Wh4+ 23 g3 Wh3 24 De4 Wh6 and White. despite the limited material, can expect a difficult defence (Gergel -Podgaets, Odessa 1967).

10.... ②fd7 11 盒xe7 響xe7 12 盒b5 ab 13 c6 ③f6 14 貫c1 (14 ④xb6 貫a5) 14... 還為 15 c7 ④a6 16 兔xa6 置xa6 17 ④e5 This is how the game Matulovic - V. Sokolov (Sarajevo 1958) went. In it Black retreated but the position has not just one, but two solutions:

17...b5 18 公c5 蒕xa2 19 公c6? 饗xc7 – analysis by Rellstab. True, it is not quite clear what he intended on 19 0-0;

17....皇b7!? (the simplest) 18 ②c6 (or 18 0-0 簋c8) 18...習付7 19 ②b8 饗xa4 20 ③xa6 饗xa6.

 2) 9... ⊘c6!? 10 b5 ⊘e4 An interesting idea, sounded out in the game Vallejo – van der Wiel (Elgoibar 1998).



By continuing 11 Deceveration 2012 bc, White retained slightly better chances. Here are some sample variations:

12...&xg5 (or 12...ef 13 &xe7 @xe7 14 @xc7 b c 15 @xa3 @h4 16 dc @xe7 14 @xc5 @xg2 18 @xa3 @h4 16 dc @ds 14 &xc5 @xg2 18 @xa3 @h4 16 dc @ds 14 &xc5 @xg2 15 @d2 @xd2 @ds 14 &xc5 @xg2 15 @d2 @xd2 @ds 14 &xc5 @xc3 15 @d2 @xd2 @ds 16 @d2 @d5 16 @d2 @d2 @d2 @d1 @d2 Bd7 dc (wcaker is 17 @c3 15 18 Bc1 f4+ 19 @xc4 &b7+ 20 @d3 Bac8 21 Bxc5 Bf7) 1...a6. With accurate play Black can apparently achieve a draw, but the general vector of the position is determined in White's favor. However Vallejo played  $11 \pm d_2 2^*$ , allowing van der Wiel to seize the initiative: 11...2u5 Now it is already too late for  $12 \cdot 2x \times 4$  de  $13 \pm x \times 5$ ( $14 \cdot 3x \times 5$ ), and if  $15 \cdot 3x \times 8$ , then  $15...3x \times 44 \cdot 16 \cdot 3x \times 5$  with a decisive attack.

In the game, play continued 12 c6  $\Omega_{\rm xd2}$  13  $W_{\rm xd2}$  a6 14  $\Xi$ c1  $\pm$ b4 15 Wc2 ab 16  $\pm$ xb5  $\pm$ a6 17 0-0  $\pm$ xc3 18  $\pm$ xa6  $\pm$ xa6 19 Wc3 Wd6 20  $\Omega_{\rm cb5}$   $\Xi$ c8 Later on, the fact that Black had only one pawn weakness against three of the opponent began to tell. Eventually Black won.

3) 9... De4! The most natural way. The theoretical basis of this move was given by Genrikh Kasparian a long time ago. This is how events could develop:

10 & xe7 W xe7 11 & Par4 (11 & Par4 de 12 & Qe5 \frac{Tar8}{3} & W d2 & 2b7 14 & ac2 for 15 & Qe4 & Qe6 16 & Qaf6 & a5! -Kasparian) 11 ... & da5 & Qe5 15 & W d3 & Qxb5 16 & W xb5 & W c7 -Kasparian) 12 & dc3 & Qe6 13 & b5 & Qh4 14 & Qe be 15 & dc3 & Qe6 13 & b5 & Qh4 14 & Qe be 15 & dc3 & Qe6 13 & b5 & Qh4 14 & Qe be 15 & dc3 & Qe6 13 & b5 & Qh4 16 & Qe6 & Qxd3 16 & W xd3



16....a6! 17 c6 ab 18 心b6 黨a3! 19 豐xb5 心c3! winning (Barlov – Christiansen, Tjentiste 1975).

С

8 \$.f4 Containing more ideas than 8 \$.g5\$, but also not without its downsides. The bishop, standing on f4, can come under the tempogaining attack g7-g5.

8...b6 Let us also look at 8...Ce4. After 9 &d3?! Black's plan would be justfied: 9...&c3 10 be b6! The pawn outpost on c5, cramping his position, is removed from the board, allowing counterplay against the weaknesses on a2 and c3. Besides this, it is useful to exchange the bishop d3 in order to deprive White of vistas for attack. In this sense it is very peritane that the knipit is still b8, since White cannot prevent an exchange on a6. Here are some sample variations:



11 cb ab 12 @c2 h6 13 0-0 @a6!;

11 ± b1 €2c6 (11... ± a6!? 12 c6 ± d6 13 ± xd6 ₩xd6 14 ± xa6 € xa6 15 ₩a4 €08 16 ± xb6 ab 17 ₩xa8 ₩xc6) 12 cb (in the present situation 12 h4!? looks more well-founded) 12...ab 13 ₩c2 h6 14 0-0 ± a6!, and Black's position deserves the preference (Pioch - Kostro, Poland 1974).

The idea of an immediate  $8... {}^{0.64}$ can be placed in doubt only by the reply 9 @(2)? After an exchange on c3 White will recapture with the queen, leaving his pawn structure intact and secure. And 9... @A5 can be partied by 10 &A3 f 51 1 &xb8!  $\Xi$ xb8 12 a3 &Xc3 13 b4!

9 b4 Black has a pleasant choice between 9...bc, 9...a5 and 9...De4.



 9...bc 10 bc Inferior is 10 dc. In the game Sliwa – Pomar (Varna 1962) Black, with very elementary moves, secured himself the better game: 10...a5 11 a3 ab 12 ab IXa1 13 Waal Qc6 14 Waa4 d4 15 Qd1 Wd5 etc.

10... $\mathfrak{De4}$  11  $\mathfrak{D}xe4$  de 12  $\mathfrak{De5}$  f6 13  $\mathfrak{De4}$   $\mathfrak{Qe6}$  14  $\mathfrak{De6}$  g5! 15  $\mathfrak{D}xe8$  $\mathfrak{W}xe8$  16  $\mathfrak{de5}$  **H**  $\mathfrak{De6}$  he counter Urbance – Meduna (Hiohovec 1993) White blundered: 17  $\mathfrak{L}e4^2$ , and, after 17... $\mathfrak{W}h8$ , one of his pawns – c5 or d4 – must be lost.

The only possibility of continuing the struggle was 17 wa4 a6! 18 2b1 2b8 19 2xb8 wxb8 20 2c2 wb1+ 21 2d1 wb5 The game in unclear.

 9...a5!? A higher ranking move than 9...bc. 10 €0a4 Possible is 10 a3 - since the white bishop is on f4, and not on g5, the jump 10...€o4 will be without tempo (compared with the games Kan - Makogonov and Gergel -Podgaets). However Black still has the tempting possibility of complicating the game: 10...abi? 11 ab Zxa11 Zwa1 2€c51 Sw44



13...bc!? In the game Spal – Lechtynsky (Klatovy 1998) White did not risk accepting the piece sacrifice. Possibly he was right. After 14 bc &d7 15 &b5 ₩a8 16 0-0 &c4 starts a quiet, approximately equal game.

However what awaits White if he takes the piece? The variations show that from his point of view the risk is hardly excessive: 14 Wxc6 2d7 15 響a6 (bad is 15 響c7? because of 15. Wxc7 16 2xc7 cd 17 Da2 Ic8 with a decisive advantage) 15...cb 16 ②b5 (also on 16 ②d1 響a8 17 劉d3 劉a2 18 急c2 耳a8 he will probably have to give up a piece for the b-pawn) 16...b3 17 2d2 (17 2d3 2b4+ 18 2d2 ₩a8 with compensation) 17 ... Wc8 18 2c7 (after 18 Wxc8 Xxc8 19 9)xb3 \$b4+ 20 皇d2 皇xd2+ 21 皇xd2 列e4+ 22 金el 盒xb5 23 盒xb5 算b8 Black

recovers the material with interest) 18... 创わ5 19 皇e5 f6 20 響xc8 罩xc8 21 皇a6 罩b8 22 创xd5 fe 23 创xe7+ 會f7 with good chances of victory.

10...Dbd7 11 %c1 After 11 c6? Black is ready to sacrifice not just one, but two pieces in a row -11...&xb4+ 12 Qd2 Qc4! 13 cd &xd7 14 Qb2 %f6 15 Qd3 Qxf2! and all this with great benefit to himself.

11.... e4 12 2b5 ab! 13 c6 2a6!



In the game Rogul – Cvitan (Porec 1998) White lost ignominiously: 14 @xa6? Ixa6 15 cd Wxd7 16 Ic7 Wxa4 17 Wxa4 Ixa4 18 Icr7 b3!

And suddenly it becomes clear that it is difficult to find a defence against this threat, if indeed it is in general possible! Even on the very strong  $18 \quad \triangle d2 \quad \triangle c_3 \quad 19 \quad \text{@f3} \quad \text{Black's}$ initiative is very strong. For example,  $19... \& c_8 \quad 20 \quad \Xi c_2 \quad \Xi xa2 \quad 21 \quad \Xi xa2$  $\Delta xa2 \quad 22 \quad \text{@e2} \quad \text{@c6} \quad c_3 \quad \triangle f3 \quad \triangle c_3 \text{ etc.}$ 

3) 9... Φie4 10 "c2 (nothing good comes from 10 Φixe4?! de 11 Φie5 f6 12 Φic4 Φic6) 10... Φic6!? Following in the footsteps of Bergrasser, but with different ideas.

11 **量b1 bc 12 bc** In the game Pilgaard – Schandorff (Greve 2002) White, unconcerned, played 12 公xe4 de 13 燮xe4.



12... ¥a5 13 & d2 A position is reached which you would definitely like to play as Black. However for the present no reliable path to an advantage has been found.

seen a piece sacrifice typical for this position: 13...Qxd4?! 14 Qxd4 Qxd215 @xd2 @xc5. In our view, in the present situation there was no need for this. The above-mentioned game continued 16  $\Xi c1$  (16  $\pm dxd3?)$  $16...\pm 2f6$  17 Qr3  $\Im a$  3 18  $\pm 2z$   $\Xi hs$ <math>19 Qb5  $\Im a$  42 Q  $\Delta bd4$   $\pm a_6$  and soon the opponents repeated moves.

Worth serious consideration is 13...\Db4!? 14 \U00fcb2 \Dxd2 15 \U00fcbxd2 \u00e4b8



No use is 16 置b3 兔a6 17 ②xd5? ed 18 兔xa6 because of 18...②c2+ 19 當d1 螢xa2; and even after 17 ②e5 置fc8 Black has the better game.

White could stabilise the position with the help of an exchange of queens: 16 2h51? 2h6c 17 ¥xa5 2xa5 18 2hd3 2h6 19 0-0 (if White seriously decides to 'dry up' the game, he should not stop half way; after 19 3h22?! 52 20 de 2hg4 Black again gets chances) 19...2h6 20 Zfd1 2h7 he endgame is approximately equal.

Drawing conclusions from the three continuations (8 b4, 8 2g5 and 8 &(4), to a greater extent focusing on White's play and to a lesser extent on the anticipated play of the opponent (&)(6-c4), it is possible to draw the conclusion that the strategy itself is not jusified. Black's plan is also more in the centre and requires fewer tempi to realise. Even after creating a pair of passed pawns on the queen's flank, White, convinced that his own king is in a lamentable state, is forced go over to defence.

#### D

8 ₩c2!? An ideal move (White prevents the jump of the knight to e4), we just don't understand why he can't do the same by placing the bishop on d3? Therefore 8 ₩c2 will probably be played rarely, and up to now there exists no connection with theory. Alter 8...b6 9 bé he can reply in different ways:



9....5 10 €a4 €bd7 11 b5! (learning the lesson taught by the game Ciolovic – Zelcic, San Vincent 2002: 11 c6? &xb4+! 12 &dd €bd 13 a 3 daf 4 cd 3xd7 15 &dc 1 Ec8 16 ∰d1 ∰c7 17 åd2 c5! 18 åc2 cd 19 åf1 d3!, and Black won) 11..bc 12 dc c5 13 &dd 15 c6 12 dc 51 a dd 51 5 c6 (Ciolovic – Fonteine, Pancevo 2002); 9...,⊉c6 10 a3 bc 11 bc c5 12 dc 2µg4 13 âc2 2µgxc5 14 2µxc5 2µxc5 17 0-0 âc6 18 𝔅d1 @g5 19 âc3 𝔅ac8 20 @d3 h5!? with chances for both sides (Nataf – Palo, Istanbul 2003).

E

8 \$\u03e94.03] The most natural and objectively the strongest move. White develops, prepares castling and prevents the knight jump to e4. One could not wish for more. As regards the plan to advance the queenside pawns, Black now actually forces White to occury himself with this.

8...b6 9 b4 a5!? Black's chances lie in intensifing the situation on the board to the maximum. It is worth giving Black a couple of tempi in development – and not even stop at that. Here are a few examples:

9...bc?! 10 bc ℃c6 11 0-0 ▲c7 12 h3 ℃b8 13 &c14 &c16 (Fischer – Vkov, Buenos Aires 1960) 14 &c2?? ₩a5 (not possible is 14...℃xd4? 15 ℃xd4 c5 in view of 16 &cxc5 2xc5 17 &xh7+!) 15 @d3 g6 16 ₩d2. Thanks to the protected passed pawn on c5 White has the initiative.

After 10 2a4 a critical position arises.



The b6 square (and this means also the tension on the queen's flank as a whole) can be held by 10...  $\Omega$  fd7 or 10...  $\Omega$  bd7. Let us look at both moves.

1) 10...0fd7 In his turn, White can choose between 11 a3, 11 b5, 11 h4 and 11 C2.

a) 11 a3?! Listless and allowing equalisation with help from the standard 11...ab 12 ab bc 13 dc €2c6 14 £b1 e5 But in the game Nuevo – Campora (Seville 1999) the desire to acquire an extra pawn led Black to the verge of a catastrophe:

15 &b5 &b7 16 &xd5 &c7 17 0-0 &f6 18 &b32? Not the best move, since the black knight attacks the queen with tempo, but in any case Black holds the initiative. For example, 18  $\&c4 \ c4$  19  $\&cd2 \ @c4$ 20 g3 &c5 with a subsequent transfer of the queen to 15.

18...e4 19 ②d2 ②d4 20 暫c4 ②g4 21 g3 互ad8 22 ②b3 ②f3+ 23 室g2 盒d5 24 暫e2 e3! etc.

b) 11 b5?? Thought up by Botvinnik, which in itself gives the move a mark of quality. However on correct play there is no danger for Black.

11...bc 12 dc e5! 13 c6 e4 14 cd 2xd7 15 0-0 ef Everything is in

order for Black after 15...\$16 [16 \overline b] ed 17 \overline xd3 & De5 18 & Dxe5 & \$xe5 19 & \$b2 (19 f4!?) 19...\$xh2+! 20 & \$xh2 \overline h4+ (Kopaev - Sokolsky, correspondence, 1950).

16  $\mathfrak{W}_{413}$   $\mathfrak{L}_{25}$  17  $\mathfrak{W}_{23}$   $\mathfrak{L}_{343}$ 18  $\mathfrak{W}_{343}$  d4! An important improvement. In the original game, Botvinnik – Pomar (Munich 1958), was played 18... $\mathfrak{L}_{46}$ , which is noticeably weaker in view of 19  $\mathfrak{L}_{43}$ 

19 \$f4 \$b7 20 Iac1 \$g5 21 \$xg5 \$\$xg5 22 f3 Iac8 23 Iac8 Iac8 24 Ie1 h5



Bortvinnik succeeded in blockading the opponent's central pawns on the dS square, and the light-squared bishop remained 'blunt'. Here, however, the bishop is almost the strongest piece on the board and in any case it is not Black who has to equalise the game (Sokolsky – Simagin, correspondence, 1964).

c) 11 h4!? Leading to a very sharp game. Black needs to be on the alert since after an exchange on b6 the bishop sacrifice on h7 is threatened. Apart from this, White wants to transfer the rook to g3.



In the game Stisis – Burmakin (Aika 1992) Black varied and ran into danger: 11...bc 12 bc 2a6 13  $\pm$ (4  $\Xi e8^{\circ}$  He will not have to wait long for his punishment: 14  $\pm$ xh7+1  $\pm$ xh7 15  $\bigcirc$ g5+ &g8 16  $\cong$ h5  $\bigcirc$ f6 =f1  $\cong$ f3+ &f48 18 h5. It goes without saying that it was necessary to play 13... $\pm$ xd3 14  $\cong$ xd3  $\bigcirc$ c6, though after 15  $\equiv$ b1 White had an unquestionable advantage.

Nor was everything alright for Black after 11...h6 12  $\Xi$ h3/?  $\Delta$ f6 13  $\Xi$ 3/3 c3 t4  $\Delta$ xh6/4 15  $\Delta$ g5. In the game Keller – Pomar (Lugano 1968) there was a downright massacre: 15... $\Delta$ c6? 16  $\Psi$ h5 ed 17  $\Delta$ g7]  $\Xi$ 68+ 18  $\Phi$ f1  $\Delta$ g7 19  $\Psi$ x7+  $\Phi$ t8 20  $\Psi$ h5+  $\Phi$ g8 21  $\Psi$ h7+  $\Phi$ t8 22  $\Delta$ e6+!  $\Xi$ x6 23  $\Xi$ x27.

Stronger is 15...ed! 16 管xd3 罩e8+ 17 堂d2 公昭 (Blatny – Adams, Oakham 1990), but even here White's attack is menacing.

11...f5!? The most reliable continuation. Now the b1-h7 diagonal is reliably covered and the way for the rook to g3 prohibited. 12 ②g5 響e8 13 索们 Necessary since any raids by White are easily repulsed: 13 ②xe6 ②xe5 14 be 響xe6+ or 13 ③b5 ab!? 14 ③xb6 篇a5 15 響c2 ③xg5 16 hg ③a6 17 ③xa6 ③xb6 18 灸d3 ③a4 19 ④t4 ④c3.

**13...並信 14 並ち ab 15** 令次6 金和6: 16 金双6 (upon 16 令汉名 金次55+ 17 金月 金石 18 令か6 令次55: Black's initiative cancels out his material deficiency) 16...令次6 17 金全 ②和4 with the better game (Barberia - Profumo, Bratto 1997).

d) 11 Wc21? Undeservedly, theoreticians have devoted little attention to this move. On the basis of an interesting, if debatable recommendation of Kasparian (see below), the queen move is considered insufficient to obtain an advantage. But how is it that the statistics are so depressing for Black?

Let us look at this continuation in detail.



d1) The trappy 11...b5!? (reckoning on 12 @xb5? ab 13 a3 @s5 14 @c2 @a6!, Haba – Jung, St.Ingbert 1991) is not so easy to refute. For example, 12 @xh7+ @zh8 13 @b2 @c6 14 @d3 @xb4 15 @c2 @xd3+ 16 @xd3 b4 17 急传 分佈 leads to a position in which it is difficult to say what carries more weight: White's attack or the pluses at Black's disposal.

Apparently, the best reply is 12 (a)c3!? Possible then is:

**12...ab** 13 ②xb5 ②f6 (13...h6 14 c6 b3 15 ℃c3!) 14 0-0 ③c6 15 a4! Here White's advantage is more clearly visible.

d2) 11...ab This move has still not been met in practice. Analysis takes us to an endgame with better prospects for White:

12 c6 (the complications after 12  $\pm$ xh7+  $\pm$ h8 13 c6  $\oplus$ xc6 14  $\oplus$ xc6 2a,6 15  $\oplus$ c2  $\Xi$ c8 16  $\oplus$ b1  $\oplus$ c7 17  $\oplus$ b2 15 18  $\pm$ g6  $\Xi$ f6 19  $\pm$ h5 g6 20  $\pm$ g5 gh 21  $\pm$ xf6+  $\pm$ xf6 lead to absolutely nothing for White) 12... $\oplus$ xc6 13  $\oplus$ xc6  $\pm$ a6 14  $\oplus$ b2  $\oplus$ c8 15  $\oplus$ xc8  $\Xi$ fxc8 16  $\pm$ xa6!? After 16 0-0 Black manages to establish a fortress, which is very hard to breach: 16... $\pm$ c4! 17  $\pm$ g5  $\pm$ d6 18  $\Xi$ t6 155.

d3) 11... ④c6 (considered the main move) 12 盒xh7+ 當h8 13 b5 ④b4 14 營b1



The position is very sharp, but what we do not understand is why everybody plays 14...bc?! here. After 15 a3, time after time White is firing at point blank range: 15...cd (or 15...c4 16 ab ab 17 ac2 b3 18 axb3cb 19 wxb3 Ch6 20 Qe5, and the black king is hopelessly weak, Liberzon – Opocensky, Leipzig 1965) 16 ab axb4+17 \$r1 f5 (after 17...g6 18 axgof [2] 0%gof Black is doomed, Alekhina – Sanadze, Beltsy 1972) 18  $2g_5$  %ed 19 **43** (Bishon – Fitzpatrick, San Mateo 1992).

It goes withut saying that stronger is 14...15!? This was the position Kasparian also had in mind when he wrote that after 15 a3 bc 16 dc 2xc517 2xc5 3xc5 18 &g6 @f6 Black had good prospects.

But firstly, instead of 16 dc, more interesting is 16 abl? cd 17 ba #xh718 a6 c5 19 0-0. And secondly, the obvious 16 &g6, You see, in order to avoid the headaches associated with calculating the capture of the bishop h7, it is simpler to adopt this order of moves: 15 &g61? **bc** 16 a3 Now on 16...cd White has every chance of delivering mate, for example: 17 h4 c5 18 & 20 k5 0h6 19 ab &xb4+ 20 字d1 ②xa4 21 罩xa4 皇d7 22 ②f7+ 罩xf7 23 皇xf7 罩b8 24 暫b3 皇xb5 25 罩xb4! ab 26 暫f3!

A little stronger is 16...c4 17 ab xb4+ 18  $\psi$ fl  $\forall$ f6 19  $\Delta$ h5 g6 20  $\Delta$ ft  $\psi$ fg {20...c4} zh5 g6 21  $\Delta$ xg6  $\forall$ xg6 22 h4  $\forall$ h5 23  $\Xi$ h3 White is attacking with equal material but not, it must be said, with equal strength.

Precisely 11 @c2!?, in our view places under doubt 10... $\mathfrak{D}$ fd7 and confirms one more time that the strongest move is  $-10...\mathfrak{D}$ bd7.

2) 10.... 3bd7!?



We look at the following possibilities: 11 c6, 11 a3, 11 皇f4 and 11 響c2.

a) The move 11 c6?! is interesting as an amusing trick in analysis but not to be played in a serious game. After 11... & hb4+ 12 & d2 ⇔b8 13 Zc1 ¥c7 14 0-0 & a6 15 & xa6 Zxa6 16 ⊕c5 Zc8 Black has a great advantage (Muse – Koch, Germany 1993).

b) On 11 a3 Black equalises with the thematic 11...ab 12 ab bc 13 bc e5! The variation 14 de?! 2xc5 15 ef 2xd3+ 16 #xd3 2xf6 17 2d4#e8+ 18 2e3 2xa4 was investigated as far back as Botvinnik, while in the game Railich – Groszpeter (Paks 2001) another capture was tested: 14 ②xe5 ③xc5! 15 0-0 ③xe5 16 de ③te4 In each case Black has nothing to worry about.

The position after 11 &f4 has been repeatedly refined. Among others, we have the idea 11...ab 12 c6 @h5?!Taking the piece now is bad: after 13 cd &at1 14 @c5 &at4 15 &ab4&ab4 14 &ab5 &ab4 15 &ab4&ab4 16 &ab4 &ab4 &ab4 &ab4 &ab4&ab4 &ab4&ab4 &ab4 &ab4 &ab4&ab4 &ab4 &ab4 &ab4 &ab4&ab4 &ab4 &ab



In his turn, instead of 13...①xg3? Black ought to play 13...①xf6!? 14 c7 變68 15 @xb6 還a7 with a complicated struggle. The process of refinement and substitution of one variation for another is endless...

In itself the idea 11...ab 12 c6  $\bigotimes h5?$  has little value. On the other hand after the immediate 11... $\bigotimes h5?$ , it looks like the whole undertaking with 11  $\bigotimes t3$  should be given up as a bdj ob. It has to be established that White simply loses a tempo and as a consequence cannot count on an advantage:



12 盒g3 f5!? 13 ④e5 ④xg3 14 ④e6 響e8 15 ④xe7+ 響xe7 16 hg ab 17 c6 ④f6 18 ④xb6 簋a3 with counterplay (analysis by Konstantinopolsky) or

12  $(\underline{a}.2)$  ab 13 c6  $(\underline{b}.0)$  (13... $\underline{b}.0$  (14) 14  $\underline{b}$  c5 g6 15  $\underline{B}$  15 b 15 16  $\underline{b}$  c5  $\underline{a}$  xc5 17 dc  $\underline{w}$ ? - Konstantinopolsky) 14  $\underline{b}$  c5  $\underline{b}$  (16 15  $\underline{w}$  b3 b5 16  $\underline{b}$  c5  $\underline{a}$  xc5 17 dc  $\underline{w}$ c7 18  $\underline{a}$  f4  $\underline{b}$  xc6 (L.Vajda - Lupulescu, Romania 1999). In all of these variations there can only be one question - how great is Black's advantage?

d) 11 徵c2 In the variation 10...公fd7 the queen move is essentially a double attack - the h7

pawn is hanging as well as the knight on b8 (after c5-c6-c7). However Black is not facing any concrete threats here, therefore he is fighting not for equality – but for the advantage.

12...&xb4+ 13  $\&d2 \cong d6$  14  $\boxtimes b1$  $\bigotimes xb6$  15 &xb4 ab 16  $\bigotimes c5 \bigotimes bd7$ Once again it is Black who is playing for a win (Blatny – Ostenstahl, Trnava 1989).

The last variations certainly represent the back yard of Panov Attack theory, and on them one cannot judge the strength of the 7 c5 system (where one can see that Black has to choose in the region of 10-11 moves to decide what is the casiest way for him to obtain an advantage?). But on the whole the system 7 c5 is going through a deep crisis. Old ideas are refuted, there are on new ones. What will be its future?

# П

## 7 ⊈g5

Variations with this move have been partially examined in Chapters Two and Four.

Less popular is  $7 \pounds f4$  – possibly because in positions with the isolated pawn (and this applies in all cases) it is more usual to see the bishop on g5 or e3, but not on f4. This is how the struggle continued:



7...0-0 8 Zc1 (8 c5 was looked at above, under the inverted order of moves: 7 c5 0-0 8 盒f4) 8... () c6 9 a3 ④e4 10 盒d3 ⑤xc3 11 冪xc3 dc 12 邕xc4 豐a5+! (usually almost every exchange favours the player fighting against the isolated pawn, and to be really precise - the exchange of queens: therefore White refrains from 13 Wd2) 13 2d2 Wd5 14 Wc2 f5! (in principle such a weakening is undesirable but in the present situation it is more important to limit the activity of the bishop d3 and at the same time guarantee the safety of his queen) 15 0-0 2d7 16 Ic1 Iac8 17 Wh1 b5! 18 I4c3 a6 19 皇e3 皇d6 20 b4 ④e7 with a verv comfortable game (Mishychkov -Sakaev, St.Petersburg 1997).

8 c5! The knight, prematurely developed on c6, will in the future become an object of attack by the bpawn, though Black loses the struggle for the key c5 square earlier.



**8...0-0** An immediate 8...2e49 2xe7 #xe7 is also played. In order not to spoil the pawn structure, we recommend 10 #d3!?, and then:

10...€)xc3 11 ₩xc3 e5!? (essentially the only possibility of getting stuck into the game) 12 de &q4 13 &b5 &xc3 14 gf 0-0 15 &xc6 be 16 0-0-0 ≣ab8 with some compensation (analysis by Dolmatov);

10...f5?! (principled but... dubious) 11 ₩e3 0-0 12 Δb5 Φb4 13 ℤc1 Δd7 14 Δxd7 ₩xd7 15 Φc5 ₩c7 16 0-0 Qc6 17 Qxc6 bc 18 f3 White has the advantage – mainly because of his possession of the e5 square (Rogers – Kuijf, Wijk aan Zec 1993).

In reply to 10 %d3 Black most frequently resorts to a repetition of moves – 10...2b4 11 %b5  $\pm$ 2c6. Returning the queen – will be a draw, not returning it – and Black takes on c3 and spoils the opponent's pawns. But there is also a third way – exchanging himself: 12  $\pm$ Xe4! de 13  $\pm$ 2s % 7 14 0-00 00 15  $\pm$ Xe6 be 16 %e2 %s5 17 a3 (Gelfand – Kuczynski, Moscow 1994). In this position Sergei Dolmatov also advised sacrificing a pawn: 17...e51? 18 %ze4 ed 19 %cd4  $\pm$ c6. 9 265 @e4 Vladimir Kramnik took in hand 9...h6!?



In the stem game was played  $10 \pm x16 \pm x16 + 10 - 5267!$  (retaining the knight for struggle against the c5 square) 12 b4 b6 13  $\frac{1}{8}$ d2 bc 14 bc  $\frac{1}{2}$ d7 and Black has no problems at all equalising (Timman – Kramnik, Amsterdam 1996).

If White retreats the bishop to h4, then there arises a position that is analogous to the main line, only with a pawn on h6 ('luft' which might in any case prove useful): 10 & h4 Cle411 & ke7 Chxe7, and then:

12 燮c2 燮a5 13 盒d3 ②xc3 14 燮xc3 燮xc3+ 15 bc b6! 16 cb ab 17 容d2 盒a6 with a draw (Kobalija – Dychkov, Moscow 1995);

12 III b6 13 c6 20d6 14 0-0 III c7 15 20c5 f6 16 20g4 a6 17 203 III c6 18 201 III c7 201 c7 2

Gradually White's principal weapon in the struggle against 9..h6 became the move 10 &f4!? After 10...℃e4 11 0-0 ℃xc3 12 bc &d7 13 ₩a4 (with the idea of making it difficult for Black to advance b7-b6)

brought no advantage in view of 13...We 8! In the game Magomedov – Klinova (Hoogeveen 2001) Black quickly obtained equality and we will not dwell on this:  $14 \, 2xc6 \, 2xc6$ 13 Wb 3 f6 16 If cl Wd7 17 If cl If C 18 Wb 3 f6 16 If cl Wd7 17 If cl If cl 8 & 25 & 2d H 19 C cl b6! 20 C d3 2b5.

Instead of 13 Wa4 stronger is 13 Ic1!?



The idea is the same – to make difficult the break b7-b6. Nevertheless Black should take a risk and go in for the variation 13...b61? 14 c41 dc 15 dc 16 dl 6% w465 <sup>10</sup>/<sub>2</sub>88 17 cb ab 18 <sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>xc4 <sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>c5. There does not seem to be any immediate danger (analysis by P.Blatny and C.Hansen).

 全d7?! 21 單b7 - and developed a menacing initiative.

Instead of 20...2d7 he should immediately exchange on e5. Only not 20... $2xe5^{\circ}$  21 de 4g5 - when White wins the exchange: 22 2xg58gxg5 23 2b5 2d42 2c6, but 20...2xe5! 21 de f5 with chances of a successful defence.

10 **②xe7** Let us look at both captures: 10...徵xe7 (A) and 10...①xe7 (B).

#### A

**10... Wxe7** White has a simple choice. Without pity to spoil his pawns on the queen's flank - 11 0-0, or with pity - play 11 罩c1 or 11 哪c2.



1) 11 0-0?!  $\Delta x_0^2$  12 bc  $\pm d^2$  In the game Kobalija – Fressinet (Calicut 1998) Black somewhat uncertainly played b7-b6: 12... $\Delta a_0^2$ ! 13  $\pm d_3$  h6 14  $\pm b1$   $\oplus c_7$  15  $\pm c_2$ ! b6. As a result adangerous initiative. Play continued: 16...g6 17  $\oplus c_3$   $\pm g_7$  18  $\pm d_2$  s bc 19  $\pm b5$ ! (doesn't the position remind us of what we saw in Kasparov against Anandry 19... $\pm a_0^2$  (defending the extra pawn is foolish, since after 19... $\pm D^2$  72  $\pm b^2$  14  $\pm 21$   $\pm g^2$  Js the g6 square) 20  $\Xi xc5$   $\forall d8 21$   $\triangle g4!$  $\Xi h8 (21... \& xf1 22$   $\forall xh6+ \& g8 23$   $\Xi c7!$ ) 22  $\forall e5+ \& g8 23$  & xg6!with a win.

13 Bb1 Bfc8 14 Ee1 €as 15 £d3 Bab8 16 €e5 €c6! 17 We2 B 18 %15 b6! De ba 20 @d2 @f6 We are following the game Anic – Prie (France 1998). Even after White carries out a favourable exchange – 21 £b5 £e8 22 £xc6! Exc6 23 @e5 Bc7, his position does not improve much. True, in such structures the knight is far stronger than the bishop but, you see, White has twice as many pawn weaknesses! Black should hold.

#### 2) 11 ac1 @xc3 12 axc3



12...e5! It is necessary to make this break before White has castled. Otherwise the advantage of the knight over the bishop will become obvious.

13 de d4! Namely so! Insipid is 13...②xe5 14 ②xe5 豐xe5+ 15 豐e2.

14 Ict Few would risk accepting the pawn sacrifice - 14 2xd4 Id8 15 2xc6 bc, and then:

16 0-0? Wd7! 17 単d3 桌a6 winning;

16 單d3?! 響xe5+ 17 罩e3 響f4 18 0-0? (the tension is maintained after 18 g3 ₩f6 19 0-0 \$e6 20 \$\overline\$e4 \$\overline\$xa2\$) 18...\$g4 19 \$\overline\$c2 \$\overline\$xe3!\$, when White resigned (Drira – Pomar, Caorle 1972);

16 f4!? (obviously the strongest) 16...\$\$\overline\$40\$ (surprisingly White can defend himself in the event of 16...\$\$\overline\$47\$ 17 \$\overline\$3 \$\overline\$45\$ 18 \$\overline\$24\$ \$\overline\$44\$ 19 \$\overline\$2 \$\overline\$x42 20 \$\overline\$42\$ 20 \$\overline\$42

14... $\bigcirc$  xe5 15  $\bigcirc$  xe5  $\bigcirc$  xe5+ 16  $\bigcirc$  c2 In the final account it all comes down to a quiet position in which neither White nor Black has particular prospects.

16... 單d5 17 0-0 全f5 (why, incidentally, does he not take the pawn - 17... 豐xa2? 18 金c4 響a5 19 變e7 豐b4 20 b3, and here if only 20... 金c6??) 18 b4 薹ad8 19 薹fd1 d3 20 螢d2 a6 The game is even (Paoli -O'Kelly, Teplice 1949).

3) 11 蜀c2!? 包g5 12 包xg5 蜀xg5 13 魚xc6 bc 14 0-0 e5



15 f4! Very strong. White determines the right pawn structure for himself. He could only reckon on a minimal advantage in the event of

15 de 鬱xe5 16 罩fe1 彎f6 17 罩ad1 罩b8 18 彎d2 盒g4 19 f3 盒e6 20 b3 (Keres – Alekhine, Amsterdam 1938).

15...ef 16 2 2 2 8 17 b3 2 h3 18 27 2 2 be8 19 2 xf4 In sight is an endgame in which Black has no antidote to the charge of the a and bpawns (Ivkov – Bergrasser, Leipzig 1960).

в

10....♥xe7! Considerably stronger than 10....₩xe7. Black realises that he should at all costs avoid a position in which a handsome knight on e5 will be facing a pitiful light-squared bishop.

11  $\exists c_1 l$ ? Clearly unfavourable is 11 0-0 in view of 11... $2xc_3$ ! 12 be be; 13 cb ab 14 at  $\textcircled{W}c_1$  15  $\oiint{W}c_3$  Lab(Suba – Rogers, Malta 1980). But why can't he play 11  $\textcircled{W}c_2$  (after all, it is precisely this move that appears in the main line with 10... $\textcircled{W}xc_7$ ?)? Because in reply there follows 10...Wa5! (here we see just one benefit of taking on e7 with the knight), and White's pawn mass once again becomes worthless – 12  $\textcircled{A}c_3$  $\textcircled{W}c_3!$  13 be h6 14 0-0 bb!

11...b6 12 c6!?



The passed pawn on c6 – is this a strength or a weakness? Let's have a look at 12... Od 6 and 12... W d6.

 12...€2d6 13 0-0!? Attentive readers will detect the difference in comparison to the game Korchnoi – Kramnik (Zurich 2001). The black pawn is standing not on h6, but on h7! If now 13...₩c7 (\*à la Kramnik'), then after 14 ₩c2 aó 15 & d3 White gains an important tempo to successfully defend his passed pawn: 15...h6 16 €hc2.

In the game Yurtaev – Ivanchuk (Tashkent 1985) Black played 13...Qxb5 14 Qxb5 a6, and after 15 Wa4 embarks on a mistaken tactical operation:

15... 2xc6? 16 IIxc6 2d7 Ivanchuk did not notice that on 17 2d6 III 18 Ifc1 IIC7 a blow awaits him: 19 2xf7! White won shortly.

Instead of  $15...\&dxc6^2$  worth considering is 15...&d71? 16 od th 17 %b5  $\Xia5$  18 %b3 %kd7. The advantage remains with White but Black can successfully defend himself: 19 %kb6  $\Xixa2$  20  $\Xic7$  %d8 21  $\Xifc1$  Q15 or 19 a3 %d6 20  $\Xic3$  $\Xia8$  21  $\Xic1$   $\Xir68$ .

2) 12... Wd6!? 13 0-0 a6



How strange that this position is easily transformed into one with an isolani: 14 &d3? &Xc6 (taking on c3, and then on c6 is not possible because of the standard blow on h7) 15 &Xc4 de 16 &xc4 &h7 17 &ec5. After 17... $\blacksquare$ dac8 (it is possible that the most accurate defence lies in 17... $\blacksquare$ dac8 (it is possible that the **Most 18...\&Xc57 19 \blacksquaredac <b>433** h61? (only not 18...&Xxc5? 19 &xh7+ &h8 20  $\blacksquare$ h31) 19 &Xxc6 &Xc6 20  $\blacksquare$ Xa6  $\blacksquare$ d5 21 &Xc67 &Zc2  $\blacksquare$ xc6  $\blacksquare$ Xc6 and it is difficult for White to realise his material advantage. However it is a pleasant kind of difficulty.

In the game Christiansen - Henkin (Biel 1994) White preferred 14 Wa4 Black should force the play: 14....倉d7!? 15 cd ab 16 竇xb5 公xc3 17 基xc3 基xa2 White's passed pawn comes closer to promotion, move by move, but the resources of the defence are far from exhausted. There mght follow 18 @e5 篇a5 19 誉b3 Ia6 20 Ifc1 f6 21 Ic8 Ia8 22 Ixa8 [xa8 23 ] b5 \$ f8! (losing is 23...fe? 24 de Wb8 25 Zc8+!) 24 b4! Not an obvious move. The basis of this idea is to defend the knight by b4-b5. How important this is can be shown by the variation 24 h3 罩d8 25 公c6 響xd7 26 響xb6 單c8

24...fe 25 de 豐xe5 26 豐xb6 豐b8 It all hangs by a very fine thread; let's stop and take a look.



27 <u>Le8+!</u> <u>477</u> 28 <u>Wd4!</u> (after 28 d8公+? <u>4</u>c8 White loses!) 28...<u>wyh4</u> 29 d8℃+! <u>4</u>c8! 30 €2c6+ <u>Lex8</u> 31 <u>Wxh4</u> <u>Lex6</u> An excellent finish to an imaginative game. Black constructed a fortress and waited for the draw offer.

## Ш

## 7 cd

The main continuation. Black can take on d5 with the pawn or the knight.

## A

7...ed A passive move, which cannot be recommended. The position now reached makes a curiously depressing impression – symmetrical, with almost a complete lack of counterplay for Black.



Let's look at 8 2d3 and 8 2b5+.

 1) 8 &d3 (in this case Black is considered to have an easier defence) 8...?\ce6 After 8...0\ce0 9 h 3 Black should not develop the bishop on b7. He will not succeed in fighting for the e4 square and there could be even more trouble. As, for example, in the game Mukhytdinov – Burmakin (Cappelle la Grande 1995): 9...b6?!
 10 -0 &b7 11 &df 4a 61 Zel b 5 13  $\Xi$ c1 Oc6 14  $\pounds$ b1  $\Xi$ e8 15 Bd3 Oa5? (a blunder but Black's position is in any case suspect) 16  $\pounds$ c7!

9 h3 0-0 10 0-0 h6 Quite often 10... \$e6 is played, and then:

11 里e1 里e8 12 盒f4 愈d6 13 愈e5 ②h5 14 變d2 f6 15 愈xd6 變xd6 16 墨e3 ②f4 (Spassky – Pomar, Palma de Mallorca 1969).

11 全名 温6名 (dubious is 11...℃d7?) 12 全(2) 響か6 13 全)は 温ac8 14 響か1 h61 5 急力キ 全形81 6 金方、Saganian – van der Wiel, Rotterdam 1989) 12 響心2?! (stronger is 12 三c1, in order to hidt the bishop d3 in his 'pocket' on b1) 12...℃b4 13 金b1 ℃4 (Balashov – Larsen, Buenos Aires 1980):

11 <u>2</u>,14 <u>1</u>,681? 12 <u>3</u>,61 <u>3</u>,661 13 <u>2</u>,0a4 <u>3</u>,632 (14 <u>3</u>,61 <u>2</u>,64) 14...2x,d4 15 <u>2</u>,x,d4 <u>2</u>,x,c5 16 <u>2</u>,x,c6 fc 17 <u>3</u>,x,c6 <u>3</u>,d7 18 <u>3</u>, <u>5</u>,5 <u>2</u>,c4 19 <u>3</u>, <u>3</u>,x,2,2 <u>2</u> <u>3</u>,x,5 <u>3</u>, and <u>Black</u> 0 <u>5</u>,41 <u>5</u>,21 <u>5,21 <u>5</u>,21 <u>5</u></u>

As we see, there is nothing particularly terrible for Black. And yet it cannot suit him that there is absolutely no possibility of displaying activity in all these examples (perhaps with the exception of the game Portisch – Larsen).

11 2f4! This came into fashion following the example of Vishy Anand. Previously 11 2c3 was played.

**11...**&**66** (11...&**d6** 12 &**e**5! – Anand) **12**  $\blacksquare$ **e1**  $\blacksquare$ **c8** He could drive away the bishop from f4 – 12...&h5 13 &c3 &d6, but after 14 &g5! &ff6 15 &Xe6 fe the position transforms into one that is favourable for White. He has two bishops and pressure over the whole board. The game Gulko – Barhagen (Berne 1995) continued 16 ≣cl ≣c8 17 a3 &b8 18 ≣c2 €ie7 19 &c1. White's advantage can only get bigger.

13 @d2 I e8 14 I ad1 & b4?! 15 a3 In the game Anand – Ravi (India 1988) Black conceded that his last move was a loss of tempo and retreated: 15...&R. In Anand's opinion, White's advantage is consolidated by 16 & b1 & 2d7 17 II e2.

But certainly Ravi originally intended to play 15...&xc3 16 bc Oc4 (16...Oas 17 &xc4) 17 &xc4de 18 &xc4 &d5 (17 &xc4) 19 &xc8+ &xc8 20 &b12; with the dica 21 &b2 – Anand) 19 &c3 &ca5(19...&d7?; 20 c4! &xc4 21 d5!) with a blockade on the light squares in return for the sacrificed pawn.



But why did he at the last moment reject his own idea? The solution lies in the variation 20  $\bigcirc$  65 f6 21  $\equiv$ g3? fe 22 &xe5 & 76 23  $\blacksquare$  674 & 477 24 &xg7+ &e7 25 &xh6 with a decisive attack.

 Black is also set serious problems by 8 2b5+. We examine all three defences against the check: 8....2c6, 8...2bd7 and 8....2d7.

a) 8... $\partial c6$  9  $\partial c5$  d7 10 0-0 0-0 11  $\mathbb{R}^{c1}$  In the game Hubner – Petrosian (Seville 1971) White played 11 &g5? Hubner's deep calculation is admirable: after 11... $\partial xc5$  12 de  $\partial c4$  13 &xc7  $\partial xc3$ 14 &xd8 &xd1 15 &xd7  $\mathbb{R}^{td}8$ 16 661 Black's position, despite the small number of pieces, is very difficult.

11....268 (White has a minimal advantage after 11...2b4 12 2xc6 2xc6 13 2xg5 h6 14 2h4 Wa6 15 Wb3, Tal – Meduna, Lvov 1981) 12 2xg5 Ze8 Black made a positional mistake in the game Velimirovic – Benko (Vrnjacka Banja 1973): 12...2c6?



Now with the clear cut  $13 \le xc6!$  bc 14 (2)a4 White established a blockade on the dark squares.

13 Icl!? Taking into consideration the fact that Black has no means of gaining counterplay, assuming that White himself does not help his cause, it is useful to play in an unhurried way. On the other hand, the attempt to immediately extract an advantage from the present situation runs the risk of defeat: 13 &xf6? &xf6 14 £xd5? (White wins a pawn, but... toses a piece) 14...£xe5 15 de &xb5 16 ef  $\Xi$ xe1 + 17 %ete | %xd5.

13...a6 14 &xc6 &xc6 15 &fa&fa 16  $\Xic3$  &d7 17 &xd7 &xd7&xd7 &xd7 &xd7Ba fact The character of the struggle has not changed over the course of the last ten moves or so. It is better for White to maintain a stable position just as it is for Black to wait patiently for the chance to offer a draw (Brunell - Li, Gausdal 2001).

b) 8...≥bd7 The point of the move lies in the transfer of the knight to b6 where, firstly, it defends the d5 pawn and, secondly, at an opportune moment it will take up an active position on e4. But, as shown by practice, even this plan is insufficient for equality:

9 0-0 0-0 10 至e1 ②b6 11 ②e5 盒e6 12 響e2 (with the threat of 13 ③xf7!) 12....a6 13 盒d3 至e8 14 盒g5 ④bd7 15 互ad1 ④f8 16 響f3 至c8



18 单b3 罩cd8 19 单f4 with unpleasant pressure (Tal – Chistiakov, Kharkov 1967).

c) 8...2d7 9  $\pm$ xd7  $\cdot$ 2bxd7 10  $\pm$ 3 2b6 11 0-0 0-012  $\pm$ 25 We underline the strict way Kasparov played against the computer ·Mephisto' (Hamburg 1985): 12  $\pm$ 65  $\pm$ 68 3  $\pm$ 61 6 h3  $\pm$ xes 17 de  $\pm$ xes 18  $\pm$ xb6  $\pm$ 17 de  $\pm$ xes 18  $\pm$ xb6  $\pm$ cl = 19  $\pm$ xcl  $\pm$ 8xb6 20  $\pm$ xd5 and yet he still achieved quite a large advantage in the endame.

12...b6 13  $\pm$ h4  $\Xi$ c8 14  $\Xi$ fe1  $\Xi$ c6 15  $\Xi$ c2 g5 16  $\pm$ g3  $\oplus$ h5 17  $\Xi$ ac1 Thus continued the game Adams – Granda Zuniga (Elenite 1993). The position is just right for Michael Adams – a solid advantage with mimimum chances of interference from the opponent.

#### B

7.... ②xd5 The tabiya not only for the present system – but for the whole Panov Attack. Hundreds, thousands of games have come streaming down to this position.



We divide the further material into three parts: 8 意b5+, 8 意c4 and 8 意d3.  8 2.b5+ This old move does not pose Black problems.

8...∂c6 By driving his knight into a pin, Black maintains some sort of initigue. There was absolute calm on the board after 8...&d7 9 &xd7+ wat for 9...&d7 9 &xd7+ wat for 9...&d7 9 &xd7 + wat for 9...&d7 + wat for 11 wb5 2.b6 12 0-0-0-13 &44 &d6 14 & xd6 wxd6, Alekhine – Eliskases, Buenos Aircs 1939) 10 2e5 2wc3 11 bc ₩b5 12 ₩b3 wat 31 3 ab 2d7 14 £xd7 & wat folloelsavsky = Juetin, Minsk 1957).

9 ₩a4 It is also possible to pile up on the knight c6 in another way – 9 Φc5, but after 9...&d7 there is no advantage: 10 €xA7 ₩xA7 11 ₩b3 爲d8!! 12 €xA5 ₩xA5 I3 ₩xA5 ॾxA5 14 &xc6+ be (Minic – Holmov, Skopie 1967).

9...0-0 Konstantinopolsky suggested sacrificing a pawn: 9...2xc3!? 10 &xc6+ (10 bc &d7) 10...bc 11 ₩xc6+ &d7 12 ₩xc3 &b5! One can agree: there is unquestionable compensation.

10 2xc6 2b6 11 Wa5 bc 12 0-0 2d5 13 Wxd8 Ixd8 14 2e5



Thus continued the game Pachman - Kotov (Moscow 1946). It can be shown that White will gradually lay his hands on the c6 pawn. But in fact there is a concrete idea: 14... Db4! 15 &c3 f6 16 D(3 c5! 17 dc Dc2 Passing the stage of equalisation, Black immediately proceeds to a struggle for the advantage.

2) 8 &c4 This was frequently played by Botvinnik. As distinct from 8 &b5+, the thrust of the bishop to c4 has not lost its topicality to this day.



White encourages the opponent to exchange on c3. If this happens, a strong pawn pair is created in the centre 'c3+d4'. Then, under cover of the pawns (and exploiting the absence of an enemy knight on d5), the bishop on c4 transfers to the b1h7 diagonal. As a result of all these manoeuvres, White has good chances of an attack.

Black's basic plan of defence is as follows: reinforcing the king's flank by the reconstruction  $\mathfrak{A}(6, \mathfrak{O})$ 8-c6e7, a timely fianchetto of the lightsquared bishop and engaging in counterplay in the centre and on the queen's flank.

8...0-0 For a long time the authors of this book had, so to speak, a cool regard to the voluntary exchange on c3. We studied attentively 8...€xc3!? during our preparations for the superfinal Candidates match against Andrei: Sokolov (Linares: 1987) and came to the conclusion that the way to equality for Black was thorny and long. Over the course of many years the assessment of  $8...^{OXG3/2}$  no longer looks so categorical... After 9 bc @c7 10 @c2 and 10 @d3 should be examined.

Against 10 營e2?! the key can be found quite easily:



12 置d1 盒d6 13 盒g5 b6 14 d5 Qc5 15 Qc4 Qc4! 16 Qb5 盒xh2+ 17 金f1 (17 金h1 Qxf2+!) 17... 雙c5 18 盒c7 響f4 19 響f3 Qg3+ 20 金e1 響xc4 21 盒xf8 斷f1+ 22 金d2 獸xb5 winning:

12 &b2 b6 (inaccurate is 12... $\pounds$ )f6?!, allowing the knight to e5) 13 &a3 &b7 14 c4  $\sharp$ fe8 15 we3 (Alterman – Khlian, Rostov-on-the-Don 1993) 15...&d6! with equal chances:

12 acl &d6! 13 acd3 b6!, ignoring the threat of 14 acd4 in view of 14...Orf6 15 acd8 acb7 16 acd8 acb7 acb817 acb8 acb8

Far more dangerous looks 10 響d3 (with unambiguous designs on the h7 square). After 10...参d7 11 0-0 0-0 we were troubled by the plan proposed by Igor Zaitsev: 12 @g51? @16 13 f4. But now it does not seem so dangerous. By playing 13...\$d7 14 &b51; Black blockades the c3 pawn and obtains good counterplay.

It remains to add that the computer 'Fritz', in a game against Kasparov (Munich 1994), suggested playing 12 2g5!? instead of 12 2g5.



There followed  $12...\underline{x}g5$ (preferable is  $12...\underline{x}f6$ ):  $13 \pm b3 = b6$ with the idea, after  $14 \text{ Hacl} \pm b7$  $15 \pm c2 g6$   $16 \pm xf6 \pm c2 \text{ Hacl} \pm b7$  $15 \pm c2 g6$   $16 \pm xf6 \pm c2 \text{ Hacl} \pm$ 

9 0-0  $\mathcal{C}_{16}$  10  $\mathbb{E}$ e1 White passed over the win of a pawn - 10  $\mathbb{A}$ xd5 ed 11  $\mathbb{B}$ b3, and we can confirm this was done deliberately. With the move 11... $\mathbb{A}$ g4! Black can offer the choice of either of two pawns, but both are completely 'inedible'. 12 鬱xb7 创b4! 13 创e5 亘b8 14 鬱xa7 簋a8 The queen cannot hide from perpetual attack – draw (A.Zaitsev – Tal, Tallinn 1971) or

12 ②xd5 皇xf3 13 寶xf3 ②xd4 with full equality (Robatsch – Trifunovic, Havana 1963).

After 10 He1 we have a parting of the ways in the variation 8 \$c4.



Black's problems become clearer if we look closely at the consequences of 10...b6? White played 11 &\xdS ed 12 &\xdS t, and it turned out that it was not at all easy for Black to hold this outwardly slightly inferior position. Here is a classic example: 12...&d7 13 @a4 &\xdS 14 &\xdS t & xdS 15 @xdS a6 16 @xd1 & ad6 17 & xd6 @xd6 18 \vdash clear advantage (Botvinits, He has a clear advantage (Botvinits, He has a clear advantage (Botvinits, Alckhine, Amsterdam 1938).

11 2xd5 ed 12 2xd5 = this is a real threat. He can only defend against it in two ways: either by exchanging himself (11..2xc3), or covering the b5 square (10..a6). The third way - is to immediately start regrouping the minor pieces: 10..2xf6.

a) 10....<sup>(2)</sup>xc3!? 11 bc b6 12 **2d**3 2b7



If Black has obtained a respite for 2-3 moves and can during this time complete his development, then his counterplay on the light squares, together with pressure on the pawn pair c3+d4, outweighs every other factor. White's chances – lie in attack, which he should commence at once. We look at two ways: standard (13 Wc2) and sharp (13 H4).

a) 13  $\frac{13}{6}$  26 14  $\frac{1}{2}$  h6 It is not possible to combine both ideas – on 14 h4?!  $\frac{1}{2}$  cs 15  $\frac{1}{6}$  d2  $\frac{1}{2}$  f6 16 h5 follows 16... $\frac{1}{2}$  xd4!, and White's position is wreckel: 17  $\frac{1}{2}$  xxd4 (or 17 cd  $\frac{1}{2}$  xl3 18 gf  $\frac{1}{2}$  xxd4 19  $\frac{1}{2}$  a3  $\frac{1}{2}$  xal 20  $\frac{1}{2}$  xal  $\frac{1}{16}$  f6) 17... $\frac{1}{2}$  xc3! (Poulsen – Farage, Gausdal 1976).

**14... 星8 15 谢d2 星c8!?** Played with extraordinary coolness. Usually the bishop h6 gets on Black's nerves so much that he endeavours to exchange it at once.

Thus in the game Lerner – van Wely (Germany 1998) was played 15... 218 16 h4 &xh6 17 @xh6 @ff6 18 &e4  $\equiv$ ac8 19 h5  $\equiv$ c7 20  $\equiv$ c3!? The rook heads for h3, supporting the attack.

The game Eingorn – Farago (Boblingen 1997), deserves a separate discussion – or rather the following position from the game, reached after 15...\$f6 16 \$f4 \$\frac{1}{2}\$c8 17 \$\frac{1}{2}\$c97 18 \$\screwtyst ye7.



Eingom played here 19 &c4, and Black, move by move, refuted all the hreats: 19...&c7 20 &hf &c27 11 &xb7 (21 &g5 h6 22 &xb7 hg) 21...&f5 12 &e4 &d6 23 &e54 f f 24 &g3 &xb7 25 &h3 &f7 26  $\exists$ ac1 &d61 The partners agreed a draw in view of the following variation: 27  $\exists$ xc6  $\exists$ xc6 22 & &c6 & &c6 &29  $\exists$ xc6  $\exists$ xc3.

Nevertheless Black has a great supply of ammunition in the position. On 19  $\pounds_{05}$  there follows the reply 19... $\mathfrak{P}_{16}^{*}$ , and the endgame after 20  $\mathfrak{P}_{x6}^{*}$  +  $\mathfrak{P}_{x16}$  can be held:

21 Oxh7+ sg7 22 Og5 Oc7! The extra white pawn is not worth much since the pawns on a2, c3 and d4 are weak;

21 De4+ De7 22 d5 Db8! 23 d6+ Def8 24 d7 Dxd7 25 Dd6 Dc5! Again there is great positional compensation (now for the loss of the exchange) which should be enough for a draw.

16... 2a5 17 2g5 &xg5!? 18 &xg5 (18 hg c5) 18...f6 19 &f4 ₩d7 20 ℤac1 &d5 21 &b1 2c4 H White's attack hasn't already landed in a blind alley, then it is very close to it (van Wely – Piket, Wijk aan Zee 1998).

#### a2) 13 h4!?

A sharp thrust, but only in this way is it possible to break through Black's defence. In his turn, Black has a choice: to stick to principles and accept the pawn sacrifice – 13...\$xh4, or exploit this tempo for another assignment which is to divine the direction of the main blow and try to cushion himself against it – 13... #d5, 13... 4a5, 13... f6 or 13... #c8.



a21) 13... \$\overline{xh4?!} (but in the present case exact adherence to principles can also be false...) 14 \overline{xh4} \overline{xh4} 15 \overline{abc} 26 \overline{Theta} Threatening 16 \overline{Abc}. How to defend?

Possibly too passive is 15... #d8 16 #h5 g6 17 **Eg3** #d7 18 &h6 **Ef68**, as was seen in the game Poluljahov – Volkov (Tomsk 2001). But after 19 **Ec1** Black's position looks extremely suspect.

Here are some sample variations: 19...51? (White wins by direct attack in the event of 19...5? 20  $\pm$  20  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  18 23  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  18  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  54  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  54  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  27  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  20  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  27  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  20  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  27  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  27  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  27  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  26  $\pm$  21  $\pm$  21 \pm 21  $\pm$  21  $\pm$ 



Hardly, and to be really accurate he cannot take the second pawn: 24...\24.25 \overline cand can be accurated as a second pawn: 24...\24.25 \overline can be accurate

On the other hand it is possible to defend actively, even too much so: 15...f5?! Grandmaster Adrian Mikhalchishin assumed that it was not possible to play 16 Exc6 because of 16 ... 2 xd4. But analysis does not support this: 17 cd! (there is nothing for White after 17 Ie3 2c6 18 Ih3 響g4 19 響xg4 fg 20 盒xh7+ 當f7) 17 ... Wxd4 18 2a3! (this is stronger than 18 2b1 Wd5 19 Wf3 Wxe6 20 豐xb7) 18. 豐d5 19 豐f3 豐xe6 20 豐xb7 嶌fd8 21 急b2 費d7 22 豐xd7 Zxd7 23 2xf5. By force an endgame has arisen with great chances of victory for White.

However most of the time it is best to defend neither passively not hyperactively, but somewhere in the middle:



15...g6 16 Eg3? (rather weaker is 16 Eh3  $rac{1}{2}$  (rather weaker is 16 Eh3  $rac{1}{2}$  (rather weaker is 216 Eh3 22 Eh63  $rac{1}{2}$  (rather weaker is 217 Eh25 22 Eh63  $rac{1}{2}$  (rather weaker is 218 Connes 1988) 16.. $rac{1}{2}$ (rather weaker) - Gonda, Cannes 1988) 16.. $rac{1}{2}$ (rather weaker) - Gonda, Cannes 1988) 16.. $rac{1}{2}$ (rather weaker) resent practice provides evidence in White's favour: 17  $rac{1}{2}$  (rather weaker) resent practice provides evidence in White's favour: 17  $rac{1}{2}$  (rather weaker) Eh66 20  $rac{1}{2}$  (rather weaker) England 1988). (d4-d5 is threatened, and all Black can do if defend, defend...

17 \$\overline\$25 fo 18 \$\overline\$16 \$\overline\$17 (18... \$\overline\$16 \$\overline\$17 (18... \$\overline\$16 \$\overline\$19 \$\overline\$15 \$\overline\$20 \$\overline\$16 \$\overline\$18 \$\overline\$21 \$\overline\$18 \$\overline\$36 \$\overline\$22 \$\overline\$23 \$\overline\$26 \$\overline\$26 \$\overline\$26 \$\overline\$26 \$\overline\$36 \$\overl

It is not clear how much partiality he has to have for the other side's pawn to suffer such torment after 13...\$xh4?!

a22) 13...₩d5?! The reputation of this move is based mostly on an analysis of the game Anand – Timman (Moscow 1992), in which White played 14 Eb1. The fact of the matter is that Black can calmly take the pawn:



However these and such like analyses are empty. This is because even White's very first move after 13...\#d5 is clearly dubious! Instead of 14  $\Xi$ b1, 14  $\bigcirc$ gs?! suggests itself. After 14... $\triangle$ xg5 15  $\triangle$ xg5  $\bigcirc$ c7 16 wg4, 15 17 wh3 White holds the advantage in comparatively quiet circumstances, while the sharper 14...h6 15  $\triangle$ xh7  $\div$  wh8  $\bigcirc$ c4 wc4 17 wh5 wg8 18  $\bigcirc$ h3!? also turns out in his favour. For example, 18...f5 19  $\triangle$ f3 wrc3 20  $\triangle$ xh6 wrc4 21  $\bigcirc$ gs  $\triangle$ h4 22  $\Xi$ ad1 wc4 23  $\blacksquare$ xc6!

a23) 13...2n5 There is a story attached to the move 13...@d5: it is considered reliable but it is not good. About 13...2n5 one can say exactly the opposite: the move (on the basis of the game Razuvaev – Farago, Dubna 1979) is almost considered to be losing by force, but actually it is wrong to knock it.

In its day the game Razuvaev – Farago actually went the rounds of the world's chess press: 14 ②g5 h6? 15 徵h5 兔d5



However after the elementary 14...&xg5 (instead of 14...h67) 15 &xg5 (or 15 hg 57: 16 g @x16 -Pachman) 15...@d5 16 @g4 f5  $17 @g3 \Xiac8$  18 &f1 @d7 19 h5 &d5 (Hernandez – Miguel, Vulka 1984) how big is White's advantage?

a24) 13....\$6!? 14 @g5 g6 15 \great{g6} h5 A forced move; Black cannot allow h4-h5. For example, 15...@e7?! 16 h5!, and then:

16...公f5 17 hg hg 18 公xe6! fe 19 歡xg6+ 皇g7 20 冪xe6 (Poluljahov - Gomez Baillo, Buenos Aires 1998) or

16...豐d5 17 hg 公xg6 18 盒e4 豐d7 19 豐h3 (Poluljahov – Notkin, Tivat 1995).

The position after 15...h5 looks highly dangerous for Black; however in practice he quite often comes out unscathed.

A sure sign that not everything is going well for White – there is no uniformity in his action. If he were to find an accurate order of moves, somehow he would get his act together, but for the present the fact that even his queen comes under fire suggests otherwise.



In the game A.Sokolov – Christiansen (Dubai 1986) was seen 16 @f4!?, and after 16...e5?! 17 @g3 @d7 18 &a3 Zife8 19 &c4 &xg5 20 @kxg5 White stood to win. But stronger is an immediate 16...&xg5!? 17 @kxg5 (17 hg e5!) 17...@kxg5 18 &kxg5 Qa5 19 Ziacl Ziac8. New endgame looks very respectable for Black. There is play against the pawn weaknesses and a blockading strategy on the dark squares.

The other direction is 16 暫h3. The game Cifuentes – van der Sterren (Holland 1996) did not last long: 16...e5 17 点a3 亘e8 18 ④e4 ed



19 嘗d7!? 必e5? 20 響xe8+!, and Black resigned.

Which move isn't puzzling here. It is clear that 19...Qo5? is a blunder, and in the event of the correct 19...Ixc4! 20 Wxd8+ Exd8 21 &xe4 dc White will be fighting for the draw. And it is not a fact that he will achieve it, for example, 22 Ead1 &g7!? 23 Exd8 & 2xd8 24 & xb7 &xb7 25 Ecl a5 26 Ebl &d4 27 &ft Qxd8 28 &ec 20e6 etc.

Cifuentes himself indirectly acknowledged this by suggesting, instead of 18 纪4, another means of winning: 18 纪xf7! 查xf7 19 曖g3 逗8 20 位 纪xe5 21 區xe5 盒xe5 22 曖xe5 盒d5 23 盒b5!

We agree. But also for Black in this case an improvement – on the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> moves – suggests itself. Instead of 17...Le8 stronger is 17...Lexg5! 18 & x18 & d2! 19 Eddi xc3 20 Eacl ed, and instead of 16...e5 – 16...De7!? 17 & a3 Ec8, and no good is 18  $\partial_{xxe6}$  fc 19 Wix6+  $\Xi$ 17 20  $\Delta_{xx7}$  7 Wix7 21 Wix6 Wd7 22  $\Delta_{xxg6}$   $\Delta_{xx7}$  1 Wix6 Wd7 22  $\Delta_{xxg6}$   $\Delta_{xx7}$  1 Wix6 Wd7 22  $\Delta_{xxg6}$   $\Delta_{xx7}$  1 would seem to be a miniature, plain and simple, but so many questions!

In reply to 15...h5 White most frequently retreats 16 **#g3** Here there was also once a short game: 16...**#d7**?! 17 **De4 \$g7** 18 **\$g5 \$**07?



19 Wd6! Material loss is inevitable, and after a few moves Black resigned (Onischuk – Magem, New York 1998).

16... $\bigcirc$ e7 17 &a3  $\cong$ d7! Many times Black has fallen under the blow 17... $\equiv$ 68? 18  $\bigcirc$ xe6! with a rout – the first time this happened was in the game C.Hansen – Kir. Georgiev (Kiljava 1984).

18 @e4 @xe4 19 @xe4 Eac8 20 Ee3 Efe8 21 Wf4 @g7 The position has calmed down, the attack failed to materialise. Black's chances are superior (Banas – Ostendad, Trnava 1989).

a25) 13...Ec8 14  $\bigoplus$ 5 Instant defeat as a consequence of just one mistake is not uncommon in this variation. Here is an example:  $4u_{ac}$ ?? 15  $2xh^{2}$   $2xh^{2}$  16  $\bigotimes$ 16  $\bigotimes$ 54  $4u_{ac}$ ?? 15  $2xh^{2}$   $2xh^{2}$  16  $\bigotimes$ 16  $\bigotimes$ 54 19  $\mathbb{E}$ e4! (Matveeva – Intinskaya, Tbilisi 1987).

Analysis shows that also 15 營h5 (instead of 15 全h7+) does not promise White any particular



One look at the position is sufficient to understand: here the extra exchange plays no role at all. White has in prospect a hard fight for a draw.

All the same, 14...h6 will play on his nerves. Safer and simpler is 14...2xg5!? 15 2xg5 365! 16 36255! 17 363 265! Four exemplary moves – and the blockade on the light squares is in place.

In the game Poluljahov – Balashov (St.Petersburg 1998) White rolled up the attack, hastening to secure himself against loss: 18 Ee5 Warf19 &b5 &c6 (Black likewise is satisfied with little; otherwise he would have played 19...Wf71; 20 Ea1 64 22 Ward 20 &a6 Ee8 and it is difficult for White to improve his position, for example, 21 Eb1 &c422 &b5 &c6 23 &d3 &d520...&c6 21 E2 25 22 Ea1 Ec8Son a draw was agreed.

Summing up the variation 10... (2) xc3!? 11 bc b6 12 2d3 2b7, it

is possible to say that it is better than its reputation. True, it demands courage of a chessplayer. But if you want to play solidly, do not panic, you have every chance of coming out of the battle with an equal and even better position.

b) 10...a6 With this move Black pursues three objectives: to defend against 11  $\oplus$ xd5 ed 12  $\pm$ b5, to prepare an extended fianchetto b7-b5, and in addition, simply to wait for White to show his cards.



11 **2**b3!? A move which places Black under very great difficulties, but let's also look at other continuations.

A classic example of 11  $\pm$ 03 is the game Polugayevsky – Portisch (USSR – Hungary match, 1969): 11... $\Omega$ 16 12  $\pm$ 25 b5 13  $\pm$ cl  $\pm$ b7 14  $\pm$ b1  $\pm$ ce 15  $\frac{1}{8}$ d2  $\pm$ ce 16  $\pm$ cd 204 17 2  $\pm$ ce 5  $\pm$ 045 18  $\frac{1}{8}$  d3  $\pm$ c6 19  $\frac{1}{8}$ h3  $\pm$ cx 20 bc  $\pm$ d5! 21  $\pm$ d3 2h5 with the better prospects for Black.

In his time, Grandmaster Andrei Sokolov suggested 11 We2!? Perhaps the right reaction to this move is to follow the game Stocek – Galkin (Port Erin 2001): 11...Qf6! Logical: as White has already brought his rook to e1, he does not want to lose time on  $\mathbb{R}^1$ . Stock replied 12 & 2.a.3, and obtained a version of the Queen's Gambit Accepted that is comfortable for Black: 12...b5 13 & 2.b3  $\mathbb{Q}_{23}5$ 14 & 2.c2 & 2.b7 15  $\mathbb{Z}_{23}d1$   $\mathbb{Z}_{25}8$   $\mathbb{Z}_{24}$  17  $\mathbb{Z}_{25}f6$  &  $\mathbb{R}^6$  18 &  $\mathbb{R}^6$  with equality.

After 11 0b3 Black usually exchanges on c3, but a further two ideas are worth considering.



Firstly, all the same 11...b5, despite the fact that the financhetto here comes without tempo. After 12 @xd5ed 13 @d3 (unclear are the consequences of 13 @c5 @xc5 14 de d4) and by comparison with the game Tal – Paakhis White still has on the board his light-squared bishop, which is undoubtedly to his advantage. And yet one should no verstate White's superiority.

19 Kac6 fc 20 &d3 with a minimal advantage in the endgame. And this is only because Black has not secured himself against the break 44-d5: 13...2ba3? (instead of 13...b5) 14 &da 2 b5 15 d5 ed 16 Exd5 Exd5 17 Wad5 Wad5 Wad5 18 &xd5 &b7 with equality.

11...€\xc3 12 bc b5?! Very dangerous! The right order of moves was demonstrated in the game Stocek – Czech (Olomouc 1995): 12...\$\Lambda fb? 13 \$\Lambda 14 \$\Lambda c2\$ \$\Lambda 15\$ \$\Lambda 16\$ \$\La



18 arrow xf7+!! arrow xf7 19 arrow b3+ arrow 620 arrow xe6 arrow b3- 21 arrow xf6+! arrow xf622 <math> arrow g5+ arrow g7 23 arrow xd8 arrow xd8 arrow 4 arrow d4, remaining with an extra pawn in the endcame.

The position after 11 ≜b3 €bxc3 12 be b5?! is usually considered the tabya of the variation 10...a6, so we assumed that Andrei Sokolov's discovery against Kharitonov (Moscow 1990) had practically closed down the variation. However, without rushing, we will discuss each in turn.



b1) The impatient 13 d5?! does not give an advantage in view of 13...abs (also sufficient for equality is 13...abs) (also sufficient for equality abs ( $b \ Q_{25} \ \Delta xg5$ ) 17  $\Delta xg5 \ Wd3$  $B \ \Delta c^{-7} \ Dxb3$ ) 14 de  $\Delta xc6$  15  $\Delta xc6$ Wxd1 16  $\Delta xt7$ +  $\Xi xt7$  17  $\Xi xd1 \ \Delta c^{-6}$ with serious compensation (pointed out by Anand).

b2) The idea 13 h4!? After a detailed look at the variations and branches, 10...2xc3 11 bc b6 12 Åd3 Åb7 13 h4 already looks standard. There we did not fear it, and here also we should not worry about it.



Taking on h4, of course, is not necessary; after  $13... \pounds xh4?!$ 14 2xh4 2xh4 15 3acd 3acd 16 3ah32f6 17 3ac2 the pawn is not worth all the suffering.

The main line of the position arises after 13... $\pm$ 07!? 14  $\bigcirc$ gg5  $\bigcirc$ as 15  $\circledast$ h5 (on 15 &c2!? it will be necessary to part with one of the bishops rather more quickly: 15...&xg5 16 hg f5!) 15...&xg5 16 &xg5 %d6 17 &fd?



He cannot accept the piece sacrifice: 17...gf 18 盒c2 f5 19 響g5+ 全h8 20 斷f6+ 全g8 21 邕c3 邕fc8 22 盒xf5!

The tempo-gaining side-step is parried by 18 d5! ed 19 愈c2 g6 20 豐g5 笪ae8 21 h5, and the attack is very strong.

And yet there is a defence: 17... $rac{1}{9}$ f4! 18 &e5 (or 18 &c2 g6 19  $rac{1}{9}$ g5  $rac{1}{8}$ x5 20 hg  $\Xi$ fc8) 18... $rac{1}{9}$ f5! 19  $rac{1}{9}$ xf5 ef 20 &c2 g6 21 a4 &c4 White is a little better but Black should hold the position.

b3) 13 ♥d3!? This idea was tested in the game A.Sokolov – Karpov (Linares 1987). Black replied 13...Ea7?! and obtained the clearly worse game: 14 ♠c2 g6 15 ♣h6 ﷺ 68 16 ♥e3 Щd7 17 h4!? ♣f6 (dangerous is 17...♣xh4 in view of 18 €xh4 ♥xh4 19 ♣g5 ♥g4 20 ♣d1 ♥f5 21 g4 ♥d5 22 ♣f3 ♥d6 23 ♣f6] 18 ♣g5 ♣g5 19 ♥f4 ♣xg5 20 €xg5

響c7 21 響f6 ④xd4 22 盒xg6 hg 23 cd 算d5 24 罩ac1 響d7



Here, in playing 25 Zc5, Sokolov did not find the strongest continuation. The game ended with a drawn result. Meanwhile serious problems are posed by 25 @e4! For example, in the variation 25 ... Th5 26 d5! (this is even stronger than 26 Wxg6+!? fg 27 5f6+ \$g7 28 列xd7 罩xh4 29 罩c7 皇d5) 26... 響xd5 27 邕c5 響xc5 28 @xc5 Txc5 29 Zd1 and Black does not have full compensation for the queen.

The correct order of moves was demonstrated by Anand: 13...&b714.&c2 g6 15 &h6  $\exists$ c8 16  $\exists$ ad1 (G.Kusmin advised trying 16 ad b4 17 c4) 16... $\exists$ c8 17 h4 @d51 18 &b3 @b51 9 @c3 &da51, and Black's position is already rather more pleasant (Matveeva – Anand, Frunze 1987).

b4) 13 & c21 In this also lies Andrei Sokolov's idea, found by him three years after his match with Karpov. The variation looked at above shows that Black cannot do without the advance g<sup>-7</sup>ge6. On d3 the enemy queen is lined up against the triad f7géh7, but it really belongs on g4. White can then carry out the pawn advance h2-h4-h5 and under the three attacks from c2, g4 and h5, the g6 square will start to crack.



There is no need to explain again in detail how dangerous it is to accept the pawn sacrifice: 14...2xh4?! 15 @xh4 Wxh4 16 Ze3 etc.

Also unsatisfactory is 14...  $\forall$ d5?! because of 15  $\pm$ g5! In the game Mukhydinov - Graf (Svidnica 1997) play continued: 15... $\pm$ fc8 16  $\forall$ d3 g6 17  $\pm$ b3  $\forall$ d6 18 h5  $\pm$ xg5 (on 18... $\pm$ f8 unpleasant is 19 hg hg 20 hg! (a very important intermediate move) 20...hg (he will not manage to save the endgame after 20... $\pm$ xg5 21 gf+  $\pm$ xr7 22  $\pm$ kh7+  $\pm$ g7 23  $\pm$ xc6+  $\pm$ xc6 24  $\pm$ xg7+  $\pm$ xg7 25  $\pm$ xc6) 21 d2xc6! with a rout.

In the stem game A.Sokolov – Kharitonov (Moscow 1990) Black also defended poorly: 14...266 15 Og5 66 16 Wg4 Ic8 8 17 h5! White's plan works 100%. Black's position is indefensible.

fg (allowing the opponent to win beautifully, more tenacious is 18...hg

19 響h4 @xg5 20 @xg5 響xg5 21 響xg5 @xc2).



19 ①xh7! ②xc2 20 警xg6+ 金h8 (20...호g7 21 ②g5) 21 호g5! 호xg5 22 ②xg5 智d7 23 置xe6 置c6 24 響h5+ 查g8 25 置d1! 響g7 26 罩dd6! A brilliant attack!

To his great credit, Sokolov's discovery crosses the plan 11...\$xc3 12 be 5. However this does not raise particular alarm, since there is a worthy alternative – 11...\$16. This move leads to the main tabiya of the Queen's Gambit Accepted (D27), but to analyse this position properly, in great detail and within the limits of the present book, is impossible.

11 2e4 b6 12 a3 White obtains no advantage after 12 2x16+ 2x1613 2g5 2b7 14 Ec1 Ec8 15 2d3 h6 16 2c3 (in the game A.Sokolov – Schussler, France 2001, White played impulsively, 16 2h4?, not noticing that then 16...2xd4! is no good 12.... 金b7 13 響d3



In this position Black has several continuations worthy of consideration.

Simplest, certainly, is to play at once 13...0cc7. In the game Korchnoi – Oll (Groningen 1993) play continued 14  $\pm da 2 \Phi_0 615 \Phi_0 c5$ (15 g3!?) 15...0dc7!, and Black showed he was well prepared for the tactical stranggle: 16  $\Xi x$ c6!? (16  $\Xi ad1$  $\pm d5$  17  $\pm ac6 \Phi_1 f5$  with equality – Oll) 16... $\pm x$ c8! 17  $\Xi x$ fog f1 8  $\pm 0$ xB @d7.

Fully recommending itself is the direction 13... $\mathbb{Z}687$ ; 14  $\bigcirc 2055 \otimes 205$ 5 & x g 5 f. After 16 & d 2 it is possible to play in the old fashioned way: 16...@ 47 17 & a d 1  $\bigcirc 205$ & a 2  $\& \mathbb{Z}68$  19 h 4 (after 19 & a 17);  $\bigcirc 206$  20 @ g 3 f5! and Black seized the initiative, Tal – Petrosian, Moscow 1966() 19...& h 812 0 & b 1 g 2 1 @ h 3 $\bigcirc 15$  (Nikolic – Ribli, Ljubliana 1985), Also it is possible to adopt a contemporary treatment: 16...& h 81?17 & b 3  $\bigcirc c 7$  18 & a 3 & a 6 19 @ g 3@ 47 20 & Z d F4 (Acs – Cvitan, Szale 2020). Most often Black chooses 13...Ze8!?, absolutely not afraid of the doubling of his pawns: 14 \(\Delta xf6+ gf! 15 \(\Delta b3 \(\Delta ce7 16 \(\Delta a4 \(\Delta c6 17 \(\Delta xc6 6 \(\Delta b4 \) \(\Delta caravanan - Sasikiran, Nagour 199).

More principled is 14 & d2 & 2ce715  $\exists call \& D15$  16 & a2 & 2de6 in the game Serper - Kaidanov (Groningen 1993) White rather strayed from the course: 17 & Q23? g6 18 & Q25 & g27etc. Serper thimself subsequently indicated the best direction of play: 17 & egs1? g6 18 hd? White's plan is clear: he threatens to play 19 & Q25, then to transfer the queen to h3 and open the h-file. How can Black counter this?

For a start he should repulse White's first threat: 18...&g1? Now 19 &c5? (sees (19...f6) – so far so good. Obviously White plays 19 h5, and after 19...@66 (in some variations threatening a knight jump to f4) arises a critical position.



Harmless is 20  $\bigcirc$  5  $\bigcirc$  14! 21 &xf4 @xf4, therefore 20 hg No way should he open the edge files – 20...hg?! It is not easy to show with variations that this move is bad, but all the same the complications must turn out in White's favour. For example: 21  $\bigcirc$  65 Obligatory is 20...₩xg6!?, when a double-edged struggle follows: 21 @e2 h6 22 \$\overline{2}\$ \$\verline{2}\$ \$\verline{2}\$ \$\verline{2}\$ \$\verline{2}\$ \$\verline{2}\$ \$\verli

24... $\dot{s}h8$  25  $\dot{s}b1$  Wg7 26  $\dot{s}xf5$  ef 27  $\dot{c}h4$  42 8 Wc4 Wg5 29 g3  $\fbox{Lab8}$ 30 Wd4  $\fbox{Le6}$  31 Cg2 Wh5, speculating on threats on the long diagonal;

24...Qd4!? 25 ₩e4 ₩xe4 26 ¤xe4 Qxf3+ 27 gf Qc7 28 ¤g4+ Qg6 29 ✿g2 ¤ad8 30 &b1 h5. Thirty moves have already been played but the prognosis on the outcome of the game, as before, presents difficulties.

Nowadays there is not just one direction. After  $8 \pm 6 + 0 - 9 - 0 - 6 \geq c = 0$  $0 = 1 \pm 1 \pm 61$ ? White has not managed to demonstrate a way to gain even a minimal advantage. Therefore it is possible, in part, that the move  $8 \pm c = 4$  will noticeably yield in popularity to  $8 \pm d = 3$ .

3) 8 ad3 Objectively the strongest.



8...0-0 Dubious is 8...b6?! because of 9 De5! The development of the bishop c8 is delayed because of the check on a4, while after 9...0, we see that it was wrong to spend a tempo on b7-b6: 10 Wh5! f5 11 0-0&b7 12 &c4 0d7 13 &cxd5 ed 14 &b3 &cx5 15 de with advantage (Petrosian - Bagirov, Moscow 1967).

9 0-0 In the game Sveshnikov -Kasparov (Tbilisi 1978) was seen 9 h4!? Played with a flourish - like a hussar! For the sake of objectivity let us say that there is no prescription for such an attack (incidentally, if Black wants to avoid it, he can play 8 ... \$ c6, and there is nothing better for White than 0-0). The further continuation of the game was 9...のc6 10 豐c2 f5 (simpler is 10 ... 266, intending on 11 De4 to play 11 ... Db4 12 Dxf6+ \$h8! 13 \$h3 \$\xd3+ 14 \$\vd3 盒xf6) 11 a3 b6 12 0-0 當h8 13 簋e1 216 14 #a4 2d7 15 2g5 2g4 16 f3 @ce5!? 17 Wdl h6 18 fg @xd3 19 @xe6 @xe6 20 Wxd3 @g8, and the rivals concluded peace.

a) 10 🖉 e2



The most reliable is  $10... \ge 16$ , but let us briefly stop at the remaining moves.

There is no sense in accepting the pawn sacrifice by 10...Ohd94?II  $\Delta et A^{2}xd4 12 Oxtd wxtd, since$ the difficulty with the development ofthe light-squared bishop outweighs $the modest material gain: 13 <math>\Delta e3$ We 51 47 4 We 81 5 Zad1 f5 16  $\Delta f3$  $\Delta e6$  17 We 4 (Udowic – O'Kelly, Havana 1964).

Also dubious is 10...\Debt 11 \Debt 1 b6, but not because of 12 \Debt 2xd5? \overline with the second secon

11 프d1 신b4 12 오b1 b6 13 신e5 오b7 14 a3 신bd5 15 신e4 신xe4 16 빨xe4



16...f5! 17 營f3 单f6 18 单a2 罩c8 The game is even (van Wely – Kobalija, Batumi 1999).

b) 10 a3 Black has the choice between 10...42xc3 11 bc b6 and 10...46f6.

b1) 10... (2)xc3 Upon an analysis of this kind we pick up a peculiar chess principle: nearly always an exchange on c3 justifies itself when the pawn is on a3 and does not justify itself – when the pawn is on a2!

11 bc b6 12 We2 Play in the centre promises White little. For example, 12 金e4 金b7 13 單d3 h6 14 罩d1 罩c8 15 金f4 金d6 16 金g3 單c7 17 罩ac1 罩fd8 18 c4 金xg3 19 hg 包a5 with even chances (Karpov – de Firmian, Oslo 1984).

Possible is 13 Ze1 Ze8 14  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  66 15 Zad1  $\bigcirc$  0.5! (it becomes clear that the programmed c3-c4 can be carried out only by weakening the kinsgide pawn structure) 16 c4  $\pm$  0.5? 17 gf 66 18  $\pm$  0.1  $\pm$  0.2 (1)  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2 20  $\implies$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2  $\pm$  0.2 (Namysio – Podgaets, Dortmund 1993).

13... 2 f6 14 We4 g6 15 2h6



15...⊘a5?! An instructive moment. Moving the knight to a5 is quite often seen in such positions and yet it is not worth doing it without particular need. On c6 the knight controls the c5 square and it can make a timely transfer (via c7) to f5, consolidating the position of the king. But on a5 it often find itsel out of Pay. In the present situation worth considering is 15...&g7 and only after 16&g5 - 16...&2a5 So when a concrete idea is revealed in the manoeuvre &bc6a5, then it is good. On 17&axd8 follows 17...&xe48&c7&xd3; on 17 @c3 - 17...@c7or even <math>17...@d5 with a blockade of the c4 square; on 17 @h4 - 17...@f5with an excellent position.

16  $@44 \ \&g7 \ 17 \ \&xg7 \ &xg7 \ &$ 

Far stronger was 20...f6?; intending on 21 €24 to reply 21...g5 22 ₩33 ₫№K (mistaken is 22...Ξxc3 23 ℤxc3 ₩xd4+ 24 ₫№h | ₩xc3 because of 25 ₩h3). Although even here after 23 ₩h30. White's prospects are superior – namely because Black needs the knight a5 in the region of the f5 square!

However if Black brings the queen to d8 because he fears, on 20...f6, the reply 21 c4, this is wrong: 21... Wd8  $22 \bigcirc g4 g5! 23 \bigcirc g3 h5 24 \bigcirc f2 \bigcirc b3!$ 



Black, as shown by the following variations, is out of danger:

25 息e4 @xc1 26 息xb7 簋xc4;

25 亘b1 ④xd4 26 盒e4 盒xe4 27 亘xd4 盒xb1 28 亘xd8 亘cxd8;

25 宣c3 響xd4 26 響el ②c5 27 힕e4 響e5 28 ፬xb7 響xel+29 莒xel ④xb7 30 菖xe6 菖fe8

b2) 10....2f6 There is not one variation (with the exception of 11 2c4 and 11 Ze1) that does not deserve intensive scrutiny here.

Advancing the statistics for Black in the branch 11 &e3  $\bigotimes$ xc3 12 bc b6, we then have, for example: 13 &c2 g6 14 &h6 &g7 15 &xg7  $\hookrightarrow$ xg7 16  $\Xi$ fe1 &b7 17  $\Xi$ ad1  $\Xi$ e8 18  $\blacksquare$ d2  $\blacksquare$ f6 19  $\Xi$ e4  $\bigotimes$ r2 7 20  $\Xi$ f4  $\bigotimes$ r15 (Frolyanov – Galkin, Toliatti 2003).

b21) 11 盒e4 Here the moves 11...徵d6 and 11...公ce7 are worthy of equal respect.

x) 11...%461? The honour of discovering and working out this branch belogs to Semen Abramovic Furman. Later Hungarian grandmasters took up arms with the system. By reinforcing the d5 square (and not ceding the c5 square which is extremely important for the variation as a whole), Black wants to complete his development by £c8d7.

If White cannot think up something radical in reply, there can be no doubt that Black will achieve an equal game without difficulty: 12 ¥c2 b6 13 ≣d1 \$\overline{2}\$b7 14 \$\overline{2}\$g5 \$\overline{2}\$\$xg5 15 \$\overline{2}\$\$xd5 \$\overline{2}\$\$f6 16 \$\overline{2}\$\$e4 \$\overline{2}\$\$d8 17 \$\overline{2}\$\$e5 \$\overline{2}\$\$wf7 \$\overline{2}\$\$wf7 20 \$\overline{2}\$\$e4 \$\overline{2}\$\$e7 18 \$\overline{3}\$\$f6 \$\overline{2}\$\$ust7 \$\overline{3}\$\$xb7 20 \$\overline{2}\$\$e4 \$\overline{2}\$\$\$e7 18 \$\overline{3}\$\$ \$(Korchnoi - Furman, Leningrad 1963).

White links his hopes to the move 12  $\forall d3$ , and then his further intentions depend on which pawn the opponent advances – g or h.



If 12...b6, then White consistently tries to swap the places of the queen and the bishood 3 - you see by nowBlack cannot play g7·g6, since in thiscase the pawn on h6 is hanging. Andin the event of 12...g6 White tries toshake the pawn triangle f7·g6·h7with the advance h2·h4 with whichwe are already familiar.

However practice shows that these hopes (it goes without saying, upon competent play by Black) are destined not to be fulfilled.

12...h6 Considered the main line, though there is apparently also no contra-indication to 12...g6 13 盒h6 道魯 14 盒xd5 ed 15 ④b5 彎d7 (Aratovsky – Furman, Vilnius 1949).

13 Idl Before placing the queen at the head of the battery along the b1-h7 diagonal, White must defend the d4 pawn. The time comes for Black to find an accurate order of moves.



In his game against Antoshin (Moscow 1970) Furman did not manage this. As a result White achieved the desired reconstruction: 13...**¤d**8?! 14 **@**c2! b6 15 **&**c2! **&**b7 16 **@**d3 with appreciable pressure.

Otherwise Black plays as in the game Filip – Pinter (Budapest 1977): 13...b6 14  $\le 2$   $\le b$ 7 15  $\le c.2$ , and now 15... $\le xc.3$  16 be  $\ge c.2r$ ?? The white queen is not allowed to e4 and in addition the knight is ready to close the weak diagonal, taking up a place on g6 or f5. The game continued 17 a4  $\equiv$ fd8 18  $\le$ d3  $\le$ g6 19  $\le$ d5  $\equiv$ ac8. Black's position is not bad at all.

The most accurate order of moves seems to be 13.... 盒d?!? 14 響e2 **温ac8** 15 盒c2 ②ce?! 16 ③e4 響c7 17 ②c5 **這fd8** 18 響e4 ③g6! (Alburt – Sax, Hastings 1983).

y) 11... Dcc7 Also this move has a logical reason: above all Black wants to take care of the defence of the king's flank, putting off for a while the development of the queenside.

12 2 e5 He could also develop active operations with the help of 12 Bd3 g6 13 2h6. What can Black

do? To exchange the dark-squared bishops – 13...&g? 14 & xg? & xg? – means allowing himself to be drawn into a tedious and rather worse position. For example: 15 & %d  $\Delta f6$ 16 Eacl  $\Delta xc4$  17  $\Delta xc4$  & d7 18  $\Delta e5$ & 6 (Makarichev – Tukmakov, New Delhi 1986). Instead of 13...&g? more interesting is 13...Ee8, and then 14 Efc1 & d7 15  $\Delta e5$   $\Delta xc3$ 16 @xc3.



In the game Podgacts – Kotlerman (Odessa 1971) Black played inaccurately – 16..., 2d5 17 智巧 皇仓 18 蓋act 鱼xe5 19 de 獸h4 20 金d2 置d8 and after 21 置c4! ④h6 22 置b4 金xc4 23 置bxe4 響e7 24 金h6 ran into difficulties.

Kotlerman rejected 16...20f5!?because of 17 &xf5 ef 18 d5, and wrongly: 18...2a4! 19 d4 d6!20 &f4 &b3 21 c4 a64 d622 &c5wc4 leads to an immediate draw.

Incidentally, if Black wants to continue the struggle, he has a way to do this: 19...&c21? (instead of 19...\#d6) 20 d6 &c4 21 &c41 &wa5 22 d7 Ixxe5 23 b41 Ec6! 24 #xf6 #wd5 25 Eadl #xd7 Exf6, and the attempt to restrict the lightsquared bishop by 27 b5?? is no goat in view of 27...g5! 28 &cx5 Eg6 29 f3 皇xf3 30 gf 菖xg5+ 31 雪f2 b6 with equality.

After 12 De5 arises a critical position for the assessment of the idea 11...Dcc7!?



Dubious is 12...g6 13  $\pm$ h6  $\pm$ g7 14  $\pm$ xg7  $\pm$ xg7, as was played in the game Smyslov – Ribli (London 1983). The ex-world champion reacted simply and sensibly: 15  $\pm$ Gc11 b6 16  $\pm$ 2xd5 17  $\pm$ xd5  $\pm$ Xd5 17  $\pm$ xd5  $\pm$ Xd5 18  $\pm$ C7 There is no need to exchange pieces, but there is a need – to start to outplay the opponent. After 18... $\pm$ b7 19  $\pm$ Q4  $\pm$ dd8 20  $\pm$ d1 a5 (20...h5? 21  $\pm$ Xg6+) 21 h4 Vasily Vasilievich developed a strong initiative and later won.

Black was more successful with his manouvres in the game Lemmers -(Germany 2000): Kakhiani 12... @f5!? 13 Zel @de7 14 @f4 2)g6!? (probably, Black rightly rejects the offered pawn; after 14...豐xd4 15 ②g4 豐xd1 16 ②xf6+ gf 17 Haxd1 e5 18 ac1 White has serious compensation) 15 2xg6 hg. Lemmers played 16 \$xf5 gf 17 \$e5 \$d7 18 d5, but did not achieve a draw: 18 ... Ze8! 19 Wd4 @xe5 20 其xe5 嘗c7 21 其ae1 嘗d6 White stands beautifully but that is all.

Instead of 16 &X51 it is interesting to try the immediate 16 d51?, but also here counterplay appears for Black: 16...e51? 17 &X5 ef 18 &c2 @b6 19  $\exists$ b1 &f5 (19...&d7 20  $\exists$ c4) 20 &x55 gf. Retroanalysts will allow themselves to unravel how three black pawns come to be on one file but for practical players, we assume, the arising position must be a matter of taste.

However from the educational point of view we should be mostly interested in the position after 12...d7 13 d7 3 d 4 dh 6 dg15 dx 27 dx 27 16 dx 45 ed 17 df 61



It arose in the game Speelman – Xu Hanbing (Budapest 2000). A position of this kind is typical for the Panov Attack, therefore it is important to understand which method of defence Black should adhere to.

In the above-mentioned game Black played 17...\$c6?!, which is essentially incorrect. The white knight is far more active than the black bishop, and he will not manage to drive it away now (the bishop is hanging on e6). There followed 18 Jacl ¥a5 19 ¥b5! ¥b5 20 Qxb5 a6 21 Qd6 Qf5 22 Qxf5+ &xf5 23 Jac7 Jab8 24 (3') with an enormous positional advantage in the endgame.

In the diagram position Black, in the first instance, needs to drive away the knight from the c5 square. This is achieved by 17...fc1 After 18 2hd7 3td7 19 3b5 2tl ael 2fc7 21 2l ael 2fc7 (it is important to avoid the weakening of the dark squares by the move a7-a6) the endgame is nowhere near as good for White as before. And if he decides to play on a little with queens - 22 3d5 4e7 23 3sc7+ 24 2a4. then follows 24...b61 (this is why it was so important not to play a7-a6), and the game is very close to a draw.

b22) 11 🖀e1



It goes without aying that this move has equal rights to 11 &e4. But for the authors there is one problem: variations in the present branch will constantly be crossing over to variations with 10 &e1 &f6 11 a3 (or with the advance of the a-pawn on the 12m and 13m moves).

Let us deal with it this way: in the present branch we have gathered together all examples with the combination of moves  $\mathbb{E}el$  and a3, and analysed 10  $\mathbb{E}el \triangleq f6$ , refraining from showing games in which at an

early stage the move a2-a3 is seen.

After 11 Zel the first thing that should be made clear is the assessment of the position after 11... $\Omega_x d_1 2 \Omega_x d_4 \Delta_x d_1 13 \Delta_x h_7 +$  $\alpha_x h_7 14 \cong x d_4 \Omega_x 3 15 \cong x c_3. It is$ one qual - with queens White retainssome pressure - but close to equal,for example: 15...fo 16 <math>& 3b 17  $\boxtimes$  c\_2 + &g8 18 Zed1  $\boxtimes$  c7 19  $\boxtimes$  ad &b7 ("Finit" - Golod, Israel 2000).

Furthermore we make clear what happens on 11...2xc3. In fact we have already become familiar, in all its details, with the struggle which offers good chances of equalisation for Black: 12 bc b6 13 h4 &b7 14 20g5 g6 15 Wg4 h5 16 Wg3 2c717 2c4 Ec5 18 Eac1



18...₩d7! (18...€h5?! 19 €xc6! is not actually so bad as one might think at first – after 19...£xh4 20 £xd8 ±xg3 21 £xg3 ≣fxd8 22 £xf5 Black has only a slightly worse endgame, Makarichev – Meduna, Schi 1983) 19 €h3 £xf3 20 ₩xf3 €hd5 21 £h6 £g7 22 £d2 b5! and already Black is playing for a win (C.Hansen – Rbih, Plovdiv 1983).

Black's most frequent reply to 11 Ze1 is 11...\$d7!? A useful developing move, not letting White have control of the e5 square. At the same time is set a mean little positional trick: if White tries to remove the blockade of the d5 square by 12 &e4, then Black replies 12...&ce7, and how then to explain why White played a2-a3?

After 11... & d7 we look at three dull moves -12 @ e2, 12 & c2 and 12 @ e4, not one of them for preference.



12 We2 Incl 13 Oct 42x(41?) (bad is 13...4x(4?) 14 Oct 6 Inc 71 5 Oxt4 Oxt4 16 We4 Oft 51 7 42x(5) 14 Oxt4 4x(44 15 Oct 64 Oft 51 7 42x(5) 14 Oxt4 4x(44 15 Oct 6 We16 16 Oxtes Incl 17 Act 4 Act 6 18 a4 g6 19 Incl 18 Act 6 We16 18 Act 6 Incl Port he exchange, a pawn plus a solid position in the centre – this should be more than enough for a draw (Stocek – Meduna, Larze Bogdanee 1999):

12 金c2 筐c8 13 ④c4 金c7 14 罾d3 g6 15 金d2! (parrying 15...⑤cb4 and in his turn preparing b2-b4) 15...衢b6 16 b4 篇fd8 17 金b3 金e8 18 置ac1 with a space advantage (Gulko-Kaidanov, Key West 1994).

12 De4!? (the pawn sacrifice suggests itself, but in practice its prospects have as yet not been confirmed) 12...\$x44 13 Deg5 (13 Dxd4 Dxd4 14 \$\$c4 \$\$b6 15 \$x45 ed 16 Dc3 De6 17 Dxd5 \$\$d8 with a draw, V. Schmidt – Farago, Baile Herculane 1982) 13...h6 14  $\oplus$ xd4 hg 15  $\oplus$ 15 h(16 h4 gd 17  $\oplus$ h2 g3! 18 fg  $\oplus$ e5 19  $\equiv$ xe5 fe 20  $\oplus$ 13  $\oplus$ b5! White has been completely outplayed (Dreev – Kazimdzhanov, Wijk aan Zee 2002).

c) 10 Ze1 The main position in the Panov Attack which can also easily be reached by transposition of moves from the Queen's Gambit.



 
 We examine Black's possible moves in increasing order of strength: 10...56, 10...42, xc3, 10...42, bt4, 10...47, 10...₩d6, 10...42, f6 and 10...46.

c1) 10...b62 (a blunder) 11 €xd5 ₩xd5 (11...ed 12 &xh7+!, and in any case White wins a pawn, since on 12...\$\phixh7 follows 13 ₩c2+ and 14 ₩xc6) 12 &c4 ₩d6 13 €c5! This is even stronger than 13 ₩c2 &b57 14 &xh7+ \$\phih5 \$\sec4 & \store{\sec4}\$ follows 14 &xh7+ \$\phih5 \$\store{\sec4}\$ follows 14 &xh7+ \$\phih5 \$\store{\sec4}\$ follows 17 & \store{\sec4}\$ follows 19 & \store{\sec4}\$ follows 14 & \store{\sec4}\$ follows 15 & \store{\sec4}\$ follows 16 & \store{\sec4}\$ follows 16 & \store{\sec4}\$ follows 16 & \store{\sec4}\$ follows 16 & \store{\sec4}\$ follows 17 & \store{\sec4}\$ follows 18 & \store{\sec4}\$ f

13...2b7 14 2f4! 2f6 15 2g6 Wxt4 16 2xt8 2xt8 17 Wxt4 2xt4 18 Zad1 Zd8 19 2xc6 and without waiting for 19...2xc6 20 2e5, Black resigned (Brodsky – Kobelev, Perm 1997). c2) **10...a6**?! A shallow move, containing no ideas at all. It is surprisingly played quite often.

11 2c4<sup>3</sup> 2f6 12 2xc6<sup>1</sup> bc 13 2a4 2d7 14 Wc2 2b7 15 2f4 Wa5 16 2c5 2xc5 17 3xc5 Wd8 18 Zd1 The bishop b7 is outrageously bad, and this determines a positional advantage for White (Matanovic – Portisch, Bled 1961).

c3) 10...Dxc3?! A poor version of what is generally an interesting idea. Firstly, the bishop gets to d3 in one move, and not two, secondly. White does not spend time on a2-a3. Saving two tempi in this way has a negative influence on the assessment of Black's position.

11 bc b6 Black fell into a plain and simple trap in the game Keres – Sorokin (Parnu 1960): 11...2 d7?!  $12 \ge f4!? \Xic8 13$  b1! with a double attack on b7 and h7.

12 ₩c2 The diagonal battery can be set up also in reverse order: 12 ₩c2 ab7 13 ₩c4. In the game Mukhin – Pavlenko (Irkutsk 1966) play continued 13...g6 14 ab6 ℤe8 15 ₩g4, and White's attack was very dangerous.

As always, interesting is 12 h4!?, and then:

12...金f6 13 ②g5 g6 14 響f3 兔d7 15 ①e4 兔g7 16 h5 ①e7 17 h6 兔h8 18 兔g5 White is close to victory (Lalic – Stefanova, Dos Hermanas 2002):

12...\$b7 13 2g5 g6



12...g6 (on 12...h6 White will obviously return to the plan 13 We2 2b7 14 We4 13 2h6 We are following the game Winants – Kamsky (Tilburg 1992). White won but Luc Winants was not satisfied with his 13th move, suggesting instead 13 h4!? with the following variations:

13...堂xh4 14 皇h6 邕e8 15 皇b5! 皇d7 16 響e4;

13...皇f6 14 h5 皇g7 15 hg hg 16 ②g5;

13... 2b7 14 h5 全f6 15 hg hg 16 全xg6! fg 17 竇xg6+ 会h8 18 邕xe6 winning.

13...Le8 14 h4 As distinct from the previous variations this is not a pawn sacrifice, since after 14...&xh4? 15 d5! (he cannot take on d5 as then the queen will be continually preoccupied with the bishop on h4) 15...€pa5 16 &b5 White wins immediately.

 16...2.b7 17 h5  $rac{1}{2}$  7 18  $rac{1}{2}$  4  $rac{1}{2}$ 

c4) 10....℃cb4?! 11 &b1 It is not clear whether White needs to include the move 11 &c4 △f6, and only now play 12 &b1 (Botvinnik – Flohr, Groningen 1946). Black voluntarily prepares to lead his knight to f6 – otherwise it is difficult to gainfully employ the second knight on b4.

11.... 156 Also seen is 11... b6 12 a3! 2xc3 13 bc 2d5 14 Wd3, and then:

The position after 11... Df6 presents no little interest for those who habitually play for or against the isolated pawn in the centre.



Which order of moves is the best for White? In the game Keene – Miles (Hastings 1975) White achieved success after 12 &55 bf 13 &65 &67 14  $\Xi$ 63 g6 15  $\Xi$ g3  $\Xi$ 68?! 16 &h6  $\Xi$ 68 17 a3 &66 18 &2xg6! hg 19 &xg6! fg 20 %61. It was Keene himself who pointed out the correct path for Black: 15..&66 16 &h6 %xd8! 17 %xd4 &xd4 18 &xf8 &xf8 with sufficient compensation for the exchange.

We stop for a more detailed examination of the most natural 12 De5 2d7 13 2g5 2c6 14 2e3! 96 (threatening 15 \$xf6 \$xf6 16 @xh7+! @xh7 17 Wh5+ @g8 18 Ih3) 15 Ih3 This is how the game Podgaets - Novak (Bratislava 1967) continued. Black replied routinely: 15 ... Ic8 ?!, violating the main principle in such positions: at the first opportunity unload the position by exchanges! Concretely: 15... ②d7! 16 单h6 里e8 17 单f4 ②xe5! 18 皇xe5 皇f8 19 響g4. There is a complicated game in prospect with some initiative for White.

16  $\oplus 02$  (with the threat of 17 &xf6 &xf6 18  $\oplus$ h6) 16... $\bigcirc$ hd5 17 &d3! (taking the time to include the rook al in the game) 17... $\bigcirc$ xc3 18 &xf6!  $\bigcirc$ d5 19 &xe7  $\oplus$ xe7 20  $\oplus$ h6  $\bigcirc$ t6 (losing is 20...f5 21  $\bigcirc$ xg6 hg 22  $\oplus$ h8+  $\oplus$ t7 23  $\equiv$ h7+) 21  $\bigcirc$ xg6? Easily winning is 21 g41, but White is enticed by a study-like idea on the theme of 'overloading'.

21...Äfd8



22 d5!! The pawn places itself under fourfold attack but it cannot be taken by anything.

Novak played 22...全xd5 and after 23 豐g5! resigned (23...全g7 24 公xf6 豐xf6 25 罩xh7+!).

Also simply losing is 22...2xd523  $wxh7+ crite{18} 24 wh8 mate and 22...2xd5 23 crite{18} 24 crite{18} 24$ 

There is a slightly longer continuation upon 22...ed 23 \u03e15! \u03e17 (on 23...\u03e18 as winning is 24 \u03e1x26! fg 25 \u03e1x16+ \u03e1x16 26 \u03e1x16 + \u03e18 7 \u03e13) 24 \u03e1x16 x16 25 \u03e1x17+ \u03e18 26 \u03e18 + \u03e18 x18 x16 25 \u03e1x17+ \u03e18 26 \u03e18 + \u03e18 x18 y17 \u03e1x18+ \u03e18 26 \u03e18 + \u03e18 x18 y17 \u03e1x18+ \u03e18 27 \u03e18 26 \u03e18+ \u03e18 x18 y18 \u03e18 - \u03e12 27 \u03e18 x18 y18 \u03e18 - \u03e18 27 \u03e18 26 \u03e18 x18 y18 \u03e18 - \u03e18 27 \u03e18 26 \u03e18 x18 y18 \u03e18 - \u03e18 27 \u03e18 26 \u03e18 x18 y18 \u03e18 - \u03e18 27 \u03e18 26 \u03e18 x18 y18 \u03e18 - \u03e18 26 \u03e18 x18 u18 \u03e18 - \u03e18 x18

Finally, it is useless to decline the sacrifice: on 22...&e8 there still follows 23 &xg6! fg 24 @xf6+ @xf6 25 @xh7+ &xf8 26  $\Xi$ f3.

c5) 10... 2 d7 A passive continuation which cannot be recommended.

11 a3 c/xc3 12 bc wa5 13 wc2 g6 14 mb1 wc7 15 mc41 A multi-phene bishop enter the game via the handy 14 square. Then, waiting until the hpawn weakens the pawn cover of the enemy king, the rook will go

(depending on circumstances) to the g4 or h4 square.

**15...b6** 16 ⊈f4 ₩b7 17 ₩c2 △d8 **18** ④c5! In this game Black did not last to the 30<sup>th</sup> move. (Malaniuk – Palat, Geneva 1997).

c6) 10... Wd6 Though rarely played, in terms of quality this move is superior to all the previous ones.

11 a3 Id8 12 Wc2 h6



The attempt to get into h7 here leads nowhere: 13 0xd5 wxd5 $14 \le 2$ ; 7(11 advised trying the pawn sacrifice: 14  $\pm c4$ ? 0xd4 15 0xd4wxd4 16  $\pm c3$ ; 14... $\pm d7$  15  $\pm h7+$  $\pm h8$  16  $\pm c4$   $\pm h5$  17 -2c5 0xc518 de  $\pm ac8$  19 wc2 wc2 20  $\pm xc2$  $\pm c6$ ! (Spassky – Korchnoi, Kiev 1968).

More promising is the plan to grab space on the queen's flank 13 @e4!? #c7 14 b4, familiar to us in the Gulko – Kaidanov game seen above.

14...2d7 15 2d2 Zac8 16 Zac1 Was 17 Wab3 a6 18 2b1 2c819 2c5 White has achieved what he wanted, though Black's position is still very solid (Eingorn – Razuvaev, Tashkent 1980).

c7) 10.... 16 In the Steiner system (see the final section) we analyse a

similar position. But there White succeeded in placing the rook on c1 before starting to set up the battery on the b1-h7 diagonal. Therefore the bishop moved to b1 without detriment to the harmony of the construction.

In the present position White obviously does not succeed in playing  $\mathbb{E}$ cl,  $\mathbb{A}$ bl and  $\mathbb{W}$ d3. Therefore either the rook al remains out of play (after  $\mathbb{A}$ bl) for some time, or the bishop must move to c2.

11 a3 (preventing the knight fork on b4, inevitable upon the construction of the battery) 11...b6



A critical position. White has four main continuations:  $12 \ge 5$ ,  $12 \ge 5$ ,  $12 \ge 5$ ,  $12 \ge 5$ ,  $12 \ge 5$  and  $12 \ge 22$ . Let's look at them.

 however, is quite impossible to realise.

12....2b7 Poor is 12....2xd4? because of 13 2c3 2h5 14 263 2h7 15 2xf5 ef 16 Zad1 268 17 2xd7 2xd7 18 2hd5 2xd8 19 2xd4 2hc5 20 2h23!? 2he6 21 2c5 2g5 22 2xf5 with advantage.

13 ▲a6 ₩c8 14 ▲xb7 ₩xb7 15 Δxc6 ₩xc6 16 d5 ₩c4 17 de fe 18 ₩c2 ₩c2 19 ‰c2 Δc5 20 ▲c3 ▲xc3 21 ¤xc3 Δd5 A great number of drawn games have gone this way, the first of them being Ribli – Kavalek (Tiburg 1980).

c72) 12 \$\overline\$g\$ The motivation for this move is absolutely clear. White is afraid that on 12 \$\overline\$c\$ 20 (2 \$\overline\$b\$) will follow 12...\$\overline\$a6!?, then the introduction of the white bishop to 43 will have to be put off for an indefinite period. Therefore White simply wants to wait until the black bishop comes out to b7 and only then to choose between \$\overline\$c\$ 2 and \$\overline\$b\$].

12... 单b7 13 单c2 We also examine 13 单b1.



The moves 2c2 and 2b1 both free the d3 square for the queen. So what is the principal difference? Well, here it is. If the battery on the b1-h7 diagonal proves to be ineffective then, from its future b1 square, the bishop can go to a2 to support the break d4-d5. However if the bishop at this moment is standing on c2, then it appears logical to transfer it to a4 (particularly with the rook on e8 when the pin on the knight c6 might prove very uppleasant).

Practice has shown that in nearly all the variations Black has an easier game if White moves his bishop to b1. This is how the struggle might continue:

Instead of 20 g4?! worth considering is another, no less sharp operation:



20 III.xc6!? fc 21 2xc6+ ☆h8 22 2yc5 2xyc5 23 2xg5 h6! 24 2xf6+ ☆h7 25 h5 ₩d6 26 III.cl 4xc6+ 27 2xc7 ₩xc7 28 2xg8+. However, in this case White can count only on a draw.

After 13 &c2 there are two main replies: 13... d5 and 13... Ec8.

x) 13... 20d5 If it were so easy to simplify the position, the variation 12 & g5 & b7 13 & c2 would have to be written off and placed in the archives. But, alas: White plays 14 Wd3, and Black is forced to albop hole on h6.

He can try to exchange bishops in another way: 13...66?; 14 & h4; (inferior is  $14 \& A^4$  in view of 14...& d61, Dolmatov – Epishin, Moscow 1995) 14...& h5? But this is a case where the medicine is worse than the disease. White forcibly obtains a great advantage by continuing 15 d5! In the game J.Polgar – Karpov (Budapest 1998) play continued 15...& h4? (better really is 15...ed 16 W d3 f5 17 & xe7Qxe7 18 <math>& 04 – though White has the mitiative, stubbor resistance is still possible) 16 dc &xc6 (or 16...\#xd1 17 &xd1! &xc6 18 De5) 17 De5. Though the game ended in a draw, it is clear that Black is on the brink of defeat.



Then follows the unforescen 16  $\pm xh7 + 1 \oplus xh7 + 7 \oplus xg5 + \oplus h6$ 18 #02 (step by step drawing closer to the enemy king) 18... $\#h5 + 19 \oplus c^2 +$   $\#6h (91...\pm xh4 + 2 \oplus C \oplus c^2 + )2 \oplus g^{-3} \oplus d^{-1}$   $\#g6 + 21 \oplus d^{-3} + 15 + 22 \oplus g^{-3} \oplus d^{-1}$   $23 \equiv xc6 + \equiv ff6 + 24 + d5! White's attack$ can hardly be repulsed.

The very first move of the variation was inaccurate  $-14...2\inftyx3?!$  He should have played at once 14...2xg5! to sacrifice on h7 now is senseless ( $15 \pm xh7+?$  dxh7 $16 \pm 0xg5+ dxg8$   $17 \oplus h5 \pm 0i6$  or  $17 \pm 0xd5 \oplus xd5$   $18 \oplus h5 \oplus f5$ ) and otherwise Black forces exchanges

which are favourable for him: 15  $\triangle xg5$   $\triangle 16$  16  $\triangle ce4$   $\triangle xe4$ 17  $\triangle xe4$  h6 or 15 hg  $\triangle xc3$  16 bc  $\triangle a5$  17  $\triangle ce4$   $\triangle xc4$  18  $\exists xe4$   $\exists xc8$ 19  $\blacksquare d5$ .

**15...Ξe8 16 Δa4** The alternative is 16 **Ξad1**, after which it is dangerous to win a pawn by 16... **Δ**xc3 17 bc!? **Δ**xa3 in view of 18 **Δ**g5!



But dangerous – does not mean impossible. Black has two defensive plans worth considering.

<sup>5</sup> Firstly, the fearless 18...Ωa5!? Any piece going to e4 can now be exchanged off, while afterwards the queen goes to d5 and from being on the defensive side Black immediately goes over to counterattack. To be concrete: 19 Δa4 (on 19 Ψh3 strongest is 19...Ψf61 and if 20 @xh7!? then 20...Ψh8! 21 Δg5 Δf8! with an exchange of queens and the better position 19...Ξe7 20 Ψh3 15!? (20...Ξc7?! – is already too bold: 21 @xh7! Δe7 22 Δe(4) 21 €xe6 Ψd5 22 Qf4 Zwe1 + 23 Exel Ψf7. The first wave of the attack has been beaten off, and though White's position is more pleasant, Black also has repented for his sins. For example:  $24 \ 204 \ 20c4 \ 25 \ 2b3 \ 2d5 \ 2c4 \ 2c$ 

In the game Novikov – Kyrkynakis (Mons 1996) Black did not go in for 18...2a51?, but made an equally worthy move 18...2e71? The mistake on his side followed a move later: 19 ₩g3 &f6?!, and after 20 ₩f4 2a5 21 IEa3 ₩e7 22 IEdel &g7 White afready brought matters to a halt:



23 ②xh7! 含xh7 24 算h3 管f8 25 盒g5+ 含g8 26 管h4 f5 27 管h7+ 含f7 28 算h6!

Instead of 19...\$.46?! the move 19...\$.46?! 20 \$\mathbf{Wh3} suggests itself, 20...\$.2xg5 21 \$\mathbf{k}.xg5 151, then the blockade 22...\$\mathbf{k}.a5 and 23...\$\mathbf{k}.a5. Frankly speaking, White's prospects look very hazy.

16.... 這 c8 16... <sup>2</sup> xc3 17 bc 全 f6 does not produce equality in view of 18 置ad1, and the centre pawns are very mobile. The game Dolmatov – Burmakin (Novgorod 1999) continued: 18... 營d5 19 c4 響h5

20 燮e3 罩ed8, and in this position there was no reason at all for White to reject 21 d5!

17 基ad1 Interesting is 17 包e4 创f6 18 基ac1 響d5 19 包eg5!?



19... $D_{0.51}$  20  $2x_{0.81}$ ? (it is still not too late to back down: 20  $w_{0.2}$   $2x_{0.37}$ + 21  $2x_{0.37}$   $B_{cdS}$  20... $2x_{0.43}$  21  $2x_{17}$ +  $w_{18}$  22  $2x_{0.6}$   $B_{cd}$  23  $2x_{17}$ +  $w_{26}$  24  $2x_{c1}$   $w_{26}$  62  $2x_{17}$ +  $w_{26}$  62  $2x_{16}$   $4x_{16}$   $4x_{16}$ 26  $Ex_{66}$   $2x_{16}$  with a better and possibly also winning endgame for Black.

17...66 18  $c_3xd5$  19  $c_3xd5$  19  $c_3xd5$  14 standard method. White, realising that on  $\pm a4-b3$  in any case follows ad-b3, in good time defends the bishop h6, In whose favour? If the queen leaves d5 without a tempo, White gains a tempo for the advance 4d-d5!

19...\$f6!? It is useless to counter the inevitable break in the centre with the move 19...\$cd8. In the game Uterrow - Lastin (Moscow 1996) White found a forcing way to his objective: 20 \$cb3 \$m55 21 d5! ed 22 \$m56 \$m56 23 \$m57 \$clas 2 \$m56 \$m56 25 \$m57!

20 2.63 It must be acknowledged that in the present branch White finds a move order that is unpleasant for the opponent. All these manoeuvres, reminiscent of a swinging pendulum  $-\hat{\underline{a}}.c^2.a4$ -b3;  $\overline{W}3ec3$ -lead to Black losing control both of the d5 square and the position as a whole. His situation is more difficult.



Unsatisfactory is 20... Wh5? 21 d5! 20d8 22 d6 (Smyslov – Karpov, Leningrad 1971).

Fifteen years later was played 20... #d7 21 d5 (in the event of 21 @e5 Black defended by 21... @xe5 22 de #c6! 23 #g3 &c7) 21...ed 22 #xb6 with advantage (Belyavsky - Karpov, Moscow 1986).

The advantage of the retreat 20...@d81? is that it forces White to 20...@d7 (from 48 the queen this move and 20...@d7 (from 48 the queen cannot move to c6), then he invariably plays 21 @e51 Taking on e5 with the knight is not possible for the above mentioned reasons, while after 21...@xe5 Black, in the game Adams – Dettling (France 2002) waited for the rout: 22 de @c7 23  $\equiv$ L ibfs 24  $\ll$  56  $\oplus$  27  $\leq$  3  $\propto$ 

If however White 'cycles' round the advance d4-d5, then on accurate defence there will be no advantage for him: 21 ¥/4?! ②a5 22 d5 (or 22 2a2 2bc4 23 d5 e5! 24 ₩e4 b5) 22...e5! 23 ₩e3 (more accurate is 23 ₩b4) 23...2xb3 (he can also wait with this move; 23...e4!?) 24 ₩xb3 e4 25 d6 Ze6 26 d7 Ze5 27 h4



This is how the game Malinin -Eliseev (St.Petersburg 1999) went, The passed d7 pawn is very strong but White does not have any other trumps. Black can solve all his problems with the sacrifice of the exchange and himself start to play for a win: 27 ... Eb5 28 Wa2 Ee7 29 2g5 (29 包g5 Ixd7 30 包xf7 Ixd1 31 ②xd8+ 皇d5!) 29...三f5 (it is too late to back down: 29 ... \$xg5?! 30 ②xg5 h6 31 ②xf7! 罩xf7 32 豐e6 or 30... #xd7 31 \#xf7+ #xf7 32 萬xd8+ 萬f8 33 萬d7) 30 @d4 axg5! 31 hg ≜xg5 32 ₩b3 e3! 33 fe 響xd7

y) 13...Ic8!? Since the plan with 13...Icd5 proves to be unsound – Black is still not in a position to maintain the d5 square, then it looks logical to try to utilise this tempt to complete his development.

13... Ites is also suitable for the same purpose, for example: 14 Wd3 g6 15 h4!? Ites 16 Ites 16 Ites 17 Oct 4 (with his 16<sup>th</sup> move White defended himself against the thrust b4, but now

tactics begin on the other side of the board) 17...f5!? 18 (2)c3 (2)xg5 19 (2)xg5 (2)f4 20 (2)c3 (2)xg5 (2)xg5 (2)f4 20 (2)c3 (2)xg2 (2)xg5 (2)xg2 (2)xg5 (2)xg7 (

14 黉d3 g6 15 트ad1 트e8!? Firstly, overprotecting the e6 square, and secondly, preparing the unloading manoeuvre ②f6-d5 (it is important that White cannot move the bishop to h6 with tempo).



Here we have yet another critical position, with its scarcely perceptible finesses and nuances. The plan with ac2-a4 and d4-d5, which recommended itself so well in parallel positions (we recall if only the game Smyslov - Karpov and Belyavsky - Karpov), is no good here: 16 2a4 a6 17 2xf6 2xf6 18 d5 @xc3!! This idea was thought up by M.Podgaets during the Karpov -Anand match (Lausanne 1998), With the unexpected exchange Black fully equalises the game: 19 dc (dubious is 19 ¥xc3?! ed 20 IIxe8+ ¥xe8 21 国xd5 b5) 19... 響xd3 20 国xd3 @xel 21 ch Icl! 22 Idl Ixdl 23 &xd1 &a5 24 De5 b5 25 Dd7 \$c7. A check on f6 - and on the board arises a drawn 'opposite coloured' endgame.

Black is faced with less difficult problems by 16  $\pm$ 03 In the game Balashov – Hort (Vincovci 1976) play continued 16... $\pm$ 05 17  $\pm$ 04  $\pm$ 07!? (Black makes his position more compact and denies the bishop the 16 square) 18  $\pm$ 02  $\pm$ 03 19  $\pm$ 2  $\pm$ 06 20  $\pm$ 05  $\pm$ 05 21  $\pm$ 04 128  $\pm$ 06 20  $\pm$ 05  $\pm$ 05 21  $\pm$ 04 128  $\pm$ 26 $\pm$ 5  $\pm$ 04 23  $\pm$ 1  $\pm$ 08  $\pm$ 128  $\pm$ 26 $\pm$ 5  $\pm$ 04 23  $\pm$ 1  $\pm$ 08  $\pm$ 27  $\pm$ 26  $\pm$ 42  $\pm$ 25  $\pm$ 04?! (it cannot be said that the compensation for the pawn is really so obvious) 25... $\pm$ 08.26  $\pm$ 26  $\pm$ 92  $\pm$ 07 27  $\pm$ 046  $\pm$ x06 28  $\pm$ x06 and in this unclear position the opponents arered a draw.

Instead of 25 ©e4 worth considering 25 ©f3!? ac5 26 Ed2 (only not 26 Ee2? ac41) 26...52 27 h3 ©h6 28 Ec2!, and White gradually forced back the enemy pieces with possibly the slightly better game.

Finally is drawn the blueprint of the plan with 16 h4, likewise not too dangerous in the present situation. Black does not fear the flank attack. but the break in the centre. If he manages to avert or render harmless advance d4-d5, then the the remaining ideas, as a rule, are not capable of causing any harm, for example, 16 ... Wd6 !? 17 We2 Zcd8 18 De4 Dxe4 19 2xe4 Da5 20 @xb7 @xb7 21 d5 @xg5 22 hg 響b8 23 de Ixe6 24 響c4 @c5 25 b4 Ixd1 26 Ixd1 ②e4, draw (lonov -Klimov, Krasnoyarsk 2003).

Let's go over to coping with the straightforward continuations: 12 \u00c0bl and 12 \u00c0c2

c73) 12 2b1 2a6!? It goes without saving, that 12...2b7 is also played,

But why? The risk might be excessive. Thus 13... #d7? loses at once:



14 d5! ed 15 \$25 g6 16 \$\$2x7! (Petrik – Masarik, Slovakia 1997). White wins in exactly the same way on 13..\$\$\$2x8?

It is possible that 12... & a6!? is no stronger than 12... & b7, but the idea – is accurate!

13 <u>\$25</u> <u>\$28</u> 14 <u>\$22</u> 26 15 <u>\$46</u> **\$268** 16 **\$361 \$264** 17 <u>\$262</u> (van Riemsdijk - Campora, Resife 1991). The simplest way for Black to equalise here is by 17... £0d5! 18 £0e4 €)f6.

c74) 12 & c2 The main continuation, and with a clear choice of reply - 12...&b7 or 12...&a6

x) 12....2b7 13 Wd3 g6 From the above mentioned it is clear that 13...Wd7? or 13...Zc8? are both losing because of 14 d5! For the same reason 13...⊒e8? is weak. Black does not lose at once – after 14 d5! ed 15 &g5 there is 15...⊙e4 16 @xe4 de 17 ∰xe4 g6, and the bishop e7 is defended. Nevertheless White can penetrate the opponent's defence and in a way that has long been known: 18 ∰h4 ₩c7 19 &b5! (threatening a strike on (7) 19...h5 20 @xe4! &g7



21 &xf? &xf? 22 &h6! The first time White won in such a way was in the game Stoica – Flis (Polanica Zdroj 1983).

14 2h6 (compared to the variations with 12 2g5 White has gained a tempo - the bishop went to h6 in one move, and not two) 14 ... He8 15 Had1 If he wants, White can return the tempo so as again to try to carry out the plan with the bishop to g5 and the sprint of the h-pawn 15 h4 Ic8 16 皇g5 ②d5 17 罩ad1. We have already examined quite a lot of examples on this theme and in the majority of cases Black succeeds in equalising the game. Here is one more: 17... \$xg5 18 @xg5 @xc3 19 bc (Georgadze - Makarichev, Vilnius 1980) 19 (如何1 20 c4 (初行)

After 15 Zad1 arises the tabiya of the system 12 2c2. White's plan is to attack the enemy king and this attack has great chances of success, if he begins not on the king's flank, but in the centre (the break d4-d5!).

The general line of defence is to exchange, exchange and exchange again. And the support of the d5 square is like a springboard for these exchanges.



Practical material on this position is more than sufficient, however the exact move order up to now has still not been established. The theory of the variation has not come together as an entity. Therefore Black's possibilities  $-15...\&R_0$ ,  $15...\&R_0$ ,  $15...\&R_0$ ,  $15...\&R_0$ , and  $15...\&R_0$  for  $15...\&R_0$  and  $15...\&R_0$  for  $15...\&R_0$  and  $15...\&R_0$  for  $15...\&R_0$  and  $15...\&R_0$  for  $15...\&R_0$  for

21....  $e^7$  22  $e^7$  4. In order not to lose the knight, Black pays off a pawn – 22...h6, but it cannot save the game.

15...\"e7 has still not been analysed very much. Black frees the d-file for both of his rooks, while the queen creates threats against the king along the b8-h2 diagonal (in combination with a jump of the knight to g4).

In the game Kharlov – Nisipeanu (Ljubliana 2002) was played 16 &b3 Zad8 (16.. $\textcircled{D}_{24}$  17  $\Xi$ xe6): 17 h3, and Black held the position by means of 17...a6 18 d5  $\textcircled{D}_{25}$  – the vis-a-vis of the queen d3 and the rook d8 is obviously in his favour.

More concrete is 16  $\triangle$ b5!?  $\mathbb{W}17$ 17 &a4. Interesting things happened (and to be more precise, did not happen) in the game Borik – Seiger (Stutgart 1979): 17...a6 18  $\triangle$ c3 b5 19 &b3  $\mathbb{W}7$  (if Black realised the risks he was taking he would have started with 19... $\triangle$ g4) 20 d5! ed 21  $\triangle$ ac4  $\Im$ c45 2  $\mathbb{W}$ #c35 &R



The German master Otto Borik here exchanged on 18; the game soon ended in a draw. It was left to the cadre to play a combination, leading to an endgame with an extra pawn for White: 23  $\frac{1}{2}$  af7+!  $\frac{1}{2}$  war7 24  $\frac{1}{2}$  af7+? 25... 金g8 26 호xf8 罩xel+ 27 ②xel 罩xf8 28 罩xb7 罩e8 29 金f1 ③a5 30 罩a7 ③c4 31 ④f3;

25...Ξe7 26 Ξexe7+ ᡚxe7 27 ᡚe5+ ጬe6 28 ゑxf8 Ξxf8 29 Ξxb7 Ξc8 30 ᡚd3 Ξc2 31 h4.

In the present position **15...\#d6** looks dubious. As also with **15...\#c7**, Black wants to make way for the rook to go to d8, while the queen is tucked away in the region of the b8 and a8 squares.

19...公xd5 20 公xd5 ed 21 ④e5 響e8 22 罩c1, and Black suffers material loss;

19...ed 20  $\triangleq$ g5 a6 21  $\triangleq$ xc6!  $\triangleq$ xc6 22  $\blacksquare$ d4 with a double attack on b6 and f6.

For purposes of training we also look at the plan 16 h4!? Tad8 17 &g5, and more concretely – the encounter Yusupov – Lobron (Nussloch 1996). After 17...₩b8 18 &b3 arises the first critical position in this same.



The Slovakian grandmaster Ljubomir Ftacnik preferred here 18... $\Phi$ a5. An extraordinarily dubious recommendation! With the blow 19  $\Delta$ xe6! Fe 20  $\equiv$ Xxe6 White tips the balance in his favour:



20... 2d5 21 프xg6+! hg 22 빨xg6+ \$\Delta h8 23 @e5 프f8 24 프d3!;

20...0g4 (a desperate counterattack) 21 2xe7 2xf3 22 Wxf3 Wh2+ 23 Cf1  $\blacksquare$ d7 24 Wxg4  $\blacksquare$ dxe7 25 d5!, repulses all the attacks;

20... $cr(7 21 \Omega_{25}+1)$  cr(7) the takes the rook, the king is mated: 21...cr(8) cost 22 Wh3+ cr(8) cost 2 Wf3+ cr(8) cost 24 Wf3+  $\Omega_{24}$  25 Wf7 mate) 22 h5! (apart from other things, he threatens to win back the piece after 23 h6+) 22...Zaf6 23 Zado Wad6 24 h64  $\Omega_{25}$ (or 24... $\Omega_{26}$  25 cr(8) cost 24 h64  $\Omega_{25}$ (or 24... $\Omega_{26}$  25 cr(8) cost 24 h64  $\Omega_{25}$ (or 24... $\Omega_{26}$  25 cr(8) cost 25 cr(8) cost material equality;

20....Rd6 21 &f4 Exe6 22 &xb8 Exb8 (nominally, for the queen Black botains sufficient material equivalent, however his disconnected pieces prevent him from putting right his game) 23 b4 &xf3 (a forced exchange, since 23...@c6 is bad because of 24 Qp5 Ed6 25 @c4+) 24 @xf3 Qvc4 25 @b5. The threats on the a2-g8 diagonal, together with the advance of the d-pawn, allow us to assess the position in White's favour.

Lobron played 18...a6 and on 19 d5! – 19... @a5, allowing Yusupov to finish the game brilliantly:



20 de!! 公xb3 (on 20...基xd3 follows 21 ef+ 金g7 22 fe署 變k8 23 重xd3 公xb3 24 置de3 金f7 25 &xf6 金xf6 26 置e6+ 金f7 27 公g5+) 21 ef+ 金xf7 22 變c4+ 金g7 23 公e5! Soon Black resigned.

**15...** ⊘**d5**?? is played quite often. After 16 兔a4 a6 the plan that suggests itself is to prepare a pawn break in the centre: an exchange on d5, 斷d3-e3, 兔a4-b3 and, finally, d4-d5!

Perhaps there is no great practical interest in the position after 16 h4!?  $\textcircled{}_{2xc3}$  17 be!?  $\textcircled{}_{2xa3}$ , but in analysis we cannot ignore it. What carries more weight: the pawn or the attack?

Upon 18 h5 Wd5 the attack is obviously insufficient:

19 hg hg 20 c4 營h5 21 營xa3 營xh6 22 d5 ed 23 cd 簋xe1+ 24 簋xe1 ④a5 25 d6 簋d8 26 奠c4 營f4!;

19 皇g5 皇e7 20 響e3 勾a5 21 hg hg 22 皇xe7 喜xe7 23 響f4 當g7!

More interesting is 18 ②g5!? ④e7 19 h5 ④f5 20 hg hg 21 斷h3.



White's idea is revealed upon 21...&e7? 22&e7?!!  $\&xg7 23 \ \mbox{\ensuremath{\#}n7}$  $\&xf6 24 \ \mbox{\ensuremath{\#}n7} + \&xg5 25 \ \mbox{\ensuremath{\#}n6} xe5 \ \mbox{\ensuremath{\#}n7} + \&xg5 25 \ \mbox{\ensuremath{\#}n8} xe5 \ \mbox{\ensuremath{m}n8} xe5 \ \mbox{\ensu$ 

A brilliant combination but it did not prompt the right defence: 21...\#f6! The bishop on h6 gets in the way, preventing his pieces from concluding the attack. After 22  $\bigcirc$ 44 (22 &18 &b2! 23 f4 &xc3) 22...\#f8! 23 \#f3 &h6 24  $\bigcirc$ 16  $\div$  4 ff 25  $\bigcirc$ 17 &g7 26 &xb7  $\bigcirc$ 194 already Black is creating threats against the enemy kine.

The most popular reply to 15 **Ead1** is **15...Ec8** Upon this idea Qife-d5 has not been completely taken off the agenda but merely postponed. In several variations (for example, with a black knight on d5 and a white one on e4) the position of the rook on e8 gives Black the possibility of winning a pawn by Qie-b4!

16 单b3 Of the remaining continuations we see the following:

16 h4!? 令d5 17 令g5 象f6 18 令xd5 ed (mistaken is 18... 螢xd5 19 象b3 螢xd4 in view of 20 令xf7!) 19 令f3 螢d7 20 b4 寬xe1+21 冨xe1 蓋e8 with chances of equalising;

16 \$f4!? Of course it is hard to believe that White voluntarily played the bishop from h6 to f4. But, firstly, we have already carried out a sufficient examination of positions with the development of the bishop on g5 and h6, and quite a few - with the bishop on f4. And secondly, to be concrete, in this position flow a great number of variations from the Panov Attack and other openings. In order not to make unsubstantiated statements we take a well-known variation of the Nimzo-Indian defence (A54): 1 d4 4)f6 2 c4 e6 3 @c3 \$b4 4 e3 0-0 5 \$d3 d5 6 @f3 c5 7 0-0 dc 8 \$xc4 cd 9 ed b6 10 \$e1 \$b7 11 \$d3 \$c6 12 a3 \$e7 13 \$c2 Ze8 14 響d3 g6 15 桌f4 Zc8 16 Zad1 - and we have the sought-for position.

We continue the game: 16...24317  $\Delta e5 \Delta d518 \& d2 \Delta c319 \& xc3 \& d56 (apparently more accurate than$ 19...<math>& d51? with the aim of exchanging the active white knight by 20...264; the game Mecking – Polugaevsky, Lucerne 1977, ended in a draw by repetition of moves: 20 & a44 $\Xi f8 21 \Delta d7 \Xi e8) 20 Wg3 \& d55$ 21 Wf4 (with the threat of 22 & a4) $<math>21...\Xi f8 22 L64?$ 



In the game Podgaets – Buturnin (Donetsk 1976) Black decided not to accept the pawn sacrifice:  $22... \textcircled{0}{4}?!$ After 23  $\pounds$ df (it is very important to remove the black bishop from the blockading square d5)  $23... \pounds$ xe4 24 ∰xe4  $\textcircled{0}{d}$ 6 25 ∰G  $\textcircled{0}{5}$ 76 d5! White continued the attack with material equality.

The more principled 22...&xh4!? 23  $\Xi$ d3 (it is necessary for the rook transfer to the king's flank) 23...&g524  $\$  &hcm] 2 &hc



30 @fb6! Not hurrying to win back the piece, otherwise the attack will remain just a memory. However, objectively Black has sufficient resources to beat off this furious onslaught. There could follow  $30... \pm 62^3$  (only not  $30... \pm 66^2$ ) because of  $31 \pm 3xg61$   $31 \pm 3h2!^2$ (surrounding the enemy rook)  $31... \pm 64 \pm 32 \pm 63 \pm 64 \pm 33 \pm 62! \pm 61$  draw) 35  $\equiv xf1 \cong c3$  36  $\equiv g1 \cong xc2+$ 37  $\equiv g2 \cong f5$  38  $ef \cong xf6$  39  $\equiv fd2 \cong c3$ 40  $\equiv d3! \cong f6$  41  $\Leftrightarrow h3 \equiv g5!$  42 fg $\equiv ff1+$  43  $\Rightarrow g4$  f5+ 44  $gf \cong f5+$ 45  $\Leftrightarrow h4 \cong xf6+$  with perpetual check.

16... $\bigcirc$ a5 17  $\bigcirc$ a2  $\bigcirc$ d5 18  $\bigcirc$ e4!? The alternative, and quite a serious one, is 18  $\bigcirc$ e5!? The queen is transferred to the king's flank; Black is forced to be on the alert, since a sacrifice on f7 is in the air.

But it is not all so gloomy. In the game Grigorian – Machulsky (Chelyabinsk 1975) Black found the best defence: 18...\$f8 19 ¥h3 Axc31 20 bc åd5! After 21 åxd5 Machulsky took on d5 with the pawn; we would prefer 21...\$xd5!? 22 åxf8 ≦xf8 23 £33 åg2 72 4 ¥h4 Ac4 25 ≦h3 h5 26 g4 ¥d8! with approximately equal chances.

18...216 19 20eg5 Maintaining the tension around the enemy king. Tempting but weak is 19 20x164 2x16 20 b4 20c 21 d5 ed 22 3xc8+ Wxc8 23 2 4xd5 3d8 24 Wb3 in view of 24...12d7! (threatening 25...2d94!) 25 2s 32 3d8! with equality.

19...\$d5



20 € 147? An interesting but by no means winning combination. The other thing is that White, with his

previous moves, has driven himself into a corner and is now simply forced to sacrifice a knight. Moving the bishop to b1 is not possible – after 20... $20_{24}$  the bishop h6 is lost; no is there any hint of advantage upon 20  $\pm$ xd5  $\pm$ Xd5 21  $\pm$ c1  $\pm$ xc1 22  $\pm$ xc1  $\pm$ Dh7 23  $\pm$ c2  $\pm$ 2dd 24  $\pm$ xce5? (this tactical operation is also forced) 24... $\pm$ f61  $\pm$ 25  $\pm$ Xd8  $\pm$ xc2 26  $\pm$ 2c6  $\pm$ Zh2 27  $\pm$ Xa7  $\pm$ g7 28  $\pm$ xg7  $\pm$ xg7  $\pm$ xg7. The activity of the pieces compensates for the small material deficit.

20...\$xf7 21 €µe5+ ±g8 22 €µg61 (reckoning on 22...\$xa2? 23 ₩g3 ⊆h6 24 €µc8+7 ±\$r7 25 ₩f3+) 22...\$d6! This is how the game Lekhtivara - Gheorghiu (Lenk 1992) went. White, not able to continue to trade blows at a high level, played 23 \$\overline{L}\$1?] and after 23...\$\overline{L}\$?

He should go in for 23 265!? If now 23...2c7, then 24 232 4bc25 2c5! 2xa2 26 2bcchance of increasing the attack.

The duel, with an absolutely unpredictable result, proceeded 23...@c7! 24  $\pm b1!$  (weaker is 24 @g3+  $\pm h8$  25 @c1 @c7)24... $\oplus c6!$  25 @g3+  $\pm h8$  26 @h4 $\pm xe5$  27  $de \oplus 828 \&g5$ 

The last variation is a model for all systems with 12...\$b7. The resources of attack and defence balance each other out; it is not so much lengthy analysis, the game continues to be balanced in an atmosphere of unstable equilibrium.

y) 12 ... 2 a6!? The idea of this move provokes no doubt at all -

Black prevents the development of the queen to d3.



Let's look at the consequences of the following possibilities: 13 0 let, 13 0 d2, 13 1 d4, 13 b4 and 13 0 g5. The last in this series of moves is the main line.

13  $\bigcirc$  264?;  $\exists cs$  14  $\bigcirc$  2625  $\blacksquare$  36 15 & 474 h6 16  $\bigcirc$  46  $\exists$  fd8 17  $\bigcirc$  25  $\blacksquare$  47 18 & 4a  $\blacksquare$  67 19  $\blacksquare$  22 & 18 20  $\exists$  ad & 42 12 & 65  $\bigcirc$  x62 52 & 22  $\bigotimes$  x65 b5 23  $\bigcirc$  x64 bc 24  $\blacksquare$  22  $\blacksquare$  b6 (Kolin – Dettling, Aviles 2000). It is possible to draw some conclusions; they are not comforting for White. The loss of a mass of tempi and the fact that the d4 pawn is hanging (and will probably soon be lost) means Black has a great advantage; he played the rest of the game strongly and won.

Why do we show this game? To demonstrate how dangerous planless play by White can be in such positions. In this sense it is easier for Black: he should not allow the break d4-d5, keep his king secure and, indeed, steadily exchange pieces (of course, this is too primitive a scheme, but all the same...) White should be a master of attack, who knows the value of each of his moves. To attack in positions with an isolani – is a lofty art! 13 "#d2!? An original plan – White intends to transfer the queen to the king's flank, leaving the bishop c1 'in store'.

From Black is required a little bit of prophylaxis: 13...@dd! (the f4 square is taken under control, while on 14 @g5 it is possible to simply gobble up the centre pawns) 14  $\exists dl$ (insisting on @d2-g5)14...h(6 (Black is alert) 15  $@el \exists ac8$  16  $\pounds e4 \ \pounds xe4$ (T@xe4 f5 18  $@el \ ac4$ ! (the bishop on d5 is not cought to make Black completely happy) 19  $\pounds c5 \ \pounds xe5$ 20 de @c6. Nothing remains of White's idea.

13 & (44 (as distinct from 13 & gc), 'loading' Black's king's flank, this move pursues only the aim of a free development) 13... $\mathbb{E}$ (8 14  $\mathbb{E}$ c) &(4 15 & gc)?( Timma – Karpov, Wijk and Zee 1998) 15...b5! (15...c)d5 16  $\bigcirc$ (24! – this is why earlier White removed the bishop from attack) 16 b3 (it would only be worse after 16 d3?(1) 41.7  $\bigcirc$ (24  $\bigcirc$ (24 18 &xc4 &d5) 16..&d5 17  $\bigcirc$ Ad5 (the pawn is inedible: 17  $\bigcirc$ Ad5?(ad 18  $\bigcirc$ c3 &xf3 19  $\bigotimes$ (35  $\bigcirc$ Ad4) 17... $\bigcirc$ Xd5 18  $\bigotimes$ d3 g6 19 b4  $\bigotimes$ b6 20 &h3  $\boxtimes$ ffd8 and Black has no difficulties.

13 b4!? We have probably not come across this plan before in the pages of our book.



In the encounters looked at above White played b2-b4 simply in order to occupy space on the queen's flank (mainly to prop up the outpost on c5). Here the picture is principally different: the c5 square is covered, but White plays 13 b4 to win a piece on the following move!

Possibly because of the fear of falling victim to a pawn fork b4-b5, Black rejected 12...\$a6 in favour of the more modest (but also more safe) 12...\$b7. In fact he does not need to be afraid of 13 b4; there is a reliable way of rendering all threats harmless.

The most natural move 13...\$c4 is just not reliable. After 14 b5 ⊘a5 15 ⊘c5 IIc8 16 IIc3 clouds begin to gather over the black king.



16...\$\$\\$d6, 16...\$\$ and 16...\$\$ and 16...\$\$ and 16...\$\$ look at these moves in detail.

Bad is 16...&d6?! 17  $\mathbb{Z}h3$  all by itself and in combination with 17...&xcS? (better really is 17...g6, though after 18 &h6  $\mathbb{Z}e8$  19 073 and White has the initiative) which is linked to a complete miscalculation: 18 dc 0xd1+19 @xd1 &xb5 20 @xc3and to avoid the deadly check on h7, Black has to give up the exchange on c3 (Dizdar - Laketic, Kladovo 1990).

Totally unconvincing is 16...a6?Instead of slowing down the attack on his own king, Black starts to dig in on the opposite side of the board. In addition he loses a pawn: 17 Th3 g6Is ba 2xa6 19 2xh6 Zee 20 2a4 b5 21 42xh5 Wb6 22 Th1 ZedK 23 2a542c4 (Oral – Zenkluisen, Berne 1998). Of course the outcome of the struggle is still not clear right to the end – the white pieces find themselves in a hanging state.



In connection with this, worth considering is  $24 \quad @g4!? \quad @xg4 \ (or$  $<math>4x \quad @d5 \ 25 \quad &xe7 \quad @xe7 \ 26 \quad &ge1!$ with a very strong attack)  $25 \quad &xe7 \quad &xe7 \quad &xe5 \quad &xe7 \quad &xe5 \quad &xe7 \quad &xe5 \quad &xe7 \quad &xe5 \quad &xe7 \quad &xe8 \quad &$ 

Dangerous is 16...g6 when, after 17 置h3 盒d5 (Buturin – Savon, Lvov 1981), the recommendation of Savon 18 盒h6 置e8 19 營d2 followed by 20 營f4 leads to an advantage for White.

Viswanathan Anand thought up the move 16... **2**c7, including the rook in the defence of the t7 square. Though the experiment (in the game Kaidanov – Anand, Moscow 1987) ended in failure, the plan of the Indian grandmaster cannot be underestimated:



There is no doubt that White undertook the exchange on the 17<sup>th</sup> move (and the sacrifice of the piece that followed) because he miscalculated the variations before the diagram position and concluded that he would win. As indeed he did. Black played 24... $\pm$ R87 and after 25... $\pm$ R17+1! resigned in view of 25... $\pm$ R17/26 Cag6+  $\pm$ g8 27  $\pm$ R8 mate.

Anand blundered into a mate in three moves. These things happen. But objectively the piece sacrifice did not promise White more than a draw. Instead of 24...\$(\$) he should play 24...\$(\$), and after 25 Ελxg6 fg 26 \$xg6+ \$g7 27 Ωg5 \$(\$) White should repeat moves: 28 Εh7+ etc. It is necessary to do this immediately; if he leaves it a move later the chance will have already gone. For example, 28 ≡Å\$(\$), and it is too late to play 29 创h7+ in view of 29... 金e7 30 響xg7+ 金d8 31 響g5+ 金c8 32 创f6 罩d8.

And so the natural move 13...&c4?! does not justify the trust placed upon it. So reject it. It's no great loss because all problems are solved by 13...**Z**c8!



If White stubbornly continues 14 b5?! then all Black's pieces will, in order, take up their best positions: 14... むあう! 15 輩d3 金b7 16 ひら 響で7 17 置名 g6 18 單d1 むd5 19 むxd5 金xd5 etc. (Pukhlya - Ostenstad, Slupsk 1987).

Instead of 14...\$\dot\$2 the move 14...\$\dot\$2 the move difference with the branch 13...\$\dot\$2 cd?! is obvious: there White's darksquared bishop was the main spearhead of the attack, whereas here it vegetates on the forgotten (though long) diagonal al-h8. It is enough to deny this bishop play (and Black does this by firmly maintaining the blockade of the d5 square), and then he can boldly count not only on equalisation but also on taking over the initiative:



15 變d2 ②d5! 16 ②e4 a5 17 ba ②xa5 18 變d1 盒a6 (Mortensen – Ostenstad, Torshaven 1987);

15 b5  $\hat{\Theta}_{a5}$  16  $\hat{\Theta}_{c5}$   $\hat{\Theta}_{d5!}$  17  $\hat{\Phi}_{xd5}$  $\hat{g}_{xd5}$ , and the piece sacrifice made in the game Lanka – Ostenstad (Trnava 1989) 18  $\hat{g}_{xh7+?}$   $\hat{g}_{xh7}$  19 Wh5+ $\hat{g}_{g52}$  20  $\mathbb{E}_{c3}$  was incorrect because of 20... $\hat{g}_{h4!}$  21 f4 (21  $\mathbb{H}_{3}$   $\mathbb{W}_{g5!}$ ) 21... $\mathbb{E}_{c2}$ .

13 息g5!? We hope that our review of the previous variations will convince you, to one or other extent, that they are harmless for Black. Quite another matter is the thrust of the bishop to g5. If White is allowed to place his pieces unhindered, according to the scheme: 變12, **Ead**1, 變14, then the further attack will develop all by itself.

Black should hurry with counterplay!

13...2c8 14 2d2!? Far weaker is 14 2c1 2d5. Only by 15 h4!? could Black be given some trouble, and

only then if he himself helps the opponent. As, for example, in the game Borge - Danielsen (Denmark 1998): 15...@xc3?! (usually, if Black reinforces the opponent's pawn centre, then in return he will at least manage to gobble up a3; here however there can be no question of this) 16 bc h6 17 2xe7 2xe7 (looking verv dangerous is 17... 響xe7!? 18 盒b1 菖fd8 19 響c2 ₩f6 20 ₩h7+ \$f8, but there is apparently no mate) 18 2b1. In this position worth considering is 18 ... Df5!? (when so much damage has already been done, he must grab any chance he can) 19 axf5 ef 20 Wc2 皇b7 or 19 d5 ②xh4 20 ②xh4 豐xh4 21 Wc2 g6 22 de ac4! with chances of stubborn resistance.

The problem is resolved by the very simple  $15...\underline{a} < 4!$  16  $\underline{a} \times c7$  (not dangerous is 16  $\underline{a} < 0.22$ ;  $\underline{a} \times g5$  17 hg  $\underline{b} \times 41$  18  $\underline{a} \times h7 + \underline{a} \times h7$  19  $\underline{b} \times c4$   $\underline{b} < 4$   $\underline{b} < c7$  17  $\underline{b} < 0.22$   $\underline{c} \times c3$  18 be  $\underline{b} < a5$  19  $\underline{m} 5$  g6 20  $\underline{w} g4$   $\underline{a} < 5!$  with an excellent position.

The last variation shows that 14 Idc 1 is shown to be a loss of time after 14...2d5! But also upon 14 Idd 2, more in keeping with the spirit of the position, Black has nothing to fear.



14... **©d5**! Simple and reliable. But you will always find creative chessplayers who want to leave the beaten track. For example, instead of the knight, it is possible to try to establish the bishop on d5:

14... 盒 c4?! 15 賀仔 盒d5. After 16 賀h4 g6 White, in the game Sturua - Kutrov (Erevan 1996), placed his pieces ideally - 17 公式5 公式5 18 蓋ad1 電d6 19 金b3 - and soon gained victory.

Instead of 16...g6 worth considering is 16...h6!?, rejected as defective by many commentators. Sturna considered that White would gain the advantage by  $17 \exp 3 \pi 3$ 18 &  $\pm 63$  but he did not notice 18... $\exp 4!$  There and then the assessment of the position is changed.

Certainly, on 16...h6 we should first look at 17 @xh6!?, but even here the concrete variations are pleasant for Black: 17 ... \$xf3! (an important intermediate move) 18 ≜x97 (mistaken is 18 gf? because of 18... ②xd4 19 當h1 ②xc2 20 拿xg7 22 鼍ad1 (or 22 邕e4!? 邕c5! 23 邕g4+ 皇g5 24 篇d1 篇h8!) 22... @xe1 and to avoid worse White must force a draw by perpetual check.

14...&c4?! cannot be recommended but it is useful to investigate such a variation – this helps us to feel acutely how great are the defensive resources in this kind of position.

Also dubious is 14...②a5?! 15 宣ad1 ②c4. After 16 實c1 White is all ready for the break d4-d5, for example, 16...2b7 17 d5! 2xd5 18 2xd5 ed 19 2d4 with a strong initiative.

In the game Novik – Vasyukov (St.Petersburg 1991) Black played more sharply: 16...\"c7 17 d5! \Dxb2!?



There followed 18 dcf  $\Re_{xc2}$  19 de  $\langle 2xd1$ . White hastens to unload this extraordinarily tense situation by taking on f8 and d1. The game ended in a draw. Later Maxim Novik pointed out the possibility 20 &xf61  $\Re_{xc2}$  21  $\Re_{yc1}$  After 21... $\Re_{yc2}$  cf  $\Re_{xc1}$  22 cf  $\Re_{xc1}$  42  $\Re_{xc2}$  32  $\Re_{xc2}$  64 &c7 Black was forced to part with the exchange since in the event of  $A_{xc1}$  Rex 22 E Rd1  $\Xi_{xc1}$  26 &d 26 &d 84 &d &h 50 h 5

15 Øxd5 Since White cannot avoid exchanges, he should endeavour to produce a more favourable situation for himself.

The encounter Voitsekhovsky – Galkin (St.Petersburg 1998) flowed in dynamic vein: 15 蓝adl 소xg5 16 신xg5 h6 17 신금 신xc3 (17...\$c4!? does not look bad) 18 bc 留d6 19 월e3 신e7 20 활e4 g6 21 빨h4 \$e7.



Strategically the position is hopeless for White in view of the numerous weaknesses on the queen's flank. Voitsekhovsky exploited his orne chance of sharpening the struggle: 22 d5!? @xd5 23 @d4+. Also here Black falters, making it three inaccurate moves in a row – 23...@h7 24 @c5 @c7 25 @g4 %D6After 26 @xg6+! fg 27 @xg6+ @h828 @d7! and by now White could notbe stopped.

He needs to defend against the generally transparent threats in another way: 23... 288! 24 De5

25 響g4 包f6 26 響h4 響xc3 27 響xf6 響xc2 28 包d7 息b7;

25 c4 Wc3 26 2xg6 Wxd4 27 Ixd4 fg 28 cd ed. Everywhere the assessment of the position fluctuates from 'good' to 'winning' for Black.

15... Wxd5 16 h4!? Makarichev recommends here 16 &c4 Wd8 17 W4!? But Black's task against this does not change – first of all he needs to induce exchanges of the opponent's pieces: 17... Wd6! 18 Zac1 (or 18 Wh4 h6 19 £xc7 7xc7) 18... Wxf4 19 £xc74 Cas. 16... \$ xg5 17 hg



This position first arose in the game Novikov – Podgaets (Koszalin 1998). Black did not cope with the problem:  $17...6x^{27}$ ! 18 &c4 @d6 19  $\oplus$ c5  $\oplus$ c6 conclude the game beautifully: 21 @f4  $\mathbb{Z}_{22}$  22  $\mathbb{Z}_{23}$   $\mathbb{Z}_{32}$   $\mathbb{Z}_{32}$   $\mathbb{Z}_{32}$  $\mathbb{W}_{34}$   $\mathbb{Z}_{22}$   $\mathbb{Z}_{42}$   $\mathbb{Z}_{42}$   $\mathbb{Z}_{42}$   $\mathbb{Z}_{42}$ 

The truth was staring him in the face:  $17...\bigcirc xd4$  ! 8  $\oslash xd4$  e5 Black wins back the piece, achieving an equal or even slightly better game: &15 (10 &b3  $\bigotimes$ d4 20  $\bigotimes$ xd7  $\bigotimes$  13  $\bigotimes$  20  $\bigotimes$ xd7  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$  $\bigotimes$  2  $\bigotimes$ 

The variation  $10...\Omega 16$  recommends itself as a solid and reliable line. Because it is not possible to play an immediate 10...b6? in view of 11  $\Omega_{Xd} S \cong Xd5$  12  $\Delta_{cd}$ 4, Black first takes his knight out of the firing line and then develops his queen's flank. We see how this works from the variation  $10...\Delta 16$  11 3 b6 12  $\Delta_{c2}$ where Black's light-squared bishop not only can be developed on b7, but also on a6, delaying the activation of the white pieces. After that the knight will return to d5 and by means of exchanges Black will urge on the position to equality.

Another popular plan is  $2c^{-}6$ followed by  $2c^{-}c^{-}$ . Upon this the light-squared bishop is introduced on the long diagonal via the route d7-c6.

c8) 10...\$ f6 11 \$e4 The idea of sacrificing a pawn - 11 @e4!? &xd4 12 (a)xd4 (b)xd4 - has arisen quite recently and a general opinion about the correctness of this plan has still not been formed. Up to now Black has mostly succeeded in opponent's extinguishing the initiative, for example: 13 Wh5 f5 14 皇g5 響e8 15 響xe8 冪xe8 16 回d6 ≣f8 (Sulskis - H.Olafsson, Istanbul 2003), and here it is worth giving the preference to 17 ad1!? h6 18 ac4 . ②f3+ 19 gf hg 20 皇xd5 with an unclear endgame.

With the move 11 2c4 White tries to remove the blockade on the d5 square. A critical position is reached.



There are two main replies: 11...@d6 and 11...@cc7, but the strongest is the last one. Apart from these, we should mention separately 11...h6!?- Black, before bringing the knight to c7, avoids the possible 12 &25 r12 &25. These are played very rarely (apparently, in such a tense situation one does not spend time on prophylaxis), but there is no refutation of 11...h6. This is how events could swing about:

12 &bl!? (since the early advance of the h-pawn excludes the possibility of covering the bl+77 diagonal with the move g7-g6. White begins to set up a diagonal battery) 12...∂dc?!? 13 @d3 Q<sub>2</sub>G6 (the only but sufficient defence) 14 &c3 b6 15 @d2 &b7 16 &c4 Qa5 17 Eacl Qc4 18 @d3 &xc4 19 Qxc4 (Vaganian – Stangl, Germany 2000) 19...Qxc3 20 @xc3 Oh4 and the game is even.

c81) 11...Wd6 Frankly speaking, no way does this move inspire us with positive emotions. Firstly, the position of the queen on d6 is unstable, which can be underlined by a direct attack – whether from the b5 or e4 square (after the bishop moves away). Secondly, Black loses control over the g5 square. Finally, the main defect of 11...Wd6 is the lack of full value counterplay. In this variation Black does not undertake anything himself – he just repulses the various threats of his opponent.



White's replies can be divided into two groups. The first – the obvious continuations 12 20b5, 12 20g5 and 12 &g5, which are also the most popular. In the second group are included moves that are geared towards direct attack - 12 h4, 12 %d3 and 12 &c2. Though they have been studied less, it is possible that it is precisely these moves that are the way to give Black the most trouble.

x) 12 2 b5 **\$h8?!** Better to acknowledge his mistake and return to 12...**\$\$d8!** Nothing terrible has happened; the knight on b5 is virtually unemployed and will even be forced to retreat.

For a long time the move 12... where 12

13 205! g6 (even worse is 13...h6?! 14 2h7! Id8 15 ₩g4 e5 16 ₩g3!) 14 ₩f3 Id8!? No help is 14...2ce7 in view of 15 ±xd5 2xd5 16 2c3! ±xg5 17 ±xg5 ¥d6 18 2c4 ₩b6 19 2h6+.



Black defends himself with all his might. If now 15 & add  $\equiv$  Eads 16 & More, then after 16...EfS the trap is shut. True, even without the queen White continues to hold the initiative -17 & 2e4!  $\equiv$  More = 17 & 2e4!  $\equiv$  More = 18 & 20 & 2bd6 & 2d7 21 & Xr/7  $\doteq$  2g8 22 & 2bd6  $\doteq$  2d7 21 & Xr/7  $\doteq$  2g8 22 & 2bd6  $\doteq$  2d7 2d6 24 & 2bg4, but it is not fully clear. Instead of 16 & More = no look at 16 & 2d7  $\bigotimes$  More = 17  $\bigotimes$  More = 2d and = 2d 16 & 2d6  $\cong$  Xd6 17  $\bigotimes$  Xd6  $\bigotimes$  7, but also this does not lead to its objective.

A clear decision lies in 15 h4!  $\bigcirc$  cc<sup>7</sup> 16 h5! h6 17  $\land$  xd5  $\bigcirc$  xd5 18  $\bigcirc$  c4 The heavy pieces on b8 and a8 cannot help his king. The outcome of the struggle is predetermined.

y) 12 2g5 With the queen on d6 this thrust is not so dangerous:

12...g6! (12...h6!? 13 £h7 IId8 has still not been seriously tested) 13 £hxh7 \$kh714 £hxd5 ed 15 ¥h5+ \$kg8 16 £kxg6 fg 17 ¥kxg6+ and as shown by the game Kaidanov – Elimov (USSR 1980) it is best for White to be satisfied with perpetual check.

z) 12 \$\overline{2}g5 \$\overline{2}xg5\$ In making this move, it is necessary to be aware of the possible following intermediate bishop sacrifice. In the present position this blow does not work:



13 ±xh7+ ±xh7 14 ±λxg5+ ±gkg 15 ₩h5 ±∂f6 16 ₩h4 ±d8 17 ±ad1 (alas, in reply to 17 ±∂cc4 Black simply takes with the queen on d4) 17...±λx41 ±8 ±∂cc4 (or 18 ±∆b5 ±λxb5! 19 ±xd6 ±λxd6 20 ±d1 ±d7) 18...±λxc4 19 ₩xc4 ±dr8 20 ±Δh2 (20 ₩h7 ₩H2) 20..±e7 ₩ith a win.

After 13  $c_x g_5 c_{16} f 14 d5 ed$  $15 <math>c_x d5 c_x e4 16 c_x e4$  arises a critical position. Though it is clear that Black has virtually achieved equality, the following 2-3 moves from his side must be absolutely accurate – the strength of the centralised white knight in the centre cannot be underestimated.

Best is to transfer immediately to the endgame: 16...♥h6! 17 ♥c1 ₱xc1 18 ∄axc1 Ïd8! 19 ℃d6 (or 19 ℤcd1 №f8 20 f3 ≗cf5, Kosten – Adams, London 1989) 19...♣c6 20 ℃r Ξab8 21 ℃xc6 Ĩxc46 (Kuif – Dlugy, Amsterdam 1987). In both of the cited games peace was concluded without delav.

Less accurate is 16... #d8 White replies 17 #h5! Clouds thicken over the black king, but there is still a defence. This is how the game Kargin – Meduna (Chemnitz 1998) continued: 17... f5! 18 @cc3 @d7 19 Ead1 E[7] After this the queen transferred to f8, guarding the important d6 square against the enemy knight d6. Though it is more pleasant for White, there is nothing real.

But the second inaccurate move in a row -17...2e6? places Black on the verge of defeat.



18 ⊙df6+! After 18...gf nothing is offered by 19 @h6?! @h8 20 ⊙xf6 &f5 21 Ead! Od4! 22 Oh5 Eg8 23 @e3 Ee8, but far stronger is an immediate 19 Ead!! In the case of 19...⊙d4!? White will perhaps also not deliver mate but he will have an enormous positional advantage: 20 @h4 &g7 21 ⊖g3 @a5 22 ⊖h5+ &g6 23 ⊙f4+ &g7 24 Ee3 Efd8 25 Exd4! @f5 (not possible is 25...Exd4? 26 ⊙xe6+ fe 27 Eg3+) 26 ⊙h5+ @h8 27 h5!

 more tenacious was 23... 全f5!, and if 24 g4+, then now 24... 全e5 25暫g5+ 置f5 (there is no check on g3!) 26 gf 豐e1+ with a draw.



28 **Ze5!** Concluding the struggle with a typical combination on the theme of obstruction.

A beautiful attack, but it became possible only as a result of Black's improvement on the 16<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup> moves. The same thing can be said about the noves 12 c2b65, 12 c2b5 and 12  $\pm$ g5 as a whole: many beautiful variations, but only thanks to inaccurate play by the opponent.

15 g3 ②g6, and after 16 堂g2! ②ce7 17 酉h1 盒c6 18 饗g1! ended up in a hopeless position.

Also unsatisfactory is 12...124813 &g5 h6? 14 &xd5 hg (14...ed 15 &2b51) 15 &xc6 g4 16 &2e5 be 17  $\Ime2$  &xh4 18 &2e4  $\Ime35$  19  $\Imxg4$ &e7 20  $\Im b5$  followed by &2e1 e-2h3(Wells – Ryan, Dublin 1993. No one has yet shown distinctly how Black should defend against 12 h4!?...

r) Complicated problems are set by 12 營d3!?:

12...h6 13 ②b5 營d8 14 a3 b6 15 ②c3 ②dc7 16 盒t4 盒b7 17 罩ad1 置c8 18 勞b5 ③a5 19 盒xb7 ④xb7 (Wahls – Meduna, Germany 1989) 20 ④c5!? or

w) 12 &c2!? A move with ideas – White plans first to threaten mate by 13 @d3 and then, according to the situation, to play either Dg5, &g5 or h4. Black has often found success in this way



12...℃pcr 13 ₩d3 Φg6 14 Φc4 ₩b6 15 Φxf6+ Φxf6 16 &g5 Φd5 (17 &b3 &d7 18 Φc5 &b5 19 ₩g3 (achieving an ideal arrangement of pieces) 19...₩xd4? 20 Kad1 ₩b4? 21 Φxg6 hg 22 &xd5 ed 23 &c7, winning the exchange (Cabrilo – Savon, Belgrade 1988);

12... $\Omega_{xc3}$ ?! (above, we have repeatedly made clear the fatal consequences of this move) 13 bc g6 (no better is 13...Wd5 14 Wd3 g6 15 &t4 b6 16 &d2 &b7 17 &de &g7 18 Wg3 &de7 19 &dd6, Ehvest – Stohl, Groningen 1982) 14 &g5!? &g7 (Hebden – Hoffman, Vrnjacka Banja 1989) 15 Wf3!? with strong pressure.

12... Wb4!? A rare case in the 11... Wd6 system – Black attacks something! Besides this, the queen gets the chance to transfer to a more acceptable position – the b6 square.

c82) 11... Cce7 There can only be one defect of this move: in reinforcing d5, Black loses control of the e5 square. This is why 11.... de7?! is rarely employed.



A first glance - an ideal solution: now both central squares - d5 and e5 - are under Black's control. But it is too early to rejoice: by closing in the diagonal view of the queen Black fails to bear in mind 12 \$25! On 12... 创f5 follows 13 盒xf6 響xf6 14 d5 ed 15 ②xd5 響h6 (15...響xb2? 16 里b1 響xa2 17 ②c7 里b8 18 皇xc6) 16 Lc1 with a serious advantage (Neverov - Marcus, Dieren 1998), while 12 ... \$ xg5?! is simply bad in view of the thematic sacrifice 13 axh7+! (surprisingly, in the game Gligoric - Portisch, Madrid 1960, White missed this possibility and after 13 2xg5 2f5 14 盒xf5 響xg5 15 de4 Id8 a draw was agreed) 13... \$xh7 14 2xg5+. Neither of the black knights can get to f6 (yet another minus of 11...Dde7?!). therefore he has to go to a clear square with his king: 14 ... \$26 15 響g4 f5 (15...響xd4? 16 包ge4+ 雲h7 17 響h5+ 雲g8 18 (2g5) 16 響g3 當f6 17 ②b5, and then:

17... 创xd4 18 響e5+ 含xg5 19 響xg7+;

17...宣h8 18 ②c7 罩b8 19 ④gxe6 皇xe6 20 ④xe6 豐g8 21 d5!; 17... ④d5 (relatively best) 18 ⑤d6 g6 19 ⑤xc8 f4 20 衡h4 宣h8 21 ⑦e4+ 雪g7 22 쮗xd8 宣xd8 23 ⑥cd6 with an endgame advantage.

The position after 11...\$cc7 successfully passed the test for durability in the final of the XXXVI USSR championship (Alma Ata 1968) in three games of M.Podgaets: against Tseshkovsky, Vasyukov and Liberzon. Certainly, over the lapse of years the theory of the variation has advanced, but many old assessments remain unshakeable.



Let's look at possible moves for White: 12 h4, 12 \u00e9b3, 12 \u00e9c3, 12 \u00e9d3 and 12 \u20c2. The last two on this list are the strongest, the others are roughly equal in strength to one another.

x) **12 h4** A move which vegetated in the back yard of theory until the world championship match Anand – Karpov (Lausanne 1998).

12...@f5!? The most concrete continuation. Also played is 12...\$d7, allowing White to start an attack by 13 \$\overline{3}\$ db (if 13...g6, then 14 \$\overline{15}\$ \$\overline{3}\$ yr 15 \$\overline{3}\$ yr 27 \$\overline{3}\$ yr 16 \$\overline{3}\$ xd5 \$\overline{3}\$ to \$\overline{3}\$ yr 16 \$\overline{3}\$ to \$\overline{3}\$ to \$\overline{3}\$ yr 16 \$\overline{3}\$ to \$\overline{3}

<u>\$g7</u> 16 h5 g5 17 ⟨2)xg5! hg 18 \$xg5 (Dzhandzhava – Kalegin, Batumi 1991).

13 Wd3 Anand is absolutely right to reject the tempting 13 &xf5 ef 14 &2xd5 Wxd5 15 &g5. As shown by the game Ziborovsky – Kuczynski (Ksiaz 1998), the change in pawn structure after 15...&c6?! 16 &xf6 gf should not trouble Black.



The main thing is that the excellent outpost on d5 for the queen is now secured. Besides this, prospects for the rooks along the g-file are opened up. And, finally, we must not forget that White has a chronic weakness on d4.

There followed 17 響d2 堂g7 18 h5 h6 19 心h2 邕ad8 20 邕ad1 肇h7 and Black has the superior chances.

**13...⊙xc3?!** Not the best choice. He should turn his attention to the order of moves in the game Timman – Portisch (Frankfurt 1998): 13...⊙b4! 14 ₩c4 a5 15 &g5 &xc5 16 hg Q46 17 ₩b3 Qxc4 18 Tac4, and here Black equalised by 18...b5! 9 a3 &b7 20 ab ab! 21 Taxa8 ₩xa8.

14 bc h6 15 h5 The alternative is 15 盒 xf5 ef 16 盒 a3 單e8 17 單xe8+ 變xe8 18 星e1 變d8 19 變b5 (on 19 c4 it is necessary to sacrifice a pawn - 19...b5!? 20 cb 兔e6) 19...兔e6 20 留xb7 요d5 21 智b5 寫b8 22 響e2 響a5 23 兔b4 寶xa2 24 寶xa2 兔xa2 25 兔e7 a5 26 兔xf6 gf with an equal endgame.

**15...②d6 16**  ②e5 White does not create real threats even after 16 盒h7+ 塗h8 17 盒a3 響c7 18 ②e5 互d8 19 互ad1 b6.

**16...** ② xe4 17 營 xe4 盒 xe5 18 de (or 18 營 xe5 營 d5 19 營 xd5 ed 20 盒 a3 篇d8 21 簋 e7 b6 22 f3 盒 e6 with a probable draw).



18...f5! Only after this strong move is it possible to say with confidence that Black has equalised the game. In the subsequent struggle, crowned with a fascinating opposite coloured bishops endgame, Black outplayed his opponent and gained victory.

y) 12 響b3 Endeavouring to make it difficult for the opponent to develop his queen's flank. White strayed too far from the main objective – attack on the king.

12...₩b6?? Black has a somewhat more difficult task after 12...b6, and then 13 & xd5 & Axd5 14 & Axd5 Wxd5 15 ₩xd5 ed 16 & g5 & xg5 17 & Axg5 f6 18 & 33 with a slightly better endgame (Sveshnikov – Epishin, Biel 1993). **13 金xd5** After 13 蒙xb6 ab 14 金g5 篇48 15 篇ed1 h6 16 金xf6 全xf6 17 金c2 金d7 the game was equal (Chiburdanidze – loseliani, Telavi 1988).

13...\2\xd5 14 \2\xd5 ed 15 \\$\xd5 Black cannot fail to obtain compensation for the material in the variation 15 \\$\xd5 \\$\xd5 \\$\xd5 42. But after 15 \\$\xd5 \\$\xd5 \\$\xd5 42 in the game Himmel- Podgaets (Dortmund 1993) a draw was agreed.

15...≜xg5 16 ₩xb6 ab 17 ᡚxg5 h6 18 @f3 \$e6



This endgame arose in the game Sveshnikov – Podgaets (Riga 1975) and it is interesting that each of the opponents assessed it in their favour. But it was Black who was closer to the truth: 19 a3 Ifc8 20 Ie3 Ia4 21 h3 b5! 22 Ib3 b4! with a serious initiative.

z) 12 響c2 Inferior in strength to 12 響d3.

12...g6!? Nor did he manage to show any sign at all of an opening advantage after 12...h6!?, for example, 13 @c2 &d7 14 a3 %c8 15 &c2 & %c3 16 @d3 &c2+! 17 %c22 & %g6 (Buturin - Koslov, Sverdlovsk 1987).

On 13 2h6 provoking the weakening g7-g6, White could return

to the plan with 13 @b3. In the game Vasyukov – Podgaets (Alma Ata 1968) Black easily equalised, exploiting the same idea that occurred in the encounter with Sveshnikov: 13..@b6f?; 14 &ad5 &hxd5 15 &bxd5 ed 16 @xb6 ab 17 &h6 Zd8 18 a3 &g4 19 @c5 &c6 0 Zdad1 Zdc8 21 Zd3 Zda41

In not a single computer database do we find the game Podgaets – Daskalov (Odessa 1975), but meanwhile it proceeded very instructively. On 13 **@b3** Black reacted with the move 13...**\frac{1}{2}** g7, and after 14 h41 (so as after the exchange of dark-squared bishops to take the hpawn) 14...**\frac{1}{2}** c6 15 **\frac{1}{2}** g5 **\frac{1}{2}** s5 16 **\frac{1}{2}** c2 **\frac{1}{2}** sc 51 **\frac{1}{2}** g5 **\frac{1}{2}** s16 **\frac{1}{2}** c2



17... Zh8!? Original play. White opens the h-file, so that after g3, \$\pm g2 and \$\pm h\$ he can start active operations on it, but Black intends to exploit the file first!

However Daskalov's plan has a flaw and White succeeds in exposing it in a combinational way: 18 Eacl ! h6 19  $\Omega_x$ d5 ed 20  $\Delta_x$ g61 Now losing are both 20...fg 21 wc7+ wc7 22 Exc7+ wc18 23  $\Omega_c$ 5  $\Delta_c$ 15 24 g4  $\Delta_c$ 4 25 f3, and also 20...hg 21  $\Delta_x$ f7, which did Black replied 20... $\Omega_c$ 10, which did

not save him from defeat: 21 gh<sup>+1</sup>  $g_{xh6}$  22  $a_{5}$   $b_{xh8}^{*}$  (22... $\Delta xd4$ 23  $a_{53}$   $b_{xh5}$  24  $\Delta xd_{23}$  23  $a_{53}$   $B_{11}$ (23... $\Delta bd_{4}$  24  $b_{xc81}$   $B_{11}$  25  $b_{g2}$   $B_{xc8}$  26  $B_{xc88}$   $b_{37}$  27  $B_{xh1}$   $b_{xx5}$ 28  $B_{c71}$  24  $b_{g2}$   $B_{xc1}$  25  $B_{xc1}$   $b_{x5}$ 26  $\Delta b_{xh1}$ , and after a few moves it was all over.

13...\$27 14 \$\$xg7 After 14 \$\$xg5 f6! 15 \$\$xd2 \$\$xd7 16 \$\$m53 \$\$xc6 Barcon (Moscow 1966), managed to achieve an ideal arrangement of pieces, and already White had to take measures to turn around the struggle: 17 \$\$xd5 ed 18 \$\$xe4 \$\$xf7 19 \$\$xc5 \$\$xf5 with a draw.

14...\$xg7 If White does not start the attack now, he will never start it.



Upon 15  $\&xd5 \ \&xd5 \ \ &xd5 \ \ &xd5 \ \&xd5 \ \ &xd5 \ \ &$ 

There was more interesting play in the game Tseshkovsky - Podgaets (Alma Ata 1968): 15 對b3 全f6 16 全e5!? (a pawn sacrifice for the initiative) 16...製xd4 17 全f3 公f5 18 茎ad1 獸c5 19 獸a4 a6! 20 獸f4 h6 21 h4 薹a7 with a double edged struggle.

q) 12 **₩d3** h7 is hanging and it makes sense to look at both defences – the traditional 12...g6 and the possibly even stronger 12...h6.

Not good is 12...266?! – at once White has two ways to obtain an advantage:

13 &d2 b6?! 14 h4! &b7 15 h5  $\Im$ gr4 16 Wb1 Wc7 17 &xh7+  $\oiint$ h8 18 &c4 with a healthy extra pawn (Kamsky – Epishin, Las Palmas 1994);

13 對b5?? (original but also very strong) 13... 公民 7 14 公已5 對d6 15 兔d2 g6 16 条h6 条g7 17 兔xg7 ☆xg7 18 氯ac1 氯d8 19 對b3 (Bologan - Salov, Engien-les-Bains 1999).

q1) **12...g6 13 急h6** Not terrible is 13 h4 急d7 14 包e5 急c6 15 急h6 邕e8 16 h5 because of 16... ①f5! (Kveinis – Gahwehns, Bonn 1994).

13 De5!? is met from time to time. The position after 13...Qd7 14 &h6 &g7 15 &xg7 &xg7 we looked at in detail when we spoke about 12 De5. Now, however, we stop at 13...b6!?



With the bishop on e4 the idea b7b6 looks suspect. But if he does not succeed in refuting it (and meanwhile no one has succeeded), instead of the ponderous \$\overline{a}c8-d7-c6\$ the bishop is developed, 'as it is supposed to', on b7.

In the game Kavalek – Hubner (Bugojno 1982) play continued  $14 chxd5 2xd5 15 \pm h6 ag7 16 2c6$  $@d6 17 \pm xxd5 ed 18 chc7+ af88$ [19 @63 acc. The fianchetic did nothappen, but this should not botherBlack; the game is absolutely equal. $Stronger is 14 <math>\pm h6 hcg. 27 15 @h31?$ 



...with the idea on 15...\$b7?! to reply 16 \$\overline\$g5! From h3 the queen does not allow him to play f7-f6; Black is bound hand and foot.

In the game Hachian – Asrian (Erevan 1996) on 15 %h3 was played 15...6?! 16 &xg7 &xg7 17 &d3%d6, and after 18 axc1?? (in the game White placed the queen's rook on d1) the picture for Black was miserable. The king is weakly defended, on the c and e-files the white rooks dominate, and the collapse.

Here are some sample variations: 18... 全d7 19 全xd5 公xd5 20 公xd5 響xd5 (20...ed 21 響g3 響xg3 22 hg 亘f7 23 心f4 兔f5 24 f3, and Black has a difficult endgame) 21 心f4 響xd4 (21...響f5 22 基xe6!) 22 基ed1 響a4 (22...基ac8 23 響g4!), and now



23 罩xd7+! 竇xd7 24 罩c7! winning. So is the idea 13...b6!? not justified? No, it is too early to draw a conclusion. After 14 2h6 2g7 15 Wh3!? it is necessary to try a very 15...@xh6!? simple solution: 16 豐xh6 皇b7. In our view, Black has a fully defensible position. For example: 17 Zac1 (nothing is offered by 17 2xd5 2xd5 18 2f3 创f5 19 皇xf5 皇xf3. while the combination 17 &xd5 @xd5 18 @e4 f6 19 @xg6!? is good only for forcing a draw) 17 ... 2 f5 18 axf5 ef with equality.

13...&g7 He can also preserve the dark-squared bishop: 13...Re8, but the position after 14 Kad1 &d7 15 &xd5 Qxd5 16 Qxd5 ed 17 Qc5 de 61 8h 3 Re8 19 M2Z Ber 20 Wg3 Eec7 21 Ede2 should be assessed in White's favour (Marin – Khaltin, Goteborg 2004).

14 \$\pm xg7 After 14 \$\pm d2\$ we want to draw your attention again to 14...b6!? It is surprising how few games have been played on this theme; and meanwhile this is the most logical move!

White can try to refute the fianchetto idea by 15 h4!? 2b7 16 h5.



After 16... $\bigcirc$ 15 17 &xg7 (17 &xf5 ef 18 &xg7 &xg7 returns us to the game Kurass – Podgaets) 17...&xg7 18  $\oslash$ xd5 &xd5 19 &xd5 &xd5 20  $\Xi$ e5  $\bigotimes$ d8 21 d5 ed 22  $\Xi$ xd5  $\bigotimes$ d6 (Gipslis – Tavadian, Yurmala 1983) 23  $\Xi$ d1 and White has a minimal advantage.

Rather than putting up with the pawn on h5, it is better to take it: 16...gh? It is not so easy to approach the black king. Apart from this, the g6 square beckons the knight. Here are some sample variations:

17 皇xg7 皇xg7 18 饗g5+ 包g6 19 饗xh5 包f6;

17 闡g5 公f5 18 盒xg7 闡xg5 19 公xg5 쓸xg7;

17 ④c2 置b8! 18 ④g3 ④f6 19 鱼xb7 罩xb7 20 鱼xg7 塗xg7 21 螢g5+ ᡚg6 22 ④xb5+ ④xb5 23 螢xb5 置d7! and Black has sufficient counterplay.

14...\$\product xg7 15 \overline{Action 12} action to the position is very reminiscent of that which arose in one of the games of the candidates match for the world championship Smyslov - Ribli (London 1983). The difference lies in

the fact that instead of the moves 當f1-e1 and 營d1-d3 in that game the moves ②f3-e5 and a2-a3 were made.



Smyslov's plan (we looked at it above) is simple, but at the same time also very dangerous. White intends to capture twice on d5. No way does Black want to take with the pawn how then he could he exploit the weakness of the isolani on d4? Besides this, upon the fixing of the pawn pair d4-d5, the centralised white knight on e5 will always be stronger than the light-squared bishop. Therefore more logical for Black is both times to take on d5 with a piece. But then (as happened in the above-mentioned game Smyslov -Ribli) the possibility appears of the rook getting in to c7!

15...b6 16 & xd5 ⊙xd5 17 ⊙xd5 wxd5 An important nuance! For Smyslov, as we recall, the pawn was already standing on a3 and he could place the rook on c7 without fear. Here, however, the move H& Xe7! entails a pawn sacrifice. Over the board it is not easy to decide on such a sacrifice; this is why without exception every chessplayer on the 15<sup>th</sup> or 16<sup>th</sup> move plays a2<sup>-α3</sup>, losing precious time. However analysis proves that after 18...響xa2? 19 響c3! White wins in all variations:

19...金g8 20 色e5 響d5 21 色g4! (this is stronger than 21 包c6 置e8 22 色e7+ 氯xe7 23 簋xe7 金b7 24 f3 置c8) 21...豐g5 22 h3! with the threat of 置e5;

19...豐d5 20 罩e5 豐d8 21 d5 寧g8 (21...豐f6 22 de 兔xe6 23 罩xe6!) 22 de fe 23 罩xe6!

If it is not possible to take on a2, there remains 18...2d7 But after 19 De5 the game can in no way be considered equal.



Giving up the pawn at once is stronger – 19...Ead81? 20 Exa7ab5, placing the opponent in a dilemma: to cling on to the material to the end (21 BT3 BT3 C2 CxT3Ba 2.3 Exa8 Xa8 Za 3 Exa8 (24 a Ca8 cs) or to return it in exchange for a stable advantage in the endgame (21 BC3Bx44 2.2 Bx44 Ex44 2.3 b3). We think that the character of the struggle in each case cannot suit Black.

q2) 12...h6!? The plan with &h6and  $\Xiacl$  is now impossible and White has in prospect to think up something else.

13 ④e5 The reconstruction 響d3e2 @d3-b1 and @e2-d3 looks ideal since Black cannot defend against mate by g7-g6 (the h6-pawn is hanging). But, tempo by tempo, a defence can be found: 13 We2 2.d7 (again it is worth turning our attention to 13...b6!?, for example 14 2d2 2b7 15 Zacl 2xc3 16 bc âxe4 17 ₩xe4 2f5 18 âf4 冪c8 19 De5 2g5 with equal chances, Becerra - Asrian, Linares 1999) 14 2b1 2c6 (inaccurate is 14... Dxc3 15 bc 皇c6: after 16 ②e5! 皇xe5 17 豐xe5 豐d5 18 豐g3 White, in the game Adams - Karpov, Monaco 1992, obtained the advantage of the two bishops) 15 響d3 包g6! (closing the dangerous diagonal) 16 a3 Ie8 17 De4 のdf4 18 象xf4 のxf4 19 費d2 (we cannot see a continuation of the attack: 19 公xf6+ 資xf6 20 資h7+ 容f8 21 @e4 篇ac8) 19 ... ②g6, and Black's position is rather more pleasant (Trabert - Murdzia, Hamburg 1995).

13...∞hx3 (we stopped at the continuation 13...∞d7 when we examined 12 ∞c5) 14 ∰xc3 Usually he will take with a pawn here, but in the present situation the endgame after 14 be ∞xc5! 15 de ₩xd3 16 ∞xd3 ∞d7 17 ∞a3 য়c8 18 Eadl ωa4 19 ≅dz Zac8 20 <br/> 4b C1 ≈ Δd6 ∞f5 (S.-B. Hansen – L.-B. Hansen, Copenhagen 1996) does not promise White an advantage.

**14...** If Leading to interesting complications is 14... Who  $15 \le c2!$ ? (once again intending to make way for the queen to go to d3) 15... Ed8 16  $\le c3$ .



One wrong advance -16...0457, and to all appearances the game already cannot be saved: 17 #d32 hze3 18 fe  $\Delta xc5$  19 @h7+cR20 de @h22 12 fl1 @hc52 22 ge6 f5 23 e4. Black has two extra pawns but his king is hopelessly weak. For example: 23...@h76 24 Ge7 (24...65 25 Igad1) 25 fe @d4+26 @h1 @xc627 @h71 @h72 @h22 @h22 @h2227 @h71 @h7 @h22 @h22 @h22@h71 @h12 @h22 @h22 @h22@h12 @h22 @h22 @h22 @h22@h22 @h22 @h22 @h22 @h22 @h22@h22 @h22 @h22 @h22 @h22 @h22 @h22 @h22@h22 @h22  $\text{$ 

In the game Dolmatov – Enklaar (Amsterdam 1979) Black played the stronger 16...267. However White's pressure continued to increase: 17 Ead1 &dT 18 d5! 9a6 (18...26xe3 19 Eaxe3 ed does not solve the problem because of 20 &d3 &c621 Edc1 &dr8 22 &dg6-H g2 3 Eaxe6 &bxb2 24 &bxc6 Eaxe8 25 &d510 &dx 52 d2 &d4 &d2 21 &d3Dolmatov confidently led the game to victory with a decisive role being played by the passed d-pawn. 15 & 2a 3cf? This move, thought up spontaneously by Karpov at the board (during his game against Topalov, Linares 1995), is apparently the strongest. The rook a8 starts to breathe' and besides this there is a concrete idea: to impose an exchange of queens on his opponent after a5-a4 and Wa8-a5.

The move 15...  $\triangle xe3$  has had rich practice. In the world championship match Chiburdanidze – loseliani (Telavi 1988) was seen 16 fc  $\Xi b8$ 17  $\Xi ad1 \pm d7$  18  $\pm b1 \pm c8$  19  $\triangle g4$  $\triangleq g5$  20 e4 h5!, and Black rid herself of difficulties.

After 16 對xe3 對b6 Black likewise equalised the game: 17 單ad1 單d8 18 b3 全d7 19 對f3 全b5! (Sher – L.-B. Hansen, Vejle 1994).

He can only fight for the advantage by 16 \u2225xc3!? After 16...\u2265b 17 \u2225d1 \u2225d8 arises a critical position.



Black has a solid position without pawn weaknesses. It is clear that in protracted trench warfare his chances are at least not worse.

It is necessary for White to seek his fortune in direct attack. Three pieces, marshalled on the e-file, are ready for this, it remains to accommodate the queen. Therefore 18 &c2!? If the queen lands on h7, the deed will be done – 18...&d7? 19 @d3!, and then: 19...&e8 20 @h7+ &f8 21 d5! &xe5 22 Xxe5 @xb2 23 Zdel or 19...&c6 20 @h7+ &f8 21 & b3 @a5 22 @xf?! &xf7 23 &xe6+ &e7 24 d5!

20...ed? 21 Wd3;

20...f6?! 21 置e3 ed 22 營d3 全f8 23 營h7 兔e6 24 罩de1 鱼g8 25 營h8 營c7 (or 25...營d6 26 罩g3 營c7 27 兔h7 營f7 28 罩ge3) 26 兔f5;

20...篇ac8 21 變d3 g6 22 金b3 金b5 23 變f3 金c4 24 金xc4 篇xc4 25 de 篇xd1+ 26 變xd1 fe 27 h3. Though it is quite agonising playing this endgame, the chances for a draw are not bad.

16 **fad1** In the stem game was played 16 **fac1** at 17 **fac1**. Karpov took on e3; later play turned towards 17...**w**55 18 **w**xa5 **fax5** 19 **dx**57 *dx*c520 *dx*c4 *da*6 21 d5 ed 22 *dx*d5 *dx*c5 20 *dx*c4 *da*6 24 d5 ed 22 *dx*d5 *dx*c5 23 b4 ab 24 *a*b *dx*c6 (Lesiege – Shipov, Moscow 2001). Instead of 17...**w**537 it 84 *cole*4 **db5**.

17  $\textcircled{D}g4 \ @g5$  On 17...Dxe318  $\textcircled{D}xf6+ \ @xf6$  19 fe Wd8 20  $\fbox{Cl}$   $\blacksquare a_5 21 \ \Ande 2 b 6 22 \ \Ande c 2 once again$ no way can the position be calledeven (Shariyzdanov – Lygovoi,Toliatti 2003).

18  $\pm x5$  of 19  $\pm xc5$  hg lt needs to be recognised that both sides have strayed quite a long way from the canons of struggle with an isolated pawn. In the game Molnar – Polak (Pula 2001) paly continued 20  $\exp 5$  $\cong a57$  21  $\cong c4 \pm c6$  22 d5  $\equiv Tac8$ 23 b4!, but an improvement suggests iself: 20... $\pm c64$  with equality.

Stronger is 20 De3!?



It might be pointed out that the black pawns have advanced too far, but variations do not confirm this. After 20...**Ea6** 21 **W**c5 **Ed6** 22 **2**c4 (22 d5 **E**c81) 22...**Ed5** 23 **W**a7 **2**c6 24 **2**c3 **E**3 **E**3 **E**5 **W**xb7 **f4** 26 **6**c2 **2 2**d5 27 **W**c7 **Zb5** with mutual play.

r) 12 2 5 The main reply is rightly considered 12...2.d7, but first we look at the sidelines: 12...2xe5, 12...2f5, 12...2c6 and 12...g6.

**12...\&xe5** – this is the start of a great exchanging operation: 13 de  $\bigotimes$ xc3 14 be  $\bigotimes$ xc11 5  $\exists$ xc11. True, after 15.. $\bigotimes$ d5! chances for a draw are real, but why impoverish the

game like this? And whether Black can make a draw – is still a question. For example, in the game Mazura – Molina (San Paolo 1999) – he did not make it: 16 dl3 b5 17 Åb1 a6 18 &a3 Æs 19 &d6 &b7? 20 c4! bc 21 Eh3! Instead of 19...&b7 stronger is 19...&d7? 20 &dx6 de d2 1 Exd5 &c6 22 Æd2 Æac8 23 &b4 f6! 24 ef Æcd8 – such opposite coloured bishops, as a rule, do not win.

12 \$ f5?! is considered dubious on the basis of an analysis by the Filipino grandmaster Eugenio Torre: 13 2g4! 2xd4 14 2xd5 ed 15 公xf6+ ₩xf6 16 公xd5 ₩h4 17 2f4 In the game Novikov - Lugovoi (St.Petersburg 1995) Black did not actually take the pawn, limiting himself to 13 ... Db6. After 14 2xf6+ 15 Wg4 2c4 Lygovoi ₩xf6 recommended 16 d5!? @cd6 17 de \$xe6 18 2d5 ₩d8 19 \$g5 with the initiative. In our opinion, the simplest way to an advantage lies in 14 皇xf5!? (instead of 14 ④xf6+) 

12....②c6!? Apart from anything else, this is still an invitation to peace negotiations: 13 ②f3 ③ce7 etc.

If he decides to play on, White usually chooses 13  $\frac{10}{2}$  d3. After 13...g6?! 14  $\frac{1}{2}$  h6  $\frac{1}{2}$  g7 15  $\frac{1}{2}$  scg7  $\frac{1}{2}$  xcg7 16  $\frac{1}{2}$  xcd5 cd 17  $\frac{1}{2}$  xcc6 hc 18  $\frac{1}{2}$  ad and Black stands noticeably worse (Sher – Asrian, Frevan 1996). There is more complicated play upon 14... $\frac{1}{2}$  Res 15  $\frac{1}{2}$  ad1  $\frac{1}{2}$  h8 (15... $\frac{1}{2}$  xc5 16 d  $\frac{1}{2}$  xc5 (17  $\frac{1}{2}$  xc6) 16 d6?! (Ara Minasian – E. Danielian, Erevan 2000) but even here the chances are on White's side. On 13 變d3 it is necessary to reply 13...h6!?, after which the play divides into two.



14 a3 has also been played:

14... 2)de7 15 2)xc6 2)xc6 16 d5 ed 17 2)xd5 盒e6 18 2)xf6+ 豐xf6 19 盒e3 (Ljubojevic – Khalifman, Groningen 1993);

14...&xe5 15 de Oxe5 (Nijboer – van der Sterren, Hilversum 1989) 16 &h7+ &h8 17  $\boxtimes$ xe5 Oxc3 18 bc f5 19 &xf5 ef 20 Wxd8  $\boxtimes$ xd8 21 &e3 (analysis by Nijboer).

But the most interesting way has slipped away from practice: 4...2xc3! > 15 2xc6 dc2+116 faxc2 bc 17 faxc6 wb6 18 wf3 (or<math>18 ka 88 ac6 19 wc2 cxc 2 2 0 ac4fac6 19 wc2 cxc 2 0 dc4fac6 10 wc2

14 &xd5 is parried by the intermediate 14... $\bigcirc$ bd! 15 %g3 &hd! After 16 %G3 he can start to 'dry up' the position: 16...ed 17  $\Xi$ c2 &e6 18 a3  $\bigcirc$ c6 19  $\bigcirc$ Xcc6 be 20  $\bigcirc$ ha4 with a minimal advantage for White (Smyslov – Ivanchuk, Moscow 1988). But it is also possible to play more entertainingly: 16... $\bigcirc$ xd5 17  $\equiv$ dc4? If 18  $\equiv$ xh4 (18  $\equiv$ c2?)  $\bigcirc$ c6 09 &dc4 (Mortensen – Jelling, Denmark 1989), True, if it turns out that the complications are in Black's favour, White can return to  $17 \ Dxd3$  (instead of  $17 \ Zxd4$ )  $17 \ dxd3$  (instead 19  $Wxf6 \ dxd6 \ 20 \ dxe3 \ dxe6$ . The endgame is approximately even (Djurhuus – Asran, Erevan 1996).

12...g6 might prove to be premature. You see, now White does not need to spend time on 13 Wd3; for him there is now a chance to get into a position known to be equal – but with an extra tempo!

After 13 &h6 &g7 14 &xg7 &xg7we have quite an unpleasant idea for Black which we looked at in the game Smyslov – Ribli: 15  $\equiv$ cl!? b6 16 &xd5 &xd5 17 &xd5 &xd518  $\equiv$ c?!



In the game Spraggett – Taylor (Ottawa 1984) Black could not cope with the arising problems and was quickly 'consumed': 18...24719 @g4 Zack 20  $\Xid7$  @s5 21  $\Xif1$ 2c6 22  $\Xic7$  2cf6? 23  $\Xic7+1$   $\Xix7$ 24 @f4+ 2c7 25 @x77+ @x8226  $\Xic1$ . In fact everything is not so gloomy: after 22. @x67? 23  $\Xixa7$ 2b7 24 2d3 2g8 25 2b4 @d626  $\Xixb7$  @xb4 it is still possible to nut us tubbom resistance. Apart from 14 &xg7 we stop and look in more detail at 14 @d2!? For a long time and on the basis of the game Liberzon – Podgaets (Alma Ata 1968) this move was not considered dangerous for Black. This is how the game went:

14... $\Delta n = 0$  (bad is 14...b = 0) in view of 15  $\Delta n = 0$  (bad is 16  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ )  $\sigma = 0$  (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ )  $\Delta n = 0$  (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) winning is 22 fact with the terrible threat of 22 fact (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) winning is 22 fact (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ )  $\sigma = 0$ ) (16... $\Delta n = 0$ ) (16... $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (16... $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (16... $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (16... $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (16... $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (16... $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (16... $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (16... $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (16... $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (16... $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (16... $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (16... $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (16... $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (16... $\Delta n = 0$ ) (bad  $\Delta n = 0$ ) (16... $\Delta n = 0$ ) (16..., n = 0) (16...

However later White found a way to strengthen his play: 16  $\triangle$ xe4!? Then he exchanged the dark-squared bishops and by means of  $\triangle$ be5-g4 started a mating attack on the dark squares. How to defend?



Only not by 16...2d5 17 20g4 ( $e^{-7}$ . After  $18 \pm xg7 \pm xg7 19$  ( $h^{-6} \pm g^{-8}$  $20 \approx 203$ ) (Winsnes – Astram, Sweden 1994) and White has essentially an extra piece in the attack – as the

bishop c8 with all the will in the world is not capable of covering the dark squares around his king.

Elena Danielian from Armenia twice defended this position. In her game against Monica Grabics (Medelin 1996) she chose 16...b6 and even won (in this way taking revenge for her defeat two years earlier - see above) But this has no relevance at all to the assessment of the present position since after 17 2g4! 2f5 18 皇xg7 會xg7 19 響c3! Black is facing defeat. Which, appropriately, is also confirmed by the game Hunt -Danelian (Zagan 1997), arriving by transposition of moves at the same position: 16...公f5 17 皇xg7 當xg7 18 2g4! b6 19 Wc3! After 19...f6 20 列gxf6! Ixf6 21 列xf6 曾xf6 22 d5+ e5 23 響c6+ Black resigned.

Apparently the most stubborn defence is 16...\$xh6!? 17 @xh6 215 18 @d2 f6 19 Dg4 @g7 20 De3 De7! 21 Dc3 \$\$\$7. Somehow patching up the holes in his camp, Black prepares to repulse a new wave of attack.

13... 20g6 has been played in surprisingly few games, though everything points to the fact that the move is no less strong than 'the people's favourite' - the advance of the g-pawn.



Exchanges do not promise White any advantage:

14  $\bigcirc$  xg6 hg 15  $\bigcirc$  xd5 ed 16 & xd5? Wa5!, the same idea of double attack on d5 and el also works after 14  $\bigcirc$  xd5 ed 15 & xd5? Wa5;

14 &xd5 ed 15  $\bigotimes$ xd5 &xe5 16 de &c6 or 15  $\bigotimes$ xg6 hg 16  $\bigotimes$ xd5 &c6. It is hard even to imagine that White can realise such an extra pawn.

In the game Ivanchuk – Karpov (Monaco 1992) White played 14 &d2 &dc 15 &ixc6 bc 16 &a4. The simplest way to equality here is 16...Eb8! with the sample variations: 17  $\verb"a3"$  (17  $\verb"acal <math>\verb"abel"$ ) 17... $\verb"abel"$ 18 &ixb6 @wib6 19 &c3  $\blacksquare$ fd8 (on 19 &c3 would follow the same move) 20  $\blacksquare$ d1 (20 d5 @c7) 20...@b3 21  $\blacksquare$ abl @xd3 22  $\blacksquare$ xd3 &c7.

 advantage) 15 & g5 £)f? 16 & xf6 \$\Delta xf6 17 & xf5 (or 17 & xc6 bc 18 & \Delta x6 bc 19 & ff5 & g27 with compensation) 17...ef 18 & ad1 & \Delta f5 19 & g3 f4! 20 & g4 h5 21 & g73 & \Delta x63 14...& g27 f5 & g7 & gx7 The usual question; how to take on d5?



There are fewer arguments in favour of 16  $\triangle$ xd5 ed 17 &13 &e6 18 &b3 &b6(z) 19 &xb6 ab 20 a3  $\boxtimes$ fc8 21  $\boxtimes$ c2 &15 22  $\boxtimes$ d2  $\boxtimes$ a4! 23  $\boxtimes$ ad1 b5! (we recall that twenty years before the game we cited, this plan was realised in the encounter Sveshnikov – Podgaets!) 24 g4 &d6 (Kharlov – Dzhandzhava, Moscow 1995).

It is obvious that in the situation with the fixed pawn pair  $d^{4}-d5$  White needs a knight far more than a bishop. Therefore 16 **\pmxd5** ed (worse is 16... $\pm$ xd5 17  $\pm$ xd5 ed 18  $\pm$ b3) 17 h3 We look briefly at the remaining moves:

17 ¥F3 金疗5!? 18 罩ad1 (if 18 g4, then 18...f6! 19 ¥g3 fc 20 ¥xc5+ 金g8 21 gf 公xf5 22 公xd5 罩c8 with an unclear game) 18...f6 19 仑d3 金xd3 20 罩xd3 ¥d7 (Sturua – Burmakin, Biel 2000);

17 亘e2 f6 18 ②xd7 豐xd7 19 亘ae1 ②c6 20 g3 亘f7 (Topalov - Vizhmanavin, Groningen 1993). Everywhere it's just a little more pleasant for White.

17...f6 18 2f3 Yet another important moment.



Black's position is worse, gloomily worse. He, so to speak, 'runs no risk' of winning. Reconciling himself to this, he needs to concentrate his efforts on neutralising White's pressure. How? Firstly, by developing the queen's rook to e8 and in this way gathering all his men into a unified force. Secondly, by improving the position of the knight e7. The ideal place for it is on f4. If it all comes together as he thinks, then a draw becomes full reality.

18...\$c6! After 18...\$t7?! 19 \$\equiv 22 \$\equiv 22 \$\exists c8 & 20 \$\exists ae1 (Hracek - Dzhandzhava, Moscow 1994) Black did not manage to put right the coordination of his forces and lost accordingly.

19  $\underline{E}$ 2 It seems that more dangerous would be a build up of heavy pieces on the c-file: 19  $\underline{E}$ 66  $\underline{W}$ d7 20  $\underline{E}$ ael  $\underline{E}$ aes 21  $\underline{W}$ c2?? Black will not succeed in solving the problem of the pin tactically: the endgame after 21... $\underline{W}$ xe6?! 22  $\underline{W}$ xe6  $\underline{C}$ 15 23  $\underline{W}$ xe6  $\underline{E}$ xe8  $\underline{A}$ xe8  $\underline{A}$ xe8 25  $\underline{C}$ xd5  $\underline{A}$ c6 26  $\underline{C}$ e3 is probably lost. But the quieter 21... $\underline{K}$ F?! and then 22... $\underline{C}$ 8 gives equal chances.

19...變d7 20 b4 b6 21 b5 金b7 22 a4 g5! 23 罩ae1 公g6, and the game ended in a draw (Kosten -Kuczinski, Saint Affrique 1995).

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## Appendix

## Steiner System: 1 e4 c6 2 c4



At the end of the 20s – beginning of the 30s of the last century, the Hungarian player Lajos Steiner played some memorable games starting with the moves shown in the diagram postion. Inspired by his victories he published a series of analyses which endeavoured to prove that the move 2 c4 refuted the Caro-Kann defence.

It goes without saying that this is not so; upon correct defence Black should overcome all difficulties. However he should know precisely what problems are facing him and not in any way rely on general principles. Otherwise he will get into trouble.

It should be mentioned that the Steiner system not infrequently loses its independence and transposes to another opening variation. Thus after 2...e5 3  $\Omega$ (3 d6 4 d4  $\Omega$ ) before us is an Indian (with the bishop on e7) or King's Indian (with the bishop on g7) defence. Upon 2...d5 3 ed cd 4 d4 arises the initial position of the Panov Attack. The moves 2...e6 3 d4 d5 4  $\Omega$ (3 de 5  $\Omega$ )xe4  $\Delta$ b4+ 6  $\Delta$ d2 Wxd4 lead us to the tabiya of the so called 'Slav Gambit'.

Let us go over to a review of the variations. After 1 e4 c6 2 c4 Black has three main possibilities: 2...e5 (I), 2...e6 (II), 2...d5 (III).

## I

## 2...e5

In his turn, White has at his disposal three continuations: 3 C3 (A), 3 d4 (B), and 3 C13 (C).

## A

3 20c3 A creation of the Latvian grandmaster Normunds Miezis. White is thinking about fianchettoing the light-squared bishop – which, quite frankly, is not a very energetic idea in the present position.

3...2c5 (If, for time being, White declines to fight for the central squares, then Black himself will occupy them with pleasure) 4 g3 **#f6**  Worth the most concentrated attention is the pawn sacrifice: 4... D fo  $5 \triangleq g2 \ 0.06 \textcircled{D}$  ge2 d5!?



In the game Miczis – Sasikiran (Djakarta 2001) White did not hit upon the necessary reaction to such daring and was soon forced to go over to defensive play: 7 ed cd  $8 \propto hot S \gtrsim 6 0 + 0 \le g 4$  10 h3  $\pm h5$ 11 a3  $2 \times d5$  12 cd  $2 \otimes d4$  13 g4  $\pm g 6$ 14 d3 f5! 15  $\pm c \le f g$  16 hg  $\mbox{Wh4}$  etc. It looks like the treatment of Indian grandmaster Krishnan Sasikiran has every chance of becoming the main teort for Black in this variation.

5  $\underline{\ \ }$  2 d6 6  $\underline{\ \ }$  2  $\underline{\ \ }$  6  $\underline{\ \ }$  2  $\underline{\ \ }$  6  $\underline{\ \ }$  2  $\underline{\ \ }$  6  $\underline{\ \ }$  3 h6 Prophylaxis against the possible threat of  $\underline{\ \ \ }$  cl-g5. However there is also a flip side to this move...

8 d3 0-0 9 0-0 White acted in a cunning way in the game Miezis – Henley (Gaussia 2001): 9 h3? a5 10 g4??  $\mathfrak{D}_{26}$  11 g5!, and it became clear that the move 7...h6 had become a useful lever for the pawn storm on the king's flank. There followed 11...hg 12  $\mathfrak{L}_{25}$  g $\mathfrak{M}_{6}$  6 13 h4! f5 10 d-0-0 fc 5  $\mathfrak{L}_{35}$  c4  $\mathfrak{L}_{46}$  16 h5! and the attack became irresistible: 16... $\mathfrak{W}_{24}$  17 hg  $\mathfrak{W}_{22}$  18  $\mathfrak{D}_{35}$  c5!  $\mathbb{Z}_{32}$  19  $\mathbb{Z}_{35}$ 



This is how the encounter Miczis – Baljon (France 2000) went. It is obvious that with his last move White started to prepare 12-14. Black should immediately commence active play on the queen's flank. For example: 19...a4!? 20 ba 2xa4 21 2e3 2e7(preventing the penetration of the knight to the d5 square) 22 2d2 2e523 2e1 2e61 24 a3 (24 2a1 b3!) 24...2a21 After this strong move Black obtains the better endgame by force:

25 Ea1 2b3! 26 Exa2 2xd2 27 Eg1 b3 28 Ea1 &d4! The blockade from the b2 square is removed, the white knight is forced to retreat, and Black can develop an initiative without hindrance:

29 Odl d5! 30 ed **Ead8** 31 Oc3 Odd5! (the sacrifice of the exchange is the shortext way to his objective) 32 £xd5 **Exd5** 33 Oxd5 £xb2 34 **Ed1** £b7! 35 **Exd2** £c!! The b-pawn is untouchable; Black's position is easily winning. Today the variation 3 (2)c3 (2)c5 4 g3 does not enjoy great popularity.

#### в

3 d41? An idealistic move. Exploiting the fact that the c6 square is inaccessible to the knight, White immediately 'strains' the c5 and d4 points. He hopes (not without foundation), that Black will not have enough force to wrestle for these points, and the advantage in the centre will remain with White.



We look at the following moves: 3...ed, 3... \$b4+, 3... 66 and 3... d6.

 3...ed?! (this seems the least strong of all four possibilities) 4 ₩xd4 ₩f6 5 & e3 @a6!? After the exchange of queens there is no compensation for the weakness of the d-pawn in Black's camp.

6  $\bigcirc$  col  $\Rightarrow$  col  $\Rightarrow$ 

11 e5!? A positional sacrifice of a pawn. In return White obtains the e4 square for the knight and an enduring

initiative. The less forcing 11 \$e2!? also does not look bad.

**11...de 12**  $\bigcirc$  def Wal 13  $\bigcirc$  def  $\doteq$  dark 14 Warf4 ef 15  $\Rightarrow$  de2  $\bigcirc$  265 16  $\blacksquare$  he1  $\Rightarrow$  drSt? Black gives up the important bishop in order to rule out the possibility of a jump of the white knight to e5 or g5. However the passivity of the black pieces remaining on the board is depressing.

More interesting is 16... 2g6!? 17 2g5, and then:

17... 全xe2?! 18 基xe2 f6 19 ④gf7 置g8 20 b4, and the doubled rooks on the e-file are decisive: 20... ④a6 21 置del ④c7 22 g3!

17...2c5!? 18 c2! (in this way he prevents the penetration of the knight to d3) 18...f6 19 xg4 2xg4 2xg420 Qg77 gg8 21 gd2 f3! 22 h3 <math>2h623 2xh6 gh 24 g3 and probably White still wins.





In the old game Becker – Beutum (Vienna 1931) there followed 17...h5?! and White missed the chance to conclude the struggle at nonc: 18 b41  $\alpha$ Aa 19  $\alpha$ Ab7  $\alpha$ Ab4 20  $\pi$ A7  $\alpha$ Ag8 21  $\alpha$ C5. Now 21... $\alpha$ Xa2+ is not possible in view of 22  $\alpha$ b2  $\alpha$ D4 23  $\pi$ B7, indeed, generally speaking, ...nothing is possible. Securing the outpost of the knight c5 would be more tenacious: 17...a5! Although after 18 & de4 & dxe4 19 & zxe4 & dg6 20 & Id7 Black's position remains bad, possibilities of resistance do remain for him.



The main defect of this (moreover, also the previous) variation remains its passivity. It is easy for White to grab space, which in its turn brings him up against super-aggressive play.

6  $\hat{\Omega}_{c3}$ ? An unambiguous hint that before playing  $\hat{\Omega}_{c1}$ ! -3 White intends to send forward the Fpawn. On the other hand, 6  $\hat{\Omega}$ ! 3 is not only lacking in ideas it is simply inaccurate: 6.  $\hat{\Omega}_{c3}$  (47)  $\hat{\Omega}_{c2}$   $\hat{\Lambda}_{c1}$ ! 8  $\hat{\Lambda}_{c1}$   $\hat{\Omega}_{c2}$ 9  $\hat{\Omega}_{c3}$   $\hat{\Omega}_{b2}$ (7) 10  $\mathbb{E}$ (1 -0 11 0-0  $\mathbb{I}_{c3}$ 12  $\hat{D}_{c3}$   $\mathbb{W}_{a5}$  13  $\hat{\rho}_{c1}$   $\mathbb{I}_{ad8}$  14  $\hat{\Lambda}_{g2}$  a 61  $\hat{S}$   $\mathbb{I}_{c1}$  15  $\mathbb{Z}_{c1}$   $\mathbb{I}_{c3}$   $\mathbb{E}_{ave}$  Black play with fully equal rights in the game Immanliev – Shabalov (Moscow 1994).

7 f4 0-0 8 0-0-0!? More cautious is

8 4)f3 with the following variations:

8...ef 9  $\cong xf4 \bigtriangleup h5$  10  $\cong d2$  f5!? (in this lies the point of the exchange on f4) 11 e5 de 12  $\boxdot xe5 \cong h4+ 13 \cong f2 \cong xf2+ 14 \bigotimes xf2 \ \textcircled{d}d7$  15  $\boxdot f3$ ! The better pawn structure defines White's advantage;

8...ed 9 ₩xd4 c5 10 ₩d2 42c6 11 0-0-0 & g4 12 h3 & xf3 13 gf 2\d4 14 4 b51? By exchanging the opponent's only active piece, White establishes control over the whole board (Tal – Nei, Parmu 1971).

The given variations allow us to draw the conclusion that after  $8 \triangle 13$ White's chances are superior. But the temptation to start an attack with opposite sides castling (indeed, even with a heavy superiority in the centre) is too great.

## 8.... #a5 9 213 2bd7



10 h3!? Intending to continue the offensive on the king's flank by g2-g4.

The other plan is to create a passed pawn in the centre: 10 fe de 11 d5. But it runs the risk of losing the initiative; apart from this he should not underestimate Black's counterattacking possibilities (b7b5!). This is how the struggle turns out after 11...cd: 12 cd a6!? 13  $\pm$ b1 b5 14  $\pm$ d3 b4 15  $\oplus$ c2  $\pm$ e8 (defending the e5 pawn and freeing the knight for active operations) 16  $\oplus$ g3  $\oplus$ c5 17  $\pm$ c2  $\pm$ d7 18  $\oplus$ h4  $\pm$ b6 or

12 ed b5!? 13 ᡚxb5 (on 13 cb Black, in the style of the Volga gambit, replies 13...a6!) 13...₩xa2 14 ᡚc3 ₩b3 with an absolutely unclear game in both cases.

**10...ed 11**  $\pounds$ xd4  $\pounds$ c5 **12**  $\pounds$ d3 (T.Hansen – Bai, Gausdal 2000). Here Black missed the only chance to start a fight: **12...** $\pounds$ c6!? **13** g4 d5! (upon a flank attack one should react with a counter-blow in the centre!) **14** cd (or 14  $\pounds$ c2  $\pounds$ a4! 15 f5  $\pounds$ xc3 16  $\Re$ xc3  $\Re$ xc3+ 17 bc  $\pounds$ d7) **14...cd** 15 cs  $\pounds$ 16!

b) 6... "#f6!? This was often played by the inexhaustibly inventive English grandmaster Anthony Miles.



Black is certainly not able to equalise but he can bring some diversity to the position. Indeed, he also saves himself against the attack after 7 0-0-0 \$\mathcal{M}\$fer 3 \$\mathcal{M}\$ \$\mathcal{M}

7 ②ge2!? (now on 斷f6-h6 he always has f2-f4!) 7... ②e7 8 0-0-0 0-0 9 f4 2g4



The offensive on the king's flank should continue: 10 f5!? 2c8 11 de de 12 h3 xc2 13 xc2 2a614 g4!? (Sax – Miles, Lugano 1989). Lest White is labouring under too many delusions, let us say: as a result Miles beat both West and Sat!

3) 3...ۓf6!? A move that is rejected as defective by many theoreticians on the basis of the game Tal – Garcia (Sochi 1986). However, in our opnion, in general this is the best reply to 3 d4.

After 4 Oc3 Black has the right to choose between two moves, pinning the knight c3: 4...Ob4 and 4...Wa5.



a) 4... 2b4!? 5 de €xc4 6 ₩d4 ₩a5! A recommendation of Ta1. Weak is 6...d5? in view of 7 d ₩a5 8 ₩xc4 2xc3+ 9 €d1! as happened in the above mentioned game Ta1 – Garcia. Yet another blunder - 9...cd?, and after 10 ₩c2 one of the black bishops is inevitably lost. Soon Garcia resized.

It was because of these trifles that the whole variation was buried!

7 ②e2 ②xc3 (it is interesting to test 7...②c5!? 8 ≝d1 ②a4!) 8 ③xc3 0-0 9 ▲e2 ≅e8 (Black commences a siege of the e5 pawn) 10 &f4



10...c5! 11 **#d2 @c6** 12 0-0 **@xe5** 13 **Efc1 @xc3** 14 **bc #c7** 15 **Ead1 d6** Black's chances are superior and we do not know at what point White could have improved!

b) 4... a wast?? If the move 4... b 4?? has been poorly researched, then here this is generally not the case. Nevertheless we dare say that even after the queen move Black has every right to reckon on counterplay.

5 f3 âb4 6 ᡚe2 ed 7 ∰xd4



7...d5! A blow on the most heavily defended square! However analysis shows that this is not only effective but also the only means of imposing his will on the opponent.

Insufficient for equality is 7...0-0 in view of 8 c5 & be 9 & fd4! White prevents the freeing advance d7-d6, while a break in the centre from the objective: 9...f6 10 0-0-0 &c5 11 &d2 fc 12 &xc5 d6 13 &g3 &b4 14 & 3&fs7! 15 &fd4 &xc3 16 &wc3 &xc3+ 17 bc &g6 18 h4 h6 19 h5 &h7 20 c51 d5 21 c4! The endgame is obviously in White's favour.

In the game Ostermeyer – Meduna (Porz 1988) Black offered a pawn sacrifice: 7...d6 8  $\pm$ 14 0-0? But the fact of the matter is that the compensation for it does not look sufficient: 9  $\pm$ xd6?  $\pm$ xd6 10  $\pm$ xd6  $\pm$ d8 II  $\pm$ a3  $\pm$ xa3 12 ba  $\pm$ Aa6 13  $\pm$ 14  $\pm$ c5 14  $\pm$ a41 etc.

Here also it turns out that there is no real alternative to 7...d5!

8 cd He can also decline the pawn − 8 Åg5, but Black does not stop there: 8...de! Though his king's flank is subject to ruin, possession of the c5 square gives him counterchances. This is how events might further develop:  $9 \triangleq xf6 gf 10 #xf6 0-0 11 fc <math>\bigcirc d7$  12 #h4  $\bigcirc c5$  13 0-0-0 (or 13 #g3+  $\bigcirc h8$  14  $\bigcirc dc4$  f5!?, opening the e-file and including the bishop c8 in the game) 13... $\bigcirc xc4$  14  $\bigcirc dd4 \bigcirc c5$  with very sharp play.

8...cd 9 ed 0-0 10 a3 &c5 11 @c4 @b6!? (striving to exploit the weakening of the a7-gl diagonal) 12 @g3 &f2+ 13 @d1 @bd7 14 @ge4 @xe4 15 @xe4 Zd8



Let us say this: the longer the variation 3... (2)16 remains in the shade, the... better it will be for Black!

4) 3...d6 The main continuation. Play in this variation in fact 'steers' towards a position that is characteristic of the 'Indian' but not the Caro-Kann scheme. Too vast to include here; and so where resemblance transfers into full identity, our coverage has to stop.

White has a choice: 4 d5, 4  $\bigcirc$ c3 or 4  $\bigcirc$ f3 There is one other move, very simple: 4 de?1, but the endgame after 4...de 5 %d8# %d8 can only be worse, for example: 6 f4 %d4+ 7  $\bigcirc$ c3  $\bigcirc$ f6 8 %d2  $\bigcirc$ dc4 7 g fe  $\bigcirc$ xes 10  $\bigcirc$ f3  $\bigcirc$ df4 T1 a3 %d6 12  $\nexists$ d1 %c7 13 b4  $\And$ 68 (Frialde – Spraggett, Toronto 1996).

a) 4 d5?! A premature move - the tension of the pawn pair d4-e5 is clearly in White's favour, and he should not break it too soon.



He can try to equalise by standard methods:  $4...\&e75 \pounds c_3 \pounds f_6 6 h_3 a6$  $7 \pounds d_3 \pounds bd7 8 \pounds ge2 h5!? - firstly, to$ prevent g2-g4, and secondly,intending an operation to seize darksquares on the king's flank.

But he can play even more sharply: **4...151**? This is interesting even from the formal point of view – all eight half moves have been made by pawns. If, however, we are talking about essentials then White is in no position to maintain his centre.

5 2d3 fe 6 2xe4 2f6 7 2c3 2xe48 2xe4 #h4 (the early introduction of the queen is absolutely in order here) 9 #e2 (on 9 #d3 it is necessary to consider 9...₩g4!?) 9...cd 10 cd ▲15 In the game Ciric – Burmakin (Berlin 1995) followed the more peaceful 11 20:3 20d7 12 20f3 ₩h5 13 20d4 ₩xe2+ 14 20dxe2 with an equal endgame.

More principled is 11 \psib5+!? \Dd7 12 \Dg3, and White wins a pawn. But after 12...\$c2!? 13 \Df3 \psib4 14 \psib5 \Df3 Black has compensation.



Wherever the queen goes it will not find peace:

15  $rac{1}{2}c7$  ad3!? (preventing casting) 16 b3  $rac{1}{2}xb3!$  17  $rac{1}{2}c8+c^2c7$  18  $ag5+c^2r7$  19 ab  $rac{1}{2}xa4+20$  add2  $rac{1}{2}b2+21$  adxa43 cbc5+22 adc3  $rac{1}{2}c3+c^2$  with perpetual check, or

**15 We6 Wb**4+! (inferior is 15...**W**x6?! 16 de \De6 17 \De3 \De3 \De3 **18** \De3 L, and the endgame is in White's favour) 16 \De1 \De3 \De3 \De3 A to \De5?! 18 0-0 **W**b7! 19 \De1 \De5 20 **W**d4 \De3 21 \De3 \De3 \De3 C. The initiative fully belongs to Black.

b) 4 **Oc3** Quite a lot of games are played on this theme, but only a few of them remain on the track of the Caro-Kann defence. For example, 4. **W**e7 5 **Ol3 Ol5 Oc6 Oc6**  about the chain of moves 4...g65 ( $\Delta f3$ ) g7 – again an Indian, only the code has changed (this time it is A42).

4...2e7 5 Df3 2g4 and 4...Df6 5 f4 ₩a5 can be considered as relatively independent.

bl) 4 ... 2 e7 5 2 f3 2g4!?



From the point of view of struggle for advantage, the endgame after 6 dc?! \$\overline{2}xf3 7 gf de 8 \$\overline{2}xd8 + \$\overline{2}xd8\$ is poor. Here the two bishops do not play any particular role; the main thing is the blockade on the dark squares.

All White's efforts to change the status quo lead to nothing: 9 f4!?  $\Delta d7 \ 10 \ g1 \ \&c7! \ 11 \ \&h3 \ \Delta gf6$  $12 \ \Xi xg7 \ eff (gaining the important c5$  $gauger) 13 \ \Xi g5 \ \Delta c5 \ 14 \ xf1 \ \Delta g6$  $15 \ \Xi f5 \ \Delta g8! \ 16 \ b3 \ \Delta 8c7 \ 17 \ \Xi h5 \ \Xi d8 \ 18 \ \&a3 \ \&c5 \ and \ Back stands$ better (Sax - Hort, Amsterdam 1983).

If it cannot be changed then it means that the d4 square needs to be held -6 & 2.5, but then the standard (again, however, purely 'Indian') exchanging operation snaps into action: 6...&x13! 7 @x13 &x25! It is to Black's advantage to remove from the board all (except the light-squared bishop) the opponent's minor pieces – then it will be quite an easy matter

to bring about the blockade on the dark squares.

So as not to obtain a strategically hopeless game. White needs urgently to do something. For example, 8 Wg3 &xe3 9 fet? Wf6 10 c5!, wrecking Black's pawn chain and giving his light-squared bishop space on which to operate.

Unsatisfactory now is 10...dc because of 11 & c4! with the threat of  $\Xi$ h1-f1. There remains 10...ed 11 ed dc, but even then dreams of a blockade turn to dust:



12 âcd! ℃h6 (how else to defrand the f7 square?) 13 0-0-0! ℃d7 (or 13...0-0 14 € ℃ 15 Åd6 ☉h8 16 Åhd1 with a great positional advantage) 14 Åhf1 ₩g6 15 ₩c7 Æd8 16 €h1 White draws ever close to victory and even 16...b5 does not help Black get out of the vice in view of 17 d5!

b2) 4...2161? 5 f4?! (more reliable, it goes without saying, is 5 ∞13, but then we once again move away from forcing Caro-Kann variations to the Indian labyrinth) 5...₩a51? The correct order of moves. White is forced to defend the pawn with a not very attractive queen manoeuvre, thereby losing tempi needed for the development of his pieces.

6 ♥d3 ②a6 7 ②f3 ed 8 ♥xd4 ②c5 A double attack: the pawn on e4 and the fork on b3 are both hanging.



The strongest chain of moves for both sides is 12 th 1 Jls 8 13 Wxd62b6 14 e5 2cf5! (heratening to trap $the queen) 15 a3! <math>\pm ad8 16 b4 \pm 3xd6$  $17 ba \pm 3xc3 18 \approx 2cedr? = 2cxc4$  $19 \pm 2xc4 \pm 3d48 20 \pm 2g3 \pm g4 - 1ead8$ us to a position which we have to assess in Black's favour.

However on closer inspection it becomes clear that the defence is illusory and the pawn could be taken: 9... $\Im$ exce4! 10 b4 @b6! Thanks to this move Black nor only saves the piece but also gains the advantage: 11 c5 @d8 12  $\Im$ xe4 @c7 13  $\Im$ fg5 d5 14  $\Xi$ h3  $\Im$ xe4 15  $\Xi$ c3 f5 16  $\pounds$ c2  $\Xi$ e8! 17 0-0 g6 etc.

c)  $4 \otimes f3$  (the most natural continuation)  $4... \otimes g4$  Yet again  $4... \otimes d7$  leads us to the Indian scheme with the code A55.

After 4...&g4 begins the 'hanging' of the d4 pawn. There are three defences to choose from: 5 de, 5 d5 or 5 &e2.



c1) 5 de &xf3 6 gf Also harmless is 6  $\$  xf3 de 7 &c2 &f6 8 0-0 &bd79 &c3  $\$  xf7 10  $\$  xg3 &c5 with a particularly unpleasant transfer of the knight to d4 or f4.

6...de 7 ₩x48+ ☆x48 (nowhere in this endgame will Black risk getting the worst of it) 8 ft? (trying to 'wake up 'his bishops) 8...\$b4+1? The most concrete decision. The insipid 8...f6 is certainly weaker but even here White cannot count on much:

9 오h3 當c7 10 Dc3 Da6! (intending to catch the important dark-squared bishop on the e3 square)  $11 \& e3 \Xi d8 12 \& e2 \& c5$ :  $13 \Xi ag1 g6 14 fe \& xe3$ ; (the catch is successfully completed) 15 & xe3 fe  $16 \Xi g5 \Xi e8$ , and it is Black who is playing for a win (Seirawan – Nikolic, Tiburg 1990).

9 De3 The eccentric 9 &e2!? (in order to generally avoid exchanges) does not have the anticipated effect: 9... $\Diamond$ d7 10  $\Xi$ g1  $\Diamond$ gf6! (enjoying an advantage in development, Black quite rightly sacrifices a pawn) 11  $\Xi$ xg7 &e7 12 13  $\Diamond$ h5 13  $\Xi$ g4  $\Diamond$ xf4+ 14 &xf4 ef 15  $\Xi$ xf4 &d6 (and once again all the dark squares are under Black's control) 16  $\Xi$ h4  $\Diamond$ e5 17  $\Diamond$ c3 h5!? with more than sufficient compensation (Yagupov – Navarovsky, Budapest 1991).

9...216 10 13 2bd7 11 2c2 The alternative is 11 2d2 cf 12 2x14 2b5 13 2d2 2d6 14 0-0-0 2c7 15 2c2 2lke8 16 2c2 2c5 17 2d4 Zad8 18 2bf5 (or 18 f4 2d6 19 c5 2c5 20 2c2 f6), undermining the c5 pawn) 18...2f8 19 2c2 2d5! with an occupation of the f4 square.

11 ... \$d6!? Forcing White to

decide: either to close the position by 12 f5 – but then the light-squared bishop finally loses 'citizen's rights' – or to exchange in the centre and concede to a dark square blockade.

12 fe **kxe5** 13 0-0 On 13 **k**e3!? (Bunzmann – Brameyer, Germany 1993) the right reaction consisted of 13...\Dh5!? 14 0-0-0 \property of the an inevitable blockade of the 14 square.



13...g5! Black's conception remains unchanged for the whole course of the endgame: control of the dark squares and ideally – a complete dark square blockade.

So as not to allow a bind, White is forced to go for a break. But this simplification is favourable for Black and (in the first place) loses the most important defender of the dark squares – the bishop cl: 14 far gf 15 &xfa  $\exists$ g8+16 &h1 &c7 17 &xc5 &hxc5 18  $\exists$ f5 &faf 19  $\exists$ af1 fa (Nevednichy – Becerra, Erevan 1996). The Cuban grandmaster won this game, though upon accurate play White certainly has the right to neckon on a draw. But not more!

Practically all variations and versions of such an endgame – with exchanges on e5 and d8 – are harmless for Black.

c2) 5 d5!? In contrast to the approach to the problem seen in the previous variation – White closes the centre. It is worth adding that analogous to the variation 1 e4 c6 2 c4 c5 3 d4 d6 4 d5?! here the pawn advance is not appropriate: the inclusion of the moves  $4 \ ch \ s \ deprives$  Black of his most important resource (7-5!)



5... 2e7!? An idealistic move – above all Black wants to develop his dark-squared bishop.

The standard  $5...2016 6 \ color 2 \ bbd7$ 7 h3  $\&x13 8 \ Wx13 \ \&c7 \ comes up$ agains 9 h4, and the light-squaredbishop – the cinderella of thisconstruction – suddenly becomes astrong piece. In the game Vaulin –Savon (Warsaw 1992) followed: $9...0-0 lo g3! a5 11 <math>\&h3 \ Dc5 12 \ 0-0$ (13 cd b5 (it seems that Black has found counterplay but this is no more than an optical illusion) 14 &c31 b4  $L5 \ \&cx51$  be 16 &a3 cb 17 &xb2&d7 and here White's advantage is consolidated by 18  $\ Efc1 \ Dc5 19 \ \&a3$  $\ Bb 20 \ Ec4$ .

6 ②c3 盒xf3!? (it was still not too late to return to usual play by 6...②f6) 7 曖xf3 盒g5 (the dream has come true, but...) 8 燮g3! 盒xc1 9 篇xc1



With the exchange of the darksquared bishops Black is left with no bad pieces, but... none of them are in play! White's advantage in development (a mininum of three tempi) places a question mark against Black's strategical plan. Above all the break e4-e5! is threatened.

9...₩f6 (9...₩f8 10 c5!) 10 c5! dc 11 dc 2xc6 He would like to play 11...bc, in order to prevent the knight going to d5, but after 12 2a4 2c7 13 2xc5 0-0 14 ∐d1! White's positional advantage is too great (Suba - Cetras, Romania 1999).

12 Od5 who 13  $\cfrac{xxc5}{yd6}$  The other defence against the fork on c7 was the move 13... $\cfrac{xc5}{zc6}$ , but the simple combination 14  $\pounds$  b5 (the pawn on c5 is hanging) 14... $\cfrac{wd6}{zc6}$  b5 (b6 (b  $\cfrac{xc7}{zc6}$ ) bc 16  $\cfrac{vc7}{zc2}$  b 17 0-0  $\cfrac{uc2}{zc2}$ B b4! gives this idea up for lost.

14 置b5 管h6 Threatening a check on cl. Black, of course, does not object to a repetition of moves: 15 置c5 營d6, but there are other plans for White...

## 15 **@e**2!

Neglect of development of his own pieces costs Black dear – he will not succeed in castling on the short side:



15... ≝b8 16 ⇔b4! ⇔ge7 17 ⊕xc6 ⊕xc6 18 ≣xe5+! ⇔f8 19 ₩a3+ ⇔g8 20 ≣d5 ₩c1+ (also losing is 20... ≣c8 because of 21 0-0 ≣xc4 22 ₩xa7!) 21 ≣d1 ₩f4 22 ₩a3 etc.

18  $rac{1}{2}$   $ac{1}{2}$   $ac{1}{2}$ 

Of course this analysis needs to be carefully confirmed in practice but first impressions are that the idea of playing for an exchange of bishops –  $\frac{1}{2}$ (Re7-g5 – might turn out badly.

c3) 5 兔c2 公d7 Play, linked to an exchange of dark-squared bishops, already lacks its former optimism: 5...兔c7!? 6 0-0 요xf3 7 요xf3 兔g5!? 8 兔xg5 ♥ ₩b3! ₩c7 10 ℤd1!

It is still a long way to the endgame, but with queens on the board the positional niceties fade into the background



The frontal attack c4-c5! is threatened, for example: 10...9a611 c5! dc 12 d5! <math>206 13 &c2!?  $\overline{ad8}$ 14 d6!, and Black is closer than ever to his demise:  $14...\overline{a}xd6$   $15 <math>\overline{x}xd6$  $\overline{w}xd6$   $16 \ \overline{w}xb7$  20b4  $17 \ 9c3$  0-0 $18 \ \overline{ad1} \ \overline{w}b8$   $19 \ \overline{w}xb8 \ \overline{x}xb8 \ 20 \ \overline{ad2!}$ with a technically winning endgame.

In the game Shchakachev – Varga (Lausane 2001) Black, realising the he might be consumed without a great struggle, first of all tucked away his king: 10...2h6 11 &c3 0-0. But this is hardly the way to equality. Here is a sample variation: 12  $\exists$ d2 &a6 13 de! de 14  $\exists$ ad1 &c5 15  $\forall$ a3! (threatening 16 &a4) 15... $\exists$ t68 16 b4 &c6 17  $\exists$ d7  $\forall$ f6 18  $\exists$ cb7 &d4 19 &c2 and White has an unquestionable advantage.

which he missed the opportunity of obtaining compensation by 17...心b6!? 18 盒xf6 響xf6 19 会h1 呈ad8.

6...\$e7 7 0-0  $\bigcirc$ gf6 The opportunity for the manoeuvre 7...\$x13 & \$\&x13 \&g5\$ has already passed by. The more so that in the present situation there is the mirror reply - 9 &g41 \$\&xc1 10 \&xd7+\&xd7 11 \&xc1 \@16\$ 12 641, winning the struggle for the centre: 12...ed 13 \&xd4 0-0 14 \&cd1 \&xd8 + \&xd8 18 \&cd1 \&xd1 already the that and age 15 75 the 16 \&xc5 \&c7 17 \&xd8+\&xd8 18 \&cd1 \&xd1 already that allege 1978).

8 & €3 0-0 Before us is a tabiya, indeed, again from another opening – A53. But since there is an inconceivable number of games (with all possible move orders) passing through this position, we cannot leave it completely without attention.



There are three methods of struggle for the advantage:

9 2\d2!? \$\overline\$ \$\overline\$ 210 \$\overline\$ \$\ov

19 创f5 创c5 20 e5!? de 21 響g3 g6 22 響h4!? with chances of attack;

9 d5 (consolidating his space advantage) 9...65 10 & Δel Δxe2 11 ¥xe2 & Δe8 12 g3!? (preparing the break 12-4) 12...g6 13 & Δh6 Δg7 14 & Δg2 & g5 15 & Δxg5 ¥xg5 16 f41 (Morozevich – Savchenko, Alushta 1993):

9 **□c**1!? (a cunning move: White waits...) 9...**□e**8 But now follows with far greater effect 10 d5! The rook on e8 is doing nothing and it is some time before it returns to the place where it is needed.

10...c5 He must close the centre otherwise White's breakthrough will be even easier: 10...&f8?! 11 b4 a5 12 dc! be 13 b5! (Ivanchuk – Gallejo, Erevan 1996).

The fact is that in the variations 1 ef 62 264 63 4d 64 2 23 03 4 2 13 a clear way to equality is notalways apparent. But it must not beforgotten that he has a fine trump uphis sleeve <math>-3...2616! Thus it is too early for White to rest on his laurels.

#### С

3 €/B! Namely this move (and not 3 d4) – is the most unpleasant for Black. He has five replies with various degrees of eccentricity: 3...d5, 3...f5, 3...€/f6, 3...₩c7 and 3...₩a5. The sixth, the most popular, is 3...d6, after which 4 d4 returns us to what we have a lready looked at.



1) 3...d5?! Giving up material, but for what is not clear: 4 cd cd  $5 \Leftrightarrow xes$ de 6 &b5+ &d7 7 @b3 @e78  $\&xd7+ \bigotimes xd7$  9 @xb7 Ib810 @xd7+ @xd7 9 @xb7 Ib810 @xd7+ @xd7 11  $\oslash xd7 fxd7$ (Florian – Zinn, Dresden 1959) 12  $\bigotimes cd \Leftrightarrow fa$  13 b3 &cs 14 &b2 with a easily winning endgame.

2) 3...f5?! a venture of pure water, but since it was devised by a grandmaster – the Swede Jonny Hector, then it needs to be taken seriously. Incidentally, we cannot imagine what is the strongest move here!



 gs 12 %x71 + %x71 13 %h5 %c7 14 %c2 %c6 and it is quite possible to survive. True, in the game Jansa – Bobzin (Hamburg 1993) Black did not realise that he was threatened with the move 15 0-0 and went quickly downhill: 15...%A7?! 16 f3! Certainly, the f1e needs to boarded up before it is hit: 15...%L75!? 16 dc d 17 f3 c3! Possibly even here White has the advantage (18 %d3!?) but this still has to be proved.

4 **2c2!** – this is a clear solution. First he completes his development and then the pawn weaknesses will fall all by themselves – 4...fe 5 <sup>2</sup>∂xe5, and then:

**5...**⊙16 6 0-0 &c7 7 ⊙3 d5? (this is quite bad but also after 7...0-0 & 2₀4 ⊈e8 9 %c2 Black is not be envied) 8 cd cd 9 &b5+ &dr1 10 ⊘xd7 ⊘bxd7 11 ⊘xd5! (Gofshtein - Hector, Manila 1992) or **5...%h4** 6 ∂c3 d6 7 &g4! ⊙a6 8 &xc8 ₫xc8 9 ∂g4 ⊘c5 10 0-0 ⊙16 11 @x76+ gf 2 g3 Щ8 13 Щc1 15 14 d3 and it is not clear how Black will manage to make a draw from this position (Sher – Hector, Veile 1994).

3) 3... $\bigcirc$ f6 4  $\bigcirc$ c3 We see some kind of wild blend of the Caro-Kann and Petroff defences upon 4  $\bigcirc$ xc5!? d6 5  $\bigcirc$ 3  $\bigcirc$  xc4. Moreover the path is quite untrodden and when the opportunity presents itself it can give White chances of success:

6 ℃c3!? (more interesting than 6 d4 d5 7 \$d3 \$b4+ 8 \$bd2 \$c6 9 0-0 \$\add 210 \$\overline{sd2}\$ \$\overline{sd Âxc3 8 dc followed by long castling, Belyavsky – Tavadian, Yaroslav 1982) 7 dc & 2e7 8 & 2e2 ⊙dr 9 0-0 0-0 10 & 4 ⊙f6 11 ¥e2 d5 12 ≣ad1 ¥b6 13 h3 & d7 14 & 2e5 with some pressure (Kuporosov – Meduna, Lazne Bogdanec 1994).

4.... 2.b4 5 @xe5



Should he immediately win back the pawn (5...) or wait a while (5...0-0)? This is the question.

a) 5...\\$e7?! (100 conservative) 6 \\$\Delta d2\\$ White's good fortune is that he finds a tempo to make this retreat. After 6 \Delta f3, as shown long ago by the game van den Hoek - Euwe (Hague 1942), he did not reckon on the fact that 6..\Delta f4 not reckon on the fact that 6..\Delta f4 not age 8 0-0 d6 9 \\$\Delta D2 f16 10 d4 \&g4 11 \&g5 \Delta f2 f61 \Infty f8 led to a dull symmetrical position.

6...②xe47 ≙e2!? The alternative is 7 ₩e2 with the better endgame or attack:

7...②xc3 (endgame) 8 dc ∰xe2+ 9 &xe2 &e7 10 &f4! d6 11 0-0-0 &e6 12 &b4 (Votava – Meduna, Lazne Bogdanec 1995);

7... 盒xc3 (attack) 8 dc 0-0 9 盒f4 簋e8 10 0-0-0 響f8 11 饗c2 d6 12 f3 创f6 13 g4 创a6 (Tepla – Stefanova, Benasque 1997) 14 盒g3!? 7...2a5 (no use is 7...2d6 – after 8 0-0 0-0.9 2xe4 @xe4 10 b3 2c7 11 2a3 @d8 12 @d8 12 @d8 White's advantage is in no need of explanation) 8 0-0 0-0 9 @d8 10 2d3 2xe3 11 dc @f6 12 2e4 2b6 13 @h5



An advantage in development, and the attack – all at once. In the meantime he threatens mate in one move, while on 13...h6 White had in store 14 g41, and the pawn inexorable marches on. In the game Zaichik – Izeta (Spain 1991) Black defended in another way – 13...g6, but after 14 §g51 he did not last long.

b) 5...0-0!? A pawn down, but in return a developed piece up!

6 & e2!? Possibly he should be satisfied with less -6 & d3 & xc3 7 d6 & xc4 8 & c2 d5 9 cd & xc3 7 d6 & f5 11 & c3 & e6 12  $\exists$  c1 & d7  $\exists$  & c1 & d5 d4 & d4 & xcd1 15  $\exists$  scd1 & ef6 16 15 pursuing the 'advantage of the two bishops' in the endgame (Tal – Mukhametov, Leningrad 1991).

6...d6 7 ⊙ld3 ⊥xc3 8 dc ⊙xc4 9 0-0 ≣c8 Lacking in prospects is 9...⊙d7 10 ≣c1 ₩f6 11 f3 ⊙cc5 12 ⊙lf2 a5 13 ⊥c3 (Bareev - Volkov, Elista 1998). It seems, as distinct from the variation 5...₩e7, there is not really much in it... 10 f3 🖓 f6 11 🏩 g5



The opening has just about finished but there is apparently no ray of hope for Black. The game Vaganian – Nogeins (Leningrad 1987) continued in this way: 11...COB 71 22 CPL Wa55 13 &h4 d5 14  $\Xi$ cl b6 15 cd  $@\lambda$ d5 16  $@\lambda$ cl &h4 d5 17  $\&\lambda$ ad  $@\lambda$ ad 18 @dA16 b j5 19 at!? Again White is better.

4) 3...豐c7 Quite simply, without hassle, defending the e5 pawn. White can choose between 4 d4 and 4 包c3.

a) 4 d4 <u>\$b4</u>+ 5 <u>\$bd2</u>? 5 <u>\$d2</u> <u>\$xd2</u>+ 6 <u>\$xd2</u> d6 7 <u>\$c3</u> \$d6 8 <u>\$c2</u> 0-0 9 0-0 looks more solid. In the game Bajovic – Meduna (Plovdiv 1982), after 9...<u>\$c4</u> 10 <u>\$c1</u> \$bd7 11 <u>\$ac1</u> a5 12 h3, Black mistakenly rejected the exchange.



12... h5? A tactical rather than a positional mistake. But White 'forgave' the opponent, not noticing

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13 de! winning material: 13...de? 14 g4 皇g6 15 g5 or 13...①xe5 14 g4 皇g6 15 螢xd6 螢xd6 16 罩xd6.

He should have exchanged: 12...2xf3 13 2xf3 Ead8, and there is nothing in particular for White.

5...ed 6 a3  $\hat{x}$ xd2+?! It is of course attractive to keep hold of the d4 pawn but concrete variations turn out in Black's favour. Therefore it was necessary to reconcile himself to 6... $\hat{x}$ e7 7  $\hat{x}$ d4 d6 8  $\hat{x}$ 213  $\hat{x}$ 16 9  $\hat{y}$ d3 0-0 10 0-0  $\mathbb{R}$ 8 with an acceptable game.

7  $\forall xd2$  c5 8  $\forall g5 \triangle e7$  (or 8...g6 9 &f4 d6 10  $\forall g_{23}$ ) 9  $\forall xg7 \ \Xi g8$ 10  $\forall xh7 \triangle bc6$  11  $\& g5 \triangle d8$  12 h4! A non-standard position requires a non-standard solution. In this way White includes the rook in the attack.

12...\b6 13 \B13 d5 14 \B13 de 15 \Data xe4 f5



We are looking at the encounter Kosten – Szabolcsi (France 1997). All beauty in this game remained with the cadre. There could (and even should) follow  $16 \pm g5 \ \%e617 \ \Xic3!!$ A study-like move on the theme of 'covering over': 17...de  $18 \ \epsilon / 164$ . Also losing is  $17...fe18 \ \Xixe8 \ \Xixe8$  21 罩xe7+ 含f8 22 罩e5 Why is everything non-forced so beautiful?

b) 4  $\oint c_3$   $\oint f_6$  Not finding the logical idea 4...& b4. Possibly because of 5 g3?  $\oint f_6$  6. $\& g_2$   $\& x_{c3}$ 7 be  $\bigcirc x_{c4}$  8 & e2 d5 9 & a3 & e610 0-0  $\bigcirc d7$  11 cd cd 12  $\Xi f_6$   $\bigcirc dh 6$ 13  $\Xi ab1$ . Black has an extra pawn, but joy - none: 13... $\bigcirc \bigcirc -0$  14  $\bigcirc xe5$ !  $\& x_{c5}$  15 d3 & c7 16 de  $\bigcirc xe4$ 17  $\Xi ec1$   $\bigcirc de1$  6 & dc3 de  $\exists xd6$  19 ce1 (A.Sokolov - Glek, Vilnius 1984).

**5 d4?** White played the opening in an odd way in the game Franco – Abreu (Varadero 2000): 5 a3?! (preventing the development of the bishop on b4 but perhaps it is not worth bothering himself with this?) 5...&c5 6 &d3?! (but this too is quite a strange move; why not 6 b4?) G.a.5 7 0-0 d6 & b13, and now...



8...g5! Exploiting the fact that White has tied his own hands, Black commences the attack. Serves him right! Instead of a2-a3 it is nearly always useful to play d2-d4...

5... ▲b4 6 de ②xe4 7 ₩d4!? ₩a5 8 ₩xe4 ▲xc3+ Yet another fresh position. General words and criteria do not apply here; it is necessary to consider all variations deeply and skilfully.



9  $\pm$ d2 Worthy of attention is 9 9d2!?; at least this move cannot be refuted at once: 9...&b4 10 a3! (but not 10  $\pm$ d3?! in view of 10... $\pm$ da61 11  $\pm$ c2  $\pm$ c5 12  $\frac{1}{2}$ e2  $\pm$ c6, and Black adroitly transfers the knight from b8 to e6) 10... $\pm$ c7 (now 10... $\pm$ da6 parried by 11  $\pm$ b1!  $\pm$ c7 12 b4) 11  $\pm$ b1! (aone the less) 11... $\pm$ c7 12 b4 d6 13  $\pm$ b2 -0 14  $\pm$ d3 g6 15 ed  $\pm$ xd6 16  $\frac{1}{2}$ e2  $\pm$ 20 7 17 c5, and White has all the play.

9...&xd2+ 10 2xd2 2a6 11 a3 (preparing to castle long) 11...0-0 12 0-0-0 d5!? (without this pawn sacrifice it is difficult for Black to finish his development) 13 ed &f5



In the game Kharlov – Shabanov (Kuibyshev 1990) White carelessly played 14 203?! There and then the queen became 'enraged' (or in diplomatic language, became a 'desperado'): 14...響xa3! 15 ba 皇xe4 16 国d4 皇f5 17 c5 ④b8 18 皇c4 ④d7 19 国e1 b5! The position is full of life.

But meanwhile even dropping Black into a pit was very possible: 14 %23 <u>flads</u>15 %b3 %41 66 c51 **gle8 17** %c3 **%f4+ 18** %d2 %b8 19 %c4 h6 20 g31 Driving away the enemy queen from its central position, White seizes the e-file and breaks through to the 7<sup>th</sup> rank: 20...%h6 21 <u>alkel bc 22 </u><u>g</u>e7! <u>g</u>f8 23 f4 %xd6 42 **sla**xa7 with advantage.

4  $\triangle$ c3 There was a fresh treatment of this position by Joel Lautier: 4  $\triangle$ c2  $\triangle$ fb 5 0-01?  $\triangle$ xe6  $\triangle$ El d6 7 d4  $\triangle$ fb 8  $\triangle$ d2  $\forall$ c7 9 de de 10  $\triangle$ xc5!  $\triangle$ c7 11  $\triangle$ t4  $\forall$ b6 12  $\forall$ c2 0-0 13  $\triangle$ c3  $\triangle$ c6 14  $\exists$ ad1  $\triangle$ bd7 15  $\triangle$ T3 White has won back the pawn and his pieces occupy significantly betters quares (Lautier – Kuczynski, Polanica Zdroj 1991).

4.... 6 White's next move is very important.



It is clear that Black is thinking of playing \$\$18-b4. This idea can be

prevented (5 a3 or 5 d3 \$b4 6 \$d2) or ignored: 5 g3 or 5 \$e2.

5 a3 looks nothing special because of 5...&c5 and dubious is 6 @xc5?!&x72+! 7 &x12 @xc5 8 d3 d5 with the better prospects for Black. While after 6 &xc2 d6 7 0-0 @c7 8 B1 &g4 9 9 b4 &b6 10 d3 &x13? 11 &x13@hd7 12 @xc2 0-0 13 &b2 Zftes14 <math>@c2 c5?! 75 g3 @x18 16 &g2 @c6Black comes out of the opening with a fully worthwhile position (Kharlov – Volkov, Samara 2000).

5 \$e2 (for the present this remains the most popular, although 5 d3!? looks at the very least no worse) 5...2.b4 6 We21? A flexible continuation. In defending the e4 pawn, White intends an assault on the queen's flamk by means of a2-a3 and b2-b4. However in the event of an exchange on e3, White has the possibility of recapturing with the dpawn followed by doubling his heavy pieces on the open central file. After 6 0 + 0 + 0 + 3 Black has more levers for counterplay:



7...d5?! (apparently premature) 8 cd (now Black has to give up the bishop and the factor of the advantage of the two bishops becomes significant; not so clear is 8 cd cd 9 Åxes, Korchnoi – Gurevich, Barcelona 1992, 9...d4!?) 8...âxc3 9 bc cd 10 Åxes de 11 Åxd Wc7 (11...₩xc3? loses the exchange: 12 Åb2 ₩b4 13 Åx3) 12 de Åxe4 13 Åd3 Åc6 14 Åxe4 Åxc4 15 Åe1 Åa6 16 Åe3 (Cholvic – Volkov, Ohrid 2001);

7...âxc3! (best and meeting the requirements of the position, you see

White cannot take with the d-pawn) 8 bc d6 9 ₩c2 IIe8 10 h3 Dbd7 11 Oh2 d5 12 cd cd 13 cd Oxd5 14 Acd2 Oxf6 15 IIe dd Oxd5 14 Castilio - Ravi, Linares 2000).

**6...0-0 7 0-0 Ze8 8 a3** One way or another Black has to retreat. He must either concede space (8...\$R) or allow the formation of a weak dpayn in his camp (8...\$x3 9 dc).

In the game Lastin – Volkov (Perm 1997) equality proved to be close at hand: 8...&xc39 dc d6 10  $\&s \leq 5$  bd7 11  $\Xi$ ad1 &c7 12 &c1 h6 13  $\&c3 \\ close 2$  dl 4 g3 &c3 &c18 16 f3 b6 17  $\Xi$ d2 d5!, but White's play does not make the best impression.



9 b4!? White intends to attack on the broadest possible front. But he has to take into account that the position of the pawn on b4 allows Black to attack it later with by a7-a5.

More circumspect is 9 d4 d6 10 h3 Dbd7 11 & 2 a a6 12 de Dxc5 13 Dd4! (with an advantage in space, it is unfavourable to exchange pieces; apart from this, White will 'charge forward' with f2-f4!) 13...\#c7

14 国acl b6 15 f4 ②g6 16 g4!? 金b7 17 ②f5 c5 18 金f3 with a strong initiative (Ivanchuk – Miles, Biel 1989).

15 cd ₩xd6 16 €c5 ℤxa1 17 ≙xa1 €xc5 18 bc ₩c7 19 b3 Thus continued the game Erikalov – Sitnikov (Smolensk 2000). Black did not test the attacking potential of his forces and quite wrongly so.

After  $1^{\circ}$ ... $\bigcirc$ h5! 20 d4 ed 21  $\bigcirc$ xd4?! (stronger is 21  $\bigcirc$ xd4? hough even here, Black's position is not worse in view of the weakness on c5: 21... $\bigcirc$ Af4 22  $\triangle$ f1  $\bigcirc$ C7 etc.) the rook is included in the attack with decisive effect: 21... $\bigcirc$ Af4 22  $\triangle$ T  $\blacksquare$ C5! 23  $\bigcirc$ D3  $\blacksquare$ C5 24  $\triangle$ h1



## 24.... 2xh3! 25 gh 徵c8 26 全g4 基xg4! 27 hg 徵xg4 28 f3 徵xf3+ 29 全h2 ②e2 winning.

A beautiful variation, but it has no bearing on the assessment of the system 1 e 4c 5 c 4c 45. The system is dubious. Has Black any objection to going into Indian channels? Alright, but why go via the Caro-Kann defence?! The combination of an early c7-c6 and c7-c5 leads to a struggle in which Black loses the central squares d4 and c5 without a fight: 3 ch3! d6 4 d4! And his extravagant and intricate moves do not change this assessment at all.

## П

## 2...e6

Giving Black a solid, albeit somewhat passive position. In reply White can choose between 3 Df3, 3 Dc3 and 3 d4.

#### A

3 (13)? An old, respectable move. Today it is rarely employed though it is not so easy for Black to equalise the game.

3...d5 4 ed ed 5 cd cd 6 2b5+ Possible then:

6...2d7 7 2xd7+ ₩xd7 8 2be5!? ₩c7 9 0-0 2d6 10 d4 2be7 11 2bc3 0-0 12 2k4 with a minimal 'plus' (Botvinnik – Flohr, Leningrad 1933) or

6.... 2c6 7 ≝e2+ ≝e7 8 2e5 2d7 9 2xc6 bc 10 0-0



10...3¢481? (renewing the threat of 17-76 after which, as before, would follow a check on h5) 11 b3? (White is alert, now on 11...16 he has  $2 \pm 2 \pm 3$ .3) 11...¥e6 12  $\pm 3 \pm 15$   $\pm d6$  14  $\oplus 3 \pm 7$  15  $\oplus c3$   $\oplus 16$ 16  $\oplus 3 \pm 4$   $\oplus 5$  17  $\oplus c3$  Inventive play by both opponents has led to a position in which White's chances are nevertheless superior (Gulko – Shabalov, Berne 1992).

## в

3 262 d5 4 cd ed 5 cd cd In this variation (as also the previous one) verything lise in fine points invisible to the naked eye. Should he give an immediate check on b5 or wait a while? And after the check – should he first develop the queen to a4 or the knight to B and then to c5? The order of moves in this sort of variation has decisive significance.

1) 6 2b5+ 2c6 7 ₩a4 ₩d6? An imperceptible inaccuracy – now the position already cannot be saved. The only correct way is 7...2c7 8 2h3 a6 9 00 2c6, as played in the game Giorgadze – Oll (Tbilisi 1983). There followed 10 2xc6+ 2xc6 11 2d4 營d7 12 公xe6 fe 13 變g4 0-0-0 14 d3 象d6, and everything is in order for Black.

8 전f3 전f6 9 0-0 요e7 10 진e5 오d7 11 d4 實b4 12 진xd7 술xd7 13 嘗c2 基ad8 14 요f4 요d6



2) 6  $\bigcirc$  13  $\bigcirc$  16 7  $\bigcirc$  15  $\div$   $\bigcirc$  14 7 8  $\bigcirc$  15  $\bigcirc$  24 7 8  $\bigcirc$  15  $\bigcirc$  25  $\bigcirc$  26 7  $\bigcirc$  16  $\bigcirc$  25  $\bigcirc$  26 7  $\bigcirc$  16  $\bigcirc$  26  $\bigcirc$  26 7  $\bigcirc$  27  $\bigcirc$  26 7  $\bigcirc$  27  $\circ$  27

The encounter Olafsson – Shabalov (San Martin 1993) developed in the following way: **12 d4** (worth considering is 12 d3!?, denying the black knight the e4 square, for example, 12... $\pm$ b4+ 13  $\pm$ d21 0-0 14  $\pm$ g,5 with a slight advantage) 12...童b4+ 13 we2 0-0 14 호e3 신e4 15 Ihc1 신d6 16 a4



Here he should play 16...0513'with the idea that after  $17 \text{ }\odot c7 \text{ }\odot xc7$ **18**  $\mathbf{xc7}$  **Tables**: **19**  $\text{ }\odot \text{ }03$  **Black has** the resource **19...168**! White's initiative gradually comes to naught: **20 Tables**: **Tables**: **Tables Tables 20 Tables**: **Tables**: **Tables Tables 30 Tables**: **Tables**: **Tables 30 Tables**: **30 Tables**: **30 Tables 30 Tables**: **30 T** 

#### С

3 d4 d5 4 e5 Weaker is 4 cd ed 5 e5 in view of 5...2a6! It turns out that on 6  $\pm$ xa6 follows 6... $\pm$ xa6.+, Black transfers the knight to e6 with counterplay: 6  $\pm$ c3  $\pm$ c7 7  $\pm$ ge2  $\pm$ c7 8  $\pm$ c4 4 c515  $\pm$ s2.5  $\pm$ c6 10  $\pm$ xe6  $\pm$ xc6 11  $\pm$ d3  $\pm$ xc3 12 fe  $\pm$ fb4+ 13 g3  $\pm$ g5 14  $\pm$ d2 h5 (Tal – Bisquier, Bled 1961).

On 4 20c3 the struggle goes over to the channels of the Slav defence (code D31) – both in the case of 4...2b4 5 e5, and 4...de 5 20x42b4 + 6 2d2 Wd4 (Slav gambit).

After 4 e5 Black's choice is not easy.



Going for the advance  $-4...cS^{21}$ is hardly a good idea, since White has the possibility of favourably simplifying the position: 5 od wxd56 cbc31 wxd4 7 wxd4 cd 8 cbb5 cba69 cb3 dc5 10 a31 The endgame is extremely difficult for Black, for example: 10...cbh6 11 dxh6 gh 12 dc2 dc7 13 cb dxd7 14 cbk4abc8 15 abc1 dxd4 16 cbxd4 cbk817 f4 (Kaidanov – Zamora, New York 1997).

The attempt to modify the idea – 4...dc  $5 \triangleq xc4 + c5?!$  is also not good: 6 d5! a6 (Stohl – Shabalov, Werfen 1990) 7 d6!  $\triangleq c6 \$ \triangleq 13 f6 9 \triangleq f4$  with the better prospects for White.

In all probability, Black should not get excited and immediately provoke a crisis. He should calmly complete his development and then and there try to break out of the vice.

In precisely this way – cooly and logically – Black played in the game Vaganian – Dolmatov (Vilnius 1980): 4... $\Im r 5 \ \Omega f 5 \ 0 \ f 5 \ 0 \ s 3 \ ac6$ (provoking White's next move, after which the position of the knight 3 is weakened) 7 b3  $\Omega f 5 \ ac2 \ ac4$ 



Black's development is no worse than his opponent's, indeed, concrete variations reveal no defects in his position. For example, 10 0-0  $2c\delta$ 11 cd  $2c\lambda$ c1  $2c\lambda$ c2  $2c\lambda$ c2 3tW22 W $d\lambda$ c2  $2c\lambda$ c2  $4c\lambda$ c2  $2t\lambda$ c2  $d\lambda$ c2  $4t\lambda$ c2  $4t\lambda$ c2  $d\lambda$ c2  $4t\lambda$ c2  $4t\lambda$ c2  $d\lambda$ c2  $4t\lambda$ c2  $4t\lambda$ c2  $d\lambda$ c2 27  $d\lambda$ 

The system with 2...e6 has never become popular, even more so a main line. It is too heavy-going for this. The system is for people with strong rerves, not inclined towards showy effect. Such people arrive, sit down, work long and patiently at the board and as a result calmly make a draw with Black.

Is this such a bad thing?

#### ш

## 2...d5!?

A critical continuation for the assessment of the whole Steiner system. Black shows his preparedness to sacrifice a pawn, albeit with various modifications.

3 ed It makes sense to restrict Black's possibilities by 3 cd, since the pawn sacrifice  $3...\Diamond_16$ ?! 4 dc  $\Diamond_{XC6}$  is dubious in this position: 5 d3 es 6 & c2  $\bigotimes_{D6} 7 \oslash_1 3 \&$ c5 8 0  $\odot \oslash_2 g4$ 9  $\bigotimes_1 d_1 0 \bigotimes_2 dd_2 \bigotimes_2 7 11 \bigotimes_{D6} dd$  象b6 12 響c3 0-0 13 h3 ④f6 14 象c3. The activity of Black's pieces is variable but White's extra pawn – constant (Mestel – Ruxton Plymouth 1989).

After 3 ed Black can continue sharp play to take over the initiative – 3... (Af6 (A), but he can also change his mind, returning to the channels of normal, 'correct' play: 3...cd (B).

## А

3....⊘f6!? In this position the sacrifice has more basis. White has two independent paths: 4 ₩a4 and 4 dc. The third continuation - 4 d4 - leads to the Panov Attack.

 4 Wa4!? And here he cannot avoid a fork in the road.



It is not easy to rid himself of the pin on the a4-c8 diagonal. However practice has shown that the appearance of a piece on d7 brings disharmony to the black ranks. For example, 4... $\mathbb{W}d7$  5 dc  $\Phi$ xc6 6  $\Phi$ f3 e5 7 d3, and then:

7...e4!? 8 de  $2 \times 4$  9  $2 \times 3$   $2 \times 5$ 10  $2 \times c5$   $2 \times c5$  11  $2 \times 2$  -0-0 12  $2 \times 3$  $2 \times 4$  13  $2 \times 2$   $2 \times 8$  14 0-0  $2 \times c3$ (Black exploits the possibility to spoil the opponent's pawn structure, however White obtains play on the bfile, while the doubled pawns control the central squares) 15 bc 營g4 16 盒d3 營h5 17 簋ab1 with advantage (Vaulin – Zurek, Pardubice 1994);

7....&c5 8 &c2 0-0 9 ℃c3 ₩f5 10 0-0 &d7 11 ₩c2 Iad8 12 a3 Ife8 13 ℃c4 € xc4 14 de ₩g6 15 &c3 and Black's initiative is coming to an end (Chernyshov – Afek, Pardubice 1998).

4...661? 5 de &c51? Correct! The beginning of a gambit – he cannot stop halfway. The more so that quite frankly the risk is not great. For example, 6 eft &xh7 7 &be2 &g4 – f2 is hanging and White is catastrophically behind in development. Black pulls up his heavy pieces on the e and f-files – and it's the end.

In the game Hubner – Luther (Saarbrucken 2002) White hurried to give all the material back, but still it did not safeguard him against a crushing defeat:



6 213 2124 7 d4 2xd4 8 2xd4 2xd4 9 262 2a6 10 2a3 (10 b3) 2b4 11 26 2c5 10...2x66 11 b3 2b4 12 26 265 10...2x66 11 b3 2b4 12 262 264+ 13 2c2 2722 14 211 2b1 25 272b4 0-0-0 16 2b5 cb 17 2f4, and finally - an attractive combination: 17...2xf1+1 18 2xf1

තිf3+ 19 කe2 තිd4+ 20 කd2 තිc6+ etc.

2) 4 dc 2xc6 5 2f3?! One of those cases where the most popular move is at the same time the weakest.

The normal path -5 d3 e5 6 & &2.2 (but no way 6 &)3?, why - becomes clear later) 6...&15 7 &)13 & d7 8 0-0 0-0-0 9 & wa4 & xd3 10 & xd3 & wxd3 11 & &23 (Selezniev - Bogo]jubox Triberg 1917), and here 11...&3q4 12 & xa7 e4 13 & 2g5 & d6 unleashing a very powerful attack, for example: 14 g3 & w61 5 h & &27 16 & 3 & xh41



In the game Korchnoi – Gat (Zurich 1988) White did not continue his policy to the end, eventually playing 10  $\Omega$ /37! After 10...**Z**d8 11 **w**[el  $\Omega$ <sub>24</sub> 12  $\Omega$ <sub>34</sub> Dl Back missed a forced win: 12...e4! 13 de **E**xd1+! 14 **w**Acl **w**Ac2. 15  $\Delta$ c2 **w**C3+ 16  $\Delta$ cd2  $\infty$ c3.

He should secure himself against the break e5-e4, by playing 10 e4! and only later develop the knight. **5...e5 6 d3 e4!** In this lies the whole business! As distinct from the variation 5 d3 e5 6 & e2, here White has no bishop on e2. Therefore the king is forced to set off on a long (and probably hopeless) journey.

7 de Wxd1+ 8 \$xd1 @xe4 9 \$e3 \$f5 10 @h4 0-0-0+ 11 \$c1 \$e6



Despite the extra pawn, White should be thinking about saving himself. However there does not seem to be any way out:

12 2 d2 2 xd2 13 2 xd2 2 c5 with a future doubling of rooks on the d-file;

12  $\oplus$ 13 &c5 13 &xc5  $\oplus$ xc5 14 &c3  $\oplus$ b4 (striving to get to the weak d3 square) 15  $\oplus$ c1 &15 (gamong other things, threatening mate in two moves: 16... $\bigotimes$ xa2+1 and 17... $\bigotimes$ b3 mate) 16 b3  $\boxplus$ b8 17 &c2  $\boxtimes$ xc2 18  $\bigotimes$ xc2  $\oplus$ bd3+ 19  $\bigotimes$ xd3  $\oplus$ xd3+ 20  $\oiint$ cd2  $\oslash$ xc1  $\clubsuit$ c2  $\boxtimes$ xb1  $\blacksquare$ d3+ etc.

In the game Chandler – Adams (Hastings 1989) White tried to repair his position with the help of 12  $\gtrsim$  c3, but after 12... $\approx$  3 13 bc  $\Rightarrow$  b8!? 14  $\lesssim$  13  $\lesssim$  as anyone would take Black's side.

#### в

3...cd 4 cd 徵xd5 5 ②c3 變d8 In this branch Black does not sacrifice anything and in general plays quietly. 6 d4 ⊘if6 7 ⊘if3 e6 8 &d3 (8 &c4!? leads to a position from the Queen's Gambit Accepted, well known since the time of the Zukertort – Steinitz world championship match of 1886) 8...&e7



This position can be reached from the Panov Attack, Queen's Gambit, Nimzo-Indian defence, the 2 c3 variation against the Sicilian defence and many other opening schemes.

How can White develop his forces? After covering the b4 square against a knight fork, he can set up a battery on the b1-h7 diagonal with his queen on d3 and bishop on c2 (or b1). Black cannot withstand such pressure and will be forced to weaken the pawn cover of his king. The white rooks will occupy the central files, the darksquared bishop – the g5 square, the knight will be established on c5. Such is the disposition.

How does White intend to decide the game in his favour? There are two basic ideas. Either to carry out the break d4-d5 (but only when it is actually effective otherwise the break provokes mass exchanges and a quick draw), or include his pieces in a mating attack. In the last case there are not infrequently sacrifices (most often – the knight on f7). When the opponent has an isolated d-pawn the basic principle of defence is this: with the manoeuvre  $\hat{e}_10^{\circ}$ d-5 or  $\hat{e}_0c^{\circ}$ -bd-d5 Black should blockade the d4 pawn and try to simplify the position as much as possible. Together with this, the 'bad' light-squared bishop should be financhettoed ( $\hat{a}_c$ 8-b7 or  $\hat{a}_c$ 8-d7-c0).

First and foremost White has to decide what will be his next move: 9 &g5 or 9 0-0. One would think what is the difference? The difference is enormous.

Upon 9 **&g5**?? Black easily carries out the unloading manoeuvre €]f6-d5 – providing he finds the right order of moves. But if he does not find it then he will succumb to a devastating attack.

a) 9...0-0? (a superficial move) 10 象c2! ②c6 11 a3! b6 12 變d3 g6 13 h4! a5 14 h5 象a6



15 Wd2?! After 15 We3! (placing in his sights the e6 square) Black cannot save himself.

15... ④xh5? 16 簋xh5! gh, and the very brilliant 17 盒f6!! 盒xf6 18 斷h6 with an unavoidable mate;

15...②g4 16 豐e4 盒xg5 17 豐xg4 盒f6 (there is also no saving himself on the more stubborn 17...h6 18 簋d1 f5 19 饗g3) 18 hg hg 19 盒xg6! fg 20 豐xg6+ 皇g7 21 ④g5 單f6 22 嘼h8+!, again with mate;

15...QudS 16  $\Phi$ xdS ed 17 hg hg (or 17... $\Delta$ xgS 18  $\Phi$ xgS hg 19  $\Delta$ xg61) 18  $\Delta$ xg61 (g (declining the sacrifice does not mean he can withstand the attack: 18... $\Delta$ e8 19  $\Delta$ h7+  $\Phi$ g7 20  $\Delta$ xc7  $\Psi$ xe7 21  $\Phi$ s51  $\Psi$ f6 22  $\Xi$ h5) 19  $\Psi$ e6+  $\Xi$ f7 20  $\Psi$ xg6+  $\Xi$ g7 21  $\Psi$ e6+  $\Xi$ f7 22  $\Xi$ h7 with an uncomplicated win.

We are following the game Vadasz - Sapis (Budapest 1977), given in many opening books. Practically all the so called commentators, 'rush encounter. They only mention that after 15 @d2 @c7 16 hg fg (in no way better is 16.hg? because of 17  $\pounds$ f4 @d8 18  $\pounds$ c5) 17  $\pounds$ b3 Cd8 18 @c3  $\pounds$ c4 19  $\pounds$ scc4 Csc4 20 Cc5 White gained an easy victory. The whole of White's play, beginning with 10  $\pounds$ c2, is acknowledged as exemplary.

However 15  $\mathbb{W}d2$ ?! is essentially inaccurate, after which White might have denied himself a deserved victory. Concretely: what to do after 15... $\mathbb{E}_{x}$  M5??



Analogous to the variation 15 響e3 ②xh5, also here 16 基xh5!? suggests

itself. But then, like a cold shower. follows 16...f6! This is the difference between having the queen on e3 and d2: the e6 square is not in his sights! He cannot completely correct the position - 17 We3 gh 18 Wxe6+ wh8 19 響xc6 fg 20 響h6 簋f7 21 包e5 Ig7. The outcome of the struggle remains unclear. Many commentators mention the move 15...@xh5!, but indicate that it is refuted by 16 g4 \$xg5 17 @xg5 @f6 18 @xh7. In fact this is a false trail; instead of 17 ... 266 stronger is 17... xd4! 18 &d1 (18 &e4 ④b3) 18... 单b7 19 罩h3 f6 20 ②xh7 \$xh7 21 gh g5!, and it is Black who is playing for a win.

However these variations, undoubtedly worthy of attention, are interesting only as corrections in an opening manual. For the theory of the given variation (9...0-0?) there is something more important: after  $10 \& c2! \& c_0 \le 11 a3! b6 12 @ d3 g6$ 13 h4! a5 14 h5 & a6 15 @ e3! Whitedevelops an irresistible attack.

**10 0-0** In the event of 10 a3, a negative side to the early development of the bishop on g5 comes to light – by means of 10...公d5! Black can make favourable exchanges: 11 盒xe7 ②cxc7 12 盒b5+ 盒d7 13 盒xd7+ 響xd7 14 ②e5 ③xc3! 15 bc 鬱d5.

10...0-0 11 Zc1 (with the idea of moving the bishop to b1)



11...b6!? Not hurrying to reveal his plan regarding which knight will blockade the d4 pawn. It is more usual to see Black trying to solve this problem at once.

11...②d5 12 h4!? (Zakharov – Malakhov, Kolontaevo 1997) 12...h6 13 ②xd5 ed 14 盒xe7 蠻xe7, and he would prefer the h-pawn to be on h2;

11... 2064 12 急bi b6 13 a3 20645 14 響d3 g6 (the opponents place their pieces 'according to the book') 15 急h6 混毛 16 公c5 金b7 17 公e4 公xc4 18 響xc4 (Yubishiev - Lovkov, SL.Petersburg 2001) 18... 金f6, and the whole struggle still lies ahead.

**12** Ξe1 Ir is necessary to know how to neutralise the pressure on the c-file − 12 ±xft(2) ±xft 61 3 ±c4 ±b7 14 ⊕xft6+ ₩xft6 15 ±c4 ±ac8 16 ±c3?? The right reaction consists of 16...₩41 17 ±c1 (nothing is offered by 17 ₩b1 because of 17...15 18 ±xc6 ±xc6 ±c6) 17...h61 18 ₩a4 ₩a6 19 ±ce1. It seems that White has

reinforced his position to the utmost but tactics will come to Black's aid.



12....\$b7 13 \$b1 The traditional plan is to play a2-a3, in order to prevent the knight fork, and develop the queen on d3, provoking a weakening of the opponent's king's flank.

13...Ic8 14 a3 g6 15 Wd3 Ie8 (over-protecting the bishop on e7 and preparing the unloading manoeuvre 2)f6-d5) 16 2a2 2d5!



It should be recognised that it is Black who has won the strategical battle. All vulnerable squares are covered and a favourable simplification for him is inevitable. In the game Onischuk – Rogers (Djakarta 1997) play continued 17 & \$x45 (nothing is offered by 17 h4 \$xc3 18 bc @a5 or 17 \$\overline{a}\$ d2 \$\overline{a}\$ uses \$\overline{a}\$ for 17 \$\overline{a}\$ d2 \$\overline{a}\$ uses 19 \$\overline{a}\$ d5 \$\overline{a}\$ \$\overline{a}\$ uses 20\$ \$\overline{a}\$ d5 \$\overline{a}\$ \$\overline{a}\$ uses 20\$ \$\overline{a}\$ d5 \$\overline{a}\$ \$\overline{a}\$ uses 20\$ \$\overline{a}\$ data equal endgame.

The move 9 &g5 nevertheless helps Black put right his defence – giving him a flywheel for exchanges after Df6-d5.

2) 9.04 \$c\$, cc6: 10 a3 0-0 In view of the fact that the d4 pawn is hanging, White is forced to adjust his plan. The deployment of the bishop ong 5 is called off; the bishop goes to e3. The rooks are placed not on e1 and d1, but on d1 and e1. The queen goes to e2, while the light-squared bishop – to a2, in order to control the d5 square and at the first convenient opportunity to assist in the carrying out of d4-d5.

11 ≜e3 b6 12 ₩e2 ≜b7 13 簋fd1 ₩b8!? Freeing the d8 square for the rook and threatening a timely \$\frac{1}{2}16g4. Also worth considering is the more natural 13....\$\frac{1}{2}c8.

14 h3 **Zd8** 15 **Zac1 Zd7** 16 **&b1 W08** 17 **&a2 Zc8** (Black completes the regrouping of his forces and prepares to renew the pressure on the d4 pawn) **18 Zc2**? A flexible move, leaving the opponent in ignorance. First White doubles on the c-file, then concentrates his heavy pieces on the adjacent files, thereby 'speeding up' the break d4-d5.

18...⊙a5 (Black prevents the pawn break, but at the high price of losing control of the e5 square) 19 ⊘e5 (looking in real earnest at the f7 20... <a>2</a> 20... <a>2</a> 20... <a>2</a> <a>2<

In the event of 20... $\bigcirc$ d5?! White obtains a great advantage by 21  $\bigcirc$ xd5 &xd5 22  $\equiv$ xc7  $\equiv$ xc7 23  $\equiv$ xc7  $\cong$ xc7 24 &xd5 ed 25  $\cong$ f3!;

Likewise unsatisfactory is 20...a6? (parrying the threat of 21 b4! and 22 ②b5) in view of 21 d5! ③xd5 22 ③xf7! 查xf7 23 鱼xb6! winning.



21 ᡚxf7! It goes without saying that the sacrifice bears a purely intuitive character; it is not really possible to calculate its consequences in practical play.

21...∞kt7 22 ₩g4! (an extremely unpleasant resource for Black) 22...%d7 (22...∞d5 does not save him because of 23 €2xd5! Exc2 24 Exc2 Exc2 25 ₩xe4 Exb2 26 €2r4 Exc2 27 ₩xe6+ ∞c8 28 ₩xa2 and White is already attacking with extra material) 23 €2xc4!! In this move lies the point of the tactical operation begun on the 21<sup>st</sup> move. Even a rook down White continues to play positionally, improving the positions of his pieces.

23...≣xc2 24 ≣xc2 ≣xc2 25 ₩f5+! ★e8 (25... £f6?) loses because of 26 ±xe6+! ₩xc6 27 €25+) 26 ±xe6 ₩a4 27 €26+! Exploiting the invulnerability of the knight, White transfers it to a more active position.

27... 空d8 (27... 皇xd6 28 響f7+ 空d8 29 皇g5+) 28 包f7+ 空e8 29 包e5!



Threatening 30 & dr7+ winning the queen. In the game Podgaets – Zhuravlev (Leningrad 1971) Black tried to defend himself by 29...&c6, but after 30 de51 the pawn is included in the attack with decisive effect: 30...&b5 31 @f7+ &d8 32 d61 After a few moves Black resigned.

Black also had another possibility at his disposal -29... \$\vert d k\$, but even this would not have saved him: 30 \$\vert d7!, and then:

30...變b3 31 包f7+ 豐xf7 (31...空c7 32 息f4+) 32 豐xf7 含xd7 33 豐f5+ and 34 豐xc2 or

30... 皇c8 31 ②f7+ 畲c7 32 皇xc8 g5 (otherwise 33 皇f4+) 33 皇a6! ②b7 34 釁c4! The Steiner system even today is found in the repertoire of many of the world's leading players. Certainly it cannot be said that they play it absolutely seriously but on the other hand it is also hard to call it an overindulgence.

Such a system is good as a one-off tournament weapon. For example, you have a foreboding (or just simply know), that your opponent, on 1 e4 c6 2 c4, invariably replies 2 ... e5. But you only need to know this - that the Indian scheme will work perfectly for you. Or on the other hand - your opponent has an inclination for 2...d5 3 ed cd 4 cd Wxd5 5 2c3 Wd8, and you like to play positions with an isolated pawn on d4. It is clear that you will not find your next 'Black' opponent unaware that you play the Steiner system - but it doesn't matter. Pack it away ... until the next tournament!

If, however, you are playing Black, then the Steiner system requires one, thing from you: knowledge! The last thing to do is to sit and think at the board, how are you going to react to 1 e4 c 6 2 e4? No, you should be aware beforehand: how you intend to repulse the offensive, what type of position you are prepared to go in for. We hope that the variations presented in this book will help you make a conscious choice.

And then no way will the Steiner be terrible for you.

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# **Illustrative Games**

#### No.1

### M, ADAMS – R. PONOMAREV Sofia 2005

1 e4 c6 2 c4 d5 3 ed cd 4 cd  $\triangle 16$ 5  $\triangle c3$   $\triangle xd5$  6  $\triangle r3$  $\triangle c6$  7 d4  $\triangle g4$ 8  $\forall b3$  & xd5 9 gf e6 The variation 9... $\triangle b6$  has been ousted from grandmaster practice. Forever? We don't know, but already for a few years no one has been keen to risk playing the position after 10 d5!  $\triangle d4$ 11 & b5+! (page 24).

10 響xb7 ②xd4 11 单b5+ ②xb5



12 We6+ The main expert on the present system for Black – grandmaster Alexei Dreev – managed not only to equalise but also to beat White in this supposedly "dull technical endgame". Here is a recent example: 12 響xb5+ 暫d7 13 響xd7+ \$xd7 14 \$xd5 ed 15 \$e3 \$b4+ 16 ge2 a5 (in the theoretical section we were inclined towards the move 16 ... The same Rozentalis -Bologan - page 27) 17 Ehd1 \$e6 18 萬ac1 萬hc8 19 當d3 f6 20 b3 皇d6 21 h3 g5 22 @d2 @b4 23 @e3 @a3 24 耳xc8 耳xc8 25 单b6 单b4 26 a3 ¤c6 27 ≜d8 ≜xa3 28 ≜xa5 ≜c5 29 h4 @xf2 30 b5 Zc4 (Bartel -Dreev, Internet 2004). Objectively the position is unclear (Black has an extra pawn, White has a dangerous passed pawn), subjectively ... Dreev won!

12... @e7 13 曾xb5 曾d7 14 公xd5+ Wxd5 15 Wxd5 The alternative is the intermediate check 15 2g5+ f6, and only now 16 響xd5 ed 17 皇e3. In the encounter Onischuk - Bologan (Poikovsky 2005) Black was easily able to defend himself and in the variation which was previously 17...\$e6 considered dangerous: 18 温g1 ?? (for the idea of this move see page 33). Here Bologan played: 18...g6 19 0-0-0 2b4 20 2d3 Zac8+! 21 金b1 盒c5! (the main defensive resource is to exchange bishops) 22 Ie1 2xe3 23 fe Ic5, and a draw was agreed.

15...ed



16 &c3 An important novely in the variation 16 &ft &ft of 17 0-00 was introduced by Alexi Dreev. Actually, he improved on his own game against Onischuk (page 30). There 17....#d8 was played but it turned out that it was not necessary to defend the d5 pawn! After 17....&c5!? 18 Exd5 & &xt2 19 & bbl Eh8 20 a d #G2 21 Ec1 Ea88 and Black has no difficulties (Sulskis – Dreev, Tallinn 2004).

16...☆e6 17 0-0-0 ☆b4 18 ∄d3 Also this position in included in theory. How it is included, we repeat, is also the main idea of the defence: to strive as much as possible to exchange the bishop e3. On page 30 is the game Franco – Dominguez: 18...∄hd8 19 a3 ∄ac8+! 20 ☆b1 àc5! In the present game Ponomarev demonstrates the same idea only a move earlier:

18... $\Xi hc 8+!$  19  $\Leftrightarrow b1 \& c5!$  (what improvement had Adams thought up?) 20  $\Xi c1 \& b6$  21  $\Xi g1 \& xe3$  22  $\Xi xe3+ \Leftrightarrow f6$  it seems none at all. White's position is in no way better and the English grandmaster quite reasonably forced a draw.

23 Eg4 Ec7 24 Ef4+ &g6 25 Eg4+ &f6 26 Ef4+ &g6 27 Eg4+ Drawn. As we see, justifying the conclusion on page 34: "it is only possible to reckon seriously on an endgame victory after 9...e6 if the opponent is significantly lower rated.".

#### No.2 A. GRISCHUK – E. BAREEV Moscow 2004

**1** 64 65 2 dd d5 3 ed cd 4 c4  $\triangle$  16 5  $\bigcirc$  c3  $\bigcirc$  c6  $\triangle$  g5 dc There is a total overestimation of the value of the present variation. The move 7 d5, the main line for over half a century, has faded into the background. For a clue, as we have already mentioned, we should look into 7... $\bigcirc$  2.5 8 b4 cb 9 ab 2.07! 10 b4  $\equiv$  C8! (page 42).

In return it is improbable that the theory of the move 7 &xe41? will grow at a fast tempo. In reply Evgeny Bareev chose the most principled continuation but, as will be seen from the sequel, it is not quite ready to enter into the debate.

7...管xd4 8 管xd4 包xd4 9 0-0-0 e5 10 f4! 急g4 11 包f3 包xf3 12 gf 急xf3 13 fe 急xh1 14 ef



Here ends the analysis of B. Kantzler (page 37). The evaluation - White's initiative outweighs the

sacrificed material.

14...Ic8 Improbable, but true: this natural move loses by force!

15 Ze1+ "It is important to exclude the possibility of castling by Black". A. Grischuk.

15... 堂d7 16 罩d1+! 鱼d6 Alexander Grischuk presents variations to prove a win for White after 16... 堂e8 17 象d3!:

17....\$t3 18 ≣e1+ \$\phi d7 19 \$\pm f5+ \$\phi c7 20 \$\box e3 \$\pm h1 21 \$\pm f4+ \$\pm d6\$ 22 \$\box e7+ \$\pm c6 23 \$\pm d7+ \$\pm c5\$ 24 \$\pm e3+ \$\pm c4 25 \$\pm c2 \$\pm xc7 26 fe \$\pm c6 27 \$\pm 31!\$

17 2e2! gf 18 2xf6 2g2 19 2e5 2re6 20 2xd6 Ind8 21 2g3 Ixd1+ 22 2xd1 a6 23 2d2 Black's position is very difficult and after the next move – hopeless:



remains for Black. As the self-critical Grischuk himeself acknowledged, he did not conduct the technical part of the game faultlessly – but all the same it was good enough not to allow Black a single moment to hope for a draw.

The funeral of a variation? Not a bit! At the start of 2005 in the prestigious tournament at Wijk aan Zee was played the game Mamedyarov - Smits. Instead of 14...Äc8? Black produced an improvement - 14...h6! And though Mamedyrov played 'à la Grischuk', by depriving Black of castling -15 Zel+ \$d7 16 Zdl+ \$e8, after 17 \$h4 \$\$c8 18 \$e2 g5! 19 \$g3 £e4 20 £g4 Ixc3+ 21 bc £a3+ 22 gd2 h5 chances were mutual. The game was actually won by Smits.

An improvement, but now obviously for White, should be sought in the region of 18 & e.2. The Petersburg grandmaster Sergei Ivanov suggests instead of this 18  $\mathbb{E}$ 1+  $\frac{1}{2}$  d  $\frac{1}{2}$  19  $\frac{1}{2}$  x(7)  $\mathbb{E}$ x(3) + 20 be g 2 1  $\frac{1}{2}$  3  $\frac{1}{2}$  at 2 + 2  $\frac{1}{2}$  2  $\frac{1}{2}$  2  $\frac{1}{2}$  c 2  $\frac{1}{2}$  12  $\frac{1}{2}$  c 2  $\frac{1}{2}$  c 2  $\frac{1}{2}$  2  $\frac{1}{2}$  c 2  $\frac{1}{2}$  c 2  $\frac{1}{2}$  2  $\frac{1}{2}$  c 2  $\frac{1}{2$ 

1 c4 c6 2 e4 d5 3 ed cd 4 d4  $\bigcirc$ f6 5  $\bigcirc$ c3  $\bigcirc$ c6 6  $\bigcirc$ g5 dc 7 %xc4 e6 As we have already mentioned (page 38), this solid move will gain widespread practice if and when the assessment of the complications after 7...嘗xd4 finally proves to be Black's favour.

8 13 267 9 0-0 0-0 10 Ict a6 11 2d3 2d7 12 Ict Ict Not unlike the usual tabiya with the 'isolani', but no one could have forseen the storm...



13 h4!? The most delicate moment! On page 39 was presented the game Ivanchuk - Dreev: 13 a3 2d5 14 h4!? @xc3 15 bc h6 16 @xe7 2xe7, and Black succeeded in defending himself. In what sense does lvanchuk's novelty improve upon his own game? It turns out that if Black goes along the same path as Dreev - 13 ... 2 d5, then he will lose at once and very beautifully! Here is the main variation: 14 @xd5! @xg5 (14...ed 15 Ixc6! 2xg5 16 Ixc8) 15 息xh7+! 當xh7 16 包xg5+ 當h6 (16... 雪g8 17 響h5) 17 響d2! 雪g6 (17...響a5 18 @xf7+ 當g6 19 @e5+ 當h7 20 響xa5 包xa5 21 包xd7) 18 \$14+ \$66 (18 \$66 19 \$e4+ 當e7 20 创d5+! ed 21 響g5+) 19 @gxe6! fe 20 @xe6+ and 21 (D)xd8.

A brilliant idea! However, the Indian grandmaster Harikrishna unravelled it and rendered it harmless. After 13... (2) b4! for a long time the game transferred to quiet positional channels.

14  $\pm$ 01  $\pm$ c6 15  $\oplus$ c5 g6 16  $\pm$ 03  $\oplus$ 045 (possibly Black was playing it safe by rejecting [1. $\pm$ wat4) 17  $\oplus$ xc6 be 18  $\oplus$ 14  $\oplus$ 47 19  $\pm$ g3  $\pm$ xg5 20 hg  $\pm$ 3z 21 b3  $\pm$ 168 22  $\pm$ c4  $\pm$ 02 23  $\pm$ c01  $\pm$ 04  $\pm$ 16 he key moment in the game. Taking on a2 is dangerous – it might lose the queen. But to take... is necessary! After 23... $\pm$ xa2 24  $\pm$ a1  $\pm$ 22 5  $\pm$ 03  $\pm$ 05 26  $\pm$ xa6  $\pm$ 05 he outcome of the struggle is unclear. Now, however, White's advantage



24 오, 431 ed 25 트, 7: 트, 7: 트, 7: 26 월 87 프 1: 월 87 프 1: 월 88 28 프 66 신 89 오, 5: 5: 5: 30 프 1: 6: ed 31 월 87 7: 한 8: 32 프 34 안 8: 33 프 37 월 5: 34 안 3: Black resigned.

#### No.4 L. ARONIAN – M. CARLSEN Tripoli 2004

**1 c4 c6 2 c4 d5 3 cd cd 4 d4 ⊉16** 5 Φc3 g6 6 ₩33 <u>2</u>g7 7 cd 0-0 8 <u>2</u>c2 Φ**b**d7 Let us deepen (see pages 88-89) our knowledge of the position after 8...Φa6 9 <u>2</u>d3 ₩b6 10 ₩xb6 ab 11 Δgc2 Φb4 12 0-0 Ξdd8 13 d6 Ξxd6 14 <u>2</u>d4 <u>2</u>d7 15 <u>3</u>td1 Φjd5!



It is surprising but the main expert in the present system Vladimir Burmakin played it inaccurately! After 16 2xd5 2xd5 17 2e5 he did remove the knight from not exchange, preferring the routine 17... Id8?! There followed 18 &xd5! 重xd5 19 纪c3 重d8 20 鱼xg7 金xg7 21 d5! We looked in detail at this idea on page 89. White has a noticeable advantage and Burmakin did not manage to shake this assessment: 21... ad7 22 ad4 adc8 23 f3 h5 24 a3 金f8 25 菖adl 菖c5 26 菖b4 b5 27 雪f2 etc. (Umbach - Burmakin, Zurich 2004).

Our recommendation also proved correct in the variation 16 2g3 Dxc3 17 bc ac6. We pointed out that after 18 2f4 Ia5 19 h4, Black, without wasting time, should immediately counterattack in the centre: 19 ... e5! In the encounter Popovic - Zelcic (Bosniaci 2005) White wanted to fight for the advantage himself: 18 Idb1 ?? The reaction of the Croatian grandmaster Robert Zelcic was predictable and ... absolutely correct: 18 ... e5! After 19 axc6 bc 20 @xe5 @xe5 21 de Ed2 22 @g3 Idxa2 23 Ixa2 Ixa2 24 h3 b5 already White must redouble his efforts in order not to lose.

9 ≗f3 2b6 10 a4!? A new idea! White forces an advance of the a-pawn in return, but why?

10...a5 11 @ge2 2f5



This position is well known to us (see pages 84-85) but without the inclusion of the moves 10 a4 a5. Let us try to work out what are the pluses and minus in the position for White.

The plus is obvious: the resource Wd8.d7, at one time the main line, in the present position is not possible – the knight is hanging on b6. There is also an obvious defect: in a number of variations the knight is transferred to b4, from where it can no longer be driven away with the move a2-a3. But on the whole... the concrete variations are not so different from those that we looked at on pages 44-85. Here are the key lines:

12 0-0 盒d3! 13 d6 ed 14 盒xb7 罰b8 15 盒f3 ④bd5;

12 2f4 g5! 13 2fe2 g4 14 2g3 2g6 15 2e2 2bxd5;

12 d6!? ed 13 兔xb7 簋b8 14 皇f3 ②bd5 15 彎d1 ②b4.

12 **(a)** But this is already a surprise! By rejecting the shadowing of the knight b6, White also rejects any claim to an opening advantage. Apparently the Armenian grand-

master had missed something in his home laboratory...

12... Dbxd5 13 0-0 @d7 14 Dg3 &e6 15 Dge4 Dxe4 16 Dxe4 b6 The development of forces is practically complete. The black pieces are arranged harmoniously and in prospect is a siege of the d4 pawn.



17  $\bigcirc g_5$  Ead8 18  $\bigcirc xce$  @xce19 Eel @de 20 &g5 &ef 21 @d2 &xg5 22  $@xc5 \bigcirc bd4$  23 Ead1  $\bigcirc c2$ 24 Ee4 @f6 25 @xf6 ef 26 g4 Ead6 27 Ed2  $\bigcirc bd4$  28 Ee7 Efd8 29 Eaf7 &xd4 30 Exd4 Xzd4 31 Exb6  $\bigcirc da3$ 2b 3  $\bigcirc f14$  33 hd Already a draw could be agreed here by repetition of moves: 33 Eb5 Ed3 34  $\&g2 \bigcirc c2+$ 35  $\&cf1 \bigcirc di4$  36 &g1 ec.

36... **kb3** 37 **lb5 la3** 38 as O 24-39 W 22 O c3 40 Lb4 W c4 41 I xe4 Lxa5, and after a few moves the opponents agreed a draw. Obviously a moral victory for the talented Norwegian teenager – you see, he was facing one of the strongest grandmasters in the world!

#### No.5 R. RUCK – A. HORVATH Austria 2005

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 5)f6 5 分c3 e6 6 分f3 In the variation 6 a3 dc 7 \$xc4 \$e7 8 \$f3 0-0 9 0-0 Yudasin's idea 9... 盒d7!? 10 竇e2 \$c6 11 Id1 \$d5 (page 92) was tested in a game between... two computer programs! After 12 2xd5 2xd5 13 2d3 Od7 White played a novelty: 14 De5 (we recall that Topalov against Yudasin played 14 We4 - page 93). The game continued: 14...萬c8 15 署f3 f5 16 皇f4 @xf4 17 響xf4 @xe5 18 響xe5 罩c6 19 盒c4! (19...罩xc4 20 Wxe6+ and 21 Wxc4). White obtained some initiative but Black managed to defend himself ('lsiChess' - 'The Baron', Leiden 2004)

**6...**  $\bigcirc$  **c6 7 c5**  $\bigcirc$  **e7 8**  $\bigcirc$  **b5 0**-**0 9 0**-**0**  $\bigcirc$   $\bigcirc$  **e4 10**  $\bigcirc$  **Te1** On page 99 we recommended 10  $\bigcirc$  **e2** - and continue to support our recommendation. Why spoil one's own pawn structure?

10.... xc3! 11 bc 2d7 12 2f4 b6! 13 cb ab



14 Ie3 Not quite new but in any event not a redundant plan.

Obviously White is playing for mate!

19 e2 ea6 20 ed2 Also now, when White's plan appears to be a failure, two weak moves in a row follow.

20...\#a7?! 21 \h6 \hfpartsh After 21...\#e7 Black would still have nothing to fear (22 \hfpartsh xg7? \hfpartsh xg7 23 \#fn 6(b). But grandmaster Adam Horvath gives his opponent a chance to produce a brilliant (but not complicated) combination:



22 ▲xg7+! Black's mistake is all the more surprising in that White bas another less forcing way to victory: 22 公g4 鱼e7 23 ▲xg7+ 金xg7 24 彎h6+ 金h8 25 公f6 ▲xf6 26 竇xf8 mate.

22... 皇 xg7 23 邕 xg7! 當 xg7 24 響g5+ 當h8 25 響f6+ 當g8 26 包g4

h6 27 ②xh6+ ☆h7 28 ③g4 Black resigned. Grandmaster Robert Ruck conducted this game aggressively – but he hardly managed to shake the conclusions of theory.

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 ⊘f6 5 ⊘c3 e6 6 ⊘f3 ⊥b4 7 cd ⊘xd5 8 ₩c2 ⊘c6 We briefly touch upon the side-lines.

About the dangers of the immediate  $8...0^{-0.21}$  – because of 9  $\pm$ d31 – we have spoken in detail on page 115. Here is a fresh example on this theme:  $8...2_{16}$  fo  $10 \cdot 0 \cdot 2_{16}$  cf 11  $\pm$  2.e3 a6? (Black is already balancing on the edge of a precipice, and in this predicament loses time – an inadmissible luxury) 13  $\pm$ ad1  $\pm$ c7 14  $\pm$ fe1  $\pm$ d7



After 15 d51 there and then Black's position falls apart: 15... $\Delta$ a5 (also bad is 15...ed 16  $\Delta$ xd5!  $\Delta$ xd5 17  $\Delta$ xh7+  $\Delta$ th8 18  $\mathbb{E}$ xd5) 16  $\Delta$ g5 d6 17  $\Delta$ xh7+  $\Delta$ th8 18  $\mathbb{E}$ xd5) 16  $\Delta$ g5 d6 17  $\Delta$ xh7+  $\Delta$ th8 18  $\mathbb{E}$ xd5) 20  $\Delta$ th5+  $\Delta$ th6 21  $\Delta$ xc2  $\Delta$ xh5 22 de  $\Delta$ xc6 23  $\mathbb{E}$ xd6) 19  $\Delta$ xh6 Black resigned

(A.Sokolov - M.Fischer, Lenk 2005). 約7f6 10 0-0 盒d7 11 例xd5 例xd5 12 ④e5 皇d6 13 皇e4, a serious improvement for Black was demonstrated in the game Kharlov -Bachin (Dagomis 2004): 13 ... #c7! In the theoretical section (page 116) we were inclined towards the game Benjamin - Sejrawan, where after 13... 篇c8 14 響b3 盒c6 15 響g3 White held the initiative for a long time. What is the point of 13... Wc7? It all comes down to the fact that the manoeuvre 14 Wb3 2c6 15 Wg3 is now simply impossible in view of 15...f6! Kharlov has to exchange queens, but the endgame after 14 響xc7 盒xc7 can easily be held by Black

9 \$e2 0-0 10 0-0 \$e7 Another popular direction is 10... Ze8 11 Zd1 皇f8 12 響e4 皇d7. Formerly 13 皇g5 (page 128) was played here without any particular thought but in the world championship Michael Adams did without this move: 13 \$d3!? The game continued 13...f5 14 We2 2d6 15 息c4 创xc3 16 bc 创a5 17 皇d3 \$c6 18 篇b1 響c7 19 c4!? (a promising pawn sacrifice) 19 ... \$xf3 20 響xf3 2c6 21 皇e3 盒xh2+ 22 當f1 \$d6 23 c5! \$f8 24 d5! White has already seized the initiative and did not let it out of his hands until the end of the game (Adams - Asrian, Tripoli 2004).

11 Zd1 &f6 The move 11... 2d7?!, rejected as defective by theory, was encountered in the game Adams – Bologan (Internet 2004). It was not rejected because two pawns are hanging after 12  $\triangle x(3)$  ed 13  $\blacksquare b3$ As shown on page 124, after 13... $\triangle e8$  the pawn is 'not worth' taking: 14  $\blacksquare b3$  15  $\blacksquare a6$   $\triangle b4$  $\blacksquare xa7 <math>\blacksquare a5$  18  $\blacksquare 5$   $\blacksquare a6$   $\triangle b4$  $\blacksquare xa7 <math>\blacksquare a5$  18  $\blacksquare 5$   $\blacksquare a6$   $\triangle b4$  $\blacksquare xa7 <math>\blacksquare a5$  18  $\blacksquare 5$   $\blacksquare a6$   $\triangle b4$  $\blacksquare xa7 <math>\blacksquare a5$  18  $\blacksquare 5$   $\blacksquare a6$   $\triangle b4$  $\blacksquare xa7 <math>\blacksquare a5$  18  $\blacksquare 5$   $\blacksquare a6$   $\square b4$  $\blacksquare xa7 <math>\blacksquare a5$  19  $\blacksquare 5$   $\blacksquare a5$  10  $\blacksquare a5$  $\square b4$  18  $\blacksquare a5$  15  $\blacksquare c5$   $\blacksquare c5$  10  $\blacksquare c$ 

12 € 2e4 Previously Adams preferred to attack in another way: 12 ₩e4 €2cc7 13 &d3 g6 14 &h6 ₩e8 15 h4 (about this – see page 125). But for the present game he had prepared a new idea..

12...&e7?! And Black immediately becomes unnerved! Why on 'a level playing field' does he give the opponent two tempi? He should choose between 12...&ce7 and 12...bc.

13 &c4 &d7 14 @cg5 @16 15 @c5The first threat appears (16 @cxf7!?  $\Xixf7$  17 @xe6). However Black's position is quite solid. It is even hard to imagine that the struggle in this game will last only two more moves!

**15...** $\bigcirc$ **b4 16 We2** (a new threat is on the agenda:  $17 \bigcirc xd7$  **W**d7 **W** 



17  $\bigcirc$  ext7?! And it becomes clear that in the variation 17... $\equiv$ x77 18 &xc6  $\ge$ xc6 19  $\boxtimes$ xc6  $\boxtimes$ 78 20  $\bigcirc$ xf7  $\boxtimes$ xf7 the unfortunate rook comes under fire: 21  $\boxtimes$ xc8+. The mistake so demoralised Black that he... immediately resigned. But meanwhile 20.. $\equiv$ c61 (instead of 20.. $\boxtimes$ xf7) still allows White to put up stubborn resistance.

#### No.7 D. SCHNEIDER – M. KUIOVICH Dallas 2004

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 2(f 5 2c2 e6 6 2f3 2b4 7 cd 2xd3 8 2c2 2c6 9 2d3 2a5? 10 a3 2xc3? 11 bc 2xd4 12 2xd4 2xd4 The Gambit variation – one of the most interesting places in the Panov Attack.



13 \$ h5+ \$ d7 Nor does the theoretical discussion end upon the line 13...當e7 14 0-0. Thus, in the game Blauert - Pascal (Budapest 2004) Black took the pawn, which we wrote was 'poisoned' (page 120): 14. mxc3?! However what was Black thinking about this time? It turns out... nothing! After 15 We4 貫d8 16 豐h4+ 含f8 17 豐xh7 it becomes clear that he cannot play 17... 響xal in view of 18 響h8+ 當e7 19 皇g5+ 變f6 20 變xg7! Black waits one move - 17 ... We5. but 18 a4! (threatening the standard inclusion for these positions of the bishop on a3) forces him to reconcile himself to the inevitable: 18 ... wal 19 wh8+ 當e7 20 皇g5+ 響f6 21 響xg7! and soon White won.

In the game N.Kosinsteva – J.Houska (Dresden 2004) Black went along the main road: 14... & 515 a4 &b6. And rightly so – because the novelty 16 & d11? (we looked at only 16 & a34 – page 120) proved harmless: 16... & c5 17 g3 & f5Black has scarcely completed her development – but when all the pieces have entered play she will have chances of realising the extra nawn.

1400 ₩d5 15 c4 ₩f5 16 &xd7+ cxd7 17 ₩b2 lt goes without saying that more natural is 17 ₩b3. Nadezhda Kosintseva demonstrated in this variation yet another novelty in a game against Leila Dzhavachishvili at the Olympiad in Calvia (2004). After 17...b6 she played 18 &b21? (for 18 ℤd1+ \$c7? 19 a4 - sec page 122). And again the novelty did not produce the desired effect. There followed 18..s&c7 19 ¥g3 Ehd8 20 Ead1 &d2 21 a4 &f4 22 ¥xg7 &xh2+! 23 &xh2 m5h5 24 &g3 Exd1 25 Exd1 ¥xd1, and the activity of the remaining white pieces was at best sufficient for a draw.

The retreat of the white queen to b2 looks artificial but there is at least one advantage: it is less studied!

### 17...b6 18 a4



18...6?! After the present game it is necessary to finally place this continuation in the archives. Black has the right to choose between 18...4ad8, 18...4bd8 and 18...4c7, for which detailed information is on pages 122-123.

**21...**@e4 Also losing is 21...ad522 @b5+ ac7 23 @a6! (Ravi – Ramesh, Calcutta 2002), now however the position is ripe for a combination: 22 智b5+ 安c7 23 cb+ ab 24 트ac1+ 字b7 25 皇xb6! 皇xb6 26 a5! 字a8 27 ab 安b8 28 트xd8+ 트xd8 29 豐c5! Black resigned.

The Gambit variation is not completely bad for Black. He has the right to play it, but... only if he has sufficient knowledge. If, however, he does not, then punishment for his lack of application will be quick, and a rout - complete!

#### No.8 I.SOLOMYNOVICH – Z. ZELIC Neum 2005

Illustrative games is a section in which we turn to the experience of established grandmasters. But for the present game we have decided to make an exception. Igor Solomynovich, representing Germany, does not have a high rank (he is 'only' a master), but he conducted this encounter in inspired fashion. And, to the point, he overturned our presentation of the opening variation which previously seemed of hich ealibre for Black.

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4  $\bigcirc$ f6 5  $\bigcirc$ c3 e6 6  $\bigcirc$ f3  $\bigcirc$ c7 7 cd  $\bigcirc$ xd5 8 ec4  $\bigcirc$  9 0  $\bigcirc$ c6 10 E4  $\bigcirc$  recall (see pages 165-166), that accepting the pawn sacrifice – 10  $\bigcirc$ xd5?! ed 11  $\bigcirc$ f03  $\bigcirc$ g4 12  $\bigcirc$ wb7 – e1fectively means signing a peace agreement. This was shown yet again by the game Bachin – Galkin (Dagomis 2004); 12... $\bigcirc$ b4 13  $\bigcirc$ f4 (bearing down on the b8 square, but... not for nog 13... $\bigcirc$ x13 14 gf  $\bigcirc$ xd6/15  $\bigcirc$ g5 a6 16 a3 當b8 17 竇a7 菖a8 18 竇b7 當b8 19 竇a7 Draw.

10...(2xc3) (more reliable is 10...a(6) and then (2cc7) 11 be be 12 (a3) a(b7) 13 he<sup>1</sup> a(b6) It is dangerous to take on hd -13...a(xh)14 (2xh4) = (xh4) 15 = (2c); but perhaps after this game the only narrow path for Black remains the variation 13...a(2x) = 14 + (2yc) a(xc2) = (2xc2) + (2xc2

18 Ead1! Over the course of many years the basis for this variation was considered the game Banas – Ostenstad (it was given on page 171): 18 Eyed &xx4 19 &xc4 Tac8 20 Tac3 Tac8 21 W4 &xr with a comfortable game for Black. However, what is it that changes with the entry into the battle of the queen's rook?

18...**¤**fe8



19 d5!! A great deal and possibly even everything! White advances his central pawn into a fourfold attack. The variations given below prove that lgor Solomynovich's idea is very beautiful and... absolutely correct:

19...ed 20 公xf7! 含xf7 21 罩xe7+! 罩xe7 22 翬xg6+ with an immediate win;

19... \$xd5 20 c4 \$c6 21 \$xg6;

19...豐xd5 20 兔e4 (there is no need for 20 兔xg6 公xg6 21 簋xd5 兔xd5) 20...豐xa2 21 簋a1 豐c4 22 兔xb7;

19... Qxd5 20 c4 ②c3 21 盒xg6 ②xd1 22 盒xf7+ 查h8 23 盒xh5 置g8 (23... ②c3 24 ④f7+ 萤h7 25 變g6 matc) 24 氫xd1, developing a mating attack with equal material on the board.

However, if there is somewhere that Black can count on survival, it should be found precisely in the variation  $19...\Omega_{\rm xd5}$  20 e4  $\Delta_{\rm cd5}$ 21  $\pm$  xg6. Only instead of 21... $\Delta$  xd1 it is necessary to decide on 21...\\$xd1!? or even 21... $\Delta$  xd1 This line remains unclear. However after the move made by Black 19...e5 Solomonynovich completed the picture with two or three energetic brush strokes:

20 ∞he4! ±g7 21 ∞hd6 Ⅲf8 22 ∞hb7 ₩xb7 23 d6 ∞c6 24 ±c4 ≣ad8 25 ∞d5! (rightly rejecting 25 ₩xg6 ∞ha5 26 ±d5 ₩xd5 27 ₩xg7 ± ±xg7 28 ≣xd5 ∞ha4) 25.₩a62 66 ±d 24 27 d7 1 Ξxd7 28 ±xf8 ±xf8 29 Ξxd4! And without waiting for 29...ed 30 ₩84+.

But... it is hard nowadays to think up something genuinely new. It turns 

...yes, you guessed it: 19 d5!! The idea of the Russian grandmaster is even cleaner; the black rook remains on 18, and as a consequence the knight cannot take on d5. There followed 19...420  $\Re$ ft 427 21 &55 &c6 22  $\Im$ e4  $\Re$ ft 5 23  $\Re$ tf 5  $\Im$ tf 5 24 &xft 8+  $\Re$ t8 25  $\Im$ xft 6 &xb5 26  $\Im$ xft 8+  $\Re$ t8 25  $\Re$ tf 6 &xb5 26  $\Im$ xft 8+  $\Re$ t9 d5  $\Re$ t6 &xb5 escond rout in what it seemed was a reliable variation! It looks like the idea 13...&ft 6 will have to placed in the archives...

## No.9 A. SHARIYAZDANOV – V. PETYKHOV Dagomis 2004

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4  $\triangle$ f6 5  $\triangle$ c3 e6 6  $\triangle$ f3  $\triangle$ e7 7 cd  $\triangle$ xd5 8  $\triangle$ d3 0-0 90-0  $\triangle$ c6 f0  $\square$ e1  $\triangle$ ch4?! A second rate move (more details on this – on page 186), but with its own 'spirit'. The combinational storm is now irresistible! 11  $\pounds bl \oplus for 12 \oplus 5 \pounds df$  7 13  $\pounds g5$  ac8 We stop at the position after  $3... \pounds c6$  14 ac3 g6. In the game Podgaets – Novak (a discussion of this is found on page 186) was played 15 af3, while here in the encounter Szabados – Muller (Zurich 1962) White played otherwise: 15  $\pounds h f ac8$ 16 ac3 and after 16...  $\oplus h5$  an excellent opportunity presented itself to carry out a mating combination. Yes, but how will he take on g6, with the knight or the bishop?



"What essentially is the difference, I have to take twice on g6 anyway" -Eugenio Szabados probably thought and he continued 17 @xg6?! hg 18 \$xg6 (reckoning only on 18...fg 19 \d3 mating). There followed the unforeseen 18 ... \$ d6! Still it was good that he found a perpetual check: 19 皇xf7+ 雪xf7 20 罩g7+ 雪f8 21 列xd5 拿xd5 22 豐c2 (the consequences of 'winning' the queen 22 Zd7+ gg8 23 Zxd8 Zaxd8 24 盒g5 當f7 are completely unclear) 22... e4! 23 Ig3+ af7 24 Ig7+ \$18 25 \$\$ g3+ etc. While here, in the event of the correct order of moves 17 \$xg6! hg 18 \$xg6!, White would have, after 18 ... \$ d6, a worthy reply:

19 ②e5+ ('discovered check' and at the same time 'covering over'!) 19... 金h7 20 ③xf7 盒xg3 (20...豐e7 21 篇g7 mate) 21 斷d3+ 查g8 22 豐g6 mate.

Why are we discussing in such detail this old and forgotten game? Because in 2004 grandmaster Andrei Shariyzhdanov had to solve the same problem as master Eugenio Szabados had to – in 1962!

14 프e3 g6 15 프g3 오c6 16 오h6 프e8 17 a3 ②bd5



18 &xg61 And Shariyzhdanov coped excellently with the task. It is superfluous to recall that in the event of 18 &xg671 lg 19 &xg6 White again has to look for a draw – 19...&d61 It is very surprising that this mistake... is also the same as an old example from practice? &xf17&xf7 21 &g71 + &f8 22 &xd5 &xd523 &d3 &c4 24 &g24 + &f7 25 &g74, draw (Filip - Pogats, Budapest 1961).

**18...hg 19**  $\partial x$ **g6 fg** (repetition - is the mother of teaching and that is why once again we point out the mate after 19... $\Delta d6$ : 20  $\partial c5$ +  $\Delta h7$ 21  $\partial x$ (A7)  $\Delta x$ (B3) - 21...W(F7) 22 E(B7) mate - 22 W(B3) +  $\Delta g8$  23 W(B7) mate 20 W(B3) it was still not too late to

make a mistake: 20 萬來6+? 傘わ7 21 豐d3 令xc3 22 萬g7+ 傘h8! (22...金xh6 23 豐g6 mate) 23 bc 嘉虔8 24 豐g6 兔c4 25 豐f7 豐f8. However after the correct 20 釁d3! Black would be left with nothing else than immediate surrender.

#### No.10 V. POTKIN – A. GALKIN Dagomis 2004

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 466 5 @ c3 e6 6 @ f3 & e7 7 cd @ xd5 8 \$ d3 \$\c6 9 0-0 0-0 10 Hel \$ f6 11 a3 b6 12 2g5 Another path continues to enjoy popularity -12 2c2 2b7 (more concrete is 12... \$ a6; in order to avoid this move White again chooses 12 2g5 - with the aim of 'waiting' until the bishop develops to b7) 13 Wd3. In the game Sedina - I.Vasilevich from the European women's championship (Kishinev 2005) Black fell into a well-known trap; 13... \$\$ c8? 14 d5! ed 15 \$25 g6 (no better is 15 ... De4 16 ②xe4 de 17 響xe4 g6 18 盒h6 里e8 19 Jadl Wc7 20 2b3) 16 Jxe7! @xe7 (16... @xe7 17 @xd5 @xd5 18 &xe7 @cxe7 19 \$b3) 17 \$xf6 and in the end she lost - on page 194 we forewarned that there could be nothing else.

But in the game Srivachiranot – Tan Lian An (Singapore 2004) the opponents decided to test a long theoretical variation 13...g6 14 &h6 Ev8 15 Ead1 Ev8 16 &h3 &ha5 17 &a2 &h35 18 &he4 &h6 19 &he5 &d5.



On page 199 we presented a game that was important for the assessment of the whole system with 10...20fo and 12...&b7, Lechtivara – Gheorghiu, in which White sacrificed a piece: 20 eXr71? dxr7 21 @es+ &g8 22 £0xg6, but after 22...&d6! was not able to obtain compensation sufficient even for a draw.

In Singapore we were able to find an improvement: 20 &xd5!? Øxd5, and only now 21 & %x7!? Øxd7 22 &be5+ &g8 23 &xg6. The idea is clear: on 23...&d6 follows 24 Tae4! (there is no bishop on d5, guarding the e4 square).

But White had not reckoned on something. And namely: 23...&gs? (as occurred in the game), and once again the attack was not worth the sacrificed piece: 24 Qe7+ We7- $25 \text{ Wg}3 \text{ wh}8 26 \&_{2}\text{ sg}5 \text{ Wg}7-27 \text{ Wh}4$  $\Xi g8 28 \text{ Esc}5 \text{ Erf8}$  etc.



19 €2x17!? A novelty – or perhaps it is more correct to say that a bomb has exploded close to the black king! After this game the theory of the variation (inclined towards variations of the type 19 @g3 @d6 20 @h3 &xg5 21 &xg5 f5!) has to be completely rewritten.

**19...☆x17 20 Zxc6!** Threatening **21 Zxg6!** mating, while taking the because of mate: 20...☆xc6 21 **₩h3+ ☆f6** 22 **▲b3! ▲f8** 23 **₩h4+ ☆f5 24 ₩f1** mate or 20...**20k** 21 **cb ₫xc6 22 ₩h3+ ☆f6** 23 **▲bh3 ▲d5** 24 **₩f1** mate.

23... 술d8 24 互e1 ④e7 25 互e6 管d5 But here it is is difficult to understand the rejection of 25... 資a3. The threat is 26... 盒d5, while on 26 互xf6 響a1+ 27 管f1 警xa4 Black is close to a drawing haven. 26  $\forall x d5 + \partial_x d5 27 \ d d + White is$ still playing for a win... Objectively itis worthwhile for him to switch overto a struggle for a draw (in the samplevariation 27 c4 <math>&c7  $- 27...\partialc$ 32 28  $\exists$ c8+ &c7 29 &r4+ -28 cd &xd5). However the game also finished this way - in a draw after 27...&c7 28  $\exists$ d7+ &c8 29 cd  $\partial$ c3 30  $\exists$ f7 &xa4 31  $\exists$ sf & d 42  $\exists$ 27 a 53 33 &f4  $\partial$ c3 34 &c5 b5 35 f3 &f5 36  $\exists$ c8+ &b7 37  $\exists$ f7+ But it must be said that White achieved this result with quite a large slice of luck.

However that may be, the idea 19  $\bigotimes_X f7!? \bigstar_X f7$  20  $\Xi x e6!$  is very strong and probably wins. The wait to confirm this hypothesis, we think, will not be very long...

#### No.11 B. MACIEJA – L. DOMINGUEZ Bermuda 2005

**1** e4 c6 2 c4 d5 3 cd cd 4 ed In the theoretical section (pages 250-251) we paid attention to the capture on d5 with the queen. Now however we try to systematise grandmaster experience from 2004-2005 in the most popular development -4...c516

 $\frac{1}{2}$   $\frac{1}{4}$   $\frac{1}{2}$  Black has a simpler task in the event of 5  $\pm$  55+. Here is an example from a recent Olympiad: 5... $\frac{1}{2}$  bd7 6  $\frac{1}{2}$  cd3 a 6 7  $\frac{1}{2}$  ed2 b5 8 d4 b4  $\frac{1}{2}$  a4  $\frac{1}{2}$  cd3 a 6 7  $\frac{1}{2}$  ed2 b5 8 d4 b4  $\frac{1}{2}$  a4  $\frac{1}{2}$  cd3  $\frac{1}{2}$  bd4  $\frac{1}{2}$  ed2 b5 8 d4 b4  $\frac{1}{2}$  a4  $\frac{1}{2}$  cd3  $\frac{1}{2}$  bd4  $\frac{1}{2}$  ed2 b5 8 d4 b4  $\frac{1}{2}$  cd3  $\frac{1}{2}$  bd4  $\frac{1}{2}$  ed2 b5 8 d4 b4  $\frac{1}{2}$  a4  $\frac{1}{2}$  cd3  $\frac{1}{2}$  bd4  $\frac{1}{2}$  ed2 b5 8 d4 b4  $\frac{1}{2}$  ed2 b4 6 d

5...Dbd7 6 Dc3 g6 7 Df3 &g7 8 &c4 0-0 9 d3 a6 Georgian grandmasters treat this position in their own way. They do not advance the a and b-pawns, preferring free piece development: 9...Db6 10 Wb3 &g4. Here are just two examples:

11 20:5 ¥c7 12 20:84 20:84 13 h3 ¥c5+ 14 20:2 20:6 15 24 ¥f5 16 g4 ¥d7 17 20:3 h5 18 f3 Ead8 19 20:5 ¥c8 (Jones – Izoria, Warsaw 2005) or

11  $\Omega_05!$ ? (a modern idea; we shall return to it again) 11... $\mathbb{R}$ 8 12  $\Delta_{05}4$   $\Omega_{cc}4$  16 13  $\Omega_0c4$   $\Omega_{cc}4$  14  $\Omega_{cc}4$   $\Delta_{cc}4$  15 dc  $\mathbb{W}_{35}+$  16  $\Omega_{cd}2$  c6 17 dc  $\Delta_{cc}6$  18 0-0  $\mathbb{R}_{cd}8$  19  $\mathbb{R}_{cd}1$  b6 (Gagunashvili Kacheishvili, Dubai 2005), in both cases with full rights for Black.

**10** main **b6** Also here, possible is 10...C **b6**. After 11 mbi the difference from the variation just looked at lies in the fact that the black pawn is on a6 and not on a7.

The game Naer - Erenburg (Ashdod 2004) developed in an extraordinarily interesting way: 11....\$f5 12 0-0 Wc7 13 \$g5 \$xc4 14 dc ad3 (Black obviously thought that he had outcalculated his opponent, but far from it ... ) 15 d6! It is not good to take the pawn: 15 ... ed 16 @xf6 @xf1 (16...@xf6 17 @d5) 17 例d5 竇xc4 18 簋xf1 竇xh3 19 ah \$xf6 20 \$)xf6+ etc. There is also no relief in 15 ... Wxc4 16 de #fe8 17 罩fel 響xb3 18 ab 全f5 (with the aim of closing the e-file to the e6 square), and White had a pleasant choice between 19 axf6 axf6 20 Gd5 @xb2 21 單a2 皇e6 22 Ge7 and the surprising 19 心b5!? ab 20 茑xa8 茑xa8 21 皇xf6 茑e8 22 皇xg7 室xg7 23 公d4.

However in the game followed 15... which is a first state of a first st

11 0-0 2b7 12 Ze1 Ze8 The most 'hot-headed' in today's tabiya of the Steiner System.



13 Og51? It is precisely this idea that revives interest in the position. Taking in his sights the fT square, White intends to go for favourable complications with the advance of the dpawn. Formerly the lifeless 13 Ag5was played, and Black equalised without difficulty: 13...b5 14 Ab3Ob6 etc.

13...b5 The most popular, but hardly the strongest continuation. Perhaps theoretical investigations will sweep to the side of one of the two following continuations:

13...h6 14 2)ge4 2)e5 15 2)f4 2)h5 16 2)xe5 2)xe5 17 Zad1 2)e7 18 g3 Zad8 19 2)b3 2)f6 20 d4 2)d6 21 2)xd6 2)xd6 2)2 2)xd6 Zad6 23 Ze5 2)g4 24 Ze4 2)f6 25 Ze5 14 &b3 &bb6 Black played enterprisingly in the game Naer – Mittelman (Ashdod 2004): 14..h6 15 &pe4 &pxe4 16 de @e5 17  $\blacksquare$ d1 @e7 18 d6 ed 19 &xd6 &xd422 &xd4 &pc4. Accepting the piece sortifier – 23 &xe4 &xd4 21 = ispointless in view of 24.. $\equiv$ cxe4! 25 fe &d4+ 26 &rf1 & xb6. In reply White.. hinself sacrifices: 23 &xh61&pxh6 24 &pd6 &xh6 25 <math>&xt7+&r826 &xe8, possibly achieving some advantage.

15 d6 e6 16 ©ge4 ⊙te4 Two rounds later the Cuban grandmaster Lenier Dominguez tried to improve on his own play: 16...©bd7 17 čxtř6-12xf6 18 @b4.cc6 19 åg5 h6 20 å.h4 g5 21 åg3 @b6 22 Če4 %h5 23 Jac1 ©xg3 24 ôxg3 Je64 But after 25 h4 åæ8 26 hg hg 27 ∰g4! he again suffered defeat (Harkrishna – Dominguez, Bermuda 2005).

17 <sup>(2)</sup>xe4 <sup>(2)</sup>xe4 18 de <sup>(2)</sup>xe5 19 <sup>[2]</sup>d1! The forcing stage of the game is at an end. White has two bishops and a far advanced passed pawn in the centre; Black can reckon only on a blockade. Obviously White's chances are superior. 19...₩h4 20 g3 (it goes without saying that the variation 20 f4 &xf4 21 g3 &xg3 22 hg Wxg3+ cannot suit White) 20...₩xc4 21 &c3 δd7 22 Ed2 Ed8 23 Ead1 ©16 An incomprehensible decision. Black voluntarily removes the blockade from the d7 square, allowing the enemy queen to c7 – in whose name? 23...Edc8 looks simpler and more natural.

24 d7! ₩b7 A loss of tempo, but also in the event of 24...₩c6 25 ₩c7 White's attack can hardly be stopped. You see, there is the deadly threat of 26 ¤d6! &xd6 27 ₩xf6 £t8 & &d4 or 27...£c5 28 ≣c1.

25 @e7 @c6 26 &g5 As before, 26  $\Xid61$  looks strong (and if 26...@f3, then he has the choice of 27  $\Xi xa6!$  or 27 & xe6!). But White finds another, no less convincing way to victory.

**26... 逆73** Allowing a simple tailpiece. However in any event there was no salvation, for example, 26... **堂7** 27 **三**62 (but not 27 f4 **世b**64 28 **@2 ④g8**) 27...**④c4** (27...**④g8** 28 **@x68**(!) 28 **三x6**4 (**27**...**④g8 @f**3 30 **三ā**3!



27... ④e4 28 单d5 ④xg5 29 響xg5 单f6 30 单xf3 单xg5 31 单xa8 单xd2 32 罩xd2) **28 트d3** Black resigned.

### No.12 ZHANG ZHONG – AI. KHARITONOV Moscow 2004

1 e4 c6 2 c4 d5 3 cd cd 4 ed 2₁6 5 2₂c3 2₂xd5 Simplest. Although also quite possible is 5...g6 6 2₂c4 2₂g7 7 2₂gc2 0-0, putting off the capture of the d5 pawn 'until later'. After 8 0-0 the following games are interesting:

8...b6 9 d3 \$\overline{b}\$1 10 \$\overline{\overline{b}\$1} \overline{\overline{b}\$3 \$\overline{b}\$1} 4 \$\overline{b}\$1 \$\overline{b}\$1 \$\overline{b}\$3 \$\overline{b}\$2 \$\overline{b}\$3 \$\overli

8... ©bd7 9 ©lf4 g5 10 ©lf2 ©b6 11 d3 h6 12 ₩b3 @l5 13 @c3 @g6 14 a4 @g4 15 h3 @c5 16 Ifd1 Ifd8 (Zhang Zhong - Volkov, Internet 2004). In both cases Black quite quickly grabbed the initiative.

6 Φ17 Φ266 7 Δ155 66 8 0-0 Δ27 9 d4 0-0 10 Zel This rook is also placed on d1 – without particular effect. For example, 10 We2 Δd7 11 Zd1 Zes 12 Δd2 Zes 13 Δd3 Φcb4 14 Δb1 Φ16 15 Φc5 Δc6 16 a3 Φ2bd5 (Damijanovic – Dreev, Alboks 2005).

The position after 10 **Z**e1 is quite popular – but it is hard to understand the reason for this popularity. In the final account it all comes down to the isolated pawn type of position (which we looked at in detail in the theoretical section of the Panov Attack), but with one reservation: White, having spent time on moves with the light-squared bishop (\$flb5-d3), cannot lay claim to an advantage!



10...&d7 Also played here is 10...&d7 Also played here is 10...&d611 a3  $\Xi$ d8 - the character of the struggle in each case remaining constant. Black successfully directs his play against the isolated pawn. For example: 12 &d3 &d61  $\exists$  &d2 bd6 14 &c2 &d57 15  $\Xi$ ad1 h6 16 &b1 &f8 (Miezis - Dreev, Reykjavik 2004).

The only defect of 10...&d7 in comparison with 10...@d6 is the fact that now White can if he wants simplify the game: 11 & 2xd5 ed. A draw is practically inevitable – but the Chinese grandmaster, as will be seen from the future play, was not in the least bit in the mood for a draw...

11 \$\\$d3 \$\Delta\$ 12 \$\\$a\$ 13 \$\\$c\$ 13 \$\\$c\$ 21 \$\\$h\$ the old encounter Gligoric - Pomar the old encounter Gligoric - Pomar 10 \$\\$k\$ 13 \$\\$c\$ 14 \$\\$d3 \$\\$d5 15 \$\\$a\$ 24 \$\\$b\$ 15 \$\\$a\$ 24 \$\\$b\$ 15 \$\\$a\$ 24 \$\\$b\$ 15 \$\\$a\$ 24 \$\\$b\$ 16 \$\\$a\$ 14 \$\\$d3 \$\\$d5 18 \$\\$D\$ \$\\$c\$ 24 \$\\$d\$ 18 \$\\$D\$ \$\\$d\$ 24 \$\\$d\$ 19 \$\$\\$d\$ 26 \$\\$t\$ 19 \$\$\\$d\$ 26 \$\$\\$d\$ 11 \$\\$d\$ 27 \$\\$d\$ 11 \$\\$d\$ 12 \$\\$d\$ 27 \$\\$d\$ 12 \$\\$d\$

Aleksander Kharitonov, in order not to waste time for nothing, thought of an economical and very functional way of arranging his pieces. The queen goes to a5, the king's rook – to d8, at the same time allowing the bishop to e8. And the pressure on the d4 pawn becomes very perceptible.

13... \vert a\_3 and a\_



19...\Delta xd4!? Certainly Black can build up the pressure - 19...\Delta cd8 or 19...\Delta d8; but commendably Kharitonov wants to bring clarity to the position - albeit at the cost of the queen!

20 20xd4 Exd4 21 2e3 Exd1?? The alternative is 21...2c5 22 2xd4 2xd4, again with full compensation for the sacrificed material.

22 2x16 Exc1+ 23 Wxc1 ab How to assess the present position? In return for the queen Black has a rook, bishop and pawn – which just about represents material equality. Plus the two bishops, in an open position, which are waiting for a cause to show themselves. Possibly White should have shown more caution and started peace negotiations But Zhang Zhong continues to look for a non-existent win:

24  $\pm$  a2  $\Xi$ d8 25 b4  $\pm$ c6 26  $\pm$ b3 b5 27  $\frac{1}{96}$ c2  $\Xi$ d4 28  $\pm$ xb5  $\Xi$ c4 29  $\frac{1}{961}$  $\Xi$ h4 30  $\pm$ c4  $\pm$ c4 d3  $\frac{1}{962}$   $\pm$ c6 Discovering a vulnerable link in the pawn cover of the enemy king – the t2 pawn. With the same objective, also worth considering is 31... $\pm$ d8.

32 We3 &g5 33  $\textcircled{W}b6 \\ \bigcirc$ g2; (by now Black will not agree to a draw) 34 fg  $\boxplus$ xc4 35  $\\ \bigcirc$ d26  $\blacksquare$ c2 36 Wc7A tragic loss of time. Despite the apparent danger he should play 36  $\\ \bigcirc$ xb7  $\boxplus$ xg2+ 37  $\\ \oiintf1 \\ \blacksquare$ c2 38  $\\ \bigcirc$ c5, and Black does not succeed in creating mating threats. Now, however, in a single moment White's position caves in:

36... ↓ 27 ↔ 2 ≡ xg2+ 38 ↔ h3 Ξ(2 39 ₩d8+ Already here 39 € xb7 is too late: 39... ↓ 2g ≤ 2 ↔ 40 ↔ g4 (40 ↔ h2 ↓ xb7+) 40... Ξ(1! 41 ₩c8+ ↓ 2g ← 24 ₩c3+ f6 43 ₩xc3 h5+ 44 ☆ h4 Ξh1 mate.

Possibly White should have shown h5 42 @b5 g5 43 g4 hg+ 44 @g3 f5



A beautiful position! White can hope only for perpetual check, but the opportunity never arises. Gaining a respite after a series of checks, Black pushes on his pawns. Then this procedure is repeated again and again – until White acknowledges defeat...

45 @d7+ &dr6 46 @d8+ &dc547 @c7+ &dc4 48 @b6+ &d349 @xc6 II6+ 50 &dz2 f4 (pawnpush!) 51 @b3+ &dc4 52 @b2+ &dc553 @b3+ &dc6 54 @d3+ &dc753 @c4+ &db5 56 @b5 II2+ 57 &h1g3 (second push!) 58 @c5+ &dc859 @c8+ &dc7 60 @c7+ &dc661 @d8+ &dc7 60 @c7+ &dc661 @d8+ &dc5 62 @d5+ &dc4 63@d1+ &dx3 64 @a1+ IIa2 Whiteresigned.

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